An Introduction to Madhva Vedan

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An Introduction to Madhva Vedan Page 10

by Deepak Sarma


  sçtisaüsthitâs

  daityas

  râkùasas

  piúacas martyâdhamas

  3.6 Tamo-yogyas

  The tamo-yogyas are either immediately born or after some time

  eventually reborn in a place called tamas, Hell. In South Asian

  cosmologies, it is typically the case that sentient beings temporarily

  go to Hell to work through their individual karma and manifest their

  prârabdha, latent, karma. Hell is generally considered to be a place of provisional residence, except for its governor Yama and his wife

  Yami.16 Madhvâcârya’s characterization of Hell as a place of permanent residence is thus different from the typical South Asian cosmology.

  He states: ‘... wicked [and stupid], they descend from there into Hell.

  And they, moreover, never rise up [out of it]. That [place] they call the

  pit.’17 The two deepest Hells he labels Mahâ Tamas, Great Hell, and Pañcakaùña, the [Place] of Five Miseries. He explains:

  14 iti dvidhâ muktyayogyâ daityarakùaþpiúâcakâþ | martyâdhamâú caturdhaiva tamoyogyâþ prakîrtitâþ | TS 6. Many thanks to Alf Hiltebeitel for an explanation of the differences between these creatures.

  15 te ca prâptândhatamasaþ sçtisaüsthâ iti dvidhâ | TS 6.

  16 see èg Veda 10.14 for a hymn invoking Yama.

  17 ... úañþâ mûrkhâ iti te vai tato ‘varuhya tamasi prapanti naivaita uttiùñþante ‘pi karhicid vavra§ vâ etad ity âhur atha | BSB 3.1.14.

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  For those who sink down to the Mahâ Tamas, Great Hell, there is

  never a rising up [out of it] ... Everywhere else there is an

  alternation between pleasure and pain, but, in the Pañcakaùña,

  the [Place] of Five Miseries, there is restriction to that unending

  [pain] ...18

  There are other Hells in addition to these. Raurava, [Place of] Terror,

  Mahâraurava, [Place of] Great Terror, Vahni, [Place of] Fire, [Place of the] Vaitaraõi [River], and Kumbipâka, the Pottery [Kiln] are temporary places for jîvas to fulfill their prârabdha, latent, karma. Tâmisra, [Place of] Darkness, and Andhatâmisro, [Place of] Complete Darkness, are

  permanent places and are for the tamo-yogyas. Madhvâcârya arranged

  these places according to dreadfulness.19

  This tripartite distinction, jîva-traividhya, three-fold classification

  of jîvas into the ucca, highest, madhya, middling, and nîcâ, lowest, is Madhvâcârya’s doctrine of predestination, svarûpatraividhya, threefold classification of natural kinds.20 This unusual link between ontology to eschatology is not found in many other traditions of thought in South

  Asia. The earlier Pâñcarâtrika thinkers have a similar doctrine of

  predestination. Their three-fold scheme is comprised of mukti-yogyâþ,

  nityabaddha, the eternally bound, and tamo-yogyâþ.21 Râmânuja also holds that there are nityasûris who are never subject to birth and rebirth

  while the Jains separate jîvas into those who possess bhavyatva, the capability to achieve nirvâõa, and abhavya, those who do not.22

  This doctrine may remind readers of similar features in Calvinist

  theology, where some chosen souls are saved and others damned. This

  and other similarities have led some scholars such as G.A. Grierson

  to claim that Christianity influenced Madhvâcârya.23 Although

  Madhvâcârya’s doctrine certainly made itself vulnerable to such claims

  18 mahâtamasi magnân⧠na teùâm uthitiþ kvacit | ... sukhasyânantara§ duþkhaü duþkhasyânantara§ sukham | iti sarvatra niyamaþ pañcakaùñe tu tatsadâ ity âdi | BSB

  3.1.15.

  19 rauravo ‘tha mahâüúcaiva vahnîrvaitaraõî tathâ | kumbîpâka iti proktâny anityanarakâõi tu | tâmisraúcândhatâmisro dvau nityau samprakîrtitau | iti sapta pradhânâni balîyastûttarottaram | BSB 3.1.16. According to pte, Kumbipâka is ‘a particular hell in which the wicked are baked like potter’s vessels ... .’ pte, 585.

