by Ravi Rikhye
Unfortunately, I have not kept current on the PAF’s SAM defenses. There are 40 SPADA 2000+ launchers each with six missiles, organized in 10 squadrons for protection of the main airbases. Two HQ-9 long-range squadrons may have replaced the two SAM-2 squadrons, presumably each with 6 or 8 launchers, each with four missiles. The missile has a maximum 200-km range. Some Crotale squadrons are still in service with upgraded missiles. The Pakistan Army has six regiments divided between FM-90 short-range and LY-80 medium-range missiles.[292] The FM-90 is the Chinese Crotale. The LY-80 is the Chinese HQ-16, 40-km, six-round launcher. Pakistan has also acquired the Chinese twin-35mm flak gun in addition to its inventory of European guns of the same caliber. Since except for the HQ-9, all Pakistan SAMs regardless of service, are ranged between 15-km and 40-km, there should be few deconfliction issues. How the PAF is going to operate over its own territory with a bunch of trigger-happy ground missileers is another complex subject; India too faces the same problem. With today’s advanced IFF systems, in theory, there is no reason SAMs and fighter aircraft can’t operate in the same space, but please to note the “in theory”. Murphy’s Law: if it can go wrong it will; expect serious blue-on-blue aircraft losses on both sides.
The PAF has six twin-engine early warning aircraft (last two for 2018 delivery), and four 4-engine Chinese AWACS (KJ-200). This is another example of Pakistan willing to accept compromises to buy capabilities it can afford. India has three AWACS with Israeli electronics, and two more on order. Plus, its first indigenous AEW aircraft has been delivered, with two more to come. But whereas 10 aircraft permit Pakistan reasonable coverage against India, our eight are insufficient because we have long borders, 3500-km with China alone. One source says China has 17 Y8 and 7 Tu-154 EW, 7 Y8 KJ-200 AEW, and 5 Il-76 AEW, four of which are KJ-2000.[293] and some newer KJ-500, which are more capable. These will first supplement the KJ-200s and then replace them. The PAF has a modest aerial refueling capability with 4 aircraft compared to India’s 7 (with more on order). Given the size of the IAF and its numerous missions, 18 would seem to be a minimum. Pakistan has sufficient AH-1 attack helicopters to maintain 30+ in flying condition, has 12 AH-1Z on order (delivery complete by 2018 [294]) and three on option. These will replace one squadron of AH-1s. The AH-1Z is not cheap: with armament of 1000 Hellfire ATGMs, parts etc, it costs $60-million each. Possibly the US refused to clear AH-64s. India has 28 AH-64’s on order plus possibly 5 as options. Doubtless, the Apache is very good, but again, Pakistan has outnumbered us in attack helicopters for decades. Another case of making compromises to buy what it can, rather than wait for the best. Why it has bought 4 Russian Mi-35s for $153-million is unclear, unless more are to be purchased. Three Chinese Z-10s were under trials for perhaps three years but have been returned.
11.3 Indian Air Force
Reequipping the IAF
GOI has put off reequipping the IAF for so long that the cows have come home, died natural deaths, been reincarnated as people, retired, and are now spending time with their grandchildren. Neither the IAF nor the Indian Navy wants the Tejas fighter, which in any case has a planned rate of production of 8 aircraft, half of Pakistan’s JF17. Yes, we have heard all the stories about another production line and higher rates of production. Isn’t it time we grew up and stopped amusing ourselves with fairy tales? The pretty, charming children’s rhyme goes:[295]
Starlight, star bright,
First star I see tonight,
I wish I may; I wish I might,
Have this wish I wish tonight.
