Expert Political Judgment

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Expert Political Judgment Page 47

by Philip E. Tetlock

2 R. Winkler, “Evaluating Probabilities: Asymmetric Scoring Rules,” Management Science 40 (1994): 1395–1405.

  3 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992): 297–323; A. Tversky and C. R. Fox, “Weighing Risk and Uncertainty,” Psychological Review 102 (1995): 269–83.

  4 C. Ragin, Fuzzy-set Social Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

  5 A. Tversky and D. J. Koehler, “Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability,” Psychological Review 101 (1994): 547–67.

  Index

  Abelson, Robert, 39n. 36, 182–83n. 16

  academic hyperspecialization, 233

  academic journals, 233–34

  accountability, 185–86, 218n. 2

  accuracy criteria, 249–50; for domestic political leadership, 249; for government policy and economic performance, 249–50; for national security, 250

  Acheson, Dean, 143

  actor-dispensability debates, 106–7

  additive rule, 301; violations of, 303–5. See also sub-additivity; support theory; “unpacking” scenarios

  African National Congress (ANC), 109–10

  AIDS, 225

  Allen, P. G., 42n. 42

  Allison, G., xiii n. 4

  Almond, G., 134n. 11

  Al Qaeda, 6

  ambiguity, 38; aversion to ambiguity as factor driving fox-hedgehog performance differentials, 81–82

  American Political Science Association, 25

  analogical reasoning (from history), 38, 92–100

  Anderson, C., 191n. 3

  Angell, Norman, 102

  antideterminists, 153

  Argentina, 114, 115

  Arkes, H., 65n. 50, 123n. 2

  Armstrong, J. S., 65n. 50, 86n. 16, 1 18n. 46

  Arthur, B., 27n. 8

  Articles of Confederation, 89

  “Asian Tigers,” 116

  Bartels, L., 25n. 1

  base rates, 42n. 43, 49, 220; prediction strategies (using contemporaneous or recent past cross-sectional base rates, defined either restrictively or expansively), 51–52, 281–82. See also difficulty-adjusted probability scores

  Bayesian belief-updating exercises, 252; ex ante assessments, 253–54; ex post assessments, 254–56; respondents, 252–53. See also reputational bets

  Bayesians, 17, 18, 122, 123, 126n. 5, 129, 180

  belief system defenses, 81, 129, 187, 224; challenging the conditions of hypothesis testing defense, 129–31; close-call counterfactual defense (“I was almost right”), 132–34, 140, 140n. 20, 141, 182; exogenous-shock defense, 131–32; “I made the right mistake” defense, 83, 135; just-off-on-timing defense, 134, 141; the low-productivity outcome just happened to happen defense, 135–36; playing-a-different-game defense, 186–87; politics is hopelessly cloudlike defense, 134–35; protecting, 156; quantitative analysis of, 136–37; really not incorrigibly closed-minded defense, 180–81; wrong questions defense, 184–85, 184–85n. 18

  belief systems, minimalist versus maximalist models of constraint, 182–83, 183n. 16

  belief-updating rule, violations of, 308–9, 311

  Bell, D., 237n. 20

  Berlin, Isaiah, 2, 2n. 3, 67, 72–73, 86–87, 88, 162, 241. See also hedgehog/fox dimension

  Beyth-Marom, R., 123n. 2, 126n. 5

  Bhagwati, J., 115n. 42

  BJP Party, analogy to Nazi Party, 94, 94n. 22

  Blake, William, 216

  Blight, J., 5n. 7

  Bloom, H., 23n. 44. See also meta-cognition (and the art of self-overhearing)

  boomsters-doomsters, 71–72

  Botha, P. W., 109

  Braudel, Fernand, 144

  Brazil, 114

  Brehmer, B., 37n. 29

  British Labor Party, 94

  Bruner, Jerome, 226

  Buffet, Warren, 33

  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xii

  Bush, George W., 134; administration of, 6

  butterfly effect arguments, 31–32

  calibration, 47, 51–54, 72, 76, 78n. 9, 80n. 11, 84, 201, 275, 277; fox advantage of, 78–81, 79n. 10; versus discrimination, 279

