by Salim Mujais
8 Letter to Rafic Halabi, June 22, 1947, Complete Works, Volume 11, pp.308-311.
9 Letter to Juliette, May 17, 1947. Rasa’il ila Dia’, pp. 222.
10 Third communique to the Lebanese people, Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.254-255.
11 Qawa’id at-Tarshih llniyabat fi al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtima’i (Principles of candidacy for elections in the Social Nationalist Party), Complete Works, Volume 8, pp.246-251.
12 Letter to Juliette, May 5, 1947. Rasa’il ila Dia’, pp. 220-221.
13 ʻAḳl, Jurjī, (editor), The black book of the Lebanese elections of May 25, 1947, Phoenicia Press, NY, 1947.
14 Fourth communique to the Lebanese people, Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.258-262.
15 Letter to Juliette, June 5, 1947. Rasa’il ila Dia’, pp. 223-224.
16 Khitab az-Zaim fi Deek al-Mehdi (Speech by the Leader at Deek al-Mehdi). Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.399-401.
17 Risalat az-Zaim ila al-Qawmiyyin al-Ijtima’iyyin Bimunasabat Intisar jhad al-Hizb (Letter from the Leader to the Social Nationalists on the occasion of the victory of the Party in its struggle), Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.335-336.
18 Risalat az-Zaim fi Sadad Wadi’ Filastin wa Mawqif al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtima’i (Communique of the Leader on the Status of Palestine and the view of the SSNP), Complete Works, Volume 7, pp.356-368.
19 Balagh min Maktab az-Zaim fi Sadad Filastin (Communique from the office of the Leader regarding Palestine), Complete Works, volume 8, pp. 235-236.
20 Tasrih al-Mutran Mubarak (The pronouncements of archbishop Mubarak), ibid., pp. 182-183.
21 al-Uruba Aflasat (The Bankruptcy of Pan-Arabism), Complete Works, volume 8, pp. 256-258
22 al-In’izaliyat al-Lubnaniyat Aflasat (The Bankruptcy of Lebanese isolationism), ibid, pp. 259-262.
23 Intisar al-Qawmiyat as-Syriyat Yuhaqiq al-Jabhat al-Arabiya (The victory of Syrian nationalism will lead to a strong Arab front), and Harabna al-Urubah al-Wahmiya lajel al-Urubah al-Waqi’iya (We fought fictional Pan-Arabism to establish realistic Arabism), ibid., pp. 263-266 and 267-271, respectively
24 Wa Harabna L’inqaz al-Lubnaniyyin (We fought to save the Lebanese), ibid., pp. 272-277.
25 Al-Hizbiyyat ad-Diniyyat La’nat al-Umma (Religious fanatism is a national curse), ibid., pp. 305-307.
26 La’ihat al-A’qaqir la Tasna’ Tabiban (A list of drugs does not a physician make), ibid., pp. 308-312.
27 Nahnu Suriyun la Helalkhasbiyun (We are Syrians not Fertile Crescentians), ibid., pp. 278-281.
28 Intikhabat al-Mukhtarin Darss Baligh (The Lessons of the recent elections of notaries), ibid., pp.377-378.
29 Letter to Abdallah al-Qubersi, April 3, 1949. Complete Works, volume 11, pp. 385.
30 Muqabalat ma’ Iza’at al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtima’I hawl al-Inqilab fi ash-Sham (Interview with the spokesperson of the SSNP about the Coup d’etat in Damascus), Complete Works, volume 8, pp.316-317.
31 Bayan az-Zaim ila al-Qawmiyyin al-Ijtima’iyyin wa al-Umma as-Suriya (Communique from the Leader to the Social Nationalists and the Syrian nation), ibid., pp 383-387.
32 Letter to Juliette, June 30, 1949. Rasa’il ila Dia’, pp. 230.
The Uprising
Indeed, the SSNP was faced with impossible choices. It could not accede to the demands of Solh and denounce its leader for alleged treasonous acts for that would be suicidal and a worse undertaking than the "National Party" initiative of Thabit, which meant to exclude Saadeh and readjust the scope of the Party ideology, but not condemn him. Further, the SSNP could not observe the systematic dismantling of its organization in Lebanon, and the targeting of its constituency, and remain passive. Such a course would inevitably result in the loss of the largest base for the Party, demoralization, and certain demise. The largest constituency of the SSNP was in Lebanon and its leadership was predominantly Lebanese. A surrender in Lebanon was not compatible with the survival of the Party. Confrontation with a more powerful foe has always been the bane of national liberation movements, and asymmetrical wars their hallmark. Even small gains by an insurgency can be translated into a political solution compatible with the survival of the Party. While militarily more powerful than the SSNP, the Lebanese government had its vulnerabilities. The fall of the Khoury government 3 years hence in the face of an opposition coalition of which the SSNP was a significant member attests to this possibility.
