Van Dorn’s legal victory was hollow. Reading Van Dorn’s pamphlet, President Davis agreed that the court’s findings had cleared him, but by then events had swept Van Dorn aside. While Van Dorn was battling in the courtroom, Grant had quietly built up his army. By the end of October he had nearly 50,000 troops on duty at Memphis, Corinth, and intermediate posts. Rid of Van Dorn’s army as an offensive threat and no longer a manpower pool for Buell, who had driven Bragg from Kentucky, Grant was ready to take the offensive. To Halleck he proposed to concentrate his forces at Grand Junction, twenty miles north of Holly Springs, and begin a drive down the Mississippi Central Railroad to Vicksburg. Grant ordered five divisions to assemble at Grand Junction and repaired there himself to await Halleck’s reply.
Halleck not only endorsed his plan, but he also promised Grant 20,000 fresh troops from Illinois. Grant elected to suspend his overland march on Vicksburg until they reported in. In the meantime he directed McPherson to reconnoiter aggressively toward Holly Springs with two divisions.15
Van Dorn was in no position to contest even such a limited move. The exchanged Fort Donelson prisoners had arrived, and stragglers by the hundreds drifted into camp daily, swelling the army to a respectable 24,000 troops. But the men were indifferently armed, low on provisions, and in poor health. Winter struck early, blanketing northern Mississippi with snow the last week of October. Hundreds took ill. Pemberton at Vicksburg had no troops to spare. He could only suggest Van Dorn abandon Holly Springs in favor of blocking positions along the Tallahatchie River.16
Van Dorn slipped out of Holly Springs on November 9, four days ahead of Union cavalry, and took up position south of the Tallahatchie. His army was still in no state to resist an advance. Rations continued to be short, and the weather had worsened. Morale plummeted with the cold. When Grant moved southward on December 1, Van Dorn withdrew to Grenada, a mere 120 miles north of Vicksburg. Although Grant paused to consolidate, Van Dorn’s lieutenants knew it was but a question of time before he would force them from Grenada. Disaster seemed inevitable. The army was in shambles. An ice storm struck during the march to Grenada, touching off an epidemic of typhoid fever and pneumonia. Desertions climbed. Van Dorn’s detractors grew bolder, and his supporters wavered. After Van Dorn dispersed Maury’s division to guard fords across the Yallabusha River, the Virginian complained: “In my opinion, we should all be concentrated about Grenada with our ’staves in our hand and our loins girt about,' and ready for a quick exodus. Why should we scatter our division in this way when no one division is strong enough to fight, and when it is not intended?"17
Van Dorn never had a chance to answer Maury. Secretary of War Randolph had resigned in mid-November 15 in disgust over the president’s policies. Randolph’s departure weakened Davis’s hand with Congress, and he at last yielded to congressional demands that he appoint his old nemesis, Gen. Joseph Johnston, to orchestrate Confederate strategy in the West. Johnston’s appointment occasioned a reshuffle in Pemberton’s department. Van Dorn was reduced to corps command, on an equal footing with Price. A week later he fell farther. A Texas colonel had suggested to Pemberton that a cavalry expedition into the enemy’s rear, properly led, might capture Grant’s huge supply depot at Holly Springs, forcing him to fall back. Pemberton consented to give the scheme a try. He detached three brigades of cavalry for the expedition and selected Van Dorn to command them. Turning over his corps to Maury, Van Dorn left to join the troopers for what must have struck the ever-ambitious Mississippian as a ride into military oblivion.18
* * *
His recall to Corinth on October 9 had disgusted Rosecrans. To Colonel Ducat he grumbled, “Those people have ordered us back. The orders are imperative, and a great part of the fruits of victory will be lost. We must cross the Hatchie tonight and try to reach Corinth tomorrow.”
“But why?" asked Ducat. “Is anything taking place that we don’t know of? It’s not possible for any troops in the center to be marching toward Corinth or wedging in anywhere between Chattanooga and Corinth.”
