by Amanda
coins that had been produced at Tarsus for the satrap Mazaeus towards the
end of Persian rule in Cilicia indicates that Alexander had simply taken
over the same mint and the same staff now used the same dies to strike the
new coins. Naturally the issuing of coins is above all an economic
enterprise; one which was made possible thanks to the capture of
considerable amounts of precious metal at Issus. On the other hand, one
cannot but also associate it with the historic importance of the Battle of
Issus itself. After this great victory Alexander began speaking more openly
about his intention to rule over the entire Achaemenid Empire. From the
propaganda point of view this was therefore a good moment to issue a new
coin that stressed this claim.104
5. Phoenicia. Syria and Palestine
After an all-night flight the defeated king of Persia arrived at a place called
Onchai (exact location today unknown) somewhere on the Amik Plain in
western Syria (today Turkey, near Antakya – in Antiquity Antioch on the
Orontes). He had gathered troops on the way, so that at Onchai there were
with him either 4,000 Greek mercenaries (according to Curtius) or 4,000
troops in all (according to Arrian). The king and these soldiers next made a
forced march east to cross the Euphrates at Thapsacus and thence to
Babylon. Despite the defeat, Darius had absolutely no intention of
surrendering. 105 We know that, apart from the soldiers accompanying
Darius, also large numbers of other Greek mercenaries had survived the
104 Curt., 3.12.13; Arr., An. , 2.12.1-2; It. Alex. , 36; St. Byz., s.v. IssÒj. Heckel 1992, pp. 260-261; Salazar 2000, pp. 186-187, 194; Le Rider 2003, pp. 161-169.
105 Arr., An. , 2.13.1; Curt., 4.1.1-3; Diod., 17.39.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 222;
Atkinson 1980, pp. 267-268; Seibert 1985, p. 70.
From Abydus to Alexandria
177
Battle of Issus. Unfortunately the sources give us inconsistent information
regarding the size of the groups and the routes they took to rejoin the rest
of the Persian army. At least 8,000 commanded by the Macedonian
Amyntas as well as the Greeks Aristomedes, Thymondas and Bianor
reached the city of Tripoli (in Lebanon), where Persian ships were
stationed. From there they sailed to Cyprus, where they divided into two
groups. 4,000 of these soldiers next sailed with Amyntas to Egypt, which
seemed to be an easy prey after the country’s satrap Sabaces had been
killed at Issus. In Egypt Amyntas, claiming to have been appointed by
Darius III the new satrap or overall commander of troops, succeeded in
capturing the important fortress of Pelusium. Next he sailed up the Nile to
Memphis, defeated the city’s garrison in a pitched battle and allowed his
soldiers to plunder the area around the Egyptian capital. It was then that
Mazaces, who had genuinely been appointed Sabaces’s successor as satrap
of Egypt, launched a sally out of the beleaguered city and slaughtered
Amyntas’s dispersed soldiers.106 Another 8,000 Greek veterans of Issus,
no doubt including the remaining 4,000 mercenaries that had originally
sailed to Cyprus, eventually turned up in Crete, where they entered the
service of King Agis III of Sparta in his conflict against pro-Macedonian
party on that island.107
The rest of the Persian army that had survived the Battle of Issus made
its way into the interior of Asia Minor, where it continued the war against
Alexander. In the winter of 333/332 a significant number of Iranian
detachments together with their commanders, including the highest
ranking official in Persia, the hazarapatiš Nabarzanes, gathered in
Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and Cilicia. Some scholars presume that these
Persian forces were acting on the Great King’s orders and that their
mission was to cut Alexander’s supply lines, recapture territories right up
to the coast so as to re-establish contact with the Persian fleet and even to
retake Sardis. Unfortunately, the ancient sources do not provide evidence
that could univocally lead us to such a conclusion. There is even no
evidence that there was any coordination between the actions of the
various Persian commanders. This would have indeed been extremely
difficult considering the means of communication between forces in those
times, that is, by using runners who would have had to have constantly cut
across enemy occupied territory. The Persian commanders did, however,
levy fresh troops in Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, and next entered Lydia.
106 Curt., 4.1.27-33; Diod., 17.48.2-5; Arr., An. , 2.13.1-3. Parke 1933, p. 199;
Bosworth 1980, pp. 222-223.
107 Arr., An. , 2.13.2; Diod., 17.48.1; Curt., 4.1.39-40. Badian 1961, p. 26; Atkinson
1980, p. 291.