  Camerer, C., 65n. 50, 185n. 19, 232n. 15

  Canada, 17, 115, 133, 134, 265–66. See also futures scenario experiments, Canadian

  Carroll, J. S., 196n. 14

  Carroll, Lewis, 216

  Carter, Jimmy, 30

  case-specific extrapolation algorithms, 51–53, 77, 282

  case study methods (strengths and limitations), 4–7

  Castro, Fidel, 5, 97

  catch-up, 59, 83, 179–80

  causality, 145–46

  Cederman, L., 227n. 7

  Chaiken, S., 118n. 45

  “change scenarios,” 196

  Chapman, G. B., 65n. 50

  China, 29, 115–17, 186, 192, 203–4, 210; as “multiethnic empire,” 116

  Chiu, C. Y., 160n. 16

  Churchill, Winston, 26, 27

  Civil War, the, 31

  clairvoyance test, 13–14, 175, 243

  clash of civilizations thesis, 105

  Clausewitz, Carl von, 33n. 26

  Clinton, Bill, 131, 132

  close-call counterfactual exercises, xiv–xv, 258–59; beliefs about, 262–65; perceptions of close calls in Soviet history, 259–60; perceptions of contingency in South African history, 260–61; rewriting twentieth-century history, 261–62; unmaking the West, 264–65

  cognitive conservatism, 7n. 11, 125–26, 126n. 5, 128, 128–29n. 9

  cognitive process, 83–85

  cognitive style, 75–76n. 7, 165, 182–83n. 16. See also hedgehog-fox dimension

  Cohen, S., 148n. 7

  coherence/process tests, 7, 17, 234

  cold war, the, 155–56

  communism: Chinese, 116, 157; communist regimes, collapse of, 96–97. See also Soviet Union, Communist Party of

  complexity theorists, 30–32

  conceptual integration index, 84

  Congo, the, 106

  conservatives, xiv n. 7, xv, xv n. 12, 12, 150–51, 152, 158–59, 257–58

  constructivists/constructivism, 177, 179, 225–26

  consumers, of expert pronouncements/information, 63, 231–32, 231n. 11, 235

  correspondence indicators of good judgment, 7, 10, 12; calibration versus discrimination, 279; components of, 275, 277–78; overconfidence versus regression toward the mean, 279–80; —, extension to multiple outcomes, 281; —, and operationalizing “mindless” competition, 281–82; —, and operationalizing sophisticated competition, 282–83; probability score decomposition, 274–75; probability scoring, 273–74. See also probability scoring, adjustments to; value adjustments (of probability scores)

  correspondence theory, 12, 15

  counterfactuals, 18n. 32, 22, 140, 144–45, 156, 157, 161–63; plausible counterfactual reroutings of history, 145–48, 152–53; and reasoning as a two-stage affair, 147–48. See also close-call counter-factual exercises

  covering laws, 88–91

  Cowley, R., 31n. 17

  Croatia, 91

  Cromwell, Oliver, 143

  Cuba, 97

  Cuban missile crisis, xii, 5, 143, 206–9; research procedures for Cuban missile crisis experiment, 269–71

  Czech Republic, 95

  Dawes, Robyn, 12n. 18, 34, 37n. 30, 161n. 18

  “debiasing” judgments, 185, 189–90; how checking one bias can amplify others, 213–15; of possible futures, 194–95; of possible pasts, 202–3, 212–13

