by Dave Meltzer
There have been numerous so-called “third party” attempts on PPV over the years within both pro wrestling and NHB genre and some that sort of are a mix between the two like Japanese so-called and real shootwrestling. Most were unsuccessful at first. A few that showed life at the beginning were unable to sustain it. There has only been one legitimate success story.
ECW is unique in that it is well established it has a more fervent cult base of fans than any “third-party” that has attempted such an undertaking. It has more of a proven track record in regard to popularity when it comes to consistent attendance than most, but not all, that have tried, and ultimately failed previously.
The only true success to this point besides WWF and WCW on PPV is the UFC, which started in November of 1993 with a money-losing 0.35 buy rate (about 75,000 buys) and took off to the point that it was profitable on its third show. Unlike most groups that started during the same time period, its audience grew with repeated showings, peaking with the fifth and sixth shows. In 1995, its buy rates consistently topped both WWF and WCW—peaking with better than 1.0 buy rates (260,000 buys) for superfights involving Royce Gracie vs. Ken Shamrock and Shamrock vs. Dan Severn. However, its numbers declined from that point, with a noticeable decline to a new lower level of popularity over the spring and summer of 1996, settling it at doing consistent 0.4 to 0.5 buy rates, a level a little bit below what WWF and WCW are now doing.
UFC was able to be a major force on PPV, and still would be running profitable shows provided they weren’t under governmental harassment, despite having no television to “create stars” and get over its storylines. What UFC has been successful in doing is getting lots of mainstream media publicity to where the UFC name is very well-known as the brand name for an illusion of a style of fighting that many would say the events themselves really can’t live up (or down, depending on your viewpoint) to. UFC, and its main competitor, EFC, due to national media publicity and controversy, are a lot better known to the general public than ECW, as noted by the fact that ECW is often confused by people with being EFC, but almost never the latter.
EFC had tons of mainstream pub for the first show, particularly in New York, over being moved out of New York in the days leading to the show. This is something it’s doubtful ECW will get, and enabled the first show to pop an initial buy rate of 0.3, which was either break-even or perhaps a slight profit or loss, but the two subsequent shows have done money losing ratings of less than 0.2 and the group is now in danger of closing up should this upcoming show not show some life.
NHB and pro wrestling aren’t the same in that there are far more fans of pro wrestling. But there are also two established major name brands in pro wrestling that already run monthly shows. Many would say there is already a glut of PPV pro wrestling programming already out there. But pro wrestling is also undeniably the hottest its been in many years right now.
ECW has the television exposure, admittedly limited in scope, that the shoot groups don’t have. TV exposure sells their stars and creates people who are huge stars to in this case a somewhat limited amount of people. In addition, the ECW exposure on Monday Night Raw has created a new awareness outside of its cult audience for the name ECW, and it’s the brand name and concept of ECW that the company is selling, and not any particular individual or match, which should add curiosity buys of people who would have otherwise never heard of the group.
In a look at new groups that have attempted PPV, aside from WWF, WCW and UFC, which are the only ones to really make it big, we see the following:
AWA/World Class/Memphis (1988) held SuperClash III from the UIC Pavilion in Chicago headlined by a so-called world title unification match with Jerry Lawler vs. Kerry Von Erich. Although generally remembered as a flop, the show was overall decent with a good main event. The buy rate was 0.5, which would be a huge success today, but in those days was considered a flop as it amounted to about 40,000 buys which would be break-even. The groups that were working together quickly fell apart and none ever ran a PPV again, and all the groups suffered business declines in the wake of the show. This group has major exposure advantages over ECW in that all three promotions that were involved with the show had strong and in some cases very highly rated regional television and AWA had a weekly show on ESPN that drew decent ratings. None of the groups had the cult following of ECW, but all had tons more television exposure and all in those days were capable of drawing bigger crowds and had on the show wrestlers with far bigger national names than ECW does today.
