by Ravi Rikhye
Helicopter units
This list is not completely accurate or up-to-date.[141]
Mi-35 to be replaced by 22 AH-64E (excludes 11 options, Army order of 39 separate))
Mi-26 to be replaced by 15 CH-47 (excludes 7 options)
Mi-35
Mi-26
Mi-8 (Mi-17V replacing)
Mi-17
104 HS Suratgarh
125 HS Pathankot
126 HU Chandigarh
109 HU
110 HU
111 HU
112 HU
114 HU
118 HU
119 HU
120 HU
152 HU
153 HU
Mi-17V (gunship)
Dhurv
Rudra Light Attack
Additionally (HF = Helicopter Flights)
Cheetah (Lama)
Chetak (Alouette 3)
Unknown types
115 HU Tezpur
131 HF (FAC)
SOF HU
141 HF
132 HF (FAC)
AEW HF
142 HF
Surveillance/Observation HF (fixed wing)
121 HF Bombay ?Mi8?
122 HF Andamans ?Mi-8?
Indian Air Force transport aircraft in support of the Army
6 C-130s for support of the Army’s Special Forces; six more will be purchased. Twenty-four additional C-130s are to be procured by 2022, delayed.
The Air Force operates 100+ An-32 medium lifters currently undergoing modernization in support of the Army’s deployment in forward mountain areas and has ~25 Il-76 heavy long-range lifters.
An initial batch of 10 C-17s is in service, replacing the Il-76s and giving, for the first time, an ability to move 60 tons of cargo per sortie to the forward mountain areas. The An-32 lifts 5-tons. Both the Army and Air Force favor the purchase of additional C-130s as well. An 11th C-17 is anticipated, last of six White Tails which were supposed to go to India to bring the total to 16, but GOI couldn’t find funds. Plan for a total of 24 were cancelled.
Meanwhile, India and Russia in 2009 started jointly developing the Il-214, a 68-ton maximum weight, 20 –ton maximum payload, 100 troops maximum personnel medium STOL lifter. The aircraft is a jet with twin engines and looks like a scaled-down C-17. India intended to buy 45 to replace all its An-32s (5-ton payload or 50 troops) and initial service was expected by 2023, but India pulled out in 2016. Forty-five could have comfortably replaced the IAF’s entire An-32 fleet.
6.8 Miscellaneous
6.8.1 General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF)
A quasi-military military engineer organization primarily engaged in construction and maintenance of roads in border areas. GREF’s services are primarily at the disposal of the Border Roads Organization. Shortage of heavy equipment
Personnel
38,000 permanent personnel
70,000 daily wage laborers (this can be rapidly increased if needed)
6.8.2 Equipment
4000 MBT T-72 and T-90
2750 IFV (15-year life extended to 35)
4000 artillery guns and rocket launchers
1500 air defense artillery including SAMs
150,000 soft-skin vehicles
250 helicopters
50 UAV
Ammunition shortages
Below absolute minimum 10-day reserves
Infantry: 70% of required war reserves
Anti-tank missiles: 50%
Tank: 40%
Artillery: 60%
6.8.3 Note on signals organization
In 2017 Army announced it was reorganizing Corps of Signals to put greater reliance of civilian infrastructure, thus freeing many troops for new combat formations. The below orbat will soon be obsolete.
Commands have two signal regiments each
Command
Composite
Corps have three types of signal regiment each
Army Radio Engineering Network
Corps Operating
Corps Engineering
Divisions have one signal regiment each
CI Forces have one signal regiment each
Several other types of signal units exist
Air Support Signal Regiments (one per Command)
Army Static Switch Communication Network (ASCON)
Army Wide Area Network units (computer links)
ELINT regiments
Field Evaluation units
Information Warfare Battalions
R and D units
Radio Monitoring Companies
Several satellite networks (many classified)
Signal Center Companies (support to fixed installations)
Signal Groups (electronic warfare)
Signals units for missile groups
Units that integrate networks
There are several signals projects underway. One, Mercury Blaze, provides mobile telephones down to platoon level. The Army wants its Battlefield Management System canceled to say money for the combat arms. This is an exceptionally bad decision. Ministry of Defense is yet to agree.
Samyukta[142] is an electronic warfare system; each regiment has 145 vehicles. Coverage is a box 150-km by 70-km. An official press release in 2004 describes the system as “High Frequency to Millimeter wave for reconnaissance, direction finding, and position fixing, listing, prioritizing and jamming of adversaries' emissions."
6.8.4 Note on Indian Army SAM organization
Previously mobile SAMs were restricted to the armored divisions. With the influx of new equipment, SA-6s with the armored divisions are being transferred to non-strike corps. These corps are also getting the new Akash SAM. SA-6 was modernized in the 2000s.
Three regiments of Israeli SPYDER are under delivery. It is unclear if they will go to the armored divisions or the three strike corps. Each regiment appears to have 36 launchers with 4 missiles, though an 8 x missile launcher is available.
