by Ravi Rikhye
It is strange that people have become so infatuated with the idea that wars can be won at a limited cost. No one wants to make a total commitment to victory. Technology has led us astray because we think it will win wars for us. The refusal to countenance casualties has led to an excessive reliance on airpower. Well, even unlimited airpower does not win wars. Something people up to 1945 understood well. There is only one way to win, and that is to keep killing the enemy, so he has no opportunity to regenerate, and to continue until he is utterly, completely defeated. In short, military coercion does not work. You either fight to win, or it is better not to fight. This is the subject of a thesis I plan for 2019 publication.
Further, even winning total war does not necessarily mean a permanent win unless the objective conditions that led to war are resolved. This is most clearly seen in Europe, where World War I merely was the first round. The Allies thought that World War II, a war of annihilation, would bring peace. Instead, Germany’s need to expand – and there is no sense in blaming Hitler, Germany’s position in the middle of Europe guaranteed trouble – was replaced by Russia’s need to expand. So the war went seventy-five years. The Germans started their expansion in 1870, so for them, it was a 120-year war, and have finally become exhausted, and so have the West Europeans. That process took, after the birth of Christ, basically 2000 years to resolve itself. So now that China is rising, it is equally willing to break the old-world order, which was a European order changed into a US order, to where it won’t end unless the Chinese become the global superpower or are totally crushed. If they are totally crushed, they will try again. If they become the global superpower, it seems unlikely the world will quietly accept it. An underlay is many of today’s crises is the revival of religious war by aggressive Islam. Just as it was after Islam was founded and was also true for 1500 years of the Catholic church, aggressive Islam seeks to dominate the world. It is paying no cost and requires no large sums of money or conventional forces such as needed by a state. I have only the briefest acquaintance with Indian history, but starting with 300 BC, the pax Britannica imposed on India 1858-1947 seems to be an aberration. Otherwise, we have had wars in some part of the country almost continuously for 2200-years. It is truly baffling why Indians think they are a pacific people. What is happening with Pakistan and China is natural and will not be resolved by limited war or negotiations. Therefore, the GOI’s habit of living each day as it comes and hoping for the best is just plain suicidal. As has been said repeatedly through this analysis, either we accept a subordinate status to China, or we fight. No compromise is possible because we cannot have two kings of the same hill.
18. 2 Two scenarios for a war
The Latin term “casus belli” is usually employed as shorthand as the reason/excuse given to justify a war. We’ve already shown in 1999, 2001-02, and 2008 that if the problem is a Pakistan attack in Kashmir or a terror attack, we’d rather the US sort out the problem for us. China will not attack us because their style is military intimidation, not an offensive. It seems unlikely that a 1962 situation will reoccur and that we will start something unless we are sure of victory. Moreover, neither is GOI interested in starting anything nor will MEA agree. So, the two scenarios below have a strong degree of imagination, and I am using them only because they are plausible. Between plausible, i.e., could happen, and actual, i.e., making it happen, is a very wide gap.
Our starting assumption is that: either India spends billions of dollars making up ammunition, spares, and other shortfalls, as in 1971; or the war will be very short; or localized and long, like Kasrgil 1999. The junior Minister for Defense made a rose-tinted statement in December 2017 [435] in response to a parliamentary question, saying the Army was well-equipped with ammunition. First, it is unlikely MOD will tell the truth in these matters, and second, he was asked the question precisely because the questioner’s information was that ammunition stocks were very low. Nonetheless, taking the junior minister at his word, ammunition purchases are now left to the army, and he said it had recently made 19 purchases worth $1.8-billion. So that’s a good first step, but readers should understand that amount of ammunition could be expended in one day in a general war, 2 days in a full scale 1-front war, 3 days in a limited one-front war, or 5-days in a Kargil-type war. These are obviously the very broadest estimates. The cost can be reduced by reducing the number of artillery rounds fired. For example, instead of 100 per gun/day, fifty could be fired. That would increase our casualties and reduce the enemy’s, as well as prolong a war. So perhaps using less ammunition to save money is not cost-effective. Plus, the Army needs serious amounts of ammunition to maintain annual proficiency.
Case 1 assumes that the Kashmir Valley revolts and asks Pakistan and the world for help. Case 2 assumes the Chinese intrude on our side of the border after occupying Jhamperi Ridge in the Doklam area of China-Bhutan-India, and we decide to hit back.
