Although both sides correctly saw “HG76” as a notable, if costly, victory for the escorts, Donitz misinterpreted the results. He believed that defeat had been solely due to a combination of poor weather and an unusually powerful escort. He reasoned that the weather would not always favour the defenders, and the Allies would be unable to field such large escort forces for every future convoy.
To a certain extent he was right. The British were unable at first to profit from all the hard-won lessons of “HG76”. They simply did not have the resources to fully implement all the changes and modifications that were required. Nor did they have enough escorts. There was still much hard fighting to be done on the sea-lanes, and in the period after the USA entered the war the U-boats were to achieve some of the most spectacular successes. Nevertheless, the lessons had been learned. “HG76” had showed that the U-boats could be beaten, and what ships, technology and tactics would be needed to win.
Appendix—”HG76” escort arrival and departure schedule.
Carnation left at 1000 on December 15th.
Campion joined at 1330 on December 15th. She left at 1350 on December 16th.
Hesperus joined at 0830 on December 16th. She left in company with Black Swan, La Malouine and Fowey at 1730 on December 16th.
Coltsfoot joined at 1350 on December 16th.
Exmoor and Blankney left at 1100 on December 18th.
Vanquisher and Witch joined at 1600 on December 23rd.
Bibiliography.
"The Battle of the Atlantic", by D. Macintyre. Published by Pan Books Ltd, London 1969.
"The War at Sea 1939-1945 Volume II", by S.W. Roskill. Published by HMSO, London 1956.
Admiralty records ADM 199/1998; ADM 199/2059; ADM 199/2098; ADM 237/136.
“Convoy HG76. December 1941”, by M Wright.
From “Battlefleet”, Journal of the Naval Wargames Society, Volume 23, issue 4.
Convoy HG-76- the Escorts Strike Back Page 3