When the government’s campaign against the SSNP did not abate, but rather continued gathering momentum, Saadeh declared on July 4, 1949 a popular uprising calling for the overthrow of the Lebanese government and the institution of a Social Nationalist order in Lebanon. Members of the SSNP started organizing popular revolt and occupying government outposts in the villages and plains of Lebanon. Most commentators on the events of July 1949 are so preoccupied with the tragic conclusion of the revolution and the shortcomings in its execution that they fail to realize or understand the grand plan of the revolution. The revolution’s maximal goal was to overthrow the Lebanese government, and its minimal goal was to force the government into a negotiated settlement, albeit the rhetoric of the era makes the latter sound unworkable. To achieve either goal, the revolution needed to reduce the territorial control of the government, or at least disrupt its ability to govern or control large areas in which the revolution would establish its own rule. The most expedient way to achieve this end was to gain rapid control of areas where government control was already tenuous such as the Bekaa valley as well as the Northern and Southern districts of the country. In parallel, the government hold over the central sectors of Beirut and the mountain would be challenged by widespread insurgency.
To gain control of the northern Bekaa, the SSNP had forged an alliance with the Dandash clans who were armed and capable of achieving the task. The central and southern parts of the Bekaa valley were to be secured by two SSNP task forces that would enter Lebanese territory from the Syrian Republic side. After securing their assigned territory, the two task forces, joined by additional SSNP recruits from the local branches, would then proceed to control the south of Lebanon. The northern districts of Lebanon would be the target of another task force that would advance along the Syrian coast. Finally, SSNP branches throughout Lebanon would launch insurgent activities against police stations and government offices with the intent of keeping government forces occupied in Beirut and the surrounding mountains. The government would keep the bulk of its forces to secure the capital and the surrounding areas, which would facilitate the control of all peripheral sectors by the revolution forces.
The strategic plan was vulnerable, however, to treachery. The various components were interdependent and the failure of any crucial part of the plan would jeopardize other components. Hence, the defection of the Dandash clans who were swayed to renege on their commitments left large segments in government control and exposed the flank of the task forces entering from the east. Further, Syrian betrayal exposed the routes and operational plans of these task forces to the Lebanese government forces, and allowed the latter to ambush and disperse the two advancing groups. The defective weapons and ammunitions delivered by the Syrian forces meant that these task forces were even more vulnerable to attack by well-equipped professional government forces. The task force entrusted with entering Lebanon from the north was thwarted by the Zaim’s regime through widespread arrests of SSNP members, intimidation and sealing of the borders. Insurgent activities in other areas would thus become futile as they could be either ignored by the government or readily contained after defeat of the major task forces.
The factors that facilitated the counter insurgency efforts of the government do not excuse the failures of execution by the SSNP. The low response rate by SSNP constituency, the lack of diligence in inspecting weapons obtained from the Syrian army, and the amateurism of some SSNP cadres bear a significant degree of blame for the failure.
Meeting of Bichara Khoury, President of Lebanon, and Husni Zaim, ruler of Syria, a few days before the deportation of Saad
eh.
TREACHERY, TRIAL AND MARTYRDOM
On July 6, Zaim invited Saadeh to the presidential palace to meet with him, had him arrested and delivered to the Lebanese police. Saadeh had been warned about Zaeem’s treachery. His visit to the presidential palace was determined by two factors: primarily, he wanted to face up to his responsibilities as a leader of a national movement. In the face of danger, he was not going to seek personal safety while his followers were espousing death for the cause. Not appearing for his appointment would have meant inviting the scourge of a military dictator on the SSNP membership. Secondly, he hoped that he could still elicit some national fervor in Husni Zaim. The latter’s treachery and callous pursuit of personal glory were irremediable, and Saadeh was surrendered to the Lebanese police by his host the President of the Syrian Republic.