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Chapter IV
The Macedonian satrap of this district, Antigonus, did not have a large
force, but by skilfully exploiting the region’s network of roads he was able
to separately defeat each of the three Persian armies in turn. After these
victories his army entered Lycaonia, while another Macedonian
commander, Calas, invaded Paphlagonia. These battles did not mark the
final defeat of the Persians in Asia Minor, large parts of which the
Macedonians never managed to conquer. Nevertheless, thanks to the
exceptional military talents of Antigonus the crisis in the region was
overcome and Alexander no longer had to fear his land connections with
Macedonia being cut.108
It was also in 332 that the fate of the Persian fleet was sealed and that
of the Aegean Sea campaign with it. In the spring Pharnabazus lost
successive squadrons of Phoenician kings returning to their homeland on
news of the advancing Macedonian army. Most switched their allegiance
to Alexander’s winning side, whereas the ships of Tyre hurried to save
their beleaguered city. That same spring the squadrons of the Cypriot
kings also suddenly sailed away from Pharnabazus’s fleet and joined
forces with the victorious Macedonian land army. Unrest spread across the
Greek islands of the Aegean. When a fleet of 160 ships commanded by
Hegelochus and Amphoterus led to a Macedonian occupation of Tenedos,
fighting started between pro-Macedonian and pro-Persian factions on
Chios. Pharnabazus managed to intervene in time. He imprisoned the
supporters of Macedonia and left a small detachment of troops to keep the
island secure for the pro-Persian politicians Apollonides and Athenagoras.
However, thanks to secret allies within the city, Hegelochus and
Amphoterus occupied Chios, arresting not only the pro-Persian politicians
but also Pharnabazus. Soon they also captured a pro-Persian tyrant of
Methymna in Lesbos, who sailed into the port of Chios with five ships
quite unaware that it was now in Macedonian hands. Then in the summer
of 332 the Macedonian flotilla sailed to Lesbos, where the sources report
that only the tyrant of Mytilene, Chares, put up resistance with the 2,000
mercenaries the Persian commanders had left behind. After a short siege
Mytilene capitulated on such terms that Chares and the mercenaries were
allowed to sail to Imbros. Chares’s resistance had been short-lived on
account of the pro-Macedonian stance of most of the inhabitants of this
largest of the poleis on Lesbos; it was for this stance that in 331 Alexander
rewarded Mytilene with financial compensation and land in Asia Minor
closest to the Island of Lesbos. The Macedonians went on to capture the
large island of Kos, while other islands not named in the sources now also
108 Diod., 17.48.5-6; Curt., 4.1.34-35, 4.5.13. Goukowsky 1975, p. 263; Billows
1990, pp. 41-46; Briant 1996, p. 851; Debord 1999, pp. 462-465.
From Abydus to Alexandria
179
went over to their side. In November or December 332 Hegelochus could
report to Alexander that the war in the Aegean was over. The Macedonian
king ordered the captured leaders of the pro-Persian oligarchies to be sent
back to their home states to be punished; only Apollonides of Chios and
his companions were kept interned in Elephantine in southern Egypt.109
Immediately after the Battle of Issus Alexander dispatched Parmenion
to Damascus to capture the baggage train that was stationed there. Curtius
presents a very detailed and dramatic account that is not contradicted by
any of the much more concise accounts of other authors. Parmenion set off
with a small number of soldiers and after a forced march reached
Damascus on the fourth day. On the way he had capture a courier bearing
a message from the commandant of Damascus to Alexander with an offer
to give up the treasures. Unfortunately this messenger next escaped, which
made the Macedonians fear this was just a trap and the Persian general
uncertain whether his offer of capitulation was accepted. That was why the
Persian baggage train left Damascus in the middle of a ferocious blizzard.
Parmenion sent three ilai of cavalry after this train which caught up with it
and forced it to return to Damascus. Vast amounts of treasure fell into
Macedonian hands, including 2,600 talents, 7,000 pack animals and
30,000 captives. The greatest beneficiary was of course Alexander himself.
But the captured treasures of Issus and Damascus also enriched many of
the soldiers; according to Plutarch, the Thessalian cavalry in particular had
deliberately been sent with Parmenion to reward them for their valour in
the battle. Alexander received from Damascus a precious container which
Darius had allegedly used to keep perfumes; henceforth Alexander used it
to hold his copy of the Iliad and it accompanied him everywhere he went.
A real or fictitious letter from Parmenion cited by Athenaeus states that
among the captured royal servants there were: 329 female musicians, 46
wreath makers, 277 cooks, 29 cooking specialists, 13 dairy specialists, 17
drinks specialists, 70 pourers of wine and 40 perfumers. Among the
relatives of satraps and Persian notables captured at Damascus was a
Persian woman renowned for her exceptional beauty and Greek education
called Barsine, an Achaemenid after her father, Artabazus, and
successively the widow of first Mentor and next of Memnon. Now she
became Alexander’s concubine; the fruit of their relationship was a son
called Heracles, who was born around 327 but was never recognised as
Alexander’s legitimate heir. Also captured at Damascus were ambassadors
sent to the Great King by Greek states obviously in the expectation of
Alexander’s defeat and of gaining some political benefits for themselves
109 Arr., An. , 3.2.3-7; Curt., 4.5.14-22, 4.8.13; IG xii.2.6. Bosworth 1980, pp. 266-269; Heisserer 1980, pp. 96-111, 118-139.
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Chapter IV
out of it. The envoys from Athens and Sparta were to be kept under guard
in the Macedonian camp up until Darius III’s ultimate defeat. The Theban
delegates, on the other hand, were released both on account of Alexander’s
qualms about destroying their city as well as because Thebes and
Macedonia were officially at war and so their pro-Persian stance was fully
justified.110
The main Macedonian forces most probably stayed for some time near
Issus. It was then that Alexander carried out the administrative measures
and soon afterwards also made the first appointments concerning Syria.
