3 Ninety-one people were killed during this pogrom, 191 synagogues were destroyed and 7,500 shops ransacked.
4 Gudrun Schwarz, Die nationalsozialistischen Lager (Frankfurt-am-Main and New York: Campus, 1990), pp. 21–33.
5 For a detailed analysis of this first phase of the concentration camp system, see Klaus Drobish and Günther Wieland, System der NS-Konzentrationslager 1933–1939 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993); Johannes Tuchel, Konzentrationslager: Organisationsgeschichte und Funktion der “Inspektion der Konzentrationslager” 1934–1938 (Boppard: H. Boldt, 1991).
6 Norbert Frei, Der Führerstaat: Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933 bis 1945 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002), p. 139.
7 Dieter Pohl, Verfolgung und Massenmord in der NS-Zeit 1933–1945 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), p. 140.
8 Ulrich Herbert, “Von der Gegnerbekämpfung zur ‘rassischen Generalprävention,’ ” in Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, and Christoph Dieckmann, Die nazionalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Entwicklung und Struktur (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002), pp. 78–80.
9 Karin Orth, Die Konzentrationslager-SS: Sozialstrukturelle Analysen und biographische Studien (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), pp. 24–5.
10 Walter Bartel and Klaus Trostorff (eds), Buchenwald: Mahnung und Verpflichtung (East Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften (DDR), 1983), p. 698.
11 Stanislav Zámecˇnik, C’était ça, Dachau. 1933–1945 (Paris: Le cherche midi, 2003), pp. 113–14.
12 For further details on this subject, see Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nazionalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung (Munich and Zurich: Piper, 1998), and Götz Aly, “Endlösung”: Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Verlag, 1998).
13 Mirosław Gliński, “Organisation und Struktur des Lagers Stutthof,” in Donald Stayer (ed.), Stutthof: Das Konzentrationslager (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo “Marpress,” 1996), p. 77.
14 In Kraków, Governor Hans Frank proceeded to a drastic reduction of the Jewish population in the city even before the establishment of the ghetto on March 3, 1941.The Jewish population of some 70,000 persons in 1939 was forced into emigration. In October 1941 the number of those expelled had already reached 32,000 persons.
15 On the Warsaw ghetto, see Israel Gutman, Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1994).
16 Cf. Helmut Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppen des Weltanschauungskrieges 1938–1942 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993), and Peter Klein (ed.), Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42: Die Tätigkeits- und Lagerberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1997).
17 Research undertaken by Father Patrick Desbois should show a considerable increase in the number of victims of the Einsatzgruppen. See his The Holocaust by Bullets (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Also see Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman (eds), The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German-Occupied Soviet Territories (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008).
18 Aktion T4 was suspended in summer 1941, mainly because of public disapproval and the commitment shown by Church leaders to ensuring that these operations ceased. A number of the state functionaries who contributed to Aktion T4 were sent to work in the different KL, organizing the executions of prisoners judged to be incapable of work (an operation designated by the code name “14f13”). Cf. Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), and Ernst Klee (ed.), Dokumente zur “Euthanasie” (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Verlag, 2001).
19 Cf. Michael Tregenza, Purificare e distruggere: (1) Il programma “Eutanasia.” Le prime camere a gas naziste e lo sterminio dei disabili (1939–1941) (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2006), pp. 111–17.
20 Cf. Mathias Beer, “Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 35, no. 3 (1987), pp. 403–17.
21 For further details on this theme, see Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), and Dieter Pohl, Von der “Judenpolitik” zum Judenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouvernements 1939–1944 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 1993).
22 On the history of the Auschwitz camp, see Yisrael Gutman and Michael Berenbaum (eds), Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1994); Sybille Steinbacher, “Musterstadt” Auschwitz: Germanisierungspolitik und Judenmord in Ostoberschlesien (Munich: Saur, 2000); Danuta Czech, Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau 1939–1945 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1989); and Wacław Długoborski and Franciszek Piper (eds), Studien zur Geschichte des Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslagers Auschwitz, 5 vols (Oświęcim: Verlag des Staatlichen Museums Auschwitz-Birkenau, 1999).