Herb Abrams UWF (1991) ran Beach Brawl from Palmetto, FL headlined by Steve Williams vs. Bam Bam Bigelow. The show wasn’t good, but it was a lot better than expected going in with a solid main event match. However, it totally stiffed on PPV doing about 5,000 buys. But it was well-known going in that this group didn’t have a prayer and doing a PPV was simply an ill-fated ego-trip for the tragic eccentric promoter.
LPWA (1992) ran the Super Ladies Showdown in Rochester, MN. Again the wrestling quality of the show was better than expected, but with nobody on the show with a national name, or for that matter any kind of a name, and limited syndication (although probably more than ECW has at this point), it was a total stiff and the promotion folded shortly thereafter.
UWFI was the first group to run on its own from Japan (1993). This was backed by a tremendous advertising campaign which got over the slogan, “Shootfighting: It’s real” (which it wasn’t, but that’s another story). The first show was a huge success doing an 0.48 buy rate, which was about what WCW was doing for its PPV shows at the time, and this was with no television exposure and nobody with name identity. So it shows a PPV can draw based on a new concept getting over. However, lack of follow-up and the fact the lack of punches to the face made it less appealing to Americans rooted in boxing as what a combat sport is supposed to look like, and the UFC that debuted one month later took off while this went nowhere, falling to about an 0.1 buy rate for the second show. After an excellent third show most notable for the debut of Jeff Blatnick as a color commentator, the group was done on PPV.
WCW had promoted three New Japan Super Shows, which were Tokyo Dome tapes aired months later, of shows in 1991, 1992 and 1993. The first show did an 0.6 buy rate, which was below what the regular WCW shows were doing at the time, but considered a success for a novelty event that wasn’t heavily promoted and only expected to draw from the limited hardcore wrestling fan audience. The promotion of the first show was much stronger than the second and third shows, which didn’t do as well. WCW tried again in 1995 with Collision in Korea, a taped show of the two cards held in front of the two largest crowds in pro wrestling history at May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea, doing less than an 0.2 buy rate. WCW also ran some unsuccessful K-1 kick boxing shows from Japan on PPV which also did less than 0.2 buy rates.
World Combat Championship (1995), a PPV event from Charlotte, NC was put on by Christopher Peters as basically the first offshoot of the successful by that point UFC. It had tremendous pre-show coverage in the martial arts magazines and was budgeted to do a first-class PPV production. When it didn’t hit, it was a huge money loser, possibly to the tune of seven figures, doing less than an 0.2 buy rate, and was never heard from again.
Continental Wrestling Alliance (1996) ran one taped show from the Dallas Sportatorium, largely based around an ego trip of a prison guard named Dominic Minaldi, attempting to be a pro wrestler. Did anyone buy that show? How many of you even know it existed?
Extreme Fighting (1995) was the second UFC offshoot on PPV. It garnered far more mainstream pub than WCC, largely over scheduling its initial shot in Brooklyn, which resulted in a decent buy rate. It was basically a lower-budgeted version of UFC. That debut was considered a poor show and the follow-up show near Montreal with all the Canadian governmental intervention and post-show arrests was a total calamity. The third show was a great card, but the buy rates for shows two and three were both in the 0.14 to 0.18 range, or major losers. The group has a fourth show coming up
on 3/28 which looks good on paper to martial arts hardcore fans, but realistically doesn’t appear to have much of a shot at turning a profit and the group has to be considered in critical condition.
Pancrase (1996), promoted by SEG as an offshoot of UFC, ran four shows. There was virtually no hype or promotion to the events which were the closest thing to a shoot sport as the world of pro wrestling has ever seen and the style was virtually unrecognizable to American pro wrestling fans. However, it wasn’t pushed as pro wrestling in the U.S., and instead pushed to the far more limited martial arts audience. The surprising draw of the first event, which did an 0.25 buy rate and 60,000 buys, may have been partially due to the $9.95 introductory price tag. The follow-up shows all did in the 0.1 range, although the final show, after the die had been cast, similar to the final UWFI show, was an excellent PPV event.
