blind for Sophist critics who might have interfered with his Academy or accused him personally of being
irrational or illogical?
The Sphinx: Again the explanation is not that simple. The dialogues may indeed have served as a blind for the
Sophists, inasmuch as they defend Platonic principles according, apparently, to Sophistic logical criteria.
But the dialogues would thus serve only a negative function, and that hardly seems to justify the obvious
effort of their preparation. Plato was first and foremost a teacher, and he would have designed the dialogues
to teach.
The Chimæra: That appears to run afoul of your previous statement that faith and reason are mutually exclusive.
If Platonic students studied the dialogues only to become skilled at the Sophistic argumentative procedures
employed therein, they would complete the Academy only as skilled Sophists.
The Sphinx: We are at something of an impasse. I confess that I cannot resolve this evident inconsistency. Let us
seek fresh counsel.
Quite suddenly there materializes a Gryphon.
The Gryphon: The dilemma can be resolved, but it is so constructed that it defies resolution by Sophistic logic.
And that is precisely the trap into which the two of you have fallen. Indeed the dialogues are there to teach,
but the student must put forth the effort to see past the Sophistic teachings to those of Plato himself.
The Chimæra: But the argumentative pattern of the dialogues is Sophistic, and any connection between Sophistic
logic and Platonic faith cannot exist. Do you think to pursue me?
The Gryphon: The key to Plato rests in the Meno. Here - He turns to page #364:
SOCRATES: Those who tell it are priests and priestesses of the sort who make it their business to be
able to account for the functions which they perform. Pindar speaks of it too, and many another of
the poets who are divinely inspired. What they say is this - see whether you think they are speaking
the truth. They say that the soul of a man is immortal. At one time it comes to an end - that which is
called death - and at another is born again, but is never finally exterminated. On these grounds a
man must live all his days as righteously as possible.
For those from whom
Persephone receives requittal for ancient doom
In the ninth year she restores again
Their souls to the Sun above
From whom rise noble kings
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And the swift in strength and greatest in wisdom,
And for the rest of time
They are called heroes and sanctified by men.
Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all things both here
and in the other world, has learned everything there is. So we need not be surprised if it can recall
the knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once possessed. All nature is akin, and
the soul has learned everything, so that when a man has recalled a single piece of knowledge -
learned it, in ordinary language - there is no reason why he should not find out all the rest, if he
keeps a stout heart and does not grow weary of the search, for seeking and learning are in fact
nothing but recollection.
The Chimæra: You imply, then, that it is not the object of the dialogues to “teach” at all -but rather to expose
Plato’s students to demanding mental gymnastics which will inspire them to recollect knowledge of the
Forms.
The Gryphon: You have recollected admirably. The Gryphon dematerializes.
The Sphinx: Is it not interesting that the example given by Socrates in the Meno employs mathematics and
geometry? That ties in rather neatly with the inscription over the entrance to the Academy. To the Platonic
philosopher, then, that inscription would have meant something more than mere ability to calculate areas of
triangles. In effect it would say: “Let no one ignorant of the recollective basis of knowledge leave here.”
The Chimæra: Harking back to what you said concerning Plato’s exposure to Pythagorean concepts, it is quite
appropriate. Mathematical consistency was Plato’s “foot in the door”, so to speak, where the Forms were
concerned. Yet, in view of relativity, does not that door slam shut upon us?
The Sphinx: That’s the Hades of it; it doesn’t. Or rather it does, but another one opens simultaneously.
The Chimæra: Do you mean that relativity provides access to another Form similar to mathematical consistency,
upon which a modern Plato could base a Theory of the Forms?
The Sphinx: No, not really. But what relativity has done has been to turn the Meno inside-out. Look here: Socrates
proves the immortality of the soul by demonstrating its intrinsic grasp of mathematics, which he considered
a Form. Pause here and consider: What, precisely, is immortality?
The Chimæra: I should say the continuous existence of the mind or soul.
The Sphinx: That would be the case if there were no such thing as relativity. But there is. So let us say rather that
immortality is the ability of the mind or the soul to exist unbounded by time, i.e. the fourth dimension.
Mortality is measured according to the notion that time is a constant. But relativity disproves this, showing
that time may be retarded, hastened, stopped altogether, or, presumably, raised to infinity. Thus the prison
of a so-called temporal span of existence is no real prison at all. It is only imagined as such by a mind
untrained in fourth-dimensional movement. The mind that is immortal is one that breaks free of time, not
one that merely plods along within it as it ticks off the æons.
The Chimæra: And so the same principles of relativity that destroy Plato’s first-known Form now open the door to
the very immortality which he sought through knowledge of the Forms. Fascinating.
