by Ravi Rikhye
But: the never satisfied Americans are developing the capability of delivering titanium penetrators from sub- or low-earth orbit. They are not bombs, simply titanium rods. It would be interesting to try and work out how deep these things could penetrate, but this book needs to be finished. You could have a few very heavy rods for deep targets, or lighter “shotgun” rods for area targets, like armored formations.
A declared nuclear doctrine is a reassuring piece of paper, nothing more. Surprisingly, India’s approach has been more logical that that of the US. It is surprising because normally one does not think of Indians as logical in terms of western logic. Educated in the west, and a hard-state person – also a western concept, Indian strategic military doctrine drives me to fury because it just does not exist. Nonetheless, with age I have come to at least understand why Indians don’t think and act on a strategic basis, and that their no-logic is logical. A simple example suffices, and here we channel Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, who like McNamara is supremely logical in theory and spectacularly wrong in practice. Rumsfeld famously said (paraphrase): There are things you know you know; things you know you don’t know, and things you don’t know you don’t know. This is a major advance on McNamara’s formulation, which assumed that if for something data could not be measured, it was unimportant and could safely be ignored. Rumsfeld, however, could not consider unknown unknowns into his planning, and could barely comprehend what to do with known unknowns. Thus, Second Gulf, where the people were supposed to greet Americans as liberators, and American forces could depart after 9-months.
The Americans believe that by rapid, decisive action on the battlefield, you create your own reality. This is identical to German World War 2 battlefield doctrine. The objective is to force the enemy to react to your reality, and never to give him the opportunity to create his own, thus forcing you to react to him. The military, with its penchant for condensing complicated reasoning into the easily memorized simple war principle of Maintain the Initiative. This works excellently on the battlefield, at the tactical level, if you will. Higher military strategy gets into a complex realm where the tactical may not translate into the strategic because of the known unknowns and unknown unknows, leading to disaster. The Indians are obsessed with the potential for disaster, and they have a perfectly valid reason to do so, based on their long-term experience. Ideally, Indian strategic thinkers would look for a way to resolve the tactical and the strategic. Indians would say they already have done so: since we can never know the full effect of an action, sometimes it is best to do nothing.
Thus, India’s N-strategic planning is based on the Doctrine of No Doctrine. The west should should not conflate this with the lack of doctrine. In logic, your initial assumptions determine the conclusions. The Indians see everything as situational, for which western linear thinkers condemn us as illogical and even immoral. Our real doctrine is “it depends.” The situation will dictate the response, not a pre-planned list of steps. Here there is a danger: India’s increasing interaction with the west since the 1980s, consisting both of Indian students who study in the west, stay there to work, or return home, and of western academics who visit or study in America. There is also the impact of the internet, which while allowing the exhibition of greater individualism also imposes uniformity. This is sparking demands from the west for declaring an Indian nuclear weapons doctrine, and Indians are responding. This may be an exceptionally bad idea. (a) what value does a declared doctrine have except as propaganda? (b) when there are so many unknowns, how can anyone write a manual for how India is to react in nuclear crises?
India’s situational way of doing things has a single answer for every scenario: It Depends. What will we do if Pakistan does X? We could do from A to Z; the choice will depend of how X and its consequences manifest themselves after activation. Is this not a better way of approaching a matter as serious as N-weapons than deciding in advance that Action X by Pakistan will lead to Action T by India.
Read David Barash’s short article on the pointlessness of deterrent theory.[386] At this point deterrence scholars will sneer: how gauche and uneducated. Is an article to substitute for the hundreds of learned volumes we’ve written over a period of six decades? Well yes. The bulk of those volumes are without sense or logic. They are worthless. What’s more, Barash takes as his basis the work of Lawrence Freedman, professor emeritus at King’s College London, probably the most learned strategist of the post-war era. A single quote shows that Barash is a level-headed person. “Deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’.
Let us also heed Gurmeet Kanwal’s excellent study before proceeding further.
“Once deterrence breaks down, a publicly declared doctrine becomes irrelevant…The method and the mode of retaliation will be based on the prevailing operational-strategic situation and the likely reactions of the Pakistani armed forces, especially the probability of further nuclear exchanges. The assessment will also include the likely reactions of the international community – the threats held out, the appeals made and the course of the discussions at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).”[387]
It follows that because Indian policy is “It depends,” a declared plan is of little use except to keep academics employed, and for India and Pakistan to feel fashionable. In Pakistan’s case, the doctrine has another, very important purpose: to warn India and to reassure its own people that the army has the defense of the country well in hand. The doctrine is total rubbish, based on technological capabilities Pakistan lacks, and discredited western jargon that even many westerners find impracticable and nonsensical. Perhaps the Pakistan Army believes its plan, and this is dangerous.