But off-stage, the grumpy old man named Reality chimes in: “If wishes were horses, beggars would ride”. Do we see beggars riding about in Cadillacs and Rolls Royces? The chances are greater than zero, but unlikely to happen. What are the chances GOI will see sense and reequip the IAF? Again, greater than zero, but less than if you sit opposite a wall in your room and wait for your instant transfer through the wall and into the adjacent room. Folks have told me it can happen if you are willing to sit there for the lifetime of several universes. Call this time X. One suspects it will take GOI to wise up X raised to X raised to X times. We see an IAF that seems to lose a squadron a year and the rate is accelerating. By extending the lives of the MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage 2000, the IAF has about 500 combat aircraft versus the 900 required for 42 squadrons. Assume, for a squadron: 16 fighters, two trainers, and three attrition, or what the IAF calls Strike Off Wastage, total 21. The modernization programs are not complete, but for purposes of discussion, we assume they are. Pakistan and China together have 200 plus 700 modern aircraft. So, we are 400 short. Against that, we have 36 first-class fighters on order. And by 2030, we lose the MiG-29s, Jaguars, and Mirage 2000s, about 250 in all, and will have begun saying goodbye to the Su-30s at the rate of squadron per year.
The state of the Indian Force
This analysis uses a table prepared by Sushant Singh.[296] Each year is the start of the next 5-year defense plan, designed to coincide with the start of the Government’s 5-year plans. It assumes that no foreign single-engine fighter is inducted. It assumes delivery of the last of the Su-30s, the 36 Rafales on order, and the timely completion of the 123 Tejas I/IA on order.
IAF strength 2002-2042
Year
Squadrons
2002
42
2007
36
2012
34
2017
33
2022
32
2027
30
2032
27
2037
21
2042
19
This cannot be described benignly as dismal. A more appropriate term is “suicide by slow starvation”, in the approved Buddhist way of departing the world when you reach the end of your contribution to family and society. If you are determined to die, it seems more efficient to kiss a very hungry tiger on its nose.
Theoretically, Tejas is supposed to replace the MiG-21s and MiG-27s. A hypothetical multi-role combat aircraft and equally hypothetical FGFA are to replace the others. The Tejas Mk I is dead. A hypothetical Mk II with the US F411 engine is supposed to take its place. Maybe one day it will, and maybe it won’t. Maybe your girlfriend says she will, and maybe she says “don’t”. The most sensible thing right now would be to buy the Grippen E as the surrogate Tejas Mk II. Sometime around 2021, maybe we’ll start getting 18-24 a year, and maybe we won’t. The IAF rejects the PAK-FA, which for some reason the Russians call the Su-57, whereas it is no more than a Su-27 Mark III with stealth coating. [297]
Su-27 Flanker
Mark I
Su-30 Flanker
Mark II
Su-35 Flanker
Mark III
Su-57 Flanker
Mark IIIA
Incidentally, the IAF complains the F-16 is an “old” fighter. But suppose the US followed the Russian system, we’d probably be at F-40 or something and then we’d feel like we’re buying the latest, which is F-16 Block 70
Everyone and her sister go around these days claiming they have a stealth fighter. Let us spare a few minutes to consider this. There is no such thing as a stealth fighter that cannot be seen under any conditions. When stealth works, as it does on the US F-22, F-35, and B-2, all that means is it reduces the probability of detection sufficiently for you to get close enough to the adversary to kill him before you are fully detected. Stealth works in three ways. One is by shaping the airframe in a way that radar bounces off in directions that prevent the adversary from getting enough information to fire missiles at the intruder. The other is to reduce engine exhaust heat so that infra-red missiles don’t get a lock until it’s too late. The last is to use radar absorbing coatings. These are absolute heck to keep undamaged. It is no good if on each sortie your stealth coating abrades because the coatings are expensive and take time to redo. Visualize an aging male whore who needs heavy, complicated makeup to look younger. Each customer encounter damages the ma
ke-up. At some point it has to be redone. The same happens with stealth aircraft and redoing their makeup costs serious money. Meanwhile, instead of fighting, the stealth fighter is hanging around the hanger anxiously asking the technicians “Do I look all right?” and the technicians reply “No, my darling, you don’t look beautiful tonight.” Some of us were suspicious of the FGFA / PAK-FA, to begin with. Then with the Russian Air Force refusing to buy it, the alarm bells for India went off. The Russians want Su-27 Mark IV, which will have more powerful engines and hopefully a better stealth coating. May enter production 2025, or it may not. The rumor is that the US 6Gen has no coatings because they are not cost-effective.