“The whole rebel army of the west, and certainly the whole flower of it, is in our front, whipped and demoralized,” continued Rosecrans. “We could drive them like a flock of sheep. It seems to me the time has come to win the war in the west.”19
Rosecrans returned to a reception hardly befitting his success. During his absence Grant had issued General Orders Number 88. Although presented as a congratulatory message, the document was insulting to Rosecrans. At Corinth Rosecrans had inflicted losses twice as great as his own and repelled some of the fiercest attacks of the war. Yet Grant scarcely acknowledged his achievements. Said the journalist Whitelaw Reid, “Passing by the brilliant battle of Corinth with a single clause, [Grant] devoted most of the order to extravagant praise of Hurlbut for the brief onslaught he made upon the enemy during their retreat.” Grant also intimated that relations between the commands of Rosecrans and Ord were strained: “Between them there should be, and I trust is, the warmest bonds of brotherhood.”20
The insinuation offended Rosecrans. “The part that expresses the hope that good feeling will exist between Ord’s command and my own amazes me,” he wrote Grant. “So far as I know there was nothing even to suggest the fact that it might be otherwise. Under such circumstances the report is to be regretted, because our troops, knowing that there was no foundation in it for them, will be led to think there is some elsewhere.”21
Rosecrans’s allies in the press corps took up his cause. In his account of the Battle of Corinth, Cincinnati Daily Commercial correspondent William D. Bickham minimized Grant’s role in the campaign: “And now, to whom is due the honors of the batde of Corinth? The verdict of the whole army is in favor of General Rosecrans. . . . It would seem from General Grant’s dispatches that he claims the honors. . . . There is no doubt that the public will give the credit to General Rosecrans, where it belongs.”22
Grant was incensed. He held Rosecrans responsible for the report and demanded he silence Bickham and members of his staff who had instigated “a distinction of feeling and spirit” within the department. He also upbraided Rosecrans for paroling prisoners incorrectly, a triviality to which Grant devoted a hectoring dispatch.
Grant’s hostility to Rosecrans was an open secret at the headquarters of both generals. It most certainly derived from indiscreet chatter on the part of Rosecrans’s staff, who “knew all their general knew” about Grant’s failure to support him at Iuka. Querulous members of Grant’s military family answered that Rosecrans, who had erred in bringing on the battle too soon and in leaving open the Fulton road, sought credit for the victory at Grant’s expense. As Col. Mortimer Leggett told John Rawlins, “It [is] a gross outrage for the minions of a newly fledged major general, not only to attempt an exclusive appropriation of all the honors but, by irresponsible assertions, and mysterious insinuations, to attempt to awaken and deepen, former prejudices against the general to whom naturally and rightfully the first honors belonged. Major General Rosecrans is undoubtedly an excellent officer . . . but the evidence is such that . . . he must be at least privy to the whole devilish scheme.”23
Netded by Rosecrans’s high-handedness after Corinth, Grant allowed himself to believe the conspiratorial ranting of his military circle, where three weeks earlier he had praised Rosecrans for vigor and good judgment at Iuka. Grant also began to complain that Rosecrans had missed the chance to destroy Van Dorn’s army when he waited a day to give chase. Rosecrans behaved as badly as Grant. His brittle ego and hair-trigger temper got the better of him, and he enlisted his field commanders for a verbal duel with Grant. Those who refused to cooperate, Rosecrans slighted in his report of the Battle of Corinth.24
Grant and Rosecrans clashed openly on October 21. Their exchange began with an innocuous query from Grant regarding cavalry arms: “General, are you in receipt of or have you any rifles for cavalry on the way for use of troops at Corinth? If so how many? I remember hearing you say something on the subject and want to know so
as to know how to distribute when they arrive.”
Rosecrans bristled. A shipment of rifles indeed was on the way. The rifles should go to his cavalry regiments, which had done most of the fighting, rather than to those operating nearer Grant. Rosecrans’s impertinence angered Grant, and he replied sharply: “Your remarkable telegram is just received. If the troops commanded by you are not a part of my command, what troops are? The Eastern District is the same to me and I have no partiality for any portion of it, over any other portion. General, I am afraid from many of your dispatches that you regard your command giving privileges held by others commanding geographical divisions. This is a mistake.”