The core of Pakistan’s doctrine is Escalation Dominance, a US warfighting concept long discredited. And at that, the US could execute such a plan, because of its 40,000 N-weapons as small as 90-tons (.09 KT) and as large as 20-MT. Escalation dominance treats a nuclear war as a chess game. I make a move and stop. You make a counter-move and stop. My choice is to escalate up or down. It must be up, because down means my nuclear gambit has failed, leaving me looking weak and defeated. I go up, you go up, and so we continue.
Here’s the problem. When you and I play chess, we use an agreed-on set of rules. But did the Soviet Union ever agree to US rules? No. So what happens if after I make my first move, my opponent throws the board to the floor and beats me to death with his chair? I lose, he wins, despite my total escalation dominance and 39,999 unused warheads. It is not a coincidence that the same factors that led to the US’s reliance to meet the threat of a conventional Soviet offensive to seize Western Europe apply to Pakistan: there was a core, but unreasoned belief that the West could not defend itself against the Soviets’ 200, 250, or 300 divisions, depending on who made the estimate. Superficially, this made sense. The US and European allies had perhaps 30 divisions that could be quickly made ready, facing up to 300 mechanized divisions. Game over before it starts. Two points make nonsense of this neat picture. (a) US/Allies had 5x the Soviet/Allies 1945 GDP and 2x the population. The US/Allies chose not to compete with the Soviet Union’s conventional forces. In Pakistan’s case, it cannot xompete conventionally with India because of the enormous disparity in GDP, 10-1 in India’s favour, and population, 7-1 in India’s favor. In fairness to India, if Pakistan would only agree to a peace settlement based on the existing line of control in Kashmir, from India’s side there would be no further dispute. By repeatedly waging war against India, including the ongoing 30-year terror war in Kashmir, any threat posed by India is Pakistan’s responsibility.
In 2002 Pakistan unofficially laid down four red lines that are so subjective as to become meaningless. The first 3-star general to command the Strategic Plans Division said Pakistan would use N-weapons if:[388]
India conquers a large part of Pakistan
India destroys
large parts of Pakistan’s army or air force
India tries to strangle Pakistan economically
India tries destabilizing Pakistan, say by large scale subversion
Pakistan has actually has no official red lines and its policy is identical to India’s: “it depends. And that’s logical, because Pakistan knows India’s looking for space in which to assert its so-called conventional superiority, which no longer exists. If Pakistan lays down declared lines, India can exploit within those lines. Which is quite silly because N-warfare doctrine is silly. As Kanwal[389] explains, the minute the first N-weapon is unleashed, all plans go down the tube because no one can predict what will happen next. Kanwal has a balanced and sober explanation of India’s N-doctrine in his new book,[390] which again is paradoxical because India has no policy worked out in advance. The babblings we hear are simply westerners and Indian-oriented westerners playing games pretending N-weapon policy can be rational. See also Misra,[391] who discusses the weaknesses of Pakistan’s first-use policy and other positions. Again, the same mistake is being made: you cannot discuss irrational actions rationally. You don’t need three PhDs one each in logic, psychology, and deterrence theory to see that.
This entire discussion is futile because Pakistan can, and will defend itself conventionally, with Chinese assistance, as this analysis has shown. The difficulty with my thesis is obvious: it is not Indians I must convince, but Pakistanis. They will have a reasonable reply. You want us to divest ourselves of N-weapons, so you can use your conventional superiority to crush us. You say India has no conventional superiority. We say it does. We must go by our assessment, not yours. Fair enough. My point is not for anyone to divest themselves of their N-weapons. Pakistan is a sovereign country. They can have as many N-weapons as they want. My objection, to repeat, is simply their touching belief in a rational N-use doctrine. There cannot be ANY rational N-use doctrine. Let’s be rational and accept that, and let India be sensible and not fall for this nonsense of defining irrationality. “It depends” is a perfectly logical concept in this situation. Let us take credit for it, instead of trying to be good little westerners.
If India was capable of any creative thinking, it would unilaterally ditch its nuclear weapons and use its new super-moral position to shame the N-weapon power. Can’t be done? In the Internet age, the capacity to persuade the people of the world is enormous.
16. India-US alliance and the quadrilateral
16.1 Warfare and International law
16.2 The international community and the US will not help us
16.3 India will be on its own
16.4 Japanese and Australian navies
16.1 Warfare and International Law
Please keep in mind that I am not a lawyer. Nonetheless, let’s look at some legal points that may arise in the event of an Indo-Pakistan/China war. My interpretation is that if we attack Pakistan proper, China will be within its rights to blockade us. There is nothing illegal, however, in using force to recover our lost territory in Kashmir. Moreover, Pakistan is already at war against us in Kashmir. We have a legitimate right of self-defense including preemptive self-defense.
