by Ravi Rikhye
Muzaffarabad
Chaman (Quetta)
Bajaur
Chitral
Nowshera
Chor (Sind)
Okara
Dera Islam Khan
Pano Aqil
Dera Nawab Sahib
Peshawar
Dhamial
Quetta
Drosh (Northern Areas)
Rahim Yar Khan
Ghizer (Northern Areas)
Rawalkot
Gilgit
Rawalpindi
Gujranwala
Sargodha
Hyderabad
Sherqila
Jhelum
Sialkot
Karachi
Sialkot
Karimabad (Northern Areas)
Skardu
Kasur
Sukkar
Kohat
Vehari
Konodass (Gilgit)
Wana
Kotli
Insurgents
Baluchistan Liberation Army (Claimed 6,000, actual 2,000)
Baluchistan Republican Army
Baloch Liberation Front
Lakshar-e-Balochistan
Jundallah is a primarily Iranian Baloch insurgent group that often operates from the Pakistan side of the border.
There are minority groups in Pakistan Kashmir’s Northern Territories who want greater autonomy or even independence; however, Pakistan federal forces have the groups well under control.
Though some Taliban groups do periodically act against the state, calling them insurgents is problematical because on some level all the groups have ties to the Pakistan Army/ISI.
Pakistan Army’s problem, since its birth, has always been shortage of resource for purchase of equipment. For parity on its India front, it must maintain an army 2/3rd that of India. The other one-third of Indian forces is deployed against China. One measure of the financial stress this causes is brigades per billion dollars of GDP.
Country
GDP $ Bil
Brigades
GDP $billion per brigade
Pakistan
300
100
3
India
3,000
150
20
China
14,000
100
140
US
20,000
40
500
In the US case, we’ve assumed ~32 Army and ~8 Marine brigades.
In the period of the first US alliance, 1954-1962, it attained 2/3rd parity thanks to US arms aid. In the period of the first Chinese alliance, 1965-2015, it spent a large percent of its GDP on defense, bought cheap Chinese weapons, and joint arms development. In the period 1979-1989, it was again a US ally, but since US was making progress wooing India, the US assistance was strictly controlled, and nowhere enough. In the period 2001-continuing, in the third US alliance, it received little equipment help because US-India were close friends, and the equipment Pakistan needed was for the Indian front, not to aid US counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Increasing GDP and possibly favorable loans from China allowed it to buy limited amounts from the US, such as 18 F-16, second-hand SP 155mm howitzers, 12 AH-1W attack helicopters, 300 T-99 tanks from China (possibly gifted), and several thousand second hand M-113 APCs, new artillery from Chin and Turkey, SAMs from Italy and China. Contrary to Indian belief, most of the money given by the US in this period was for support of CI operations, which admittedly was half-hearted. Now Pakistan is in a second period of alliance with China where it is a close ally in China’s plan to undercut Indian and US influence in South Asia. One Belt One Road is part of this. Infrastructure assistance to the tune of $90-billion has already been committed and is being disbursed at speed. It is logical China will now start providing military aid in the form of concessional price and grant aid.
China is equipping the entire Pakistan Navy, for example, 8 AIP submarines, 8 frigates, and 4 corvettes, including ships built in Pakistan, at a total cost of about $10-billion. It is reasonable to expect China will provide help for the Pakistan Army.
Pakistan biggest need is to expand and modernize its mechanized forces. India is building to 75+ tank regiments and 50 mechanized infantry battalions. Many of the latter are reconnaissance battalions, which gives India the edge in this area. Moreover, India has a qualitative superiority with its T-90s and BMP-2s. An approximate estimate for Pakistan is 60 tank regiments and 30 APC battalions, plus several mechanized anti-tank battalions; their equipment is inferior, though their Al Zarrar conversions from T-59s are equal to our T-72 conversions. I realize that 60 Pakistan tank regiments seems way out of the ballpark. Counting the armored brigades for which I have numbers plus divisional tank regiments gives, however, 60 regiments. Pakistan has reduced the size of its regiments from 44 to 41. These have a RHQ of two, and three squadrons of 13 tanks each (HQ 1, four troops of 3 each giving 12). Plus, it has only nine tanks in regimental reserve. It can field 60 regiments with just 3000 tanks. India’s total regiment is 44+14, or 58. For our 75 regiments (including perhaps 5 more to raise, giving about 70 now); this requires 4,100. Pakistan has an edge in SP artillery, which it needs to enlarge. Pakistan does not need to equal us in mechanized forces, especially since India has ~9 tank regiments and 3-4 BMP battalions are committed to the China front. There is, however, little doubt it needs to operational Army Reserve Center.