Mobile AD assets with armored divisions were initially SA-6 and Shilka in an AD group, later upgraded to a brigade. Tunguska has replaced these systems.
TOR is to be co-produced in India; it will replace SA-8 and SA-13. Pantsir is under consideration.
The majority of AD regiments remain equipped with the Bofors L-70 which was modernized some years ago.
The immense variety of mobile SAMs arises from India’s habits of ad hoc planning/procurement.
6.8.5 Indian Intelligence Agencies
Intelligence Bureau (domestic and border intelligence)
Research and Analysis Wing (external intelligence; reports to National Security Advisor)
National Technical Intelligence Center (autonomous but part of RAW)
Directorates of Military, Naval, and Air Intelligence (part of the uniformed services)
Defense Intelligence Agency (formed only in 2002 to reduce military dependency on civilian agencies)
Signals intelligence
Image processing and analysis
Joint Cipher Bureau (technical part of DIA, but autonomous)
Narcotics Control Bureau (this is wrongly placed as an intelligence agency; it is a police anti-drug agency)
6.9 Regiments
Infantry regiments each have a regimental center, where new recruits are trained and personnel records of all battalions in the regiment maintained. The regimental enter is responsible for casualty replacements in wartime.
The regiments generally have about 21 battalions each, the following exceptions exist. The Naga Regiment has three battalions; the Gorkha regiments have 5-6, the Ladakh scouts have five (2 more to raise), and the Mechanized Infantry Regiment has 25. The Guards are going on 27. The Parachute Regiment is also called the Parachute/Special Forces and has 15 battalions (Including 31st Rashtriya Rifles).
The Mechanized Infantry and Guards Regiments are entirely mechanized, either infantry or Reconnaissance and Support battalions. Speculation is the next mechanized regiment will be the Grenadiers.
1 Gorkha Rifles
1
1 Gorkha Rifles
3 Gorkha Rifles
4 Gorkha Rifles
5 Gorkha Rifles
8 Gorkha Rifles
9 Gorkha Rifles
Assam Regiment (17 bns)
Bihar Regiment (20 battalions)
Dogra Regiment
Garhwal Rifles
Grenadiers (24 battalions)
Guards (20 battalions)
Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry (budget not under Army)
Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
Jat Regiment
Kumaon Regiment
Ladakh Scouts
Madras Regiment (21 battalions)
Mahar Regiment (21 battalions)
Maratha Light Infantry
Mechanized Infantry Regiment (25 battalions, 17th, 19th, 23rd R&S)
Naga Regiment (3 battalions)
Parachute Regiment
Punjab Regiment
Rajput Regiment
Rajputana Rifles
Sikh Light Infantry
Sikh Regiment
Indian Armored Regiments
AR = Armored Regiment; C = Cavalry; H = Horse; and L = Lancers
1 H
2 L
3 C
4 H
5 AR
6 L
7 C
8 C
9 H
10 AR
11 AR
12 AR
13 AR
14H
15 AR
16 C
17 H
18 C
19 AR
20 L
21 H L
41 AR
42 AR
43 AR
44 AR
45 C
46 AR
47 AR
48 AR
49 AR
50 AR
51 AR
52 AR
53 AR
54 AR
55 AR
56 AR
57 AR
58 AR
59 AR
61 C
62 C
63 C
64 AR
65 AR
66 AR
67 AR
68 AR
69 AR
70 AR
71 AR
72 AR
73 AR
74 AR
75 AR
76 AR
81 AR
82 AR
83 AR
84 AR
85 AR
86 AR
87 AR
88 AR
89 AR
90 AR
6th Armored Regiment is now 6th Lancers. 40 and 60 were never raised. 80 was an armored delivery regiment for the 1971 War, later disbanded.
The Indian Armored Corps’ theoretical expansion capability is 15 regiments a year. Because of equipment shortfalls – themselves because of lack of priority – only six new regiments have been raised in the 10-years since 1993 (53 AR raised that year). Five of those regiments were first sanctioned 20 years ago. The tanks may have come from regimental reserves plus the reduction in the regimental TO (see below). The Army has 100% replacement tank crews on active duty with each regiment, so raisings can be effected rapidly.
The tank inventory is (T-90 may not be accurate):
124 Arjun (124 additional on order)
~1560 T-90 (Imports and from Indian factories)
310 2001
330 2006
340 2007
354 ???MS
235 2013 domestic production
348 T-90S importing (for 3 high-altitude armored brigades)
464 T-90 new order 2016 India manufacture
700 T-90 rumored order 2017
2400+ T-72s
The tank factories consistently run well below capacity due to organizational and labor issues and problems in getting Russian to adhere to contracts. Only 150 T-90s were produced by Indian factories in 2000-2010. The 2400 T-72s are being upgraded and modernized by the Army in its base workshops, but the program is years behind schedule. Shortage of night-fighting capability is being remedied.