The customary law of blockade
On the latest customary law of blockade, see San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994.[392] This has not yet been ratified. (a) Section 4: The principles of necessity and proportionality apply equally to armed conflict at sea and require that the conduct of hostilities by a State should not exceed the degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required to repel an armed attack against it and to restore its security. (b) Section 47cii: (The following classes of enemy vessels are exempt from attack): vessels engaged in humanitarian missions, including vessels carrying supplies indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and vessels engaged in relief actions and rescue operations. I.e., no blockade of food, medicines, etc. (c) civil airliners exempt under Section 53c. (d) Section 67a: (Merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they) are believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally and clearly resist visit, search or capture. (e) Section 102a and 102b: (The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if): it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential for its survival; or the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade. (f) Section 110. Ruses of war are permitted. Warships and auxiliary vessels, however, are prohibited from launching an attack whilst flying a false flag, and at all times from actively simulating the status of: (various stipulations). This document is surprisingly interesting to read; you should skim through it and use it to impress your friends.
Pakistan and China will claim that their actions are defensive, solely in response to India’s attacks on them Thw United Nations Charter Article 51 accepts as legitimate a nation’s right to defend itself. But what about a preemptive attack, or a retaliatory act out of proportion to the inciting action?
Preemptive war
Bethlehem[393] presents an easy to read and straightforward analysis on the legal principles governing the right to act preemptively against a non-state actor. Of special interest are Principles 9 through 12 (p. 7).
“9. States are required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their territory is not used by nonstate actors for purposes of armedactivities.” Pakistan maintains that it is not behind terror attacks against India. Why not take Pakistan at its word, and accept the implication that Pakistan is not in control of its territory.
“10. Subject to the following paragraphs, a state may not take armed action in self-defense against a non-state actor in the territory or within the jurisdiction of another state without the consent of that state… Where consent is required, all reasonable good faith efforts must be made to obtain consent.”
“11. The requirement for consent does not operate in circumstances in which there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that the third state is colluding with the nonstate actor or is otherwise unwilling to effectively restrain the armed activities of the non state actor such as to leave the state that has a necessity to act in self-defense with no other reasonably available effective means to address an imminent or actual armed attack.” India does not have to prove any of the above because arising from Principle 9, we accept Pakistan’s word it has nothing to do with the terrorists.
“12. The requirement for consent does not operate in circumstances in which there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that the third state is unable to effectively restrain the armed activities of the nonstate actor such as to leave the state that has a necessity to act in self-defense with no other reasonably available effective means to address an imminent or actual armed attack.”
And there we have it. Since Pakistan has nothing to do with the terrorists, it is not in control of them, and India can attack Pakistan-based terrorists in self-defense. We will not have committed aggression. We should then stop the blah-blah we engage in trying to convince the world of Pakistan’s complicit, and act.
Two points. First, principles are not laws. But the principles have been regularly used by US, NATO, EU and to some degree even by Russia to justify numerous interventions across the world. Israel uses these principles all the time, for example, its strikes against Gaza and Syria. If they’re good enough for the US, NATO, and EU, all “respectable” states or alliances, they should be good enough for us. Second, the reason India is gassing around is not that it wants to prepare world opinion for strikes against Pakistan. It wants, rather, for the US and the international community to do its dirty work by sanctioning Pakistan. To put it more truthfully, we’re acting like a helpless, fourth-rate country, and passive-aggressive as always. Is there anything mor
e pathetic and nauseating, more indicative of our self-conception as a victim unable to stand up for itself? This doesn’t seem to bother Government of India.
Proportionate war
Before, however, we mobilise here is something that ruins our happiness. Bethlehem’s Principle 3: “Armed action in self-defense must be limited to what is necessary to address an imminent or actual armed attack and must be proportionate to the threat that is faced.” Thus, because Pakistan-based terrorists attacked the Indian parliament, causing no material damage and costing just a handful of lives, we had no right to mobilize for an all-out war. But: no problem. Strike Pakistan in a way it will be forced to hit back, and then its game on. Except this analysis has already gotten so long the Word 2016 spell-check has given up, we could usefully examine what the correct level is to provoke Pakistan.
The US and International Law
The US is a nation of lawyers. Statistics dating from around 2009 show the US has 391 lawyers per 100,000 people, Japan had 23. Admittedly, the comparison is simplistic. Australia had 357 to Canada’s 26, yet Australia filed only 1542 suits per 100,000 to Canada’s 1450. The US rate was 5806. Nonetheless, to state that the US is probably the most litigious society is reasonable. The converse of this is that when the US wants to act as it pleases, it provides heavy-duty legal cover to itself. That doesn’t change the reality that the US – and increasingly China – believe that laws are for little people/ Take some cases.