Martial Arts Reality Superfighting (1996) spent literally seven figures, particularly with a huge advertising budget, to promote a Gracie (albeit Renzo Gracie) vs. Taktarov match. There were tons of TV commercial spots, which were well produced, bought on boxing and wrestling television shows, and the Gracie name is well-known from Royce Gracie in UFC and Taktarov has name recognition although no drawing power. This was probably the single-biggest disaster ever on PPV, with seven figure losses on the show that sold about 100 tickets live and didn’t even produce an 0.1 buy rate.
Which brings us to the one promotion that ran on PPV that may be the closest for comparison to ECW—the 1994 AAA When Worlds Collide PPV. Both groups were basically similar in that they were introducing a new concept of pro wrestling in the U.S. to PPV, different to what WWF and WCW were providing, that was originally popularized in foreign countries (ECW basically being an American derivative of Japan’s FMW). Both had loyal fan bases but virtually no mainstream or crossover recognition when the shows were announced. ECW has gotten a few weeks of first-rate hype on WWF television. AAA got a few weeks of hype on WCW television, although nowhere close to the same degree, even though WCW actually was involved as promoters of the PPV portion of the show. Both cards, on paper, looked to be very good going in. The AAA show, in fact, was arguably one of the greatest PPV wrestling events in history. If the ECW event is anywhere close to that level, it’ll be looked on as a huge success at least from that standpoint.
If you compare AAA of late 1994 with ECW of early 1997, this is what you see. Both have little national recognition going in but both had tremendous cult followings. AAA in Los Angeles was far more popular than ECW is anywhere (in fact, except for WWF in the major markets during its peak you’d be hard pressed to find any American promotion that enjoyed the popularity run AAA did in Los Angeles over that 18 month period), and actually they drew more in places like Chicago, San Jose and New York than ECW has ever done anywhere in its history, so you’re talking the four of the five biggest markets in the country having a real documented strong and rabid following. Of course, being a Mexican group, the following was heavily regionalized and almost exclusively ethnic with basically no crossover appeal. ECW’s following is heavily regionalized based on lack of television exposure.
The AAA “When Worlds Collide” PPV show in late 1994, co-promoted by WCW, did a 0.24 buy rate, or about 44,000 buys, which was about break-even. Since AAA didn’t have the negative of Viewers Choice not carrying the event and it not airing in Canada, it was available in far more homes than ECW. By all rights, with the AAA of 1994 having bigger stars with more name value (at least to its cult audience—don’t kid yourself, every Mexican American at the time knew Santo, Perro Aguayo, Octagon, etc. and if you walk down the street and ask, nobody except hardcore wrestling fans know Sabu and Taz and even most average wrestling fans would be hard pressed to recognize any ECW name except Terry Funk and perhaps Shane Douglas), with more television exposure, and with a far more popular promotion and with wider distribution, ECW shouldn’t be expected to do anywhere close to that figures, right?
Maybe yes. Maybe no. The difference is ECW’s main strength. AAA had progressive wrestling and a hot promotion at the time, although it had already cooled in the U.S. from its peak one year earlier due to changes on Galavision cable which went from seven hours per week of AAA programming to about one hour, which actually as much as anything else was why AAA fell so fast in popularity in the U.S. because the exposure simply was no longer there and exposure is the life blood of pro wrestling.
But even at its best, AAA was totally messed up in regards to promotion, timing, deadlines, etc. It had no idea how to build or promote a PPV. It did nothing to peak angles for the PPV. As good as people remember that PPV show being, it was really no better (although the one tag team match was exceptional) than most of their major arena shows during that time period, nor did it come across to the promotion’s fans as any bigger of a deal since the Los Angeles live crowd was only average for AAA in that market during that time period. AAA failed to capitalize on the aesthetic success of its first show and failed to follow up to the casual fans who may have bought the show for curiosity reasons stemming from WCW television promotion, and AAA quickly faded from those fans’ memories and there was never a second show.
