William Wirt Adams. As part of the Vicksburg army watching the Mississippi River crossings, Colonel Adams and his cavalry regiment were called east from along the river to intercept Grierson. His departure left Grant easy access to landing spots on the east bank of the Mississippi. Photographic History of the Civil War
Off in distant Tennessee, meanwhile, Johnston remained out of touch with what was unfolding on the ground in Mississippi. “I am sorry that you did not sooner report raid in Southern Mississippi,” he wrote his subordinate. An incredulous Pemberton responded, “This expression of your regret may seem to imply censure, which I feel is undeserved.” He reminded Johnston that he had informed the theater commander of the raid nine days earlier, on April 20.15
Pemberton believed the major threat posed by Grierson was his ability to move into the rear of his Vicksburg army. He informed Gen. John Bowen at Grand Gulf on April 27 of this threat and made a special effort to reinforce the garrison guarding the Big Black River railroad bridge east of Vicksburg, which he believed was Grierson’s next target. “A guard of a company should be kept at each end of this bridge and trestle work,” he ordered, though it was unclear what he expected a company or two could do against a large force of veteran cavalry with artillery.16
Pemberton continued working the wires during the final days of April, sending a flurry of messages to small unit commanders (including captains and majors) to move to the scene of the raid, “harassing his rear and flank.” By this time, two main contingents of cavalry were on Grierson’s trail. One was Wirt Adams’s Mississippi cavalry regiment, which included companies of Alabamians. Adams had been deployed south of Vicksburg with John Bowen before his command was broken up to cover more territory along the Mississippi River to better prevent a surprise crossing. When a new threat appeared from the east in the form of the Federal raiders, Pemberton ordered Bowen to “collect Wirt Adams’ cavalry and send them out to meet the enemy. . . . Follow them up without delay. Annoy and ambush them if possible.” An incredulous Bowen did as ordered, even though stripping away Adams’s cavalry uncovered the river crossings Grant was even then threatening. Adams gathered his scattered companies and concentrated his command near Fayette, between Vicksburg and Natchez, with a view to moving east to meet Grierson. Adams already had a contingent of two cavalry companies under Capt. S. B. Cleveland farther east around Union Church, which had ridden there from Natchez. The companies waited around the small hamlet in Jefferson County for the balance of the command to arrive.17
A second force under Col. Robert V. Richardson gathered in Jackson. Richardson, who led the 1st Tennessee Partisan Rangers, was an odd choice to lead the effort. Just a few days earlier, Pemberton and Johnston had sought his arrest for illegal partisan conscription activity. As a result, he was no longer with his Tennessee unit because he had traveled to Pemberton’s headquarters in Jackson. Richardson had fought Grierson in Tennessee, and since Pemberton was short of riders and experienced officers, he tasked him with catching the elusive Federals. Richardson, however, only had available a few companies of Maj. Walter A. Rorer’s newly mounted 20th Mississippi Infantry. Pemberton had ordered the Magnolia troops mounted and told the regiment’s colonel, William N. Brown, that he should “take command of [the] cavalry.” Despite Pemberton’s efforts, only Major Rorer’s small and uninspired battalion received mounts. The major later confided to a cousin, “At first I disliked very much to be mounted, but after being mounted awhile, I liked the service much better than infantry.”18
Robert V. Richardson. Although under legal trouble, Colonel Robert V. Richardson was available and thus placed in command of the effort to capture Grierson in south Mississippi. Photographic History of the Civil War
Moving south from Jackson by train on April 28 was more difficult than anyone expected. Colonel Richardson arrived at the Jackson station, “supposing the train of troops to accompany me was ready to start.” Instead, he discovered the Mississippians were only then just beginning the loading process. The effort consumed several precious hours. The clock was approaching three in the morning before everyone was aboard and ready to move. The fiasco continued when someone realized the conductor had gone to bed “at his chamber.” The aggravated colonel sent word for the conductor to get out of bed and conduct the train or “I would send for him a file of men.” The conductor did as instructed, but after consulting with the engineer, he protested that too many cars were on the train and the locomotive could not pull such a load. Three cars were uncoupled, but the engineer and conductor discovered another problem: There was not enough wood aboard to make it to the next station, and no lamps were available for night travel. “These men [the conductor and engineer] were churlish, and seemed to be laboring to defeat as far as possible the movement of troops,” complained an aggravated Richardson. “They claim their privilege of exemption from military service as employees of the railroad company. It should not be granted to men who are so unmindful of the public interests.” Axes were distributed so the men could cut wood, but it was daybreak by the time the train finally departed.19