  20 amukrâstrividhâs tatra nîcamadhyoccabhedataþ | TV 6.

  21 Schrader, 86.

  22 Srinivasachari, 241. Jaini, 139–140.

  23 Grierson, ‘Mâdhvas, Madhvâchârîs,’ 234, nt. 3, 235, nt. 1. Grierson summarizes a debate whose origins lay in earlier speculations of A. Burnell and Collins, who

  addressed the same topic in The Indian Antiquary beginning in 1873.

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  and there certainly is a similarity at first glance, the influence on

  Christianity upon Madhvâcârya remains unlikely.24

  Acentanas , non-sentient entities

  Non-sentient entities are known to be three-fold: nitya, eternal, anitya, non-eternal, and nityânitya, both eternal and non-eternal.25 The only eternal non-sentient entity is the Vedas. As already mentioned in

  Chapter 2, Lord Viùõu did not create the Vedas. If they had been, they would be created at some time and would not be eternal. Despite being

  eternal they are nevertheless dependent on Viùõu to be revealed. For this

  reason they are still classified as paratantra, dependent upon another,

  and not svatantra, independent.

  In contrast to the eternal Vedas, Madhvâcârya holds that the Purâõas

  and the other smçti, kâla, time, and prakçti, material cause, are both eternal and non-eternal (see Fig. 3.7).

  acetanas

  nitya

  nityânitya

  anitya

  Vedas

  Purâõas smçti

  kâla prakçti

  3.7 Acetanas

  As mentioned in Chapter 2, smçti such as the Purâõas, Tantras and Mânava-dharma-úâstra, are humanly created. Given the flaws inherent

  in most human beings, these texts are not reproduced perfectly in each

  yuga, age, and so they are subject to change. This makes them anitya, non-eternal. Still, the purport of these texts is nitya, eternal. Therefore

  Madhvâcârya categorizes smçti as nityânitya, both eternal and non-eternal.

  Much of Madhvâcârya’s conception of time is based on the Purâõas.

  The universe proceeds through a cycle of four yugas, ages. These yugas,

  24 See Sarma, ‘Is Jesus a Hindu? S.C. Vasu and Multiple Mâdhva Misrepresentations’

  for more on this topic see also Kamath, Christian Influence on Madhvâcârya: A Myth Exploded and Glasenapp, 34.

  25 nityânityavibhâgena tridhaivâcetanaü matam | TS 7.

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  namely kçta, the first, tretâ, second, dvâpara, third, and kali, fourth age, are distinguished by the degree to which the sentient beings of the

  universe adhere to dharma, law or proper behavior.26 In kçta- yuga, dharma is upheld, while in kali-yuga, it is ignored. The names of the ages refer to throws in a game of dice. Kçta-yuga is the throw showing

  four points and is considered to be the luckiest. Tretâ-yuga shows three

  points and is less lucky. Even less lucky is dvâpara-yuga, the roll of the

  die resulting in only two points. Kali-yuga, the last yuga, is the side of the die marked with only one point and is not lucky. In the introduction

  to his BSB, Madhvâcârya cites a passage from the Skanda Purâõa when

  he describes the degeneration of dharma.27 According to Madhvâcârya, the Brahma Sûtras themselves were composed when Brahmâ, Rudra

  and other deities requested Viùõu’s assistance during dvâpara-yuga. 28

  At the end of kali-yuga when the universe is chaotic and filled with

  adharma, unlawful activities, Viùõu will return in his avatâra,

  incarnation, as Kalki who will destroy the universe and begin the cycle

/>   anew with the kçta-yuga. This periodic dissolution of the universe is

  called pralaya. One cycle is called a manvantara, age of a Manu, which is a portion of a kalpa, one day in the life of the god Brahmâ. Brahmâ, as

  I show, is in an integral part of the evolution of the universe.

  Why is kâla, time, held to be nityânitya, both eternal and non-eternal?

  Time is eternal in the sense that it comprises past, present and future, and

  moreover the past and future continue infinitely. Even conceiving of a

  time before or after time necessitates a concept of time! Hence it must be

  infinite in both ‘directions.’ As a continuous chain of events, it is eternal.

