by Ravi Rikhye
How the Chinese Army will fight
The following approximate generalizations can be made:
(a) In wartime, the Chinese will seek to confine the Indian Navy to the East Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. They will not enter the Bay of Bengal because it is narrow, and India has considerable coastal defense capability.
(b) China may use some of its considerable inventory of conventional shorter-range ballistic missiles to attack Indian airbases and communication choke points. Against this is the risk that India, unable to tell if an income missile has a conventional or a nuclear warhead, will fear the worst and react accordingly.
(c) In theory, at least, China could deploy most of its army against India, the analysis made of what India needs on the northern front was made keeping this in mind.
(d) The Chinese air force will focus on the defense of its own airbases in the region, attack Indian bases, and communication choke points, particularly to prevent shifting of forces from west to north, and to cut the Siliguri Corridor, isolating Indian Eastern Command. It will protect its ground troops from air attacks; close support to troops will be the lowest priority.
(e) It will send ground troops into Pakistan Kashmir to limit threats to the CPEC, which will be a major resupply route, air defense missile units, and fighter aircraft to Pakistan to limit India’s air superiority in the west. It will send marines and perhaps other troops to the Sindh area to assist Pakistan Southern Command in its defense against Indian Southern Command.
(f) It will continually attack our cyber-networks, probably from well before the start of the fighting. The primary targets will be banking, power plants, the transportation network – air and seaports, civil aircraft, air traffic control, etc., along with land telecommunications, cell towers, satellite networks, oil refining, pipelines, metro and rail systems – in short anything that relies on cyber, no matter how innocuous. Attacks on the military network are a given but will represent only a tiny fraction of overall effort.
By now readers will have noticed the continued references to the “Chinese Army” as opposed to “People’s Liberation Army.” This is deliberate. There is no more a PLA. China still calls itself a communist state but is just a fascist nation. This not loose abuse, it is a reality. “A system of government marked by centralization of authority under a dictator, a capitalist economy subject to stringent governmental controls, violent suppression of the opposition, and typically a policy of belligerent nationalism and racism.”[187] This describes China to an X. Xi, though now President for life, is not a dictator in the sense of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, but is hardly the first among equals either, as he would claim. Moreover, China is an aggressively expansionist state, far from liberating anyone, its own people need liberation from their government, police, and military. Old fashioned nationalism is driving modern China to build a modern empire. It is best to call a spade a spade and cut out the now obsolete leftist-socialist drivel.
Here is what a retired US Army intelligence officer of 31-years’ experience including China, Taiwan, and Russia has kindly put down on paper for the public, regarding how China will fight India.[188]
Recent PLA publications emphasize paralysis of the enemy defensive system over destruction. Enhanced capabilities to conduct deep attack via firepower and vertical envelopments improve offensive capabilities and decrease the reliance on costly frontal attacks. Precision strikes are emphasized to support ground operations and increase operational tempo by destroying enemy fortified positions. Ground-based precision artillery and missiles can overcome the loss of aviation fire support caused by weather conditions. The fire plan will include a layered assault and interdiction throughout the enemy’s depth. Artillery and Army Aviation strike forward and shallow depth positions, while longer-range rocket, Air Force aviation, and Rocket Force missiles strike in-depth targets. [10] SOF also play a key role providing intelligence, strike guidance, and damage assessments, as well as attacking key targets other forces cannot easily strike. Recent PLA publications also stress that restricted terrain can isolate defenders and degrade reconnaissance, allowing the offensive force to employ navigation and positioning systems and terrain masking to surprise, penetrate and encircle enemy positions.
This sounds impressive, but what does it mean? Precisely nothing. This an aspiration, not a strategy. It is not guidance for warfare, but a passage from an advertising brochure meant to glorify the Chinese Army, to convince the world that the Chinese Army is equal to the US in military doctrine. It quacks like a duck but does not walk like a duck. Indeed, it does not walk at all. Therefore, it is not a duck, only trying and failing to convince the world that it is. Should the analysis be trashed? No, because even if an enemy is talking garbage, India needs to understand its fantasy. Before we deconstruct the paragraph, it is best to remember that the articulated Indian Navy doctrine is only a cut-and-paste job of the things a Navy should say, and Indian Army doctrine is not worth the paper it’s written on. Just because the US has thickly written doctrines for everything, including for field latrines[189], [190] the Indian Army thinks it should have one too. A simple line suffices, and the Indian Army would do well to adopt it, however, it wants to word the matter. “The military will protect India from external enemies by fighting to win.” Nothing more elaborate is needed. Now for the interpretation of Chinese army doctrine.
Sentence 1: The Army’s aim is not to meet and destroy the Indian Army; it is to destroy the will of its civil and military leaders. Sun Tzu would approve. Lining up against the enemy and slugging it to the last man standing is so – shudder – crude.
Sentence 2: The Army will use mobile warfare and firepower to jump Indian defenses and cause the Army to disintegrate. Clausewitz would approve.
Sentence 3: Precision firepower attacks will be used to destroy the Indian fortified position. This is partly repeating Sentence 2.