The Great Rafale Pricing Mystery
India didn’t want the Rafale anymore because the cost escalated to triple. A short analysis of how Rafale is priced is useful to understand that it is very difficult to know what a fighter aircraft costs. Why single out Rafale? Because thanks to research by Ajai Shukla, we have a detailed breakdown of costs. It is worth noting that when it comes to cheating on weapons contracts, the Russians are Number One and the French a distant second. The problems with France were (a) Decision delays on our side led to inflation: weapons inflation is brutal; a seven-year delay` with 7% annual cost escalation means a plane will cost 160% original quoted price; (b) the aircraft has a tiny production base which jumps costs; (c) the French have to make money, or at least not lose money, despite the small number sold; and (d) France used a deliberately deceptive low price to hook India. It offered the 126 aircraft for $10-billion, then went to $13-billion, then when the decision was made for the plane, the price jumped to $20-billion and would have ended at $40-billion, based on Rafale sales to other countries. The deal for 36 was signed at $9-billion,[298] and since India has not been transparent about what it includes, it may come out at $11-billion. The sad story from beginning to end is found at Defense Industry Daily.[299] Indian logic is so subtle the world can never understand. It is so subtle even Indians can’t understand. their own logic. So, after canceling the order for 126, India placed an order for 36, making the per aircraft buy even more expensive.
Thirty-six is insufficient for even just two squadrons because there are no attrition aircraft, nor any for the fighter tactics unit, or for R&D. Eight aircraft for the tactics unit and six for R&D would be a minimum, meaning 56 aircraft. The R&D for Rafale is about $30-billion using the current exchange rate. Divided by the 180 aircraft France has bought so far, that is $166-million per aircraft, as opposed to the $113-million per unit. Presumably flyaway. Ajai Shukla, using 2014 figures given to French Senate, says R&D costs are about $160-million. [300] It’s aid half the Rafale’s $330-million life-cycle cost is the recovery of the R&D charges because the production base is so small. If we were to buy 500 instead of 126, that would fall to $41-million per aircraft for R&D, and $165-million for flyaway, weapon, spares, documents, etc. At $206-millon for each, the price is easier to swallow. As of end-2017, Dassault has orders for 84 export, and 180 for domestic, for a total of 264 aircraft[301]. You can see the problem right here: F-35 R&D is spread over 3500 aircraft
One aspect of Indian defense purchasing which is seldom discussed except by a very few analysts such as Ajai Shukla is the unbelievable lack of management at every stage. Indians have the unusual ability to be the world’s greatest pessimists concomitant with being the world’s greatest optimists. The pessimist side is well known. The optimist side shows up very clearly in defense: this time it will be different. It is never different. Having graduate degrees in management and business administration, I’ve wanted for a long time to do a doctoral thesis on this subject. My university, where I pay no tuition for many reasons, refuses however to remit fees for this program. The cost is enormous; because of my age, I am never offered, fellowships. So maybe if I win the lotto I can do this program, and I assure you the thesis will not just make you weep, it will destroy any faith you have in Indian defense management. (Reminder to self: to win lotto, first you must buy a ticket, That costs $2. With winning odds of 1 in a quarter billion. Better to save the money for teo weeks to buy a 10-ounce bag of M & Ms.)
An example of this mismanagement is the C-17 heavy transport program. The IAF formulated a requirement for 24, which is reasonable. MoF agreed to sixteen but made that ten plus six on option. We took so long to activate the option that the line shut down. Boeing had built six extra, “white tails”, first-come first served. By the time we okayed the six, three were left. We went back to pondering. Boeing said, buy the three, we’ll find one more. Okay, we said – but took so long one plane was left. OK, we said, we’ll buy the one. Except we asked for a further delay to arrange financing. Amazingly, we got the plane. Now, look, people. This plane is a marvel. It can deliver 80-tons of cargo to an airstrip 1000-meters long, and a rough airstrip at that. It is a giant assault transport. Our entire strategy for emergency reinforcement and supply to the northern border is based on the C-17. How could we mess up so badly and not buy the full 24, plus a couple more for attrition? We are mess-up champions of the world. The sun goes down; the sun comes up, the services together with MoD and MoF mess up.