The train lumbered south toward Hazlehurst, where word reached Richardson that “1,000 Yankees were within a quarter of a mile of the place, approaching it.” Grierson had already passed through hours earlier and was well west of the railroad, but Richardson had no way of knowing that. He rightfully ordered the train to stop and back up. A scout left the train and returned a short time later with the welcome report that there were no Federals in the area. The train continued to Hazlehurst, where Richardson found out the latest on Grierson’s whereabouts.20
While Richardson fumed over transportation issues, Pemberton continued to fixate on catching Grierson—to the aggravation of his division commanders, particularly John Bowen at Grand Gulf. Bowen, an outstanding and alert commander, knew he was facing the largest threat confronting Vicksburg and informed Pemberton as much. “Reports indicate an immense force opposite me,” he wrote on April 28. “Harrison is fighting them now.” Pemberton’s reply revealed his mind-set: “Have you force enough to hold your position? If not, give me the smallest additional force with which you can. My small cavalry force necessitates the use of infantry to protect important points.”21
***
The commotion within the Confederate ranks redounded to the benefit of Grierson’s troopers. While Adams concentrated his command and Richardson struggled to squeeze some efficiency out of the railroad, the Illinois riders moved against but little Confederate resistance.
The Federal cavalrymen awoke southwest of Gallatin on the morning of April 28 ready to continue their ride. Grierson had his troopers in the saddle by 6:00 a.m. and, with the 6th Illinois Cavalry in advance, rode southwest toward the small Jefferson County hamlet of Union Church. By 2:00 p.m. the column had made nearly 20 miles since leaving their camp at Thompson’s plantation along Bayou Pierre and crossed into the first tier of counties lining the Mississippi River. Grierson stopped to feed his men and mounts about two miles northeast of Union Church on the modest plantation along Hurricane Creek owned by Adam C. Snyder. The native 47-year-old New Yorker had five slaves and a net worth of $6,875, his real estate accounting for most of the wealth. He also had provisions, which the troopers and horses desperately needed.22
Snyder’s was not the only plantation in the area visited by the raiders. Grierson’s horses and mules were close to breaking down, and their Northern owners had little choice but to exchange them for stock found on almost every plantation and farm they encountered. Former slaves provided statements after the war for the Southern Claims Commission about what they witnessed when Grierson and his men made their appearance. According to one slave near Union Church:
A large lot of the Yankee soldiers who were riding horses and mules came to Mrs. McLean’s place and some of them rode through our front yard and there into the side gate of the pasture where we kept our horses and mules, and took them off with them. I was on the edge of the woods—and had a plain view of the pasture
where I first heard that the Yankees were coming. I went out towards the woods—I was afraid that they would harm me—and I watched them I stopped in the woods all night—some of them stopped at the place and in the house all night—and some of them down to Union Church. When they left the next day they took off the mules—they left one broken down horse he died shortly afterwards we never worked him.23
Others slaves left similar accounts. “A large lot of Yankee soldiers came to our place and stopped in the road,” one remembered, “and a lot of the soldiers went into the field where the hands were ploughing and bedding up land for corn and told them to stop their work and get the mules out—they did so and they put their saddles upon them, that they took off from the horses and mules that they were riding. They rode them off and led off the stock that they took the saddles off from.” Another slave indicated, “The soldiers rode by the house between 10 and 11 o’clock—they were driving a large lot of horses and mules with them. They got our stock out of the field where they were ploughing.” Still another recalled, “I had been down to the horse lot and had just fed the stock and was on the point of returning when my attention was called to a body of cavalrymen who were coming up the road. They rode up to where I was and on by. Some of them in the mean time,” he continued, “stopped and went into the horse pasture they opened the big gate as they went in, they caught the two mules that were in the lot and a blaze-faced sorrel horse changed their saddle and bridles from some worn out mules that they were riding to Mr. Cato’s and immediately rode out and joined the main body.”24