The Sphinx: Now we must consider the implications of this as applied to the notion of recollection of knowledge.
When Socrates used the term in the passage cited by the gryphon, he meant it of course in terms of a fixed
fourth dimension. He visualized the soul as plodding along through the æons, “seeing all things” along the
way. Thus, by the time it reached incarnation in Greece circa 400 BCE, it had completed some 9.5 to 10.5
billion years’ “sightseeing” since the last Universal concentration of radiation underwent transformation
into matter and antimatter, making it possible for existence to displace vacuum.
The Chimæra: Just out of curiosity, how do you come up with ten billion years?
The Sphinx: Simply by dividing the distances of the known galaxies from the calculated metagalactic center of this
expansion cycle by their speeds according to the Red Shifts, then taking an average. But we digress again.
We must still work out the nature of the acquisition of knowledge.
- 15 -
The Chimæra: If the invalidation of time as a constant has been shown, then the mind or soul could not have
acquired knowledge via an æonic sightseeing trip such as Socrates describes. But the mind possesses the
capability to cast itself forward and backward through time, since time is not fixed.
The Sphinx: Correct. The process is to imagination what directed thinking is to unconscious dreaming. It is
something like the Raja-Yoga technique of uniting the mind to a single idea through force of will, or like
corresponding ceremonial magic techniques.
The Chimæra: But I thought that the object of Yoga is to break the cycle of birth-death-rebirth through u
nion of
the soul or mind with the whole of existence. To one who achieves the eighth stage, samadhi, the concept of
knowledge - itself a relative measurement of that which is known versus that which is not known - would be
meaningless. All would be known, or, to use a more precise term, realized. Nothing would remain to be
“learned”.
The Sphinx: Indeed.
The Chimaera: I think I am beginning to see your point. There is an identity between the state of samadhi and the
innate condition of the mind or soul as Plato perceived it. Both exist in a state of absolute awareness,
including, presumably, the freedom to move through all dimensions including that of time. Thus they break
the bonds of both a finite period and a finite path of existence, achieving true immortality. Earthly
incarnation becomes a prison in terms of both time and space, and it is the incarnated mind’s ability to
travel within time that allows it to break free from this prison. The ambition of Plato, like that of the Yogi,
was to regain the freedom of mental movement through all dimensions of existence - which, of course,
would provide access to knowledge of the Forms.
The Sphinx: That is right. And the final proof of this is that Adepts in all cultures and all ages have inclined
towards this same realization, no matter what exploratory methods they may have used and what linguistic
terminology they may have employed. “Proof” in the scientific sense is the achievement of identical results
under identical circumstances by independent researchers. Our comparison of just two initiatory systems -
that of Plato and that of Yoga - meets these criteria exactly, given that the “identical circumstance” in this
case is Earthly incarnation.
The Chimæra: Similar evidence could be obtained from additional case studies of other initiatory systems. But one
substantiation suffices for our discussion.
The Sphinx: And now, I think, we are finally in a position to understand Plato’s distinction of the work of a true
philosopher from that of a sophist. Let us return to The Sophist. He turns to page #998:
STRANGER: Well, now that we have agreed that the kinds stand toward one another in the same
way as regards blending, is not some science needed as a guide on the voyage of discourse, if one is
to succeed in pointing out which kinds are consonant, and which are incompatible with one another
- also, whether there are certain kinds that pervade them all and connect them so that they can
blend, and again, where there are divisions [separations], whether there are certain others that
traverse wholes and are responsible for the division? ... And the man who can do that discerns
clearly one form everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and many
forms, different from one another, embraced from without by one form, and again one form
connected in a unity through many wholes, and many forms, entirely marked off apart. That means
knowing how to distinguish, kind by kind, in what ways the several kinds can or cannot combine.
The Chimæra: I am well satisfied. Now that we have resolved the questions raised by The Sophist, it seems
necessary to consider The Statesman as well.
The Sphinx: We know that The Statesman was written as a sequel to The Sophist - that Plato intended his ideal
statesman to be antithetical to the “worst possible kind” of Sophist. Observe: He turns to page #1074.
STRANGER: Therefore all who take part in one of these governments - apart from the one based
upon real knowledge - are to be distinguished from the true statesman. They are not statesmen; they
are party leaders, leaders of bogus governments and themselves as bogus as their systems. The
supreme imitators and tricksters, they are of all Sophists the archSophists.
YOUNG SOCRATES: It seems to me that the wheel has come full circle, now that the title of Sophist
goes to those who most deserve it, to the men who get themselves called political leaders.