In fairness it must be mention there is one country that messes up even worse than we do, and that is the US and its Pentagon. America gave the world modern management and modern production management. There are a hundred indicators of its decline as a super-power, and defense development/procurement is a prominent one. For example, at one time the US planned 750 F-22s. With the fall of the Soviet Union and escalating costs, its stopped production at 187. The problem is the next US fighter, the F-35, is not designed for air superiority. Yes, it does make a nifty dogfighter, but its role is tactical air support.
Currently, USAF has 125 F-22s operational[302], of which many are down for maintenance. It can be argued that neither Russia nor China can match the F-22, F-15, F-18 and F-35 combination; as such, the US can afford to wait for the 6Gen F-X. This aircraft is in design and engine development with Lockheed, Grumman, and Boeing competing. Its main feature of interest is a laser weapon, and it may end up closer to a bomber in size than a fighter. It may not enter service until 2035. RFPs were issued for F-22 in 1986, and the aircraft came into service in 2005. So, should Russia or China develop a fighter better than the F-35, the US might find itself in a jam. The minimum 381 F-22s requested by the USAF would have sufficed to see the air force through the arrival of a replacement.
For historical perspective, it is necessary to talk about the past. Up until 1962, India had no foreign exchange to spare. When it was available, there was nothing to mess up because we usually brought British, and two occasions at least when the British were acting their usual superciliously asinine selves, from France. After 1962 money was available, but the foreign exchange was not. So our options narrowed to one supplier, the Soviet Union. The Soviets were aggravating and unfair in their dealings to the maximum, and their equipment, though workmanlike was well behind. They believed a war would last 10-days before going nuclear, so why bother building stuff to last? Then come the 1970s and 1980s, and foreign exchange eased slightly. So we bought Jaguar and Mirage 2000 [303] while continuing to buy large quantities of Soviet equipment. If it is of interest, a person with direct knowledge of the deal said Mrs. Gandhi took $5-million, which she promptly deposited in her party’s coffers. Please compare with the billions in commissions collected on behalf of her son. And yes, it really was billions, but a significant amount was from civilian deals.
Come the 1990s, and the Indian economy is partly liberalized, and suddenly, India can afford top of the line. For us old-timers, the amount of money handed out on single contracts is beyond imagining. A billion dollars is hardly worth mention. At $5-billion, discussion of the deal becomes interesting. $10-billion is, for India, a big contract. But the availability of money has led the services to demand what they would like to have. The choices have multiplied. And the GOI is insisting on “Make in India”, even though that jumps the cost. All this has led to incre
asing managerial chaos. From 1947 to 1965, the meagre foreign exchange situation limited options. From 1965 to about 2000 it was almost exclusively a Soviet/Russian show. 2000 to today we have weapons menus running into multiple pages.
Tejas: A Note[304]
Had the British cleared the engine wanted for the Marut fighter, the story of India’s fighter development might have different. In the early 1950s, India hired the German fighter designer Kurt Tank to build an Indian Mach 2 fighter. The formal design work began in 1956, the first flight was 1961, and the aircraft entered squadron service in 1967. The concept of an Indian Mach 2 fighter was extremely ambitious for the time because the world’s leading aircraft designers had been at work on similar aircraft in the same time-frame. These included the US F-104, UK Lightning, French Mirage III, and Soviet MiG-21. Because the British refused to supply an engine more powerful than the Orpheus 703, two of which gave a total thrust of 9,500-lbs, the Marut was limited to Mach <1, which basically doomed the project. The Orpheus was being built in India for the Folland Gnat. Rolls Royce, which took over Bristol which made the 703, offered to develop a reheat version for 13 million pounds, with the 703 BOr 12 engines providing a combined 17,000-lb thrust. But GOI was disinterested. A pity, but we have the luxury of retrospective reflection. With the Soviet Union pressing cheap MiG-21Fs on us, perhaps that was a reason we refused Rolls Royce. Meanwhile, no one was interested in the Gnat Mach 2 with two Firestreak air-to-air missiles. Again a pity, as that was a true Light Combat Aircraft, and because of its diminutive size, hard to spot visually or on radar.