23 For further details on the structure of the crematoria, see Jean-Claude Pressac, Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers (New York: The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1989), and his Les Crématoires d’Auschwitz: La machinerie du meurtre de masse (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1993).
24 From October 7, 1941, the first large groups of Soviet prisoners began to arrive in Auschwitz. In barely a month, nearly 10,000 Soviet prisoners of war were thus deported, mainly from the Silesian Stalag at Lamsdorf. From this number, over 1,000 were shot or gassed in a very short period. The others were set to work under dreadful conditions to build Birkenau. In November, nearly 3,700 persons already had died, and over 8,300 in February 1942. Hardly one hundred out of the 10,000 were still alive by the time building work was completed. For more details, see Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im “Fall Barbarossa”: Eine Dokumentation (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1981).
25 Cf. Serge Klarsfeld, Marcello Pezzetti, and Sabine Zeitoun (eds), L’Album d’Auschwitz (Paris: Éditions Al Dante/Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, 2005), pp. 38–9.
26 From September, Jews from the ghetto-camp of Theresienstadt were incorporated into the BIIb camp without undergoing any selection on arrival. Family units were maintained inside the camp. However, almost all these Jews were eliminated in the course of the two tragic Aktionen carried out in 1944. See H.G. Adler, Theresienstadt 1941–1945: Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005). An English-language version is expected from Cambridge University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
27 This sector, also called “Zigeunerlager,” was occupied by Gypsy deportees sent to Auschwitz following the promulgation of Himmler’s decree dated December 16, 1942. They did not undergo any initial selection and remained with their families in their sector. The first transport arrived in the camp on February 26, 1943. The first Aktion against the Gypsies occurred on March 22, 1943 with the elimination of 1,700 deportees suspected of having typhus. Then a second Aktion took place on May 25, in the course of which over 500 persons were gassed. A year afterwards, on May 16, 1944, the decision to liquidate the Zigeunerlager was taken. The Nazis encircled the sector, intending to send everyone to the gas chamber. But the adults had been warned and fought violently against the SS. The Aktion was postponed until August 2, when 2,897 victims finally were sent to the gas chamber of Crematorium V. For more details, see Sinti und Roma im KL Auschwitz-Birkenau 1943–44: Vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Verfolgung unter der Naziherrschaft, ed. by Wacław Długoborski (Oświe¸cim: Verlag Staatliches Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau, 1998).
28 These operations could also be performed in the room where the ovens were. The hair was sold to German businesses that produced canvas; the gold from the t
eeth was melted down in a small room of Crematorium III and sent to Berlin.
29 Crematorium II was also provided with an oven meant exclusively for the cremation of waste and the destruction of certain personal effects such as personal documents or photos belonging to the victims.
30 In Crematorium II there was also a dissecting room used by the SS doctors Josef Mengele and his assistant, the Jewish prisoner Miklós Nyiszli, a well-regarded doctor who had been assigned to the Sonderkommando. See Miklós Nyiszli, Auschwitz: A Doctor’s Eyewitness Account, trans. by Tibere Kremer and Richard Seaver (London: Mayflower, 1979).
31 Goliath Fischl was a Vorarbeiter from Poland.
32 Cf. Filip Müller, Sonderbehandlung: Drei Jahre in den Krematorien und Gaskammern von Auschwitz (Munich: Steinhauser, 1979); Leon Cohen, From Greece to Birkenau: The Crematoria Workers’ Uprising (Tel-Aviv: The Salonika Research Center, 1996); André Balbin, De Lodz à Auschwitz: En passant par la Lorraine (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1989); Shaje Gertner, “Sonderkommando in Birkenau,” in Anthology of Holocaust Literature, ed. by Jacob Glatstein, Israel Knox, and Samuel Margoshes (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1969), pp. 141–7; Henryk Mandelbaum, “ … et je fus affecté au Sonderkommando,” in Jadwiga Mateja and Teresa ´ Świebocka (eds.), Témoins d’Auschwitz (Oświęcim: State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau, 1998). A collection of eye-witness accounts of survivors of the Sonderkommando can be found in Gideon Greif, Wir weinten tränenlos …: Augenzeugenberichte des jüdischen “Sonderkommandos” in Auschwitz (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1995); Eric Friedler, Barbara Siebert, and Andreas Kilian, Zeugen aus der Todeszone: Das jüdische Sonderkommando in Auschwitz (Lüneberg: Zu Klampen, 2002); Claude Lanzmann, Shoah (Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1985); Rebecca Camhi Fromer, The Holocaust Odyssey of Daniel Bennahmias, Sonderkommando (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1993). See Selected Bibliography for some available English-language editions.
