Mastering Modern World History

by Norman Lowe

  (a) Reasons for détente

  As the nuclear arsenals built up, both sides became increasingly fearful of a catastrophic nuclear war in which there could be no real winner. Both sides were sickened by the horrors of Vietnam. In addition, countries had their own individual motives for wanting détente.

  The USSR was finding the expense of keeping up with the Americans crippling. It was essential to reduce defence spending so that they could devote more resources to bringing living standards up to western levels, both in the USSR and in the satellite states, all of which were suffering economic difficulties. In 1968 Russian troops were sent to Prague to deal with disturbing developments in Czechoslovakia, when Alexander Dubček tried to introduce ‘communism with a human face’. There was unrest, especially in Poland in the early 1970s, which threatened to destabilize the communist bloc. At the same time the Russians were on bad terms with China, and did not want to be left out when relations between China and the USA began to improve in 1971.

  The Americans were beginning to realize that there must be a better way of coping with communism than the one which was having so little success in Vietnam. Clearly there were limits to what their military power could achieve. Some Congressmen and Senators were even beginning to talk of a return to ‘isolationism’.

  The Chinese were anxious about their isolation, nervous about American intentions in Vietnam (after what had happened in Korea) and not happy about their worsening relations with the USSR.

  The nations of western Europe were worried because they would be in the front line if nuclear war broke out. Willi Brandt, who became Chancellor of West Germany in 1969, worked for better relations with eastern Europe, a policy known as Ostpolitik.

  (b) The USSR and the USA

  They had already made progress with the ‘hotline’ telephone link and the agreement to carry out only underground nuclear tests (both in 1963). An agreement signed in 1967 banned the use of nuclear weapons in outer space. The first major breakthrough came in 1972 when the two countries signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, known as SALT 1, which decided how many ABMs, ICBMs and SLBMs each side could have (see Section 7.4(a) and (c)); there was no agreement about MIRVs. The agreement did not reduce the amount of armaments but it did slow down the arms race. Presidents Brezhnev and Nixon had three summit meetings, negotiations opened for a further treaty to be known as SALT 2 and the USA began to export wheat to Russia.

  Another important step was the Helsinki Agreement (July 1975), in which the USA, Canada, the USSR and most European states accepted the European frontiers which had been drawn up after the Second World War (thus recognizing the division of Germany). The communist countries promised to allow their peoples ‘human rights’, including freedom of speech and freedom to leave the country.

  However, détente did not proceed without some setbacks. This was especially true in 1979 when NATO became nervous at the deployment of 150 new Russian SS-20 missiles. NATO decided to deploy over 500 Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe by 1983 as a deterrent to a possible Russian attack on western Europe. At the same time the US Senate decided not to accept a SALT 2 treaty which would have limited numbers of MIRVs. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979 and replaced the president with one more favourable to them, all the old western suspicions of Russian motives revived.

  The next few years are sometimes referred to as ‘the second Cold War’. Both sides spent the first half of the 1980s building up their nuclear arsenals, and US President Reagan (1981–9) apparently gave the go-ahead for a new weapons system, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), also known as ‘Star Wars’. This was intended to use weapons based in space to destroy ballistic missiles in flight.

  Détente gathered momentum again thanks to the determination of the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–91). In November 1985 he had a meeting with Reagan in Geneva; this went well and they issued a joint statement that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. The signs were that détente was back on course. Then in April 1986 there was a disastrous accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukraine. This caused a great wave of anti-nuclear feeling in the USSR and Gorbachev decided that measures to reduce nuclear dangers were absolutely vital. In October 1986 he invited Reagan to a summit meeting at Reykjavik and proposed a 15-year timetable for a ‘step-by-step process for ridding the earth of nuclear weapons’. The Americans responded to some extent, though Reagan was not prepared to abandon his Star Wars project. At the next summit, held in Washington (December 1987), a historic breakthrough was made: Reagan and Gorbachev formally signed the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty.

  All land-based intermediate-range (300 to 3000 miles) nuclear weapons were to be scrapped over the next three years. This meant 436 American and 1575 Soviet warheads, and would include all Russian missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and all American Cruise and Pershing missiles based in western Europe.

  There were strict verification provisions so that both sides could check that the weapons were actually being destroyed.

  However, all this amounted, at most, to only 4 per cent of existing stocks of nuclear weapons, and there was the stumbling block of Reagan’s Star Wars, which he was still not prepared to give up, even though it was only at the planning stage. Nor did the agreement include British and French weapons. The UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher was determined that Britain should keep its own nuclear arsenal, and planned to develop Trident missiles, which were more sophisticated than Cruise missiles. Nevertheless, this INF Treaty was an important turning point in the nuclear arms race, since it was the first time any weapons had been destroyed.

