by Ravi Rikhye
Do Indians realize that Israel is 20,000-km2, half the size of our Haryana State? The Sinai is 60,000-km2. Put together the theatre was about 80,000-km2, the size of Jharkhand. Pakistan east of the Indus is about 350,000-km2, adding Pakistan Kashmir, its area is 430,000-km2. Considering that the Israelis wiped out the Egyptian Air Force in its preemptive attack, and that the Jordanian Air Force was tiny, and considering the Israelis were a white European race and the Arabs were, well, the Arabs; and that Israeli had interior lines of communication; and that the Sinai as a desert has a shallow covering of sand, allowing bulldozers to scrape roads rapidly. While the war proved the Israelis were brave, competent, and fighting for their existence, it has no lesson for anyone. Rather the lesson comes from the 1973 War, where the badly battered Syrians held the Israelis to a one-kilometer-a-day advance against Damascus. The Israelis wisely announced they had won and ceased fire. The Syrians managed this by creating multiple obstacle belts, and for all their undeniable skill and sir superiority, the Israelis could not advance faster.
Let us look at the so called 96-hour 1991 First Gulf War. Impressive, except the allies outnumbered the Iraqis 2-1, the Iraqis in no manner could match the allies for skill and superiority of equipment, and – the point – the allies had 2000 first-class fighters, which they used for an air war lasting 66-days before the ground war started. This was a 70-day war, hardly lightning.
But wasn’t the 1971 East Pakistan campaign lightning war? In 13-days we reached Dacca and cleared 145,000-km2. Except it wasn’t a 13-day war, but 27-days which began November 21/22, when the Indian Army entered East Pakistan in force. In 14-days India broke through the forward line of Pakistani defenses, and since Pakistan lacked reserves, the job was already half done. India had a 3-1 ground superiority, 10-1 in the air, total sea control, and almost the entire Bangali population was available to help, both by sabotage/guerilla attacks on the defender, and as sources of information, guides, and porters. Pakistan knew it could not hold East Pakistan with the equivalent of three divisions (9, 14, 16; 36 and 39 Divisions were deception divisions which did not deceive the Indians). For a proper defense, it needed two more real divisions at full-strength, plus a good deal more artillery, armor, and air defense. The Pakistanis were worn down from eight months counterinsurgency, had not been able to maintain field training, and were short of technical specialists who tended to be of Bengali origin. GHQ deceived Pakistan Eastern Command by telling it that the Chinese would arrive any moment. Once no help arrived, that was the straw and the camel’s back, and Pakistani morale, never high to begin with, collapsed. Moreover, the Pakistanis thought they would be allowed to evacuate East Pakistan, so why fight to the last? I won’t go into the massive corruption in the Pakistan Army leadership culture which gnawed at its insides for years.
Though this analysis is not about Pakistan’s 1971 strategy, it’s worth noting that the strategy for defending the East was based entirely on an offensive in the West. East Pakistan was expendable. The resultant anger was one of many favtor that built up momentum for independence. Sending 9th and 16th Divisions to the East fatally weakened the defense of the West but was insufficient to save the East. The correct strategy would have been to compromise with Sheikh Rehman, the East Pakistan leader, by letting him take power, put 17th, 33rd, 35th, and 37th Division under raising while letting Rehman and his party gorge themselves on the spoils of office, and then acted in 1973. Pakistan raised those divisions in March and November 1971, but it was too late because the civil war began in March of that year. This is a highly fanciful scenario because Bhutto made political compromise impossible, and because of West Pakistani racism. I offer it purely as an exercise, not because it is realistic. Pakistan decided on a 2-front war and lost. Of course, a 2-front war with the fronts separated by 5000 sea-kilometers (Pakistan), and one where our two fronts are separated by interior road and rail lines of 300-1500 kms (India) are two different things, but the principle remains the same.