33 The order came directly from Himmler shortly after his visit to Auschwitz on July 17–18. On September 16, Commandant Höß, accompanied by SS officers Hößler and Dejaco, went to Chełmno so as to study the methods used by Paul Blobel to burn the corpses. Blobel, in fact, was entrusted with the task of eliminating the trace of the mass murders on Polish and Soviet territory; this was an action bearing the code name Aktion 1005. Cf. Shmuel Spector, “Aktion 1005 – Effacing the Murder of Millions,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, 1990, pp. 157–73, and Patrick Desbois and Frenk Levana, Operation 1005: Des Techniques et des hommes au service de l’effacement des traces de la Shoah (Paris: Les études du CRIF, no. 3, 2003).
34 This “Aktion” was the last gassing operation carried out in Crematorium I of Auschwitz I. The crematorium installations continued to function for another few months until they in turn were dismantled.
35 Moll was replaced by Peter Voss after activities in the bunker had stopped. Moll was appointed Lagerführer of a sub-camp, Blechhammer.
36 The lists of the various different labor kommandos in the camp, as kept by the Nazis, show that on August 30, 874 persons were working in the crematoria and on October 3 only 661 were left. See APMO (Archive of the State Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau), D-AUII-3o/49, Arbeitseinsatz liste, vol. 11.
37 In this way certain manuscripts were discovered between March 1945 and October 1980. They were published in their entirety by the Museum of Auschwitz and translated into several languages. Cf. Mark Ber, Des voix dans la nuit: La résistance juive à Auschwitz-Birkenau (Paris: Plon, 1982); Georges Bensoussan (ed.), Des voix sous la cendre: Manuscrits des Sonderkommandos d’Auschwitz-Birkenau, Revue d’histoire de la Shoah, no. 171, January–April 2001; and Salmen Gradowski, Au cœur de l’enfer: Document écrit d’un Sondercommando d’Auschwitz, 1944 (Paris: Kimé, 2001). See also David Olère, A Painter in the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz (New York: The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1989).
ITALY IN GREECE: A SHORTHISTORY OF A MAJOR FAILURE
by Umberto Gentiloni
Shlomo Venezia’s history is part of our history, the history of a Europe battered by the Second World War. To gain a better understanding of the testimony of an Italian Jew in Greece, it is necessary to examine the historical context in which Shlomo lived.
On October 28, 1922, the March on Rome inaugurated what the regime called “the Fascist Era.” Eighteen years to the day later, on October 28, 1940, the Greek campaign began: as part of its expansionist plans, Italy marched on Athens in explicit commemoration of the founding act of the regime. Even today in Greece, this date is that of the national holiday, a symbol of the nation’s coming together to resist the aggressor.