Grierson contemplated his next move now that he was in the eastern reaches of a county bordering the Mississippi River. He knew the Confederates would have significantly more resources along the waterway watching for Grant than they had chasing the raiders, regardless of the diversion’s effectiveness. The Federals were within a box of strong Confederate garrisons, with Vicksburg to the north, Port Hudson to the south, the Mississippi River to the west, and the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad to the east. Confederate troops could be quickly concentrated against him either by river or, more likely, railroad. It is no wonder he later wrote, “After leaving Hazlehurst, the greatest generalship [and] the utmost care and vigilance was necessary for the safety of my command.”25
Because of the threat posed by the railroad, Grierson decided to send yet another detachment east to inflict additional damage to the line. After counseling with his officers on the road to Snyder’s plantation, he dispatched a battalion of the 7th Illinois Cavalry under Capt. George W. Trafton, along with Surby and another scout, east to Bahala (modern-day Wesson), just 10 miles south of Hazlehurst, to break the line once more and disrupt communications. Trafton, a man Adjutant Woodward described as “an officer of extraordinary good judgment and nerve,” had orders to destroy any other government supplies he ran across.” Trafton’s detachment would damage the railroad as well as a coal-firing operation, a steam engine for pumping water and powering a sawmill, and water tanks. “We chopped down some trestle work, [and] burnt up the tank & some machinery belonging to the Confederates,” related one of the Illinoisans.26
While Trafton’s troopers performed their duties, which included the capture of a Port Hudson officer who worked on Gen. Frank Gardner’s staff, Grierson remained at Snyder’s plantation. While he and his men were resting there, Captain Cleveland’s two companies of Wirt Adams’s Mississippi cavalry appeared from the southwest between Grierson’s men and Union Church.27 “While feeding,” Grierson reported, “our pickets were fired upon by a considerable force.” The colonel immediately turned out both regiments (minus the battalion with Trafton at Bahala) and moved forward, skirmishing with the Confederate horsemen. It did not take Grierson long to discover that he was not facing ill-trained state militia but veteran Mississippi cavalry. What he did not know was that he was only facing two companies and that many more, complete with mountain howitzers, were on the way under Colonel Adams himself. This was the first serious Confederate resistance faced by the main column, Hatch’s diversion excluded, since Grierson had passed through the New Albany-Pontotoc area nine days earlier on April 19. Thus far, the raiders had been extremely fortunate to make it this deep into Mississippi mostly unopposed. The appearance of Adams’s Mississippians suggested Grierson’s good fortune had turned against him.28
The skirmishing caught everyone’s attention, including civilians who took shelter wherever they could find it. Twelve-year-old Inez Torrey remembered those frightening hours and how a rider had notified her that the “Yankees were coming.” Just a mile or so west of Union Church, she continued, “We were scared to death that they would kill us all. I grabbed my little brother and we hid under the dining room table, which was covered with a long table cloth that reached the floor. I don’t know how long we stayed there, but it seemed forever. We could plainly hear the cannon-fire,” she added, “just like thunder.”29
Grierson did not mention utilizing Smith’s two pounders, as Inez Torrey remembered, but he certainly did fight. In fact, he pushed his troopers southwest and forced the roughly 100 Mississippians back to and through Union Church. The check suffered by Captain Cleveland was of little concern to the Confederate officer, who sent a report back to Colonel Adams, Franklin Gardner at Port Hudson, and his division commander, Carter Stevenson, at Vicksburg: Grierson’s raiders had finally been found. The elusive enemy was near Union Church, reported the captain, and he had “been skirmishing with them for some hours this evening.” Although he could not ascertain Grierson’s strength, Cleveland informed his superiors that the raiders had four pieces of artillery (which indicates that Grierson had, in fact, used the guns during the skirmishing). The important information pinpointing the enemy moved up the chain of command to Pemberton himself. Even though the Vicksburg commander was not listed as a recipient, an alert telegraph operator forwarded the message to him in the wee hours of the night. Even the Jackson Daily Mississippian reported on the fighting in its April 29 evening edition, writing that “quite a lively skirmish ensued.”30