Let’s return to the Western front in 1971. In North Kashmir, India had penetrated the thin Pakistani defense in the Kargil sector and the Shyok River Valley and was poised for a two-axis advance on Skardu. In West Kashmir, the Army had captured positions that could have been used for an offensive into POK. In Chaamb, we had lost ground. In the Shakergarh sector, we had made our breakthroughs and were ready to exploit. In Punjab, all the way down to Fazilka-Ganganagar, we chose to defend. In Rajasthan, we had reached Naya Chor and were planning to resume our offensive after reinforcements were brought up. A subsidiary offense from Kutch was being prepared. Pakistan had decided to launch its offensive in the Multan Sector on the night of the 19th December. India was reinforcing wherever needed with troops from the East. Though severely criticized by our own official historian and ignorant foreign observers, we did reasonably well for the first phase and were well positioned for the second. This would have required two weeks before another pause for reorganization for the third push. And this would have yielded strategic results of lasting advantage. Having done with the soup course, we stopped before the entrée. Consequently, no dessert was served.
The 1971 failure in the West was purely political and not military. Troops including senior commanders require three weeks of fighting to settle in. You cannot end after two weeks, and that too after cancelling our initial offensives for political reasons, and then blame the military for failing to perform at 100% in a lightening war. Also, there has been zero understanding that the Western front troops had no means to conduct lightning war. On a 2,000-km front, we had exactly four tank brigades (1st, 3rd, 14th, and 16th) and Mike Force, a scratch unit which later became 6th Armored Brigade. Pakistan had seven armored brigades: two each with 1st and 6th Armored Divisions, and 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Armored Brigades, though admittedly the 2nd and 8th had been formed only a year previous, but in most cases with experienced regiments. In any case, the Israeli lightning war in 1967 was an anomaly. It is long past time India got rid of its misleading and damaging myths regarding the western front in 1971. In conclusion, please note that after six weeks of fighting in Kargil 1999, we had only just begun to clear out Pakistani positions. The war ended early because the US forced Pakistan to withdraw. And talking about myths, can we please persuade the Pakistanis to forgo their tall tale about 1000 irregulars holding off two reinforced Indian divisions? Pakistan had 32 identified infantry battalions in the Northern Areas. None of this is intended to disparage the very staunch defense put up by several Northern Light Infantry battalions. And it is also time to stop calling the NLI “paramilitary.” Legally they were, but they were high quality mountain warfare troops, probably better than regulars.
Since I have dealt with this at length in a thesis which I am waiting for funds to pay tuition, so it can be submitted, I’d rather not go over the subject in length. By now several analysts have arrived at the obvious conclusion that Pakistan cannot use its (non-existent) tactical nuclear weapons without inflicting huge civilian casualties on itself. Moreover, it takes many TNWs to stop an armored attack.
13.8 Pakistan can stop Cold Start with conventional weapons
In any case, Pakistan can stop Cold Start with conventional weapons. One of the underlying ideas of Cold Start is that India would force Pakistan to deploy its strike corps to counter the dispersed armored thrusts. This would then permit India to deploy its three strike corps, which would face limited opposition, to score a decisive victory. Realizing this, Pakistan countered by adding new armored brigades and mechanizing existing infantry brigades to its corps reserves. Consequently, each of the four holding corps, XXX, IV, XXXI, and V, now have either a mechanized division or the equivalent of one. These will be used for counterattacks against the Indian Cold Start brigades, keeping the two Pakistan strike corps intact to meet the Indian strike corps. In addition, Pakistan has raised, and is continuing to raise, extra infantry brigades, and mechanizing brigades within infantry divisions. Thus, XXXI Corps which was examined earlier now has three armored/mechanized br
igades in 26th Mechanized Division, plus a corps independent armored brigade, plus two infantry brigades extra to the corps’ 14th and 35th Divisions. And it has begun mechanizing a brigade in each of several infantry divisions, akin to our RAPIDs. The likely candidates are 17, 37, 16, and 18 Divisions. 40th Division already has an armored brigade. These brigades are 2-1-0 and therefore smaller than our 2-2-0 armored brigades with RAPIDs, plus, all our mechanized battalions are equipped with Infantry Fighting Vehicles, which are akin to light tanks with an infantry section, and more powerful than Pakistan’s M-113 armored personnel carriers.