Saadeh was taken to Beirut in the early hours of the 7th, summarily tried by a court that sat in camera, and he was executed at 3 am on July 8. The lawyer appointed to his defense had requested a recess to study the case. His motion was not granted and he withdrew. Thereupon Saadeh undertook his own defense. Details of the court proceedings from observers and Saadeh’s defense are, however, not available. The trial was obviously a sham for the sentence was decided before the trial was even convened.1 It was as complete a travesty of justice as a trial could be. He was deprived of his right to counsel, his right to examine the evidence against him, and his right to prepare for his defense. The court was convened at 2 pm and by 8 pm a judgment of guilty had been rendered and Saadeh was sentenced to death by a firing squad to be carried out immediately removing any chance for a stay in execution or appeal by the defendant. Just before dawn on July 8, Saadeh was taken to the army shooting range south of Beirut and the sentence carried out. Witnesses of the assassination at dawn testified uniformly to Saadeh’s fortitude and dignity in the face of imminent death. The police hurried the clandestine burial fearing popular reaction to the execution, increased security measures, and continued to pursue SSNP members with renewed ferocity. On July 22, six SSNP members were executed as well. Ironically, these six were chosen each from a different religious sect.
The martyrdom of Saadeh was a momentous event in the history of the SSNP. It created a new spirit in the Party and established militancy, self-denial and self-sacrifice as virtues to be embraced. Scores of SSNP members derived courage and spiritual sustenance from the example of their leader who remains the most towering symbol of Syria’s will to life.
Saadeh during his final trial by a Lebanese Military Court a few hours before his execution.
* * *
1 Adel Beshara, Outright assassination: the trial and execution of Antun Sa’adeh, 1949, Reading, U.K., Ithaca Press, 2012.
Epilogue
Within days of Saadeh’s execution, the Lebanese Military Tribunal meted death sentences to twelve SSNP members in custody and harsh prison sentences to other members either in custody or in absentia. Six Party members were executed by firing squad promptly. Their courage and dignity while facing their executioners paralleled those of their leader and contrasted with mentality of the government that chose those six based on their religious affiliation to maintain sectarian balance even in injustice.
The ferocity of the actions of the Lebanese and Syrian governments were meant to subdue and intimidate. They underestimated the tenacity and resolve of the SSNP constituency. The betrayal of Saadeh by Husni Zaim only added to the mounting resentment against his megalomaniac dictatorship. On August 14, 1949, SSNP sympathizers in the Syrian army joined with others to overthrow Zaim and execute him and his prime minister immediately.1 The Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Solh fared no better. While on a visit to Jordan in July 1951, three SSNP members approached his convoy and shot him fatally. Two of the Party members lost their lives in the successful attempt. These actions, while not sanctioned by the Party leadership, were nevertheless embraced by the SSNP constituency and their perpetrators acquired a heroic stature within the Party. They also created an aura around the SSNP as being capable of exacting retribution. As alliances and political views shifted in Lebanon, the SSNP, while banned and operating clandestinely, joined with other opposition forces to bring down President Khoury in September 1952. The newly elected president Camille Chamoun duly acknowledged the SSNP’s contribution by allowing the Party to operate relatively freely.
