CHAPTER XIX.
THE BATTLE ON THE ISTHMUS.
The Sacred Phalanx, as described in the last chapter, was undoubtedly aformidable body of men, one that, rightly handled, might win a battle.The difficulty was to bring its force to bear. There were, in fact, onlytwo ways of doing this. One was to break through the lines ofinvestment which had been drawn across the isthmus; the other was totransport the troops on shipboard to some place from which they mightoperate. Both methods were risky and doubtful, but both offered somehope of success.
The lines of investment had been hastily made, contained some weakplaces, and were not adequately guarded throughout their length. It waspossible that they might be carried at one point or another by adetermined attack. Of the plan of transport by sea it could only be saidthat it was not impossible. The new harbour-mouth had, as has been said,this advantage over the old, that it opened into deep water, where theblockading ships could find no anchorage. But if in bad weather itbecame impossible for the Roman fleet to watch the exit, it was alsoimpossible, or, to say the least, highly dangerous, for any ship toventure out.
Hasdrubal determined to try both methods. He divided the phalanx intothree parts. Two of these three were to assault the investing lines atwidely distant points; the third was to try the adventure of transportby sea. This was by far the most risky undertaking. If the divisionsucceeded in reaching the spot at which it aimed, there still remainedthe problem of getting back. As a matter of fact, there would be nogetting back, except in the event of victory.
For this enterprise, therefore, volunteers were called. Thevolunteering, however, was by companies. It would have been against theprinciples on which the phalanx was constituted for any one soldier toleave the comrades to whom he was bound, either by their choice or byhis own. But about the volunteering there was no difficulty. Twentycompanies only were wanted, for more could not be safely accommodated inthe transports, but double the number could easily have been obtained.The force was put under the command of an officer who had a highreputation for dashing courage, another of the numerous Hasdrubals, who,it might almost be said, swarmed in Carthage. Cleanor was commissionedto act as his _aide-de-camp_.
Of the attack on the lines of investment little need be said. It was notwholly a failure, but it was certainly not a success. Stubborn as wasthe resistance offered by the Romans, the assailants broke through thelines at several points. At one time as many as seven or eight companiesfound themselves on the further side of the intrenchment, with somewhatdiminished numbers indeed, but still substantially intact. Yet, for themost part, the line was still held by the besiegers. If the object ofthe Carthaginians had been to cut their way through the blockadingforce, it was accomplished. At various points the way out of Carthagelay open, and it would have been possible for at least a large portionof the force to escape.
But much more than this was wanted, nothing less, in fact, than that theinvestment should practically cease to exist, that the besieged shouldbe free to go and to return as they pleased. Nothing like this had beenachieved. Those who, after a fierce struggle, had forced their waythrough to the open country, would have to struggle not less fiercely toforce their way back. Hasdrubal could not afford to run the risk. Theloss of such a force meant ruin to Carthage, which no longer possessedits old powers of recovery. He reluctantly ordered the signal of recallto be sounded, and the troops still more reluctantly obeyed.
The division to which Cleanor was attached fared better, so far, atleast, as to reach the field of battle. It was exceptionally fortunatein both embarking and landing without hindrance. A strong sea-wind hadbeen blowing for some days, and the blockading squadron had beencompelled to leave the harbour-mouth unwatched. Then came a suddenchange of weather, and the troops, who had been bivouacking for two dayson the chance of some such opportunity occurring, were hurried onshipboard, and had actually reached their destination before the Romanships had put to sea again.
The march to the place of meeting was effected without molestation, anda junction was made with the native allies. Diogenes, too, did not failto perform his part in the concerted plan, arriving exactly at the rightmoment with a picked force of a thousand mercenaries. But the hope thatsomething towards the relief of Carthage might be effected by thiscombination of forces was entirely disappointed. The native allies madeone charge, but only one. Twenty thousand horsemen came down theincline, at the foot of which the Roman army was drawn up, at a gallop,their white burnooses streaming behind them, and their spear-pointsflashing in the sun.
Cleanor always said that it was the most magnificent spectacle that heever saw. Some of King Gulussa's squadrons were swept away by theimpetuous rush of a multitude which outnumbered them many times. But theline of the Roman legions--there were three of them on the field, forScipio had brought all his available force into action--did not waverfor an instant. A few of the boldest riders hurled themselves on theRoman pikes. But not so much as a single gap was made in the ranks.Almost in a moment the huge array--like some great animal which exhaustsits strength and spirit in one struggle--broke into hopeless confusion.Then the Roman cavalry, with the reserved squadrons of Numidian horse,charged the helpless mass.