Pakistan tries a repeat of 1965
Assumption: India retaliates against a massive Pakistan infiltration attack by counter-attacking the Poonch-Uri bulge. Historically this happened in 1965. India was so confused about its strategic objectives that it returned to Pakistan our own recovered Indian territory. This was such an illogical move that for 50-years it was impossible to explain. In 2015, Dr. Sheru Thapliyal, a retired army major-general with a most inquisitive mind, indicated this was a decision by the Indian Army, in exchange for a Pakistan withdrawal in the Akhnur area. Pakistan had driven within 4-km of this critical town which controlled the road between Jammu and forward Indian positions in Kashmir. The Army did not apprehend a threat in the Haji Pir Bulge, whereas a resumption of hostilities or a Pakistan grab of Akhnur could cut the Line of Communication. [436] I cannot agree with the Army’s decision for several reasons irrelevant to this analysis but can understand its imperatives. Nonetheless, it is astonishing the Army did not explain to the nation its responsibility in the matter, thereby letting the Prime Minister take the blame for giving up India’s regained territory.
A replay could conceivably occur again. For example, a revolt by the Kashmir Valley’s Muslims against India could see Pakistan send its tame Islamic groups to lead an invasion with artillery, logistic, and training support from the Pakistan Army. This would be a replay of 1994-96 Afghanistan, where the Taliban were trained by Pakistan, but led by Pakistani Army personnel on leave or without identifying papers. Which itself was a replay of 1947. In Afghanistan, Pakistan threw in three brigades of its own troops, disguised as Taliban, and provided armor/artillery support. Pakistan won that war.
There are variations, such as India’s creation of the Mukti Bahini in 1971, backed by the regular Indian Army. Using 60,000+ Taliban and Islamic mercenaries (Pakistan has loosely gamed this with 100,000 militants), Pakistan could seize an area which declares itself as the legal government of Liberated Kashmir, signs a treaty with Pakistan, and requests intervention. Pakistan obliges by recognizing the new “government,” appeals for world help, and announces to the world it will not attack India, it is only intervening on behalf of a legitimate liberation government.
In this scenario, the world is unlikely to intervene if the fighting is confined to Kashmir because everyone accepts the area is disputed. Though there will be the usual US/UN pressure to stop hostilities and talk, China is unlikely to directly intervene, though it will provide whatever Pakistan needs by way war material.
Because the Kashmir Cease Fire Line is much more closely patrolled than was the case in 1965 or even in 1999, and because India’s aerial surveillance is more extensive, it is unlikely the preparation for the attack will catch India by surprise. Conversely, it is possible for the invader to leave too little time for India to reinforce before the attack. As discussed in an earlier situation, India has a substantial and growing civil aviation fleet; troops with their personal weapons can be brought into Pathankot, Jammu, Srinagar, and Leh at probably 10-20,000 a day without much effort. The difficulty will be their heavy equipment and vehicles. According to
one source, India’s civil fleet has only 6 B-757, 1 B-737, and one AT-72 freighters. These are unlikely to be able to take vehicles and heavy equipment because they are organized for palletized cargo.
Poonch-Uri Bulge
The passenger aircraft can also carry limited quantities of palletized cargo, say 3-tons for a 737 and 5-tons for an AB 320. Nonetheless, without meticulous planning, regular exercises, and the assurance of cargo handling equipment at the airfields mentioned, the first 10 days are going to be chaotic. This suggests that GOI should consider giving a subsidy for adding 100 convertible aircraft to the Indian civil fleet. Better would be pre-positioned equipment; the odds are low, however, that the government will pay for several complete division sets merely as a hedge.
Almost all equipment/supplies will have to move by road and rail. Raider will target these links first. India usually has 60 or so Rashtriya Rifles battalions in Kashmir, plus perhaps 40 armed police battalions. This may or may not suffice to neutralize attacks against our sparse and vulnerable transport network. The army has been aware of these vulnerabilities since it entered Kashmir in 1947, and even more so after the 1971 War. So, for example, a single road between Dhar (east of Pathankot) and Udhampur was opened in 1973. This road is by far the shortest distance Pathankot -Udhampur. In 1990 it was taken up for conversion to National Highway standard. As of 2015, twenty-five years, it was still unusable in many parts by normal traffic, forget about heavy use by military convoys, and the usual calls for urgency made by the Army and the MOD. “To make it operationally sustainable, numerous stretches of the road need strengthening, curve improvement, and maintenance. Several bridges also need refurbishment for two-way traffic. In addition, a stretch of about 8 km under the jurisdiction of the Ranjit Sagar Dam authorities is not open to civilian traffic, further dissuading the use of this route.”[437] As of 2016 the situation was still bad, with locals saying 150-km of the road – which is fairly much the entire stretch, is damaged to rain and landslides.[438]
Today’s jihadis are much better trained and much more battle experienced than those of 1965. Those were not jihadis, to begin with, just paramilitary volunteers and other coerced to join, plus perhaps 3 regular Pakistan Army per 100 men. Pakistan did not alert its cells in Indian Kashmir of the impending operation – security or lack of coordination. Today’s lot have spent years fighting the US, NATO, Afghan, and Pakistan armies. In a sense, the modern jihadis are akin to the 1947 raiders, who were recently discharged World War II veterans from Kashmir. The new infiltrators will be reinforced with Mujahids, who are now a regular regiment, Northern Light Infantry, Special Service Group, to provide the steel frame and local knowledge for the invasion force. GPS will make a big difference compared to 1947, 1965, and 1999. Pakistan artillery, staying of its side of the CFL, will provide support up to depths of 40-km. Also, with cell phones and satphones it’s possible to give local cells short-notice warning without totally compromising operational security.