The Fascist policy of occupying Mediterranean Europe represented a strategic objective that would guarantee both Italy’s territorial expansion and its status as a great power. Fascism had always laid claim to the Mediterranean as a necessary living space, and had even renamed it mare nostrum. It was as part of this thrust that the “imperial project” of domination in the Mediterranean was taken up, as a way of uniting rhetorical allusions to the Roman past with expansionist aims that sought to shift the balance of power, in a largely anti-British approach.1 Italian colonial imperialism was thus based on a warmongering and racist ideology that was manifested notably in “Italian Africa.” However, these claims were deeply anchored in the international framework of the Second World War, over and above the merely Italian context.2 June 10, 1940 marked the entry of Italy into the war on the side of Nazi Germany. The Mediterranean ambitions of Fascism were an essential component in the Rome–Berlin axis. In spite of its weakness and its defeats, the Italian regime was able to safeguard, at least partly, its international prestige thanks to the decisive support of its German ally. In this regard, we can claim that the Greek campaign and its disastrous outcome for the Italian Army marked a decisive turning point and the end of the hegemonic pretensions of Italian power. Fascist Italy was forced to adopt the role and function of a subaltern ally, militarily subject to the decisions and strategies of the Third Reich.3
Even before its entry into the war, Italy had started by occupying Albania in April 1939. From then onwards, plans for an eventual invasion of Greece were developed. On the fateful day of the outbreak of the Italian campaign in the Mediterranean, Hitler and Mussolini met in Florence to discuss their respective obligations as co-belligerents. However, Italy made no mention of the imminent action in the Mediterranean, since the invasion of Greece was to remain secret. The headlines of the Corriere della Sera were loud and clear: “The destiny of the new Europe is growing ripe. War of secession to free the continent from hateful British hegemony. Profound reaction worldwide to the Florence meeting.”4 On the first days, the war seemed to be heading towards an imminent victory, and the defeat of the British via a negotiated peace seemed highly likely. When, on October 12, 1940, Germany entered Romania, Mussolini decided that it was time for action, and thus embarked on a dual line of conduct: “surprise” and parallel war. This strategy enabled him to align himself on Nazi strategy vis-à-vis the same enemy, while acting independently on the military and diplomatic levels. Mussolini, certain of a quick victory, is said to have declared to the Council of Ministers: “If it turns out we can’t beat the Greeks quickly, I’ll give up being an Italian.”5
But his military plans were rapidly thwarted by the resistance of the Greek Army. Four successive phases in the conflict can thus be discerned: from the outbreak of hostilities on October 28 to November 13, when the last Italian attack failed (after the Italian bombing of Salonika on November 1); from mid-November to the end of December, when the Greek Army launched a counter-offensive; between the end of December 1940 and March 26, 1941, when the situation between the two armies, whose positions were now consolidated, remained static; and, finally, from March 27 to April 23, 1941, when the Wehrmacht intervened and launched an offensive that would open the way to an armistice with the capitulation of Greece.
In spite of the Greek defeat, the overall militar
y result as far as the Italians were concerned was a veritable disaster. The Italian Army, ill-prepared and ill-informed, was unable to cope with the Greek military counter-attack led by General Alexander Papagos. Mussolini was obliged to accept the intervention of German troops and to face Hitler’s criticisms of his catastrophic management of the military operations.6 The Wehrmacht obtained a stunning victory. The very day after the signing of the armistice, the fate of Greece was sealed in Vienna. The territory was divided into three zones of occupation: German, Italian, and Bulgarian. The first, under German control, included a major part of Crete, Piraeus (the port of Athens), part of Macedonia including Salonika, part of western Thrace bordering Turkey, and the islands of Lemnos and Chios.
In the German zone of occupation to the north, Salonika was the city in which the main Jewish community of Greece lived: over 56,000 persons. From October 1941 onwards, Himmler obtained permission from Hitler to act against the Jewish population of Salonika; but implementing this took some time. On July 13, 1942, forced labor was introduced, obliging between 6,000 and 7,000 Jews to work in zones infested with swamp fever, and in the chromium mines. Many Jews tried to escape into the zone occupied by Italy. In the first period, Jews of Italian nationality were spared, but in spring 1943, the German authorities demanded that all such Jews be transferred to the Italian zone. In January1943, Rolf Günther, the representative of Eichmann, traveled to Salonika; he was followed by Dieter Wisliceny and Aloïs Brunner (both of whom worked with Eichmann), who arrived there to enforce the anti-Jewish policies that came into shape very rapidly. From February 25, 1943, measures were introduced to mark all Jews (except those of foreign nationality) and all their shops. The ghetto established a zone of obligatory residence divided into several parts, in accordance with a highly detailed plan. The Baron Hirsch district, near the railway station, rapidly became the antechamber of deportation, the place at which Jews were assembled before their last journey.
Inside the Gas Chambers Page 19