The slaughter that followed was terrible. It was said that seventythousand mountaineers were left dead on the battle-field. That isimpossible. Many of the tribesmen fled as soon as they saw that the daywas not to be theirs, and these must have secured such a start as tomake their escape easy. But the victorious cavalry went on slaying tilltheir arms were weary.
The safety of the mercenaries and the third division of the phalanx wasnow seriously compromised. They had, fortunately, effected a junctionbefore the battle began, and it was of course a necessity that theyshould keep together. So much was certain, but it was not equallycertain what was the best course for them to follow. The Carthaginianswere anxious to return, if return was in any way possible, to the city.Their families, their friends, everything in fact that they held dearwas there; it was only too probable that unless they got back at oncethey would never see the city or them again. The mercenaries, on theother hand, were bent on returning to the fortress of Nepheris, fromwhich they had sallied forth. The fortress was near, so near that thelegions could not bar their way, though the light-armed troops and thecavalry might molest them on the march.
A hurried council of war was held; there was no time for discussion.Each officer--there were seven of rank to vote--gave his decisionwithout reasons. Considerations of safety, which were overwhelminglystrong in favour of a retreat on the fortress of Nepheris, carried theday. Five voted for this course, and a sixth, who had originallydeclared for cutting their way through to Carthage, changed his mindwhen he saw himself in a small minority.
Only Hasdrubal was left in opposition. "I swore to defend Carthage, notNepheris," he exclaimed. Then, with an unconscious imitation of theobstinate Spartan at Platæa, he took a huge stone from the groundand threw it down in front of him, saying, "I give my vote forremaining."[39]
Cleanor's private opinion was that his chief's obstinacy was nothingelse than madness, but he could not leave the general to whose person hehad been attached.
If Hasdrubal had thought that his opposition would determine the actionof his colleagues he was mistaken. Without a word--and indeed there wasno time for argument--they moved off in the direction of the fortress.Hasdrubal was brought to his senses by this decisive action, just as theSpartan had been before him. Nor could he mistake the meaning of theagitation that at once showed itself among his men. It was not difficultto see that he would soon be left almost alone.
Accordingly he gave the signal to march. Some time, however, had beenlost, and a number of light-armed troops from the Roman army were withina short distance of the retreating force. It became necessary, if theirattacks were to be checked, for the rear ranks to face about. There waslittle or no actual fighting. The pursuers fell back as soon as theretreating division showed them a firm front. Their object was to causeas much delay as possible; th
e Carthaginians, on the other hand, had tosolve the problem of making these necessary halts interfere as little aspossible with the rapidity of their retreat. In this they were greatlyhelped by their high discipline and what may be called their perfectcoherence, and they had actually got almost within a bow-shot of therock-fortress when they had to turn, as they hoped, for the last time.
There was now some really sharp fighting. The pursuers had beenreinforced by a detachment of picked troops from the main body, menchosen for the speed with which they could move under a heavy equipmentof armour and arms. The Carthaginians fell slowly back before them,keeping an unbroken line, and encouraged by the thought that if theycould get within range of the walls they would be in comparative safety.
Nor was this hope disappointed. The Romans, indeed, pressed on, for thewalls were to all appearance deserted, but this appearance concealed acarefully concerted surprise. Hundreds of archers and slingers werecrouching behind the battlements, and there were scores of catapults,with their range carefully adjusted, ready to discharge volleys ofstones and javelins. At a given signal, fire, if the expression may beallowed, was opened with overwhelming effect. The Roman line absolutelystaggered under the blow. At the same time the gates were thrown open,and before the enemy could recover, the whole of the retreating forcewas safe within the walls.
But when, an hour or so afterwards, the roll was called, Cleanor wasamong the missing.
FOOTNOTE:
39: "At Platæa Pausanias commanded the Spartans to change their position. All the captains but one were ready to obey, but Amompharetus refused to move. 'I will not fly,' he said, 'before the strangers, nor bring disgrace upon Sparta.' After a while the Athenians sent a horseman to learn why the Spartans did not change their place as had been agreed upon. When the man came up the dispute was waxing hot, and Amompharetus took up with both hands a huge stone, and put it at the feet of the general, saying, 'With this pebble (_psephos_) I give my vote not to fly from the strangers.' At last the general gave the signal for retreat, expecting that Amompharetus and his men would not like to be left behind. And so indeed it turned out, for, when he saw the rest of the army in motion, he also left his place and followed them" (Herod. ix. 53-5).
Lords of the World: A story of the fall of Carthage and Corinth Page 21