Sentence 4: In the high mountains, weather conditions for employment of air assault and tactical air support are erratic; artillery will be used to compensate.
Sentences 5 – 7: fire support will consist of artillery for enemy frontal positions, rockets, missiles, and airpower for depth positions.
Sentence 8: Special Forces will do their thing.
Sentence 9: Repeats the use of mobile warfare, particularly the use of advanced navigation systems to bypass the enemy.
The Chinese might do well to heed Clausewitz: “Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult”. One day, surely, the Chinese will master the complexities of the modern battlefield. But rhwy have a ways to go, especially in Tibet. Presently, China has four independent brigades in Tibet and one division out of Hotan for the west. Because of their enormous and masterly expansion of rail and road infrastructure opposite India, even right now we should not doubt that they can induct a brigade a day into the theatre, with at least 21 days for acclimatization. But while China has conducted air exercises in Tibet, that is not the same thing as sending 300 fighters plus supporting aircraft to conduct high tempo air operations. There airpower remains limited.
Recruits
In theory, China has had conscription since 1949 but has always received enough volunteers. Today China faces two problems, one of which is familiar to India. (a) inadequate numbers of university graduate applicants; and (b) as China’s urbanization approaches 60%, the physical health of recruits is declining. For example, 70% of applicants are nearsighted. China has had to reduce standards, for example, height minimums are now 158-cm (5’ 2”), versus 160-cm earlier. Maximum weight requirements, presumably as a function of heights, have been relaxed due to the growing numbers of obese volunteers. Strangely, mentally ill persons are also permitted to apply. The Indian Army has height minimums depending on the region. These are 170-cm (5’ 7”) to 166-cm (5’5”), with exceptions of 163-cm for Western Himalayas and 160 for Eastern Himalayas. The Indian per capita income is 1/5th that of China’s, so the typical Chinese volunteer should be taller than is the case in Indi
a.
China’s need for university graduates in a “high-tech” environment is obvious. Here the Chinese are willing to pay up to $25,000 for a two-year enlistment. Strangely, given the 1-4 disparity in per capita income, an Indian Lieutenant starts at $15,000/year, or more than his Chinese counterpart Technical and flying officers get more. How is this to be explained? One possibility: The 2-year enlistment, plus incentives draw college graduates; they can test and if unhappy, can opt out. On the Indian side, half the army routinely operates in hardship conditions; the Chinese army does not.
Indian Other Ranks are required to have a 10th – 12th Grade education. In China, 9-years is the prescribed minimum, and the nation does recruit from Middle School which ends at 9th Grade, but at least one source suggests that 18-years is the typical minimum to enlist.[191], [192] This suggrests the military is not the first choice for many young Chinese.
For a professional army aiming for technological superiority, a 2-year enlistment seems far too low. Indian ORs generally serve 15-years, officers generally 20. Back in the day, Indian Army spent 2-years training a rifleman. Of course, that was when recruits used to enlist with 4th – 6th Grade education and were completely unfamiliar with motor vehicles, radios, and machinery. Computers did not exist. Even the US Army requires a 4-year enlistment period for officers and ORs. It is possible Chinese soldiers and junior officers are nowhere near as well trained as their Indian counterparts, and certainly have far less field experience.
President Xi has underway a very serious drive to tackle corruption in the army, which had deteriorated to the point officers had to pay for next-rank promotions and most who could were busy making money, usually illegally. I hesitate to assume this corruption still has the vitiating effect it once had. Still, the ills were so deeply entrenched that 20-years would normally be required to fully cleanse the army as an organization. Xi has, for some years, been clearing out hectares worth of officers who came to regard the army as a soft sinecure for the rest of their working lives.
US DOD Annual China Report
For the first time the annual US DOD report to Congress’s 2017 edition acknowledged what I have said for some time, that the PLA’s strength is 850,000. That makes it the same size as the Indian Army around 1970. So where did I get my figure? Chinese open sources. This makes one wonder about the accuracy of the report.
gives 12 infantry, 7 mechanized, and two amphibious divisions. I exclude 6th Armored Division, as it is a display formation used to test new ideas. For brigades, it gives 23 infantry, 15 mechanized, and 17 armored, along with an amphibious armored and three marine brigades. This was before five armies were deactivated.
Personnel (Active) 0.85 million.[193]
Map from Savetibet.org.[194]
2016 Orbat
Group Armies/Army Corps 18
Infantry Divisions 12
Infantry Brigades 23
Mechanized Infantry Divisions 7
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Divisions 2
Mechanized Infantry Brigades 25
Armor Divisions 1
Armor Brigades 17
Amphibious Armor Brigades 1
Army Aviation Brigades and Regiments 11
Artillery Brigades 22
Airborne Divisions 3
Amphibious Divisions 2
Marine Brigades 3
Tanks 7,000 (much too high, 4,000 more likely)
Artillery Pieces 8,000 (much too high, 4000 more likely.
2018 Structure
78 Combined Arms Brigades (of which five are amphibious, plus two air assault not counted in the CAB total).
1-2 mechanized divisions
4 infantry divisions
14 Aviation brigades
15 Special Forces brigades
14-15 anti-aircraft brigades
[The 112nd heavy mechanized Division is still on the PLA’s orbat; the 113rd may also still exist.]