The M-113 is a lightly armored taxi, it drops its rifle section, say 2000-meters behind the Forward Line of Own Troops, and the infantry walks from there. The term FLOT is used by the US Army, it used to be called the Forward Edge of the Battle Area, FEBA, and given the US Army’s propensity to change things periodically out of boredom, do not be surprised if a new acronym appears within ten years. The BMP, however, being an IFV, accompanies the tanks into battle.
Or at least that’s the theory. I trust the Indian Army is aware that the minute one or two BMPs in the company attack get blown up, everyone else is going to bail from their BMPs, and that will be the end of fast-moving mobile warfare. No one wants to burn to death inside a lightly-protected steel box. This doesn’t mean the BMPs are a waste of money; they provide mobility and protection behind the FLOT, and substantial firepower to support their dismounts. Strictly speaking, however, an APC or an IFV must have the same protection as a tank. The Israelis, to their credit, were the first to realize this and the US is following with itys next generation of armored fighting vehicles. Because of expense, the Israelis cannot phase out all their APCs, but their Namer APC – for example – is built on a Merkeva IV chassis and will have more armor protection than the tank, and the same self-protection system as the army’s main battle tanks. It has a 1200-hp engine. By 2027 five hundred will be oin service. In India service that would equip 12 mechanized battalions. Likely two Namers cost as much as a Merkeva tank. The Indian Army has a choice: stick to its old ways, in which case the BMP is fine, or give equal protection to mechanized infantry, in which a 40+ ton vehicle is required.
The Cold Start division groups will undoubtedly be supported by infantry brigades or divisions to clear passage for the armored brigades through the first obstacle belt. This is not a job done in a hurry; it will likely take 72-hours before proceeding to the next belt and then the third belt. There’s no reason, of course, that the armor which is accompanied by mechanized infantry cannot blast its own way in. It’s just that attacking fixed obstacles is costly in terms of casualties, and you don’t want to weaken your armor before it exploits. I am only pointing out some problems; naturally, the commanders on the scene will decide how they will operate. While fighting through the triple-obstacle belts, the Indian forces will be vulnerable to counterattack by Pakistan corps reserve divisions. Moreover, the deeper we advance, the more vulnerable our supply lines become. Particularly difficult will be Pakistan’s fortified positions defended by militia and local defense units. India will do its best to bypass, but the population explosion in Pakistan, the expansion of urban areas, the expansion of what used to be villages in 1971 into small towns, will complicate bypassing. Moreover, from Sialkot to Suliemanke there is no opportunity to bypass. That is done more easily from Suliemanke to Rahim Yar Khan, and easiest south of RYK. But that is also the deep desert with sparse roads and much territory can be given up before Pakistan launches its counter-offensive.
14. Is there no way we can defeat Pakistan and China?
14.1 Conventional offensive vs Cold Start
Force levels
14.2 More divisions solve only part of the problem
14.3 March 1971 East Bengal
14.4 Loss rates
14.5 Indifferent armor performance
14.6 Aside: more on minefields
14.7 Defending the border
14.8 Enhancing firepower
Here we’ll look at some ideas for requirements for defeating Pakistan and China. In another work, I estimated 72 divisions in 24 corps would be needed. Can we reduce that number? Perhaps.
We’re not going to defeat anyone if the numbers are equal, as is the case today. Nor will we defeat anyone if the politicals insist the war should no longer than 7-10 days. We need more divisions, and we need to be prepared to thin defenses to strengthen key axes of advance. The example of putting 12 divisions against Pakistan’s five in the Multan sector was given at the start of the analysis.
We will also have to accept there are no short-cuts or tricks to permit quick victory. The Germans used short-cuts in World War II to score big victories in relatively short periods; but we cannot replicate the conditions in which they won so quickly. Look at the three cases.