  On the other hand, it is finite since there are instances and parts of

  time, such as the yugas described above and as individual units of time,

  second, millisecond, and the like, which are fleeting. Every second that

  passes exhibits the non-eternal aspect of time. These non-eternal aspects

  of kâla, time, is made possible by the viúeùa, distinguishing property, which is described below. Kâla, time, is thus held to be nityânitya, both eternal and non-eternal.29

  Prakçti, material cause, is also nityânitya, eternal and non-eternal.

  Prakçti is the material stuff from which all other entities are evolved or

  created. It is categorized as both eternal and non-eternal, as it exists at all

  26 Descriptions of Purâõic time can be found in any introduction to Hinduism such as Klostermaier’s Introduction to Hinduism.

  27 nârâyaõâdviniùpannaü jñânam kçtayuge sthitam | kiücitttadanyathâ jâtaü tretâyâü dvâpare ‘khilam | BSB 0.

  28 dvâpare sarvatra jñâna âkulîbhûte tannirõayâya brahmarudrendrâdibhirarthito bhagavanânnârâyaõo ... | BSB 0.

  29 For more on time see Puthiadam, 221–225 and Siauve, 154 and following.

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  times but its emanations are anitya, non-eternal. The events and entities

  that evolve from prakçti change and dissolve and are not eternal. This is

  why prakçti is held to be both eternal and non-eternal.

  These two groups of non-sentient entities, the eternal ones and those

  that are simultaneously eternal and non-eternal, are both dependent on

  Viùõu. But Viùõu does not create them. This kind of monotheism is very

  different from other types, such as Christian ones, where God is the

  creator of all things, including the material stuff from which the universe

  is produced. The Mâdhva god is like a ‘chef’ who uses eternally existent

  ‘ingredients,’ namely prakçti, to ‘cook’ the universe. The Mâdhva god is

  an instrumental, rather than material, cause. The degree of omnipotence

  ascribed to the Mâdhva god is different from comparable Christian

  conceptions. I will examine Madhvâcârya’s ‘mitigated monotheism’ in

  more detail below.

  Madhvâcârya holds that anitya, non-eternal, entities are separable

  into saüsçùña, combined, and asaüsçùña, not combined entities.30

  Entities that are not combined evolve from prakçti. Though they

  originate from prakçti, it is not an absolute, ex nihilo, origination. The idea that material entities evolved from prakçti has its roots in the

  Sâükhya tradition, one of the oldest traditions of South Asian

  speculation. Though the mechanism of the evolution of prakçti differs,

  Madhvâcârya shares the belief that previously unmanifested prakçti

  manifests itself and differentiates itself into worldly entities through

  the will of Viùõu. Unlike one version of the Sâükhya vision, the

  Mâdhva process is not self-contained and requires that Viùõu impels

  the undifferentiated prakçti to manifest and evolve. In his BSB,

  Madhvâcârya explains that Viùõu enters into prakçti to make it evolve

  and He abides in its emanations to guide their evolution.31 The universe could and would not develop without Viùõu’s initiative and impetus.

  According to Madhvâcârya, prakçti has twenty-four emanations.

  Each of the twenty-four emanations in the Mâdhva system can be

  connected with components of the epistemology outlined in Chapter 2.

  They are the mahat, the great principle, the ahaükâra, ‘I’-ness, the buddhi, intellect, the manas, mind, the ten indriyas, sense organs, the pañca-tanmâtras, five subtle elements, and the pañca-bhûtas, the five

  elements.32 Aside from the buddhi which is not found in the Sâükhya

  30 nityânityaü tridhâ proktam anityaü dvividhaü mataü | TS 8.

  31 prakçtâvanupraviúya tâü pariõâmya tatpariõâmakatvena tatra sthitvâ ‘tmano bahudhâkaraõât | BSB 1.4.27.

  32 asaüsçùñaü ca saüsçùñaü asaüsçùñaü mahân aham | buddhir manaþ khâni daúa mâtrâ bhûtâni pañca ca | TS 9.

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  system, each has correlates in Sâükhya.33 Though Madhvâcârya does not list each of the sub-categories of the twenty-four in either his TS or

  TV, it is safe to assume that he was familiar with those of his Sâükhya

  predecessors and expected his readers to have the same knowledge.