Regiments consist of 44 tanks (three Sabre squadrons of 14 each – HQ Troop of two tanks plus four troops with 3 tanks each; plus a regimental HQ Troop of 2 tanks) and were authorized 17 replacement tanks, now cut to 14. One of the three Sabre squadrons is kept in ready storage to reduce wear and tear; nonetheless, as the manpower is on establishment, activating the third squadron requires only a few hours. Annual training mileage for tanks is unknown; training rounds for the main gun have fallen due ammunition shortages. Simulators make up some of the difference. The regiment has recently been reduced from its decades-old total of 3 tanks in HQ troops to two because the Battalion 2nd-in-Command has been shifted to a BMP. This gives more room for his staff but also reduces the regiment by one tank.
6.10 Major Personnel Issues
6.10.1 Overaged Army
A major problem in the Indian Army is that it is overaged. There is a logical reason for this. Jobs in India are difficult to come by. Retiring officers at 20-years’ service and Other Ranks at 14-years, in both cases with meager pensions and leaving them with limited job prospects is cruel, and likely to reduce the already low attraction of military service. Especially with Indians living longer. This was a less of a problem earlier when men came from villages and farms they could return to, and officers came from landed gentry. For field service units/formations, however, youth is needed because combat is just physically very, very hard. The issue of mental fitness also arises. Older men have families, and they must think of what happens to them should they be killed or disabled. Today, our platoon commanders, Junior Commissioned Officers tend to 40. They are superb because they have 20+ years of soldiering behind them. In other armies, however, platoon commanders are 20-25-years of age. Their lack of experience is mitigated by experienced platoon sergeants. It would be of great interest to study how this business of age versus experience plays out in combat but is clearly beyond one’s competence. It is reasonable to assume, however, that a platoon leader of 40 is not as physically vigorous as one of 22.
Consider below the typical command age of Indian Army officers. A man who must wait ten years to command a company, and twenty to lead a battalion, is unlikely to be a happy person. Here is a list of actual and ideal age. You may have your own thoughts, feel free to modify.
Lt
On commissioning age 21
Typical command age[143]
Ideal
Capt
Minimum years of service
Major (company CO)
6
32
26
Lt.-Col
13
36
31 Battalion CO
Col (battalion CO)
15
40
Brig (brigade CO)
25
50
36
Maj.-Gen. (division CO)
32
55
41
Lt.-Gen (corps CO)
36
58
46
Lt. Gen (army GOC)
38
60
52
General (COAS)
62
55
This assumes we revert to the old system, where a field duty Lt.-Col. went straight to Brigadier, whereas a staff duty Lt. Colonel became a Colonel. Also, a brigadier should be chief-of-staff for a corps. The reasons for the grade inflation at battalion level and higher are to permit officers to serve more years, and to retire with a higher pension.
Unfortunately, we are getting two different issues mixed up. We need younger officers and enlisted men, but we need to give them a degree of job security and a pension adequate to live on in retirement. There are many ways of separating the two issues. An obvious one is that that below a JCO, a man’s first 11-years should be considered his first government job. He can be offered a generous lump sum, given an administrative job, or taken into another governme
nt service. In our proposed system for Border Force, he will not be eligible for transfer because the Border troops need to be as vigorous as the regular army. The JCO would serve longer, then offered the same deal. Officers should serve a basic 18-year term. At the end of which s/he is either promoted or retired, with the same protection as for the JCOs and Other Ranks.
For decades the Army has been complaining about a shortage of officers. The problem actually dates from the post-1962 expansion. Failure to resolve a problem half-a-century old is uniquely an Indian achievement. It is only because as a civilization we are truly superior to all others that we can reach this pinnacle, and leave other nations gasping at our magnificence and wisdom. The reason for the shortage is too well known to need elaboration: youngsters don’t want to sign up because of pay, very tough service conditions, and lack of prestige. The solutions also are simple. If the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff was moved to third in precedence, after the president and the prime minister, and other ranks adjusted accordingly, overnight the problem of prestige is resolved.
6.10.2 Officer shortage
Advanced technical education in India is essentially provided free. For example, our IITs and IIMs are world class. So, youngsters graduate and leap to highly paid jobs in India or overseas. This is also not a new phenomenon. My school batchmate Umesh Dutta, a very smart student, was accepted to an IIT. He would have graduated around 1966 but a serious accident caused him to miss a year. When I met him 1969, he told me he was the only person in his IIT class to have chosen to stay in India because he believed in the country. I will not tell you of his dismal experience in a government laboratory. In the US, the government pays for your college plus a stipend in exchange for four years’ service as an officer. So, easy solution for India: draft graduates for four years’ service, which includes training during the school year and vacation. The Army will pay a stipend, GOI already pays the tuition, and the Army’s job is make sure the young men and women (Sorry, ladies, this is the age of gender equality, and heck, some of you may actually enjoy your military service) are physically fit. If that means extra rations, provide them. If it means physical training in addition to the army training, provide that. First-class medical needed? Provide it. Next, open opportunities for Other Ranks. They come with a 12th Grade education. Give them the opportunity to get a college degree, preferably technical, over 7-years – use distance learning. Commission them as lieutenants.