Arrian mentions a certain Menon, son of Cerdimmas, whom he appoints
satrap of Coele-Syria, whereas Curtius states this same territory was put
under the control of Parmenion. In all probability both these sources are
using terminologies from later eras: Curtius is referring to the Koile Syria
of Hellenistic times, when it denoted the entire Syrian-Palestinian coast,
whereas Arrian is referring to the Early Roman Empire period, when
Coele-Syria exclusively denoted the north-western part of Syria. Therefore
we can assume that Menon was made military commander of northern
Syria, whereas Parmenion was given military control of the central and
southern coastal regions, a responsibility he soon passed on to
Andromachus. Sometime in 332 there also appears an Iranian satrap called
Arimmas, who is put in charge of civilian administration.111 Alexander’s
armies no doubt set off south towards Phoenicia before the end of 333. By
choosing this direction, i.e. to conquer the Persian satrapy of Ebirnari
(‘Beyond the River’, i.e. Euphrates) and later Egypt, Alexander may have
made the most important strategic decision of his life. After his victory at
Issus, Alexander was afforded the rare luxury in politics of having the
freedom to choose from a number of options. Instead of heading for
Phoenicia, he could have pursued Darius III, who was then fleeing to
Babylon. If successful, this other option – incidentally much more in
keeping with Alexander’s impulsive nature – could have ensured a swift
victory in the war against the Great King. Some modern historians have
criticised Alexander for not opting for this rapid strategic solution. But
here we should only note that Alexander’s strategy of conquering Syria
110 Curt., 3.12.27-3.13.17; Arr., An. , 2.15.1-5; Diod., 20.20.1; Curt., 10.6.11;
Polyaen., 4.5.1; Ath., 13.87; Plu., Alex. , 21.8-9, 24.1-3, 26.1; Plu., Eum. , 1.7; Paus., 9.7.2; Just., 13.2.7; Plin., Nat. , 7.108; It. Alex. , 41. Brunt 1975; Carney 2000, pp.
102-105.
111 Arr., An. , 2.13.7, 3.6.8 (followed by It. Alex. , 38); Curt., 4.1.4, 4.5.9. Bosworth 1980, pp. 224-225; Sartre 2001, p. 90.
From Abydus to Alexandria
181
and Egypt first and defeating Darius later not only proved successful but
also minimised the risks of enemy diversions behind his line.112
The route the Macedonian army took most probably ran through the
Syrian Gates to the valley of the river Orontes (today Asi), thence via the
river Eleutherus valley between the Amanus Mountains and Lebanon to
the Mediterranean coast. When the Macedonian army entered Phoenicia,
Alexander was greeted with a gold crown handed to him by Straton –
according to Arrian, the son of Gerostratus, the ruler of Aradus (which the
Phoenicians called Arwad – today, Ar-Ruad in Syria). By then Straton had
probably already decided to take over the throne from his father for
Curtius describes him as the king of Aradus and in fact there are coins
from that land with this legend. It is even poss
ible that Straton made this
decision while his father’s ships were still part of Autophradates’s fleet
and the arrival of the Macedonian army gave the young pretender an
excellent opportunity to switch sides in the conflict for his personal gain.
Aradus was the northernmost Phoenician state and that is why the
Macedonians entered its territory first. In Persian times Phoenicia was not
a single administrative region (satrapy or province) but a collection of
small separate states individually subordinate to the satrap of Ebirnari.
These states had considerable autonomy. There were native monarchs
ruling as vassals of the Great King but also as the highest priests to the
local gods. The power of the monarchs was shared with councils of elders,
comprising the wealthiest Phoenicians. For most of the Persian period
relations between the autonomous Phoenician states and the central
authorities were exemplary. The naval might of the Achaemenid Empire
was based on the excellence of the Phoenician fleet. However, in the 4th
century these relations somewhat soured, most notably when Tabnit
(Tennes in Greek), the ruler of the largest Phoenician city-state, Sidon,
rebelled against Artaxerxes III, as a result of which the city was destroyed
and reputedly as many as 40,000 inhabitants slaughtered. When the
Macedonian army entered Phoenicia there was no longer any city-state
that dominated the others politically. Straton, the king of the first
Phoenician state to side with the conquering Macedonians was officially
confirmed as ruler of his kingdom by Alexander.113
When the Macedonian army was in the city Marathus (today Amrit in
Syria, 11 km to the south of Tartus), which was part of the kingdom of
Aradus, a messenger brought Alexander a letter from Darius III. This was
112 Badian 1985, p. 432; Ashley 1998, pp. 237-238.
113 Arr., An. , 2.13.7-8, 2.20.1; Curt., 4.1.6; It. Alex. , 38. Moscati 1968, pp. 24-29; Bosworth 1980, p. 226; Atkinson 1980, p. 270; Seibert 1985, p. 80; Grainger 1991,
pp. 5-34; Maier 1994, pp. 319-330.
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