  The mahat is the first emanation and the first thinking principle. It

  gives rise to the ahaükâra which is the organ that produces self-

  consciousness. From it arises the buddhi, the intellect, which gives rise

  to discrimination between objects. The manas evolves from the buddhi

  and, as already described in Chapter 2, it is the organizer of sensory data and intermediary between the senses and the sâkùî.

  The ten indriyas, sense organs, are next in the manifestation of

  unmanifested prakçti. These derive from the ahaükâra and are

  separable into the five buddhi-indriyas, senses, and five karma-indriyas, organs of action. The buddhi-indriyas, senses, are ghrâõa, smell,

  rasana, taste, cakùus, sight, úrotra, hearing, and tvak, touch. The karma-indriyas, organs of action, are vâc, speaking, pâõi, grasping , pâda, going, pâyu, excreting, and upastha, procreation. The pañca-tanmâtras, five subtle elements, also derive from the ahaükâra. These are the

  mâtras, objects, of the indriyas, senses, namely, úabda, sound, sparúa, feeling, rûpa, color, rasa, taste, and gandha, smell. The last set of emanations to derive from the ahaükâra is the pañca-bhûtas, the five elements. These are the gross aspects of the pañca-tanmâtras. They are

  âkâúa, ether, vâyu, air , agni, fire, jala, water , pçthivî, earth. kâúa corresponds to úabda, vâyû to sparúa, and the like. The gross elements are the substrate of the subtle elements (see Fig. 3.8).

  These non-eternal entities are not combined and, in theory, account

  for all non-sentient entities. They cannot be broken down into

  constituent parts, so other entities and events are all comprised of them.

  In contrast to these twenty-four, combined entities are proclaimed to

  be brahmâõóa, Brahmâ’s egg, and other entities found in it.34 This primordial egg was the locus for the evolution of the mahat and the

  birthplace of the god Brahmâ, as well as all other gods and goddesses. It

  is from this egg that the material universe is born. All events and

  combined entities are found within the brahmâõóa. It is the ‘pot’ within

  which is contained the primordial ‘stew.’

  Madhvâcârya does not propose the existence of any other elements

  in the universe aside from these in either his TS or his TV. He believes

  33 See Larson, Classical Sâükhya, 179–187 for m
ore on these terms and concepts.

  See Sharma, Philosophy, 234–236, Siauve, 124–125, and von Glassenapp, pp. 125–127

  for more on the Mâdhva characterization of these twenty-four emanations.

  34 saüsçùñaü aõóaü tadgaü ca samastaü parikîrtitam | TS 10.

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  anitya

  asaüsçùña – prakçti

  saüsçùña – brahmâõóa

  mahat ahaükâra buddhi manas indriyas

  pañca-tanmâtras

  pañca-bhûtas

  buddhi-indriyas

  karma-indriyas úabda sparúa rûpa rasa gandha

  ghrâõa rasana cakùus úrotra tvak

  vâc

  pâõi pâda

  pâyu upastha

  âkâúa vâyu

  agni

  jala pçthivî

  3.8 Anitya

  that all objects in the universe can be located in this taxonomy. As

  mentioned, later Mâdhvas posit components in addition to the ones

  described here but their commentaries are beyond the scope of the

  present inquiry.

  Svatantra, the only independent entity: Viùõu

  The Lord Viùõu is [the only] independent thing ... .35

  Madhvâcârya makes this strong claim in the first verse of his TS. This

  independence emerges as a result of being self-caused. In an argument

  reminiscent of Aquinas’s cosmological argument for the existence of

  God in his Summa Theologica,36 Madhvâcârya writes: ‘In the world, creation is seen [to occur] with the help of many [things which are]

  independent [of the putative] cause. This is not so for brahman [that is,

  Viùõu, who has no cause].’37 Like Aquinas, Madhvâcârya argues that things that at first seem to be self-caused are themselves caused. This

  leads both Aquinas and Madhvâcârya to hold that God is the first cause

  35 svatantro bhagavân viùõur ... | TS 1.

  36 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part One, Question Two, Article Three.

  37 svatantrabahusâdhanâ sçùñir loke dçùtâ | naivaü brahmaõaþ | BSB 2.1.15

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  which is self-caused and does not necessitate another cause, thereby

  avoiding what they consider to be an undesirable doùa, flaw, specifically

  an anavasthâ, infinite regress. 38

  As mentioned earlier, though Viùõu is independent and everything

 

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