Western Theatre Command.[195]
(Still waiting for the new TOs)
76th Army, Xining (former 21st Army)
77th Army, Chongqing (former 13th Army)
37th Motorized Division
149th Motorized Division
17th Armored Brigade
SOF, Artillery, Air Defense and 2nd Aviation Brigades
Engineer, Signals, and EW Regiments
[47th Army now disbanded, possibly 1 or more of its four brigades have been given to other armies]
Xinjiang Military District, Urumchi
4th Motorized Division
6th Mechanized Division
8th Motorized Division
11th Motorized Division
Tibet Military District, Lhasa (direct command from Beijing)
52nd Mountain Brigade (Linzi)
53rd Mountain Brigade (Linzi)
54th Mechanized Brigade (Bhutan-Sikkim-China trijunction, formerly at Lhasa)
55th Mechanized Brigade (Lhasa, inducted late 2017)
SOF, 308th Artillery, 651st AD Artillery Brigades,15th Engineer, Signals, EW Regiments
The Xinjiang divisions each consist of one tank, two motorized infantry, one artillery, and one air defense regiments. They are B category. It remains to be seen if the Xinjiang divisions shift to the CAB structure. (This is being written end August 2018).
The three Tibet brigades are the remnants of the eponymously numbered divisions which constituted 18th Army, which led the invasion of Tibet in 1950 (Whitsun, 196), and remained at Lhasa. Wikipedia incorrectly says it was disbanded in 1952, which may refer to its shift from corps to army. Intriguingly, its commander established an independent kingdom after entry. The shift to brigades started probably around 1985.
Denis Blasko’s 10 reasons why the new Chinese Army is not ready for the big time[196]
LTC Blasko (US Army Retired) is one of the top experts on the PLA. I’m going to disagree with some of his conclusions, particularly as our analysis is concerned with India, whose army is very well trained but not yet to a first-class standard. A shortcoming that could prove fatal against the US Army need not prove a disadvantage against India.
No.
Blasko critique
PLA against India critique
1
Division of command between military and political officer, latter getting tactical training
Confers extra potency in case military officers goes wobbly
2
Army dominated command/organization
Same as India
3
Too many non-combat HQs
China has corrected this
4
Inexperienced commanders and staff
India has the advantage
5
Battalion HQ too small
India has advantage, but China is adding 4 junior staff officers (Major is Bn CO)
6
NCO corps still under development
India has advantage, but note that compared to US, our NCO/JCOs are not capable of taking as much responsibility/initiative
7
Multiple generations of equipment in units
For India, less said the better
8
Insufficient realism in training
India has advantage
9
Air-to-Ground support shortcomings
Again, less said about India the better
10
Lack of combat experience
India has advantage
Two comments. First, India does not have political commissars. Our indoctrination, such as it may be, is based on the regiment’s history. The thing with political commissars is that in war they are 100% committed. Their power strikes fear into everyone, highest to lowest. They stiffen spines and boost morale. According to the US General S.L.A. Marshall, in the Korean War, Chinese commissors led from the front, looked after the men, and carried their loads if a man was too sick to carry his own. So it was more encouragement than punishment. Second, though the PLA has been slow to modernize its equipmen
t, it is not because of resource limitations but priorities. Chinese equipment is reasonably modern and is getting better.
A short historical note on PLA formation numbering
The PLA, before shifting to the independent brigade structure, had a simple system of formation numbering. Armies were numbered sequentially, 1 through 70. So, 18th Army would have the 52nd, 53, and 54th Division, and the 52nd Division would have the 154th, 155th, and 156th Regiments; the 53rd Division would have the 157th, 158th, and 159th Regiments; and the 54th Division would have the 160th, 161st, and 162nd Regiments. There were some exceptions, but the numbering system was usually followed.
When China started shifting to brigades, divisions were renumbered to brigade, for example, as happened with the armored divisions. Sometimes a division would see two of its regiments made into brigades. There may seem to be exceptions; for example, Andy KC informs that the 3rd Armored Brigade, which was the 3rd Armored Division, is now the 202nd Combined Arms Brigade. Since there already was a 202nd Mechanized Brigade (39th Army), seems the 3rd Armored Brigade (also 39th Army) was merged with the 202nd.
As of April 2017, all the old army numbers were retired, and for the 13 armies left, numbering between 71st and 83rd was used. The PLA is giving up its connection to historically famous units and formations, for the sake of moving towards its 21st Century army concept. As far as I can tell, the sequence starts with 71st Army because previously the highest army number was 70th. The Chinese are to be congratulated in keeping their group army numbering consistent and rational.
A new variation has come up. The Air Assault Brigades keep their aviation brigade number, or in some cases because there were 13 Aviation Brigades, the regimental number, with a 1 added. Thus 121st AA Brigade is the previous 12th Aviation Regiment. It remains to be seen if this becomes a consistent practice, because the 161st AA Brigade is said to be based on the 1st Aviation Brigade, and thus should have been 101st AA Brigade.