[Quite incidentally, there is a continuing debate as to the better arrangement, 3 platoons of 3 tanks plus 1 in HQ, or 3 platoons of four tanks each and 2 in HQ, i.e., a company (squadron) of 10 versus one of 13 tanks. India uses a squadron of 14, with 2 in HQ and four troops of 3 each; Pakistan the same but only 1 in HQ troop. US uses 14, with HQ of 2 and three platoons of 4 each. China, Russia, Israel prefer the 10 or 11 tank company. With 11, the HQ gets two tanks. The smaller company has fewer battle casualties, but conversely, its speed of advance is slower than the larger companies. The reason is in the smaller company, one platoon of three moves at a time with 7 tanks covering it. The four-tank platoon can fire and jump by itself, but only two tanks are overwatching at a time. So now you have three platoons firing and overwatching, faster advance, but more risk. The five-tank platoon, used by Germany in World War II and the US subsequently, is out of fashion. In this organization, the platoon commander joins either of the two two-tank elements as needed. With a 5-tank platoon, you can have a platoon leader and two sections of two tanks each, and it can continue operating after 60% losses.
During World War II, the Germans used many different Tables of Equipment because they were hard-pressed to maintain their strength due a shortage of tanks, but the one I like is the 90-tank battalion: four companies, each of five platoons and HQ 2, plus 2 for the battalion commander. This reduced overhead, companies operating by themselves were a powerful subunit. Remember also that aside from battle losses, tanks breakdown with appalling frequency. As the war progressed, German panzer divisions fell to two battalions, and motorized division to one. 80-120 tanks were quite normal for the panzer divisions, and 40-50 for a motorized division.
Readers must not let the Pakistan Army’s poor performance against insurgents to conclude they won’t fight against India effectively. For one thing, GHQ’s orders against “insurgents” whom Pakistan regards as a fourth branch of service against India, is to do a lot of sound and fury, to put on a good show for the American benefit. It’s not a real fight. For another, the Pakistanis are indoctrinated from childhood to hate Indians. They will fight with extreme toughness against us, as they did in Kargil 1999.
Pakistan’s readiness needs improvement, they may be less well positioned than India, whose Army is frankly in ghastly shape. Ammunition stocks are no longer a problem: China will replenish them.
8. China Army
8.1 Orbat Summary
8.2 Doctrine
8.3 Overview of the new Chinese Army Tables of Organization
8.4 Brief Note on PLA Rocket Force
8.
5 The Chinese military today
8.6 The 1979 war with Vietnam
8.7 Similarities and differences between 1962 and 1979 Wars
8.8 Comparing the old group army to the new
8.1 Orbat Summary
The Chinese Army’s new order-of-battle is a major reorganization mostly completed by 2017. The orbat below is largely based on the work of Andrew K.C.,[162] an expert on the army who works the US. His blog on the Chinese military is of much use, but he writes on what strikes him, and you must assemble the data and fill-in gaps yourself. Other orbat details come from Denis Blasko, a former army officer and China expert.
CAB = Combined Arms Brigade
AB = Aviation Brigade; numbers in italics represent air assault brigades
Arty = Artillery Brigade Same Number as Army
AD = Air Defense Brigade Same Number as Army
SF = Special Forces Brigade Same Number as Army
Log = Logistics Brigade Same Number as Army
EngB = Engineer Brigade Same Number as Army
Army
Theatre
CAB
AA
71
E
2, 35, 160, 178, 179, 235
72
E
5, 10, 34, 85, 90, 124
72
73
E
3, 14, 86, 91 Amfib, 92, 163
73
74
S
1 Amfib, 16, 125, 132, 154, 163
74
75
S
31, 32, 37, 42, 122, 123
121
76
W
12, 62
76
77
W
17?
77
78
N
8, 48, 68, 115, 202, 204
78
79
N
46, 116, 119, 190, 191, 200
79
80
N
47, 69, 118, 138, 199, 203
80
81
C
193, 194, 195 OPFOR
81
82
C
188
82
83
C
Strat reserve
161
Tibet MD
W
52, 53, 54, 55
Xinjian
W
Divisions: 4, 6, 8, 11
Our list is incomplete. Brigades underlined not fully confirmed. Brigades in bold are heavy brigades, this is only a starter list. Readers will notice that the Chinese, a totalitarian nation, have no difficulty in making public detailed orbats; whereas India, a democracy with a free media, seems not to want to share such information with its public.
The new Air Assault Brigades have as their core the former army aviation brigades, along with infantry and light armored fighting vehicles. This is a major change in Chinese doctrine in its drive for modernization. Andrew KC says that the Chinese have been experimenting for years with air assault battalions. With fewer formations to reequip, modernization has stepped up. He notes from photographs of the 68th Combined Arms Brigade, formerly the 68th Mechanized Brigade that “Judging from the recently released photos, the … Brigade has traded in old 37mm towed AAA, PL-66 152mm howitzer and Type59 MBT for PGZ09 35mm SP-AAA, PPZ05 120-mm gun-mortar and Type99 MBT.”[163]
CABs in italics use 8 x 8 armored vehicles and are also known as light mechanized brigades
Not placed: 40 (last identified with now-disbanded 14th Group Army; and 60 and 70
Divisions still existing, assigned to new theatres:
112th Mechanized, Center
116th Mechanized, North
(a) Lhasa and Nyangtri have detachments from 77th Aviation Brigade. Some brigades have fixed-wing transport aircraft on their TO.