While Cleveland was falling back and sending his report, Grierson refused to let up in his push against what he had now determined to be a relatively small number of enemy cavalry. The Federal advance through the small village was a masterful display of force. The cavalry, explained Grierson, “went through the village of Union Church by sheer might. Whole lines of picket fences were torn up and overturned by mere rush. Right and left went everything that came in their way, scarcely breaking their onward step.” The Illinoisans learned the identity of the enemy command by interrogating the wounded and captured Mississippians. Despite the length of the running skirmish, possible use of artillery, hard riding, and flying lead, the affair produced surprisingly few casualties. One of the injured Federal troopers was Sgt. G. M. Vaughn of Company F, 7th Illinois Cavalry, who “was accidentally wounded in the hip while breaking a shot gun” against a tree. The discharge sent buckshot into his thigh, and he had to be left with civilians along the way. With Captain Cleveland’s companies dispersed, Grierson ordered his cavalrymen to bivouac for the night at Union Church, where he erected a strong picket line to watch for any renewed Confederate activity.31
“We camped at night in Union Town [Church.] Small place,” scribbled one 7th Illinois soldier. The village may have been unimpressive, but it was a magnet that pulled Confederates in from afar. While the Federal troopers were “resting and getting into true fighting trim and mood,” reported Grierson, scouts concluded that Adams’s Mississippians were forming for a joint attack, likely at dawn, against their position at Union Church. Cleveland’s pair of Mississippi companies still lurked ahead of Grierson in proximity to the village, but Wirt Adams had arrived with two more companies of his regiment and artillery, and his remaining companies were riding to join him. Adams had moved around the Federal position and was now behind Union Church on the road from Gallatin that Grierson had just traversed. The unsettling news that the enemy had artillery wit
h them increased the odds against Grierson, because just about any size of gun could easily overwhelm Smith’s small two pounders. It was, explained Stephen Forbes, “a dangerously complicated situation.”32
Fortunately for Grierson, help was on the way. Trafton’s 7th Illinois battalion had made its way to Bahala on the morning of April 28, where it damaged the railroad and telegraph before retracing the 20 miles back to Union Church. Because of the distance, the battalion did not arrive in the area until about 3 a.m. Reconnecting with Grierson, however, proved to be quite an adventure.33
With Confederates between them and Grierson, Trafton’s troopers advanced with Surby’s scouts fanned out ahead of them. News that “a large force of the enemy had passed about five hours before” infused the column with caution, and the men continued picking their way forward through the darkness. The scouts played their old tricks when they came upon enemy soldiers by claiming they, too, were Confederates. One of Surby’s common ruses involved asking to examine their guns before taking them prisoners. He played one Confederate particularly well. While chatting with the man, Trafton rode up and announced, “This man may be a Yankee.” The Confederate “most emphatically denied the soft impeachment, saying: ‘No, gentlemen; you are mistaken. I am a lieutenant from Port Hudson, and can tell you all about the post and who commands it, so that you can tell if I am all right.” Another Southerner, this one a planter named Mosby, was so convinced Trafton and his men were Confederates that he guided them to Adams’s command near Union Church. Almost everything Surby recommended garnered the reply, “A capital idea,” and the scouts dealing with Mosby soon took to referring to the planter as “A Capital Idea.” Eventually, when the civilian learned the truth about who he was guiding, he protested that it had been “a d—d Yankee trick.” Surby admitted as much when he replied, “Mr. Mosby, you are sold, but it is all fair in war times, and do you not think ‘a capital idea?’” Adjutant Woodward recalled that the planter was “very much mollified when given a horse and equipments to carry him back to his home.” Surby joked that he could keep the horse “in remembrance of the Yankees.”34
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 28
