Roy, J. Stapleton, 54
Rusch, Claudia, 53–54
Russia: invasion of Georgia by, 208; NATO-Russia Founding Act, 206–7; as potential NATO member, 205; prefab model and lack of role for, 8–9; resentment caused by NATO expansion, 204–9, 214; role of, 3
Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 96, 170, 185, 187, 190
Saarland, 131
Schabowski, Günter, 36–37, 39–40, 42, 50, 210
Schäuble, Wolfgang, 130–32, 156, 187; assassination attempt on, 196
Schefke, Siegbert, 20–21
Scherbakova, Irina, 11, 12, 290n2
Schmidt, Helmut, 24, 69
Schrecker, Ellen, xi–xii
Schultz, George, 22–23
Scowcroft, Brent, 55, 121; 2 + 4 forum and, 125, 126; bilateral agreement between Kohl and Gorbachev as concern of, 121–22, 139, 209; on Bush’s endorsement of unification, 67, 79; draft communiqué defining NATO reforms, 174; on EC and unification process, 57; interview with, xiv; on Laeken dinner, 79; role in negotiations, 49, 66, 75, 77, 105, 124, 125, 128, 172, 173, 191, 192; role in policy formation, 24–25
secret police. See KGB (Soviet state security force); Stasi (East German state security force)
SED. See Socialist Unity Party (SED)
Seiters, Rudolf, 62, 85, 99
self-confidence of East Germans, 28–38, 46
self-determination, German: Article 23 and provision for self-determination, 131–32; Basic Law and, 130–31; and choice among competing models for unification, 9; CSCE provision for, 162; disengagement of superpowers as context for East European, 46; EC endorsement of, 82; Gorbachev and endorsement of, 113; rise in East German self-confidence and progress toward, 28–38; Soviet endorsement of, 113, 120–21; Thatcher on responsibilities of Four Powers vs., 67
Sello, Tom, 21
Shamir, Yitzhak, 86
Shevardnadze, Eduard: 2 + 4 meetings and, 111, 122, 123, 158, 169, 190, 298n223; and backchannel diplomacy, 106; Baker and, 109, 111, 121, 163–64, 169, 176; on Cheney, 23; Gorbachev contradicted by, 184; internal Soviet politics and, 164, 184, 195; on Nazi Germany, 58–59; ouster of, 195; possible dissolution of Warsaw Pact, 105; role in negotiations, 75–76, 80, 102, 106, 121, 144, 159, 169, 178, 179, 184; troop deployment agreement with U.S., 121; and unified Germany as perceived threat, 58–59, 76, 132, 137, 144
“shoot-to-kill” border control, 12, 14–15, 42, 45
Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF), 26–27, 28, 290
Shultz, George, 22–23
Sicherman, Harvey, 97, 138–40, 155
Sixteen, the. See NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
Skocpol, Theda, xiv
Skubiszewski, Krysztof, 127
SNF. See Short-Range Nuclear Forces
Sobchak, Anatoly, 176
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): alliance politics and, 103–4, 133, 152; Brandt as representative of, 52, 140–41, 142; in East Germany, 104, 137; in elections and electoral politics, 104, 120, 140–43, 196; as Kohl’s opposition, 52–53, 102, 104, 120, 137, 196; prefab model opposed by, 137, 152–53, 187; as round table participant, 92; Soviet Union and, 102, 137
socialism, 14
Socialist Unity Party (SED): bureaucratic culture of, 153; decline in power of, 63, 69–70, 85, 133, 198; elections and electoral politics, 42, 133, 143; leadership failures of, 29, 35–36; links to Moscow, 36, 102; management of borders by, 63; Modrow’s leadership of, 70, 96; and opening of Berlin Wall, 63; reconstituted as PDS, 96, 143; as roundtable participant, 92, 94–95; travel and emigration reforms implemented by, 35–36
Solana, Javier, 206
Solidarity, 11, 18, 25, 28, 46, 49, 50, 60, 139
Soviet Union (USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): collapse of, 16, 202, 211; disengagement of, 22–25, 78, 120–21; disintegration of, 101, 109, 144, 155, 158, 162, 174, 187, 202, 211; economic situation in, 16, 36, 59, 102, 128, 151, 159, 172–73, 181–82; endorsement of German self-determination by, 113, 120–21; exclusion from process and influence, 156, 206; informal agreements with U.S. as source of resentment, 208–9; INF treaty and, 156; internal Soviet politics as context for negotiations by, 155, 161, 164, 184, 195; as key actor, 50, 101; “money carrot” as incentive to, 113, 128, 151, 157–60, 169–70, 172, 177, 179–80, 186, 188, 190, 191, 206, 211–12; NATO expansion opposed by, 205; negotiations with, 109–11, 126, 156, 158–59; political culture in, 109–11; popular support for German unification in, 181–82; Portugalov as representative of, 70–72; resentment caused by NATO expansion, 204–9, 212; role in process, 16; SED and failure to consult with, 36; trade with GDR, 154, 156; U.S. as rival superpower, 11; vacillating positions during negotiations, 70–72, 144, 169, 184. See also Gorbachev, Mikhail