(b) The Opposing Force (OPFOR) brigade is 195th Mechanized Brigade OPFOR.[164] It is designated as “Networked”. In 2014 it won 6 of its 7 fights and drew 1. The visiting brigades were put under attack the moment they arrived, losing 30-50% of their strength even before contacting the OPFOR and left the exercise losing up to 70% of their strength. The US OPFOR brigade is the 11th Cavalry Regiment with two combined arms squadrons (battalions), a reconnaissance squadron from the Nevada National Guard, an artillery battalion, and a support squadron. Reportedly, it is immensely difficult to win in an exercise against this unit. In March 2018 Andrew K.C. had pictures of a shoulder patch reading “The 1st OPFOR Brigade”[165], from 81st Army. Unclear if it refers to 195th Brigade or has 1st Brigade taken over the role. AFVs of the Brigade have a blue insignia painted on them; as China OPFOR is – naturally – blue force. Formed 2012.
(c) Group Armies may have Chemical Warfare Brigades. 78th Army has one, numbered 78th CW Bde. Since chemical weapons are banned, it is somewhat concerning that the PLA continues to have these units.
(d) Tibet Military District reports directly to Beijing, though it is part of Western Command. Its brigades and divisions in Xianjing do not report to a group army, of which there are two, 76th and 77th. I lack an orbat for the two armies.
(e) 55th Combined Arms Brigade is a new entry into Tibet subsequent to the Doklam 2017 confrontation and is part of Western Theatre Command. It likely came from 77th GA.
8.2 Doctrine
Understanding the new Chinese Army is not easy if we continue thinking in conventional terms such as number of divisions. The doctrine, which determines the battlefield organization, is best explained by the Rumsfeld Doctrine, or as some prefer, the Cheney-Rumsfeld Doctrine. Cheney was George W. Bush’s vice-president, Rumsfeld was the Defense Secretary 2001-2006; earlier he served in the Ford Administration in the same position 1975-77. Rumsfeld can be considered as the inheritor of Robert McNamara’s brilliant intellectual approach to defense. To get a detailed discussion of how the doctrine developed, read Paul K. Davis; [166] for a critique, read Moustikis and Chaudhri.[167] As an aside, contra the widespread belief that First Gulf 1991 represented the Revolution in Military Affairs that the Chinese Army seeks to implement, the RMA grew out of the experiences of First Gulf and the huge military technology advances that had begun twenty-years before. First Gulf was a straightforward “old fashioned” war using the new technologies.
Rumsfeld’s concept called for combining the Revolution in Intelligence with the Revolution in Military Technology. He wanted the US Army to consist of a small number of highly trained special forces type soldiers, perhaps no more than 100,000. Their job was locating enemy forces, using the tools of the intelligence, and to destroy him with firepower from as remote a distance as possible, using the revolution in military technology. There was no holding ground and continuous lines of troops and so on, all the stuff we associate with a traditional army like ours. The quote from Davis almost exactly mirrors the new Chinese doctrine. Unsurprisingly, because the Chinese are entranced with US military doctrine:[168]
Revolutionaries would argue that modern surveillance and precision fires would solve the age-old problem of a commander not having adequate situational awareness. That problem solved, very small forces with precision weapons would have extreme leverage over any traditional army. Skeptics resisted this view, for both good and bad reasons, and joint planning continued to train in and plan for large-scale maneuver warfare without considering airpower as a decisive instrument and without thinking about what could be accomplished with smaller maneuver units. At the same time, others believed that airpower was now the decisive reality and that the day of large armies was passing and should be hastened by reducing ground forces, with funds flowing to the air forces. The Joint Forces Command became enthralled with what was called Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)—a powerful concept—but one that rather obviously had shortcomings against a sentient adversary. As I can attest from my own experiences, (cautionaries) about RDO—even by proponents of transformation who saw great value in RDO for some cases—often fell on deaf ears.
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br /> It would be of interest to hear Rumsfeld’s views of Vietnam. There too the US Army did not intend to hold ground. It was search and destroy: hunt the enemy using advanced sensors; and use firepower to destroy him. That did not work out well.
The first reason was that the US barred itself from invading the North. That allowed Hanoi to switch the war on and off as needed. Hanoi would gather itself and attack. US firepower would inflict such heavy losses that the PAVN would have to break contact and retreat. It did this three times: in 1968, 1972, and 1975. By 1975 the US had politically got so fed- up of the war that it left, and the South fell. With the huge sanctuary of North Vietnam, aided by China and USSR, whom the US also put off-limits, and with the initiative, Hanoi was in charge and not the US.
Second, in those days instant, highly accurate firepower within 15-minutes was unavailable. The technology did not exist. So instead of small teams of ground troops seeking the enemy and letting air power destroy him, the US had to use its ground troops supported by heavy fire including air to kill the enemy. This meant high US casualties. The US public did not, contrary to popular belief, have a problem with that. Their problem was that the war seemed to go nowhere – see the first reason above – rendering the casualties unacceptable.
