by Ravi Rikhye
By 2015, two independent infantry brigades were added to the corps, and a corps armored brigade, making 13 brigades.
Meanwhile II Corps had seven brigades, with 40th Division starting to mechanize. As of 2017, five armored brigades (one corps) and two infantry brigades.
Together, the two Pakistani corps have 19 brigades. Opposite we can, for comparison purposes, assume X Corps with three divisions stationed permanently, all three divisions were new raisings after the 1971 War, plus a corps armored brigade. Further, assume II Strike Corps with ten brigades is in the sector. Thus: India 20 brigades, Pakistan 19 brigades.
Hypothetical match up Pakistan II and XXXI Corps (Suliemanke to Ahmedpur East) versus India II and X Corps, by brigades
Pakistan
Armd/Mech
Infantry
India
Armd
Infantry
HQ II Corps
1/0
-
HQ II Corps
1
-
1st Armd Div
2/1
-
1st Armd Div
3
-
40th Mech Div
1/0[a]
2
14th RAPID
1
2
22nd Inf Div
-
3
Artillery Div
Artillery Div
Engineer Bde
Engineer Bde
HQ XXXI Corps
1/0
2
HQ X Corps
1
-
14th Div
-
3
16th Div
-
3
35th Div
-
3
18th RAPID
1
2
26th Mech Div
2/1 [b]
-
24th RAPID
1
2
7/2
10
8
12
[a] Assumed it is partially mechanized
[b] Technically should carry armored division designation
[c] Some sources think Pakistan 14th Division is with II Corps, because it based at Okara, which is also the base for 40th Division. 14th was based in East Bengal up till the end of the 1971 War, when it surrendered. It was reraised around 1973, at Okara and assigned to XXXI Corps when the new corps was formed out of II Corps Multan around 1986. This was about the same time as 40th Division was raised and assigned to II Corps. 40th and 41st Divisions were both authorized after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1989 and were intended to help protect the western border without pulling troops from the India front. If I recall correctly, there was a financial problem that delayed the raising of both divisions. 26th was raised from the XXXI Corps Reserve around 2008 and yes, is still there as the corps reserve. Pakistan is free to do as the situation dictates. It could pair 26th with II Corps in a powerful striking force; it could use it as XXXI Corps reserve, it could combine 1st Armored, 14th and 40th Divisions together, or any combination it sees fit. At one time 40th Division might have been under IV Corps (Lahore). The details of which corps 14th Division belongs to is of concern only to people obsessed with orders-of-battle. Unless 26th Mechanized is moved out of the sector, it doesn’t change the above orbat analysis. Which – to remind – is purely illustrative. Orbats keep changing. Remember, the above is only a snap-shot in time.
Pakistan
Armd/
Mech
Infantry
India
Armd
Infantry
HQ V Corps
1/0
1 [a]
HQ XII Corps
1/1 [e]
1 [f]
16th Div
1/0 [b]
2
11th Div
3
18th Div
1/0[c]
2
12th RAPID
1
4
25th Div
2/1
0
HQ XII Corps
1/0 [d]
2
HQ XXI Corps
1
-
33rd Div
-
3
31st Armd Div
3
0
41st Div
-
3
23rd Div
1
2
54th Div
0
3
6/1
13
7/1
13
[a] An independent infantry brigade is supposed to raise, I have been unable to confirm
[b] Should have an armored brigade
[c] Should have an armored brigade
[d] I have not been able to confirm this
[e] The mechanized brigade may not belong to Corps, but be a Command Reserve
[f] This independent brigade may not be under Corps, but answer to Southern Command
India has no force advantage here. It is likely that at some point 11th Division becomes a RAPID. Nonetheless, if India has the initiative, then in the desert sector it does not need a force advantage, because it has the freedom to decide where to strike. There is also ample empty space to trade for time. This is not true in the Multan sector because India is tied down to defending cities, and to avoid losing rich agricultural land west of the Gang Canal. Conversely, though Pakistan has more space to fall back, its side of the border is very much more densely populated than was the case in 1971. Still, Pakistan can defend with fewer forces and still put in one corps offensive or two division-sized axes. Against this, India now looks on X Corps as offensive; for example, 18th Division is specifically assigned to attack.
Pakistan
Armd/
Mech
Infantry
India
Armd
Infantry
HQ IV Corps
1/0
0
HQ XI Corps
1/1
10th Div
0
3
7th Div
1
2
11th Div
0
4
9th Div
0
4
Corps Reserve
1/2
0
15th Div
0
4
Independent Bde
1 [a]
2/2
8
2/1
10
[a] Pakistan 105th Independent Infantry Brigade at Suliemanke is shown by some sources as part of XXXI Corps, but to the best if my knowledge with IV Corps.