SPD. See Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
“special military status” for GDR, 112, 129, 172, 288n99
Stahl, Lesley, 54–55
Stalin, Joseph and Stalinist Russia, 89, 107
“Star Wars” missile defense program, 12
Stasi (East German state security force): attempts to incite unrest by, 96; closure of, 98, 115; collaboration as political disadvantage, 133, 142; collaboration as taint on political career, 300n7; destruction of documents by, 98; dissidents and, 92, 94; dissidents and protection of, 98; Havemann and, 88–89, 92; and Jahn’s deportation, 11, 14, 92; Modrow and, 96–97, 99, 112; Normannen Street protest against, 97–98; as potential targets of retribution, 94, 197; and preparation for “German Tiananmen” in Leipzig, 18, 20, 22; reconstituted as Nasi (Office for National Security), 93–94, 96; plans to reconstitute as Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 96–97; report on mass emigration after opening of Berlin Wall, 43–44; surveillance as economic burden, 13
State Department (U.S.). See Baker, James A. III “Jim”; Ross, Dennis; Sicherman, Harvey; Zoellick, Robert
Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 27, 105, 125, 163
Sununu, John, 55
Szymborska, Wladislawa, 195
Tajikistan, 109
television: Bornholmer Street opening broadcast on, 43; East German access to West German broadcasts, 40–41, 53; and East German emigration, 33; and East German response to opening of Berlin Wall, 40–41; East German self-confidence and, 43, 46; impact of, 21; massive emigration linked to, 43–44; role in process, 16. See also Media
Teltschik, Horst, 53, 62–63, 66, 70–76, 74, 82, 85, 105, 188; Genscher as rival for influence, 71; on Gorbachev’s motives, 211; interview with, xiv; as Kohl’s aide, 52, 126; Portugalov as information source for, 70–72; role in negotiations, 112, 124, 127, 128, 160, 177; on Thatcher’s reaction, 100
Ten-Point-Program, 72, 73, 75–76, 79–80, 95, 198; Bush informed in advance of, 74–75; Gorbachev’s rejection of, 75–76; Mitterrand’s reaction to, 76; opposition to, 75–76
Thatcher, Margaret: on 2 + 4 framework, 126; access to primary documents, xiii; arms control and, 67; Bush and, 67; as dismissive of EC, 100; on Gorbachev, 155; Gorbachev and, 27–28, 61, 67, 106, 171; heroic model and, 106; inability to build coalition with remaining Four Powers, 101; Kohl and, 61, 100–101, 146–47, 152, 176; Mitterrand and, 58, 61, 64–65, 80, 100; Mitterrand’s description of, 61; opposition to unification, 27–28, 56–57, 61, 64, 67, 82, 100, 146, 171; as proponent of continued quadripartite control, 67, 80; as relatively excluded from unification process, 61, 139; restoration model and, 67; W.W.II as experiential frame for, 27, 61
Thaysen, Uwe, 94
Thirty-five, the. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Thomson, James, 163
Thucydides, 150
Tiananmen Square, 19; Deng on cause of, 18; as example for Europe, 16–22, 45, 47, 214; Krenz on, 292n20; protests and crackdown, 16–18
travel restrictions, 31; SED and reforms in travel and emigration regulations, 35–36; visa applications after November 9, 45
treaties: Helsinki Final Act and right to enter into, 162; Kohl’s reference to Stalinist era, 136–37, 202; monetary union and trade, 157; ratificati
on of unification, 195; unification and legality of, 130, 132, 136, 139. See also specific treaties
troops: Four Powers agreement and, 26; “ghetto psychology” of, 134; increased and diversified presence proposed by Warsaw Pact, 155; monetary union as problematic for Soviet, 134, 156, 158–59, 170; NATO troop deployment after unification, 192; NATO troop deployment after W.W.II, 26; numbers stationed in FRG and GDR, 26; Soviet, 2, 9, 26, 47, 80, 97, 99, 134, 156, 158–59, 170; as subject to German law, 190; “temporary” status of Soviet deployment of, 134; transition period, for Soviet, 167, 180, 182, 184; U.S., 110, 134, 177; violence potential linked to, 2, 80, 97
troops, withdrawal of: Bush policies on, 78; CFE negotiations and troop levels, 177–78, 184; economic arrangements for, 182, 187, 189–90, 191; Four Powers and concern regarding, 100; Gorbachev and, 77; Havel’s proposal for universal, 105–6; as negotiation issue, 100, 102, 110, 134–35, 140, 157, 162, 179, 184; Soviet, 102, 121, 162, 180, 182, 184–85, 189–90
Tutwiler, Margaret, 124
12, the. See European Community (EC)