  By 1985 the USSR was seriously embarrassed by its involvement in Afghanistan. Although there were over 100 000 Soviet troops in the country, they found it impossible to subdue the ferocious Islamic guerrillas; it was a drain on their resources and a blow to their prestige. The hostility of China, the suspicion of Islamic states all over the world and repeated condemnations by the UN convinced Gorbachev it was time to pull out. It was eventually agreed that the Russians would begin withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan on 1 May 1988, provided the Americans stopped sending military aid to the Afghan resistance movement. In June 1988 Reagan went to Moscow to discuss the timetable for implementing the INF Treaty.

  (c) China and the USA

  China and the USA had been extremely hostile towards each other since the Korean War and seemed likely to remain so while the Americans backed Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists in Taiwan, and while the Chinese backed Ho Chi Minh. However, in 1971 the Chinese unexpectedly invited an American table-tennis team to visit China. Following the success of that visit, the USA responded by calling off their veto of Chinese entry into the UN. Communist China was therefore allowed to become a member of the UN in October 1971. President Nixon, looking for a bold initiative for which his presidency would be remembered, decided he would visit China himself. Chairman Mao agreed to receive him and the visit took place in February 1972. Though Mao was reported to have told Zhou Enlai that the USA was ‘like an ape moving towards becoming a human being’, the meeting led to a resumption of diplomatic relations. President Ford also paid a successful visit to Beijing (Peking) in 1975. There was still the problem of Taiwan to sour the relationship: though Chiang himself died in 1975, his supporters still occupied the island, and the communists would not be happy until it was brought under their control. Relations improved further in 1978 when Democrat President Carter decided to withdraw recognition of Nationalist China. However, this caused a row in the USA, where Carter was accused of betraying his ally.

  The climax of détente between China and the USA came early in 1979 when Carter gave formal recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and ambassadors were exchanged. Good relations were maintained during the 1980s. The Chinese were anxious that détente with the USA should continue, because of their conflict with Vietnam (Russia’s ally), which had begun in 1979. In 19
85 an agreement was signed on nuclear cooperation. Things suddenly took a turn for the worse in June 1989 when the Chinese government used troops to disperse a student demonstration in Tiananmen Square, Beijing (Peking). The government was afraid that the demonstration might turn into a revolution which could overthrow Chinese communism. At least a thousand students were killed and many later executed, and this brought worldwide condemnation. Tensions rose again in 1996 when the Chinese held ‘naval exercises’ in the straits between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, in protest at the Taiwanese democratic elections just about to be held.

  (d) Relations between the USSR and China

  Relations between the USSR and China deteriorated steadily after 1956. They had earlier signed a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship (1950), but later the Chinese did not approve of Khrushchev’s policies, particularly his belief in ‘peaceful coexistence’, and his claim that it was possible to achieve communism by methods other than violent revolution. This went against the ideas of Lenin, leader of the 1917 Russian communist revolution, and so the Chinese accused the Russians of ‘revisionism’ – revising or reinterpreting the teachings of Marx and Lenin to suit their own needs. They were angry at Khrushchev’s ‘soft’ line towards the USA. In retaliation the Russians reduced their economic aid to China.

  The ideological argument was not the only source of trouble: there was also a frontier dispute. During the nineteenth century Russia had taken over large areas of Chinese territory north of Vladivostok and in Sinkiang province, which the Chinese were now demanding back, so far without success. Now that China herself was following a ‘softer’ policy towards the USA, it seemed that the territorial problem was the main bone of contention. At the end of the 1970s both Russia and China were vying for American support, against each other, for the leadership of world communism. To complicate matters further, Vietnam now supported Russia. When the Chinese attacked Vietnam (February 1979), relations reached rock bottom. The Chinese attack was partly in retaliation for Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia) in December 1978, which overthrew the Khmer Rouge government of Pol Pot, a protégé of China, and partly because of a frontier dispute. They withdrew after three weeks, having, as Beijing put it, ‘taught the Vietnamese a lesson’. In 1984 the Chinese set out their grievances against the USSR:

  the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan;

  Soviet backing of the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea;

  the Soviet troop build-up along the Chinese frontiers of Mongolia and Manchuria.

  Mikhail Gorbachev was determined to begin a new era in Sino-Russian relations. Five-year agreements on trade and economic co-operation were signed (July 1985) and regular contact took place between the two governments. A formal reconciliation took place in May 1989 when Gorbachev visited Beijing. Also in 1989 Vietnam withdrew its troops from Kampuchea, and so their relations with China improved.

  8.7 THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TRANSFORMED

  (a) August 1988 to December 1991

  Remarkable events happened in eastern Europe in the period August 1988 to December 1991. Communism was swept away by a rising tide of popular opposition and mass demonstrations, far more quickly than anybody could ever have imagined.

  The process began in Poland in August 1988 when the ‘Solidarity’ trade union organized huge anti-government strikes. These eventually forced the government to allow free elections, in which the communists were heavily defeated (June 1989). Revolutionary protests rapidly spread to all the other Russian satellite states.