- 16 -
The Chimæra: That may be nothing more than another of Plato’s invectives against the Sophists in general - a bit
of name-calling without real substance. Such seems to be the opinion of academic critics, who are prone to
ignore this exchange. But let us reexamine Plato’s alienation from the Sophists. As I said earlier:
Even if we limit our scope to the school of Protagoras, we know that Sophistic thinking disavowed
absolute knowledge. Despairing of attaining such knowledge, they regarded even its pursuit as
worthless. So they taught a sort of relativistic pragmatism as the only sound basis for human affairs.
Hence Protagoras’ famous statement that man is the measure of all things.
The Sphinx: We then considered the Pythagorean precedents for Plato’s conviction that the Universe adheres to
absolute and not relative standards. But how does this tie in with The Statesman?
The Chimæra: The connection seems to be that Plato considers statesmanship also to be absolute and not relative.
Observe the following key passage: He turns to pages #1051-2.
STRANGER: Must we not do now what we had to do when discussing the Sophist? We had to insist
then on the admission of an additional postulate, that “what is ‘not x’ nevertheless exists”. We had
to introduce this postulate because the only alternative to asserting it which our argument left us
was to allow the Sophist to escape definition altogether. In our present discussion too there is an
additional postulate on which we must insist, and it is this: “Excess and deficiency are measurable
not only in relative terms but also in respect of attainment of a norm or due measure.” For if we
cannot first gain assent to this postulate, we are bound to fail if we advance the claim that a man
possesses statecraft, or indeed that a man possesses any other of the special forms of knowledge
that function in human society.
YOUNG SOCRATES: In that case we must certainly follow the precedent and admit the additional
postulate in our present discussion too.
STRANGER: Our present task is greater than our previous one, Socrates, and we can hardly have
forgotten what a very long time that took us. However, while discussing these problems, there is one
thing to be said at the outset that it is perfectly right and proper to say here.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this?
STRANGER: That when one day we come to give a full exposition of true accuracy in dialectic
method, we shall find the need of this postulate concerning the due measure which we have just
enunciated. However, the statement in the form we have made it and with the demonstration -
adequate for present purposes - which we have given of it, is a very great help to us, or so it seems to
me. For it shows that two propositions stand or fall together. The first is that the arts exist; the
second is that excess and deficiency are measurable not only relatively but in terms of the
realization of a norm or due measure. Thus if measure in this second sense exists, so do the arts,
and, conversely, if there are arts, then there is this second kind of measurement. To deny either is to
deny both.
The Sphinx: That “existence of ‘not x’ postulate”, as I recall, left something to be desired in terms of logical
integrity. The point hinged upon things that were not themselves “existence” being able to exist. In
distinguishing them from “existence”, Plato treats “existence” as an entity. But, when saying that
certain
things “exist”, he treats “exist” as a quality. That is inconsistent and hence inconclusive. He glances at
page #1003 indignantly, then turns to pages #1050-1. And what sort of demonstration of this second
postulate does he offer?
STRANGER: On the other hand, will we not also be ready to assert that we do in fact hear words
spoken and see acts done which at one time exceed the essentially right measure and at another
time fall short of it? Is it not just this matter of attaining the due measure which marks off good men
from bad in human society?
The Chimæra: That’s not much of a proof. The words or actions that impress one observer as ideal may strike
another as excessive or inadequate. Similarly “good” and “bad” are subjective terms. Plato is guilty of a non
sequitur.
The Sphinx: True. If the stranger had been talking with someone like Protagoras instead of the docile young
Socrates, The Statesman would have floundered [and foundered] right there.
- 17 -
The Chimæra: Note that, immediately after making that statement, Plato tries to reinforce it by denying that
statecraft - or any other art - can exist without it. Thus he assumes that statecraft has already been proved to
be an absolute standard, when in fact it has not. Two unproved statements cannot be used to prove each
other, and so Plato is guilty of a second logical fallacy, generally known as interdependence.
The Sphinx: Since the rest of The Statesman hinges upon young Socrates’ blind disregard of these two fallacies, is
there a point in our discussing it further? What we have uncovered here is not some relatively-unimportant
digression. The subsequent structure of The Statesman is one of peeling away inadequate manifestations of
statesmanship, leaving, theoretically, the Form itself at the core. If there is not an agreed-upon Form, then
the peeling-away process is pointless.
The Chimæra: To be fair to Plato, let us examine his idea of the Form of statesmanship. He turns to page #1077.
STRANGER: If you will view the three arts we have spoken of as a group with a common character,
you will be bound to see that none of them has turned out to be itself the art of statesmanship. This
is because it is not the province of the real kingly art to act for itself, but rather to control the work
The Temple of Set II Page 3