Soon after the overthrow of Zaim, SSNP leaders convened in Damascus and established a new leadership structure and team. The leadership team, however, was wrought with factionalism and tendency to monopolize power. It had very narrow political horizons and naïve notions about leading a political organization. It did succeed, however, in rallying the constituency around the symbol of the martyred Saadeh and re-establishing the organizational structure of the SSNP. In the somewhat permissive atmosphere of the new regimes in Syria between 1949 and 1955, the SNP prospered and embarked on wide ranging activities. It secured very modest representation in the Syrian parliament and introduced legislation for secularization and modernization of the state that was not embraced by the majority. It opened a series of schools throughout Syria, particularly in rural areas, staffed by SSNP teachers to put in effect a model of its educational policies. Intellectuals, poets, writers, and artists gravitated towards the SSNP circles and its publications. On the political front, the SSNP had an uneasy alliance with the Syrian government, dominated during that period by President Shishakli, an ex-military officer and ex-SSNP member who separated from the Party to build his personal political fiefdom.2
The ascendency of the SSNP in Syria was paralleled by that of the Pan-Arab Baath Party, the Soviet-backed Communist Party, and pro-Nasserist elements. With the overthrow of Shishakli in February of 1954, anti-SSNP groups gained significant advantage in the control of government functions.3 Fierce competition for positions of power presaged a conflagration, which materialized in the spring of 1955. The coalition of anti-SSNP groups, with strong support from the regime of Nasser in Egypt, used the pretext of the assassination of Adnan Maliki, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian armed forces on April 22, 1955, to unleash a fierce campaign against the SSNP, accusing it of plotting against the government and being responsible for Maliki’s death. The coalition brought the full force of the government in a brutal attempt to extirpate the SSNP from the Syrian political scene, much as the Lebanese government had done in 1949, but with greater ferocity. Scores of SSNP members were hunted down, assassinated, imprisoned, tortured, had their livelihood destroyed, properties confiscated, and were subjected to every form of imaginable oppression.4 The SSNP fought back, but its attempts at regime change in Syria were not successful and it had to retrench to Lebanon where the Chamoun regime was more permissive. Thus, the political role of the SSNP in Syria entered a long hiatus until the latter parts of the presidency of Hafez Assad and the advent of the Syrian civil war when it re-emerged as a visible political force. During the long hiatus, the SSNP continued to operate clandestinely in Syria perpetuating its presence and maintaining the seeds of activists and organizers that will facilitate its recent re-emergence.
The debacle in Syria precipitated a leadership crisis and a schism in the SSNP into two parallel but unequal organizations. The smaller of the two branches supported the outgoing president of the Party under whose watch the Syrian events transpired. It was a rigidly doctrinarian group, removed from any political involvement, and a faithful custodian of the older SSNP traditions. The larger group was more politically dynamic and more open to experimentation and new approaches. Consequently, however, it was more vulnerable to infiltration by agents of Western intelligence agencies and political adventurers. This group dominated the political history of the SSNP for the following decades.
The political exodus from Damascus to Beirut was accompanied by a wave of displacement of intellectuals, poets, and artists that changed the cultural landscape of Beirut and consequently that of the Arab east. From this concentration of creative people many of the Avant-guard movements i
n poetry, theater, and other intellectual pursuits were born.5 In its political defeat in Damascus, the SSNP scored a cultural victory in Beirut!
Confined in its visible political activity to Lebanon, the SSNP became embroiled in an array of pro-Western alliances to resist pro-Nasserist expansion. Several elements influenced this course. The Nasser regime and its supporters in Syria and Lebanon were on a warpath against the SSNP and the Party reacted in self-defense. Further, the SSNP ideologically was against ad hoc unification schemes as promoted by the pro-Nasser groups. Finally, some SSNP leaders were looking for expedient ways to gain political power in Lebanon. When the 1958 disturbances in Lebanon erupted between President Chamoun (who was seeking an extension of his term as president) and the pro-Nasser groups in Lebanon clamoring to join the United Arab Republic formed by the union of Egypt and Syria under the leadership of Nasser, the SSNP sided with Chamoun. In a way, the battles in Lebanon against the pro-Nasser groups were a continuation of the events of 1955 in Syria.
The resolution of the conflict after the US military intervention,6 the election of a new president, Fuad Chehab, and an understanding with Nasser to curb his supporters from seeking immediate union, left the SSNP with no political gains for the sacrifices and efforts it expended in the events of 1958. Mounting frustration with the corruption and chaos in the affairs of Lebanon and the sidelining of the Party led the SSNP leadership to embark on planning for a coup d’état in Lebanon.7 Agents of the Lebanese intelligence services had infiltrated the SSNP ranks and knowledge of the preparations had reached the government so when on December 31, 1961 the SSNP launched its attempt, the government forces were ready to suppress it. There followed another cycle of persecution, arrests, and assassination to which the SSNP constituency was subjected. Dozens of SSNP members died under torture, scores were maimed, and all were summarily dismissed from government employment, prevented from travel, and subjected to humiliations and destructive house searches. Another dark cycle in the life of the Party was at hand. The mere suspicion of being a member, or the possession of any Party literature was an automatic sentence to jail. It was an age of terror the likes of which Lebanon had not encountered before.