  Declaration of Independence, 89

  de Klerk, Pieter Willem, 151, 152

  Democrats, 6, 10n. 15, 13, 15

  Deng Xiaoping, 93, 96, 108, 116, 176

  deterrence theory, xiv Deutsch, M., xiii n. 5

  difficulty-adjusted probability scores, 173–75, 284–88

  dilettantes, 54, 56–57, 59

  discrimination, 47, 51–54, 72, 84, 201, 277–78; versus calibration, 279. See also Normali
zed Discrimination Index (NDI)

  dissonance, 39; belief-system defenses as modes of dissonance reduction, 129–37; “don’t bother me with dumb questions test,” 24; greater fox tolerance for dissonance as factor driving fox-hedgehog performance differentials, 84–85, 88, 141–42, 156, 160–61; neutralization of close-call counterfactuals as dissonance reduction, 147–63; neutralization of dissonant historical discoveries, 158–60

  doomsters versus boomsters, 71–72

  double standards, 181–82

  dynamic–process test, 124–25. See also reputational bets

  Eagly, A., 118n. 45

  Edwards, W., 39n. 38, 126n. 5

  Ehrlich, Paul, 15, 17

  Einhorn, H., 21n. 40

  Eliot, George, 25

  Elstain, A., 65n. 50

  Elster, J., 157n. 7

  empirical accuracy, 190, 190n. 1, 218

  empirical findings, manipulation of, 160n. 17

  Ericsson, K. A., 65n. 50

  Estonia, 95

  Etheredge, L., xiv n. 7

  “Eurocentric triumphalism,” 153

  European Monetary Union (EMU), 89, 91, 132, 134

  evaluative differentiation, 250–52; evaluative differentiation index, 83

  Evans, P., 113n. 40

  evidence, setting standards for, 156–61, 165, 190–91, 215

  exclusivity and exhaustiveness test, 243–44

  experts/expertise, 49, 54, 56–57, 59, 81, 122–23, 160n. 17, 193n. 9; accountability of, 185–86, 186n. 20; and framings of historical questions, 207–9; hedgehog, 82; and hindsight effects, 137–38; inaccurate predictions of, 161–62. See also forecasters/forecasting; futures scenario experiments

  explanation, and prediction, 14

  extrapolation algorithms: cautious or aggressive case-specific algorithms, 42, 53, 53n. 47; contemporaneous base rate algorithms, 51–52; formal statistical models, 42, 282–83; restrictive versus expansive recent base rates, 51–52;

  extremists/extremism, 75, 80, 81, 82, 84. See also ideologue hypothesis; moderation-extremism

  factor analysis, 69–71n. 1, 75n. 6

  false alarms, 11–12; tendency for hedgehogs to issue false alarms of change, 83, 166–69. See also value adjustments (of probability scores)

  falsification, 164, 180, 180n. 13

  Farnham, B., 6n. 8

  fatalism, 39

  Fearon, J., 146n. 1

  Feldstein, Martin, 15

  Feyerabend, P., 3n. 4

  Fischer, Stanley, 135

  Fischhoff, B., 101n. 30, 123n. 2, 126n. 5, 191n. 2

  Fiske, A., 112n. 38

  Fiske, S., 37n. 30

  Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 67

  Fogel, Robert, 31

  forecasters/forecasting, 14–15, 16, 17, 86n. 16, 166, 218n. 2, 223, 235n. 17; accuracy of, 33, 40–41, 81, 235, 249–52; and alternative perspectives, 122–23n. 1; and the forecasting horizon, 81, 82; inferiority of, 179; “inside” and “outside” approaches to, 194; methodological background, 44–49; political, 25; qualifications and motivations of, 185–86; regional, 20–21. See also belief system defenses; forecasting, types of questions; hedgehog/fox dimension; hypotheses; imagination effect; probability scoring; randomness; regional forecasting exercises; reputational bets; thought coding; value adjustments (of probability scores)

  forecasting, types of questions, 246; continuity of domestic political leadership, 246–47, 249; criteria for, 243–44; domestic policy and economic performance, 247, 249–50; national security and defense policy, 247–48, 250; “posterior probability questions,” 255–56; special-purpose exercises, 248