  Hungary was the next to allow free elections, in which the communists again suffered defeat.

  In East Germany, communist leader Eric Honecker wanted to disperse the demonstrations by force, but he was overruled by his colleagues; by the end of 1989 the communist government had resigned. Soon the Berlin Wall was breached, and, most astonishing of all, in the summer of 1990, Germany was re-united.

  Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania had thrown out their communist governments by the end of 1989, and multi-party elections were held in Yugoslavia in 1990 and in Albania in the spring of 1991.

  By the end of December 1991, the USSR itself had split up into separate republics and Gorbachev had resigned. Communist rule in Russia was over after 74 years.

  (See Sections 10.6 and 18.3 for the reasons behind the collapse of communism in eastern Europe.)

  (b) How were international relations affected?

  Many people in the west thought that with the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, the world’s problems would miraculously disappear. But nothing could have been further from the truth and a range of new problems surfaced.

  1 The Cold War was over

  The most immediate result was that the former USSR and its allies were no longer seen by the West as the ‘enemy’. In November 1990 the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed a treaty agreeing that they were ‘no longer adversaries’, and that none of their weapons would ever be used except in self-defence. The Cold War was over, and Gorbachev must take much of the credit for bringing it to an end. His determination to work for disarmament broke the stalemate and impressed Reagan, who also deserves much credit for responding so positively to Gorbachev’s initiatives. The end of the Cold War was an enormous step forward. However …

  2 New conflicts soon arose

  These were often caused by nationalism. During the Cold War, the USSR and the USA, as we have seen, kept tight control, by force if necessary, over areas where their vital interests might be affected. Now, a conflict which did not directly affect the interests of East or West would probably be left to find its own solution, bloody or otherwise. Nationalism, which had been suppressed by communism, soon re-emerged in some of the former states of the USSR and elsewhere. Sometimes disputes were settled peacefully, for example in Czechoslovakia, where Slovak nationalists insisted on breaking away to form a separate state of Slovakia. However, war broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia (two former republics of the USSR) over disputed territory. There was fighting in Georgia (another former Soviet republic) where the people of the north wanted to form a separate state.

  Most tragic of all was Yugoslavia, which broke up into five separate states – Serbia (with Montenegro), Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. Soon a complex civil war broke out in which Serbia tried to grab as much territory as possible from Croatia. In Bosnia, Serbs, Croats and Muslims fought each other in an attempt to set up states of their own. This increasingly bitter struggle dragged on for almost four years until a ceasefire was arranged in November 1995 (see Section 10.7). So at a time when the states of western Europe were moving into closer union with the European Community (see Section 10.8), those of eastern Europe were breaking up into even smaller national units.

  3 Supervision of nuclear weapons

  Another fear, now that the Russians and the USA were less willing to act as ‘policemen’, was that countries with what the powers considered to be unstable or irresponsible governments might use nuclear weapons – countries like, for example, Iraq, Iran and Libya. One of the needs of the 1990s therefore, was better international supervision and control of nuclear weapons, and also of biological and chemical weapons.

  4 Economic problems

  All the former communist states faced another problem – how to deal with the economic collapse and intense poverty left over from the communist ‘command’ economies, and how to change to ‘free-market’ economies. They needed a carefully planned and generous programme of financial help from the West. Otherwise it would be difficult to create stability in eastern Europe. Nationalism and economic unrest could cause a right-wing backlash, especially in Russia itself, which could be just as threatening as communism was once thought to be. There was clearly cause for concern, given the large number of nuclear weapons still in existence in the region. There was the danger that Russia, desperate to raise money, might sell off some of its nuclear weapons
to ‘unsuitable’ governments.

  5 The re-unification of Germany created some problems

  The Poles were very suspicious of a united and powerful Germany, fearing that it might try to take back the former German territory east of the rivers Oder and Neisse, given to Poland after the Second World War. Germany also found itself providing refuge for people fleeing from disturbances in other states of Europe; by October 1992, at least 16 000 refugees a month were entering Germany. This gave rise to violent protests from right-wing neo-Nazi groups who believed that Germany had problems enough of its own – especially the need to modernize the industry and amenities of the former East Germany – without admitting foreigners.

  6 Relations between the western allies

  The disappearance of communism affected relations between the western allies, the USA, western Europe and Japan. They had been held together by the need to stand firm against communism, but now differences emerged over trade and the extent to which the USA and Japan were prepared to help solve the problems of eastern Europe. For instance, during the war in Bosnia, relations between the USA and the states of western Europe became strained when the USA refused to provide troops for the UN peacekeeping forces, leaving the burden to other member states. The overriding fact now was that the USA was left as the world’s only superpower; it remained to be seen how Washington would choose to play its new role on the world stage.

  FURTHER READING

  Blum, W., Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (Zed Books, 2003).

  Cawthorne, N., Vietnam – A War Lost and Won (Arcturus, 2003).

  Foss, C., Fidel Castro (Sutton, 2006).