When it comes to hyping the importance of the show and peaking angles, there is no comparison. To the ECW audience, this is a big deal, the angles are peaking perfectly, the storylines have been geared in this direction, in some cases for more than one year. Unlike WCW, which failed to feature or put over any AAA talent on its television before the event, ECW has had its performers featured on WWF television with some strong angles, and those segments have made real mainstream impact, something AAA failed to accomplish since it was given no chance to accomplish it in hyping its PPV event. Even though WCW had a financial interest in the AAA show, there was so much of the expected interpromotional jealousy and lack of communication that kept the hype level to a bare minimum with WCW not wanting to do anything to take interest away from its own PPV event at the same time.
It’s been exactly the opposite with the WWF/ECW connection. In addition, ECW already has plans for tentative dates for both a second and third show and ideas of where they are going, something AAA didn’t have and when its first show was successful, everyone was scrambling about a second show, deadlines fell through, WCW really didn’t care, and the second show never took place.
So how will the ECW PPV do? Realistically, they may make more profit from merchandising the event after the fact with videotape and t-shirt sales than from the event itself. With the ticket prices to the live show jacked up and revenue coming in from the Terry Funk banquet, as a singular weekend of events, the losses, if there are any, shouldn’t put the company in a dangerous predicament or spell major troubles as has been the case with other companies that have banked their future and then faded away after failing on PPV. Even if there are profits, it’s not like anyone at ECW will see them for 90 to 120 days.
The PPV is a cog in the wheel to build up future arena business, as with the pre-show business nowadays, it is being built to be the hottest period ever for the company. Financially, the show may prove to be a success for the company almost like a pyramid standing on its head—with the PPV itself being the loss leader rather then almost the opposite for other companies that have presented events on PPV where the events needed to be successful on a stand-alone basis and was the make-or-break for company profitability.
Of course, ECW is also the most unique perception promotion in the world. There are people ready to trumpet a failure on PPV into a success, and people ready and waiting for a failure to prove what they’ve believed all along. The ECW PPV story is far more interesting because so many more people are interested in how it does than all of the aforementioned companies that have tried and mostly failed over the past nine years, rather than how many people actually buy the show as compared with all those different groups.
For whatever reason, drawing 1,100 to 1,500 every three weeks in a city the size of Philadelphia is considered an overwhelming success because they pa
ck a tiny Bingo Hall despite those being what would be considered tepid attendance figures for any promotion of any real popularity in a city of that size if it was anyone but ECW. It does have to be noted the crowd is consistent and loyal beyond belief in that it never falls below a certain figure, but it’s not like there have ever been 5,000 people on any night wanting to get in, and it’s not like angles have never peaked before in a manner that would be expected for a good promotion to draw a monster house with—let alone close to 26,000 that jammed traffic for miles and came to the Sports Arena the night AAA ran its debut show in the building.
ECW is able to sell out small halls in the Northeast, largely because they book small halls and rarely book buildings of any size. I can recall when AAA ran a show in Oakland, CA, a city that is largely black with very few Mexicans and with no television exposure in the city whatsoever, they drew 1,300 fans and it was considered a colossal failure—and it was. If WWF this year were to run a house show that draws 1,300 fans, it would be considered a failure and it would probably be one of the worst houses of the year. A 1,300 person house would be a bad house for any of the three different promotions that run Tijuana, a city of hardly the same population as Philadelphia. A WCW show drawing that kind of figure would be a failure. That same show would be considered by many as a great house if it was an ECW show in New York City—the largest metro area in the country.
Jim Cornette remarked that ECW is a few people who make 95% of the noise, and he’s probably right in that line of thinking. But if those few people spend enough money on things like videotapes and t-shirts along with tickets so ECW can draw a profit, it doesn’t matter if millions don’t casually tune in on Monday night that would never even consider spending a nickel on pro wrestling and may mean something for bragging rights on Tuesdays but mean almost nothing for the company’s bottom line. And if those few people make enough noise that WWF and WCW are fooled into thinking there are more than a few people and they can be a beneficial ally in a ratings war, they can turn ECW and that few into a real story and ultimately a reality of many, which may actually be the most real ECW story.