In 1939, the Polish Army had 50 divisions with which to defend 3000-km of front including reservists and many independent brigades. The Germans struck so rapidly that many reservists could not mobilize. Poland’s level of mechanization and degree of firepower was abysmal. The Luftwaffe swept the Poles from the sky, and since from the start the Luftwaffe was configured to work with the army, the Stuka-Panzer combination could not be defeated. Was this a quick war? Yes, it took only five weeks. But consider. The Poles had 800 tanks, 4300 guns, and 400 aircraft. The Germans and Soviets had 96 divisions, 7000 tanks, 14,000 guns, and 5500 aircraft.
In 1941, the French Maginot Line worked – but too well. First, because of the expense, the French did not extend it north and then west along the Belgian frontier. Second, just as happened in World War I, the Germans came through the Ardennes and Belgium, invading the Netherlands to give themselves more room to maneuver. The Ardennes, said popular wisdom, were impassible to armor. Except the Germans sent Panzer Group Kleist with 5 panzer and 3 motorized divisions plus six infantry divisions in reserve through the “impassable” terrain. It is not true the French did not fight. They took 60,000 KIA and 180,000 WIA in six weeks. The British-Indian Army lost 75,000 in all of World War II. The French, however, were out-maneuvered, the Luftwaffe hammered the French Army, and the German Army was battle-experienced thanks to the Polish campaign. The First World War bled France white. They took almost six million casualties including 1.4-million dead from a population of 40-million, compared to 6.2-million Germans from a population of 65-million. If India were to suffer proportionate losses today, we’d be looking at 180-million casualties. Before criticizing the French, their World War I trauma must be considered. It also needs keeping in mind that they did not know in advance that Britain had signed a security treaty with Poland. As far as the French were concerned, why couldn’t the Poles just give Germany access to the port city? This was not, in their view, something for which to get into a war. They were neither prepared for war, nor did they feel they had any stake in the fight.
The Germans slashed their way through the Red Army in World War II, advancing 1200-km before being stopped outside Moscow. But consider that the rate of advance was 7-km/day. The front was 1700-km (Leningrad to Simferopol, Crimea). Though the major east west rail/road routes were few, there was endless room to maneuver. Stalin had executed a good portion of his senior generals. The Russians were unprepared for war. The Germans now had two solid campaigns under their belt and far exceeded the Red Army in battle skills. It cost them 861,000 casualties, [358] including 220,000 killed and missing, which amounts to 717 KIA/WIA per kilometer of advance.
14.1 But suppose India makes a straight conventional attack rather than Cold Start
Let’s stop thinking of Cold Start as a chance for a short cut because it cannot work that way. A problem of mine with the Cold Start doctrine is I cannot believe the Indian Army is so foolish that it is engaged in magical thinking of unprecedented magnitude. The only reasonable assumption is that Cold Start is a pure bluff to deter Pakistan from trying a major terror attack or another Kargil 1999: “Don’t think we can’t retaliate as happened in 2001-2002, we have serious options”. If
Cold Start is a bluff, it has worked too well, because Pakistan has strengthened its land forces to defeat Cold Start, eroded the margin of superiority we previously held and created a greater threat to us. The odds of a bluff, however, are low. We are a nation of worriers, one thousand years of invasions have convinced us that the chances of everything going against us are very high in the event of war, and by national temperament, we are cautious rather than bold. That does not mean we have lacked bold rulers. All the way from Chandragupta Maurya to Shivaji India has produced bold rulers. Today, however, absolute monarchs do not make wars, but civilian leadership that has no concept of what strong national security entails.
This is not always the case. For example, Sardar Patel was no military man, but he was far seeing, tough, single-minded, willing to take risks, and willing to use armed force when necessary. Thanks to him we have a country today. Y.B. Chavan was also no soldier, but as defense minister he knew his business, he knew how not to back down, and was prepared to do whatever necessary for our national security. In 1971, Mrs. Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram, civilians to the core, proved exceptionally bold.