  Foucault, Michel, 225

  Fox, C. R., 293n. 3

  fox/foxes. See hedgehog/fox dimension

  Friedman, T., xiii n. 6, 115n. 43

  futures scenario experiments, 199–202, 199n. 15, 214, 253–54; Canadian, 195–98, 265–66; Japanese, 198–99, 266–67

  Gaddis, J. L., 146n. 6

  game theorists, 32–34; foxes’ greater sensitivity to stability/fragility of equilibria, 22, 107–12; foxes’ tendency to hedge bets on rationality, 112–17

  Gandhi, Mahatma, 15, 26

  Garb, H. N., 161n. 19

  Garthoff, R., 93n. 21

  Gartzke, E., 33n. 26

  Gates, Bill, 17, 25

  Geertz, Clifford, 230

  Genco, T., 134n. 11

  genocide, 12

  George, A. L., 7n. 12

  Georgia, 92

  Gigerenzer, G., 21n. 39, 119n. 48, 183n. 17, 228n. 8

  Gilbert, M., 26n. 4

  Gilovich, T., 43n. 44

  Gleick, J., 30n. 14

  globalization, 115. See also boomsters-doomsters

  Goldstone, J., 29n11

  good judgment, 12n. 18, 23, 33, 144, 215, 217, 219, 220, 221, 227; and coherence and process tests, 7; and correspondence tests, 7; equated with good luck, 19–20; five challenges in assessing it, 11–13; obstacles to, 37; —, aversion to ambiguity and dissonance, 38–39; —, lightness of our understanding of randomness, 39–40; —, need for control, 39; —, preference for simplicity, 37–38; process and correspondence conceptions of, 141–43; and self-serving reasoning, 18. See also correspondence indicators of good judgment; good judgment, qualitative search for; good judgment, quantitative search for; leadership; logical-coherence, and process indicators of good judgment

  good judgment, qualitative search for, 86–117 passim, 117–20

  good judgment, quantitative search for, 68–86

  passim, 117–20; cognitive style correlates, 72–73, 75–86; content correlates, 69, 71–72; demographic and life history correlates, 68

  Gorbachev, Mikhail, xiii, xiv, xv, 12, 89, 96, 107–8, 131, 132

  Gore, Al, 130, 131, 134

  Gould, Stephen Jay, 26n. 2, 153

  Great Depression, 186

  Green, D., 10n. 15

  Green, K., 86n. 16

  Greenstein, F., 5n. 5

  Grice, H. P., 122n. 1

  Griffin, D., 123n. 2

  gross domestic product (GDP), 247, 249–50

  Grove, W. M., 54n. 48

  Hammond, K., 7n. 10

  Hastie, R., 138n. 16

  Hawkins, S., 138n. 16, 191n. 4

  Heath, C., 231n. 12

  hedgehog/fox dimension, 2, 20–23, 72–73, 75–86, 75n. 6, 75–76n. 7, 79n. 10, 119n. 47, 127n. 7, 186–88, 241, 268; defense of hedgehogs, 164–66; “foxes are just chickens” hypothesis, 80, 85; and historical contingency, 205–6; integration of conflicting cognitions and foxes, 106–7; patterning of fox/hedgehog differences, 80–81; political passion, and foxes, 104–6; reasoning stages of hedgehog and fox, 88–92; rhetoric, and foxes, 100–101; “triumphalist” hedgehogs, 96; worries about judging the past, 101–4. See also calibration, fox advantage of; “debiasing” judgments; futures scenario experiments; good judgment; probability scoring; reputational bets; value adjustments (of probability scores)

  Hempel, C., 90n. 18

  “Hempelian” agenda, 90

  Herrmann, R., xiv n. 7

  heuristics, 119, 119–20n. 50, 236, 308

  hindsight effects, 137–41, 162, 165; anticipatory, 102; hindsight bias, 140, 183–84, 183n. 17, 191, 203–5, 214; hindsight distortion, 138n. 18

  Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 5

  Hirt, E., 199n. 15

  historians, 31, 101

  history, 30, 38, 144, 145, 182–83; assessing causation in, 146; historical contingency, 205–6; and incomprehensibly intricate networks, 30–31; and narrative, 226–27; and technology, 29

  Hitler, Adolf, 4, 10, 15, 26, 27, 99–100

  hits, 11–12

  Hogarth, R., 21n. 40, 185n. 19, 232n. 15

  Huizinga, Johan, 144

  Hume, David, 230

  Hungary, 95

  Hussein, Saddam, 1–2, 99, 106, 113–14, 114n. 41, 130, 133

  hypotheses: debunking, 41–42, 49, 51–54; diminishing marginal returns from, 42–43, 54, 56–57, 59; “fifteen minutes of fame” (Andy Warhol hypothesis), 43, 59–60; indefinite
ly sustainable illusion, 43–44, 63–64; overconfidence (hot air hypothesis), 43, 60–62; seduced by power, 43, 62–63; systematic error, 61

  hypothesis testing, 125–26n. 4, 162, 180; challenging the conditions of, 129–31

  ideologue hypothesis, 75–76n. 7. See also moderation-extremism

  “imaginability,” 197

  imagination effect, 190–94, 195, 213–15; three conditions of for greatest effect, 196

  indeterminacy, 32; and the “guess the number” game, 32–33. See also radical skepticism

  index funds, 237

  India, 93–94, 116

  Indonesia, 90, 106

  institutionalists, 71, 90

  integrative complexity index, 84, 252

  International Monetary Fund (IMF), 105, 114, 135

  Iraq, 106, 114n. 41; U.S. invasion of, 1–2

  Islam, 29, 210

  Iyengar, S., 76n. 7

  Jacobson, H., 113n. 40

  Japan, 5, 110–11, 266–67. See also futures scenario experiments, Japanese

  Jensen’s inequality, 179

  Jentleson, B., 4n. 5

  Jervis, Robert, 38n. 31, 40n. 41, 100n. 29, 134n. 11, 173n. 9

  John, O., 75n. 6

  Johnson, E., 65n. 50

  Johnson, Samuel, 4, 224

  Jost, J., 75n. 7

  judgment. See “debiasing” judgments; good judgment

  Kahneman, Daniel, 40n. 41, 189, 194, 293n. 3

  Kashmir, 99, 101

  Kazakhstan, 94–95, 133

  Kennedy, John F., 5

  Kenny, D., 137n. 14

  Kent, Sherman, 17n. 29, 27n. 29, 143n. 22, 238n. 22

  Keren, G., 66n. 50

  Keynes, John Meynard, 121

  Khong, Y. F., 4n. 5

  Kim Jong-Il, 96, 99

  King Fahd, 98

  Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, xv

  Kissinger, Henry, 134

  k method (of value-adjusting probability scores), the, 57, 169, 288, 289–92

  knowledge, “ideographic” and “nomothetic,” 8n. 13

  Koehler, J., 40n. 40, 303n. 5

  Kruglanski, A., 11n. 16, 75nn. 6 and 7, 126n. 6, 160n. 16

  Krugman, P., 115n. 42

  Kunda, Z., 2n. 2, 128n. 9

  Lakatos, I., 137n. 15, 180n. 13

  Langer, E., 39n. 37

  Larsen, D., 5n. 5

  Laudan, P., 18n. 31

  leaders: rationality of, 112–13; “when do leaders matter?” 107–12

  leadership, 18n. 32, 107, 107n. 34

  Lebow, Ned, 206

  left versus right, 71, 75–76n. 7

  Legvold, R., 109n. 35

  Lepper, M., 128n. 8

  level playing fields, 11

 

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