7th Division is now a RAPID, and 9th Division is assigned for an offensive. Put together, XI Corps has more offensive potential than before, but the fixed defenses on Pakistan’s side are extremely dense so the going is difficult. We too have thick defenses on our side.
Thirteen brigades for India versus 12 for Pakistan ends up with a force balance against India because of the enormous sensitivity of the ground. India cannot afford to give up any. On Pakistan’s side. the land is as valuable, but Pakistan is willing to take greater risks. India brings in a mountain division for insurance. The fortifications, primarily based on canals, are formidable and dense on both sides. For India to gain an advantage would require attrition battles, unless we manage to turn Pakistan IV Corps flank to the south or the north. It has already been seen that because of numerical equality in the Multan sector, there is only a limited and risk-prone chance of doing this. To the north, Pakistan XXX Corps sector, the same situation pertains.
Pakistan
Armd/
Mech
Infantry
India
Armd
Infantry
HQ XXX Corps
1/0
0
HQ IX Corps
1/0
8th Division
0
4
26th Div
0
4
15th Div
0
4
29th Div
0
5
Corps Reserve
2/1
0
HQ I Corps
1/0
HQ II Corps
1/0
6th Armd Div
2/1
0
1st Armd Div
3/0
0
17th Div
0/0
3
14th Inf Div
1/0
3
22nd Inf Div
0/0
3
6/2
11
6/0
15
This lineup requires some explanation. (a) India would not like to tie up a strike corps here because the front has no depth and it wants force superiority elsewhere, as was the case in 2001. Its preference would be to bring in a mountain division, making the balance 1 armored and 12 infantry brigades. While the infantry is adequate, the armor balance is most definitely not. Therefore, unlike 2001, 1st Armored Division and the corps independent armored brigade would have to remain, weakening Cold Start. The solution is obvious: add an armored division to Indian IX Corps as a reserve and convert one of the two infantry divisions to RAPID. This, plus a mountain division would give 5 armored and 12 infantry brigades. There are different ways of doing this; for example, in 2001, 4th Division from I Corps was sent here. Nonetheless, with Corps Reserve XXX Corps equal to an armored division, if we want to keep all three if our three strike corps for offensive action, a major increase on armour is mandatory.
Sialkot sector
(On Pakistan’s side, between the Chenab and Ravi Rivers it has two corps including one strike, totaling six divisions, including a GHQ Reserve and a “corps reserve”, equal to a mechanized division, plus two armored brigades. We have one corps with two divisions and one armored brigade plus a corps reserve with one infantry brigade.)
Before we take up the practicability of Cold Start, some caveats are necessary for the specialists reading this analysis.
(a) The Pakistan orbat is “to the best of my knowledge.” I have no assurance it is 100% correct, but on the large scales being examined, that is not a comparison killer. Please do keep in mind that orbats change. We are not, however, making an operational plan for the next war, only making general points about India’s Cold Start doctrine. (b) No account is taken of differences such as Pakistan anti-tank missile battalions, and more artillery and engineers on India’s side, or extra artillery and a light anti-tank battalion with Pakistan’s 14th Division, the larger number of reserve tanks per regiment – 14 for us, 6 for Pakistan, plus a host of other matters. (d) Wars are not chess games. Paper discussions such as this one can offer only general ideas as to what the outcome of a 2-front war might be.
(The AOR of Pakistan V Corps, which covers all of Sindh, is 500-km, a very long distance. On India’s side the front is held by XII Corps, in wartime a strike corps also deploys. It seems inevitable that Pakistan XII Corps Quetta will deploy to help V Corps shorten its AOR. V Corps has a mechanized division and one independent armored brigade in reserve; thus, a total of five divisions. India will match this.)
13.5 How realistic is Cold Start
We’ve discussed the background to Cold Start in some detail. Now we can discuss how realistic is the plan. To begin, is the Indian assumption that it can be the first to launch an offensive operation using eight-division task forces viable? In every war, except 1971 in the East, we have never taken the offensive first. Even 1971 requires qualification. Mrs. Gandhi’s plan was for the Indian Army to seize a border zone inside East Pakistan and then declare an independent Bangladesh. She had no plan to aim for Dacca. India was supposed to open an offensive against West Pakistan no later than December 3/4. At the last minute, due to Soviet pressure, this was cancelled despite GOC Western Command’s vehement protests that if he did not launch first, he would lose ground, something GOI had expressly forbidden. This plan had two objectives: to seize ground which we would not return with the purpose of widening the Jammu-Pathankot corridor and boosting security for our line of communication to Kashmir. Second, to bring Pakistan I and II Strike Corps to battle and destroy them.