2 + 4 forum, 102, 104–5, 110, 122, 181, 185; accord created during, 189–92, 194; as advantageous for U.S., 126, 139–40, 156; bilateral German-Soviet negotiations avoided by, 126, 156, 158–59; Chernyaev’s “six” power proposal, 102; consultative function of, 125–26; limits to scope of, 123, 129, 139, 152–53, 156; media and publicizing of, 123–24; NATO membership and, 126, 139–40; NSC and, 125; Poland and, 127, 144, 185; representation of GDR at, 152–53; Soviet role in, 123–24, 129, 158–59, 190
Uhse, Beate, 69
Ukraine, 187
Ullmann, Wolfgang, 115
unification, German: alternative plans for (see models, competing visions of unification); Basic Law Article 23 and provision for, 131–32; Basic Law Article 146 and provision for, 116, 117, 130–31; as campaign issue in German elections, 87, 119–20, 160; and competition for economic aid with EC, 145, 188; costs of, 187–89; East German opposition to, 152–53; economic and monetary union, 82–85, 112, 133–34, 135, 144, 148, 149, 156, 160, 194; economic impacts of, 203–4; European integration linked to, 8, 65, 82–83, 144, 145, 149; exchange rate as issue, 144–45, 154, 156, 200; German self-determination and, 120–21; interest in cooperating with united Germany, 181–82; as issue in electoral politics, 189; litigation after, 203; “money carrot” as incentive to USSR, 113, 128, 151, 157–60, 169–70, 172, 177, 179–80, 186, 188, 190, 191, 206, 212; neutralization and demilitarization linked to, 121; perceived expansionist threat and, 28, 82, 86, 115, 131–32, 144, 158, 178–79, 180; popular support for, 53, 85–87, 95, 138–39, 160; “post-historical” era in politics and, 201; Schäuble and preparation of unity treaty, 156, 187, 190, 196; Soviet opposition to, 158; Soviet requirements for endorsement of, 121, 180; speed of process, 86–87, 95, 99, 112, 120, 123, 139, 145, 147, 187, 188–89, 200, 202, 203, 211, 214; West German opposition to, 70, 189
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union (USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). See Great Britain
United Nations, 22–25, 188
United States (U.S.): disengagement of, 22–25, 46, 49, 78; Gorbachev’s heroic model and exclusion of, 155–56; as key actor, 49, 209; Poland and, 25; policy regarding Gorbachev, 205–6; role in process, 16; stake in preservation of status quo, 46. See also Bush, George H. W.
USSR. See Soviet Union (USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) vandalism, 96, 98
Vashem, Yad, 89
Védrine, Hubert, 147, 210, 296n29
violence: dissident commitment to nonviolence, 94; Gorbachev’s inclination toward nonviolent responses, 18, 45–46; media insulation of East German leadership and lack of violent reprisal on November 9, 44–45; potential on November 9, 42–43; Soviet troops and potential for, 2, 80, 97
Volkskammer, 117, 136, 152, 171; election results (1990), 142
Waigel, Theo, 63, 179, 181, 182, 186, 189–91
Wałe˛sa, Lech, 50
Wallace, Chris, 55–56
Walters, Vernon, 54, 75, 81, 99
Warsaw Pact: arms race and, 26–27; CFE and, 195; declining influence and authority of, 174, 176; demilitarization and, 153; disagreement among members regarding unification, 144; East German desire for withdrawal of, 91; East German optimism regarding reforms, 14; GDR as member of, 65, 190; Gorbachev as leader of, 59, 80, 185; heroic model and institutional replacement of, 104–5, 172; map of member states, 30; as perceived threat to the West, 79; reform efforts of, 14, 80, 172; Shevardnadze and possible dissolution of, 105; as trade network, 36, 137, 154, 156; troop increases proposed by, 155; unification as threat to existence of, 59; unified Germany as member state in, 155, 167; withdrawal of Germany from membership in, 190
Washington Summit, 160–68, 182–83, 288n61
Weber, Juliane, 62
Weber, Max, 119, 120
“welcome money,” 45, 68
Westad, Odd Arne, xiv
West German Federal Bank (Bundesbank), 85, 133–34, 144–45, 154
West German-Polish Treaty of 1970, 103
West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany)
Wolfram, Klaus, 116
World Bank, 25
World War II: four-power rights, 26, 65–66; peace treaty proposals in 1989, 127, 185, 202; reparations as ongoing issue, 136. See also Nazism (National Socialism)
Wörner, Manfred, 49, 56, 112, 125, 129, 140, 173, 175, 176, 178, 186, 288n24
Yakovlev, Alexander, 23, 102, 212
Yao Yilin, 19
Yeltsin, Boris, 163, 168, 176, 206–7, 207
Zagladin, Vadim, 124
Zelikow, Philip, 55, 71, 77, 79, 112, 113–14, 115, 125, 168, 174; interview with, xiv; on NATO expansion, 207
Zoellick, Robert, 33, 77–78, 125, 138, 175, 192; interview with, xiv
1989- The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe Page 56