Rosecrans found Grant’s missive equally remarkable, and he demanded an apology for its tone. Grant not only did not apologize, but he also obliquely accused Rosecrans of insubordination. He repeated his anger over the “leaky [nature] of some on your staff or in confidential relation to you as evidenced by newspaper correspondents and their attempt to keep up an invidious distinction between the armies of the Mississippi and the Tennessee,” and over Rosecrans’s improper disposition of Rebel prisoners, which “looked like ignoring higher authority.”
Rosecrans could not let matters rest. He took exception to Grant’s continued criticism of his handling of prisoners and denied anyone at his headquarters was fomenting discord; the problem rested with Grant’s staff. Rosecrans closed with a challenge: “There are no headquarters in these United States less responsible for what newspaper correspondents say of operations than mine. This I wish to be understood to be distincdy applicable to the affairs of Iuka and Corinth. After this declaration I am free to say that if you do not meet me frankly with a declaration that you are satisfied I shall consider my power to be useful in this Department ended.”25
A full-dress showdown between Grant and Rosecrans looked inevitable. Rosecrans tried to preempt it by demanding Halleck transfer him. Making it clear that “mousing politicians on Grant’s staff” were responsible for the “feeling of jealousy” Grant had toward him, Rosecrans begged Halleck to assign him to “any other suitable duty.”26
Rosecrans was right about Grant’s subordinates, but he did Grant a disservice in accusing him of petty jealousy. Rawlins, McPherson, and Hurlbut all wanted Grant to relieve Rosecrans, and they appealed to Julia Grant to use her influence with her husband to that end. Julia spoke to the general, but Grant dismissed the matter. He intended to overlook Rosecrans’s indiscretions. “Rosecrans’s action was all wrong,” he conceded, but Rosecrans was “a brave and loyal soldier with the best of military training, and of this kind we have none to spare at present. Besides, ’Rosy' is a fine fellow. He is a bit excited now but he will soon come around alright. Do not trouble yourself about me, my dear litde wife,” Grant assured her with a smile, “I can take care of myself.”27
Halleck spared Grant the trouble. On October 23 he told Grant to have Rosecrans report to Cincinnati, where he would receive an onward assignment. “General Rosecrans is ordered to Cincinnati to receive orders,” Grant confided to Ord. “I suspect he is going to take Buell’s place. Have had no intimation of the fact but Buell’s failure to come up with Bragg, whether his fault or not, will raise such a storm that he will probably have to give way.”28
Grant guessed correcdy. Bowing to pressure from the press and from Republican governors, President Lincoln replaced Buell with Rosecrans as commander of the Army of the Ohio.
Both Rosecrans and Grant were delighted: Rosecrans to have an independent command, and Grant to be rid of a troublesome subordinate. He felt no need to castigate Rosecrans further. The pressures of his new assignment would try Rosecrans’s nerves far better than could Grant. “It is a great annoyance to gain rank and command enough to attract public attention,” Grant told Ord. “I have found it so and would really prefer some little command where public attention would not be attracted towards me.”29
26. The Reckoning
Apart from poisoning relations between Grant and Rosecrans and wrecking the career of Earl Van Dorn, what had the Battle of Corinth accomplished? Federal generals removed from the squabbling of Grant and Rosecrans considered Corinth a signal defeat for the South. “The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great,” wrote William T. Sherman. “It was, indeed, a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in West Tennessee. From the timid defensive we were at once enabled to assume the bold offensive. In Memphis I could see its effects upon the citizens, and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained a death blow.” David Stanley agreed Corinth was a disaster from which the Confederacy never recovered. A convalescent Richard Oglesby had no doubt he had been wounded in “one of the most decisive battles, in its immediate results and in its effects upon subsequent campaigns, of the early engagements of the war.”1
Those close to Grant and Rosecrans emphasized lost opportunities rather than gains. Grant supporters blamed Rosecrans for letting Van Dorn slip away. Grenville Dodge, whom Grant placed in command of Davies’s division after Corinth, summed up the consensus at district headquarters: “Van Dorn and Price retreated completely demoralized, and should have been relentlessly followed, and their trains and artillery captured; and although Grant urged this in dispatch after dispatch, for some reason there were delays.”