This would leave Pakistan at India’s mercy. We would disarm Pakistan so that it could present no threat for 50-years. Naturally, this required the movement of troops from East to West, and wrapping up the western campaign by mid-April, before the northern passes opened, allowing China to threaten us. The shift of troops began immediately after the fall of Jessore. Pakistan had eight fully raised divisions, two partly raised, and another two authorized to start raising in November 1971. India had 13 divisions plus a sector equal to a division. One division and a corps HQ had already arrived from the east, as well as a brigade group, and the elements of another division had begun
Sindh
entering the theatre. By end January we could have moved at least three more, while leaving four divisions in the Northeast. With 18 divisions against Pakistan’s eight plus four partly raised/raising, its 3-1 air superiority, and its 5-1 naval superiority, there is no question that India would have succeeded. Except on December 16, after Dacca fell, Western Command was ordered to ceasefire, forcing the cancellation of our December 17/18 offensive. This was because of Soviet pressure, with Moscow ganging up with Washington. I have dealt with these events in an unpublished book, “How the US and USSR conspired to steal India’s 1971 victory”.
It is inconceivable that India will launch a war against Pakistan unless the latter has attacked us. For argument’s sake, let’s assume that India can attack first. But why exactly would we? It is said we could not respond to Pakistan ‘s December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament because of our slower mobilization. So presumably, we will move to punish Pakistan if it commits a similar provocation. Which leads to the question: since Pakistan knows its provocation will lead to a punitive Indian attack, wont it alert its forces before it launches the provocation? In which case, Cold Start is again proved irrelevant.
Now let us assume that yes, we have attacked first, and caught Pakistan by surprise. We’ve advanced as far as we assume we can advance without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red line. Though the Pakistanis boldly say even a single Indian soldier crossing into Pakistan means its line has been crossed, this is utter, complete, unbelievable nonsense. In 2016 at least two Indian Army platoons crossed into POK, did what they had, and withdrew. Was Pakistan’s reaction to fire a nuclear weapon? No. It will deny a raid took place and avoid de-escalation. How do we know that? Because that’s what they did in 2016 in Kashmir. Pakistan said yes, there were artillery exchanges in which their Army lost 2-3 soldiers and India lost 11-14 – several claims were made with differing figures. Pakistan’s red lines could reasonably be expected to be different in each sector. But speculating further is pointless because Pakistan itself does not know what its red lines are. Indeed, later I will argue that the nuclear factor will play no role if India launches Cold Start.
So, there we are, eight divisions sitting – say – 20-km to 50-km inside Pakistan depending in the sector, and we call for a ceasefire and negotiations over Kashmir. What will Pakistan do? It will do what India will do if the situation was reversed, as happened in 1965: refuse to accept a ceasefire and continue the war. Which, by the arcane and convoluted reasoning we Indians excel at, means the western powers, which means the US, will intervene, by our planning on D+8 or D+11 (7 to 10 days). At which point we must withdraw, there are no talks, and we are humiliated. Let’s do the dreaded and boring historical analysis to make this point.
In 1947-48, Pakistan attacked Kashmir. Suppose they had stopped at the current CFL and offered talks over Kashmir, would we have agreed? Obviously not. In 1965 Pakistan attacked Kashmir again. There is ample evidence Pakistan’s objective w
as to force India to the negotiating table. Did India comply? Obviously not, we staged a counteroffensive. In 1999, Pakistan did its version of Cold Start. It seized parts of North Kashmir. Fait accompli staged, did India accept negotiations for the future of Kashmir? Again, obviously no. We staged a counteroffensive; when the US asked us to restrain ourselves and offered to sort out Pakistan, we accepted. The US forced Pakistan to withdraw. So how come our geniuses believe that we can sit in Pakistan and negotiate?
Can Cold Start be achieved?
No, and we should not feel bad because no army on earth can achieve a real Cold Start. At least one Indian analyst, Gurmeet Kanwal, a retired brigadier, has the sense to understand this and allots seven days warning time for the divisional battle groups to move into position.[355] He does suggest that our formations on or close to the border, which I am giving as 1st Armored (Strike Corps but close to border at Ambala), 33rd Armored Division (also strike, but located at Hissar and close to the border), 14th and 16th Armored brigades, 10th RAPID, 2nd and 3rd Armored Brigades; 23rd Armored and 55th Mechanized Brigades; 18th and 24th RAPID, 6th Armored Brigade; 12th RAPID, 4th Armored and 340th Mechanized Brigades could begin the attack within 72-hours. This is 19 armored and mechanized brigades, to which will be added 5+ infantry brigades already deployed on the border, giving the equivalent of eight divisions. The Cold Start division battle groups will be tailored for their mission. “Tailored” is another American concept we’ve picked up. But already all missions are tailored to the objectives, opposition, and own suppwe don’t need to get fancy-shmancy about this.