Arthur Ducat disagreed vehemently. It was Grant who had permitted Van Dorn to escape. “If Grant had supported you . . . the Vicksburg campaign would never have been necessary,” Ducat assured Rosecrans. “I regard the calling back of you at Corinth as an unexplained military crime, and shall so regard it while I live unless your superiors will admit that they were insane or jackasses.”2
Overwrought language aside, Ducat’s argument has merit. Contrary to Dodge’s claim, Grant never urged Rosecrans on, and Rosecrans pursued aggressively—eventually in defiance of Grant’s orders. Could Rosecrans, as he himself suggested, have gone all the way to Vicksburg, or were his troops too exhausted and their supply lines too attenuated for an extended pursuit, as Grant maintained?
Testimony from the men in ranks suggests they could have pushed on far beyond Ripley. They were tired but in excellent spirits. Demoralized Southern stragglers and abandoned Rebel equipment gave the Federals a feeling of being in on the kill. Straggling among the Yankees was a problem until rations met the army at Ripley; a brief rest there, and with the weather turned cool, the army certainly could have pushed on. Unlike the Rebels, Rosecrans’s men were never starved; they found foraging quite fruitful. “We ran out of rations and foraging parties were sent out,” said an Iowan. “They brought in sweet potatoes and fresh pork . . . and the boys have been pitching freely into cattle and hogs in this locality.” “We feasted on hog and sweet potatoes,” a member of the Fiftieth Illinois recalled fondly. “The regiment feasts on chickens, geese, and sweet potatoes,” said a soldier of the Seventh Illinois.3
Had Rosecrans continued beyond Ripley, Grant feared he “would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had at Corinth and behind in- trenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army.” On the contrary, a Federal drive southward would have turned Van Dorn’s flank, rendering Holly Springs indefensible. Van Dorn’s army was in no condition to resist, nor were his subordinates inclined to obey him.
For the Union, victory at Corinth secured control of northern Mississippi, making possible Grant’s offensive against Vicksburg. With Van Dorn’s army near collapse, a protracted Union pursuit might have eliminated the principal Southern force in the state and made the Vicksburg campaign shorter and less costly. That Rosecrans delayed a day in giving chase is immaterial; it took Van Dorn weeks to restore his army to fighting trim. As Dabney Maury recalled, “At Holly Springs five thousand exchanged prisoners taken at Fort Donelson joined us, and many absentees and stragglers came in. The enemy remained supine, and for more than a month we were encamped about Holly Springs, and actively engaged in reorganizing, refitting and reinforcing our army. A vigoro
us pursuit after our defeat at Corinth would have prevented all this and effectually destroyed our whole command.”4
Confederate defeat at Corinth had ramifications far beyond Mississippi. It fatally compromised Braxton Bragg’s position in Kentucky at the climax of his campaign. Bragg had counted on Edmund Kirby Smith to cover his right flank and Van Dorn to protect his left during his drive on Louisville. Both failed him utterly. Smith considered his part in the campaign finished after he captured Lexington in early September. Rather than unite with Bragg or threaten southern Ohio to ease pressure on him, Smith scattered his army across eastern Kentucky. Van Dorn and Price, of course, never made it beyond the Mississippi-Tennessee state line. With both flanks exposed, Bragg stopped short of Louisville, yielding the initiative to Buell.
On October 1, while Van Dorn marched on Corinth, Buell advanced from Louisville to do battle with Bragg. At Perryville on October 7 and 8 the two armies fought to a standstill. Believing himself outnumbered, Bragg withdrew toward the Cumberland Mountains. On October 12 he called his generals and Smith to a council of war to consider future plans. Despite Smith’s lack of cooperation and the lukewarm reception Kentucky had accorded his army, Bragg had not given up on the state. But while he waited for his generals, word came of Van Dorn’s debacle at Corinth. Van Dorn’s defeat left the Army of the Mississippi as the only force between the Appalachians and the Mississippi capable of contesting a Yankee invasion of the Deep South. And with Federal control of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad now undisputed and northern Mississippi and northern Alabama emptied of Confederates, Chattanooga was vulnerable to a rapid strike from the west. Bragg decided he must retreat at once to save his army and protect Chattanooga.5
The Darkest Days of the War- the Battles of Iuka and Corinth Page 38