As discussed earlier, we have seven divisions in Jammu and Kashmir against Pakistan. There are two divisions in reserve, one based in Northern Command, the other at Pathankot from XVII Mountain Strike Corps ex-Eastern Command. Will 100 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles and armed paramilitary police suffice to stop 60-100,000 jihadis? The regulars will be busy protecting the border against the Chinese and Pakistan Armies. We will have to bring in 4-6 more divisions to cope with the raiders. Since we have 38 divisions, this is easily done in a 1-front situation, more accurately a 1.5- front situation as the jihadis make for half a front. But it is not easily done if Pakistan’s attack is coordinated with China, as it inevitably will. I have previously shown that six more divisions are needed for a proper defense of Kashmir: one division extra for the four corps, and two combined with a reserve division for a proper 3-division strike corps – in this case, counter-strike corps.
China need not make a full attack to ties up our northern forces: probes, intrusion, artillery duels at several points will make it difficult for us to shift China front divisions to Kashmir. Nor can we move plains Western front forces to Kashmir in case the fighting with Pakistan escalates.
The sole feasible solution is that the minute jihadis start entering Kashmir, India will have to launch a full-scale offensive against Pakistan across the International Border. No hesitancy, no exploring diplomatic options, no limited advances regardless of the nuclear overhang. The goals will be (a) prevent regular Pakistan divisions from reinforcing an offensive against Kashmir when the jihadis declare the Independent Islamic Republic of Kashmir and appeal for Pakistani and global Islamic intervention; (b) to seize territory inside Pakistan not just to negotiate the return of territory we lose in Kashmir, but to force Pakistan to vacate all Kashmir plus the Sialkot salient, and force a 20-km DMZ carved out of Pakistan. If we don’t do that, Pakistan will come right back when it has rebuilt its forces.
Sounds great on paper, doesn’t it? It does, enough to leave us totally impressed. The problem? The US will be screaming at us to stop the plains advance, and the closer the alliance between India and the US, the louder will be the screaming. Why? Because the US’s first concern will be to limit escalation, if only because the US will not want to be drawn into an expanding South Asia war, spilling over to the Arabian Sea. And the other problem, which we have repeatedly discussed, is that China will not let us attack Pakistan. So: scratch these grand plans and prepare to lie back and think of England in the Mini Ice Age.
The only way we can fight to secure our interests is the 18-corps, 54-division army plus adequate war reserves for 60-90 days that I have been demanding throughout this book. And which presumably the GOI will as loudly refusing in the grounds we don’t have the money. So, anyway, who needs Kashmir? We’ll get it back at some point, 100, or 500, or 1000 years in the future. And look at all the money we’ll save once our northern international is drawn along the Punjab-Himachal border. We can reduce the Army, the huge subsidy we give Kashmir is eliminated, no more need for non-Army security forces. And: best of all, since Pakistan will immediately incorporate Kashmir into Pakistan, now WE can support the Kashmiris in their demand for independence. In international eyes, we will no longer be the villain crushing the Kashmiris, but the good-guys. While we’re at it, let’s give the Northeast to China. We can easily cut our Army, Air Force, Navy by half, and the GOI will have even more money with which to buy votes. Win-Win all around: cue the singing and dancing, the celebrations, and best of all the Victory March down Rajpath, because now Pakistan/China will have the insurgents, and our security will be so terrifically enhanced by reducing our land borders to half. We’ll make India Great Again: so much winning: how will we stand it?
India-China get into a tussle in the north, Pakistan does a repeat of 1999
India and China get into a prolonged tussle including clashes; Pakistan takes opportunity to seize Sonamarg-Kargil road. Facing the Northern Areas, India deploys 8th Mountain Division with three brigades at Kargil, Dras, and Matayan, and 109th Independent Brigade in the Northern Gullies sector (28th Division AOR). This lies to the extreme west of the northern Kashmir Line of Actual Control. 102nd Independent Brigade at Thoise normally has six battalions, some of which can be on temporary attachment from other formations like 3rd Division. As a broad generalization, two battalions are deployed at Siachin, which is a 70-km front; two are de-inducting after completing their tours, and two are training for induction. In an emergency, two battalions can be deployed down the Shoyk River. India raised a new brigade after the 2013 and 2014 China incidents to cover what used to be called Sub Sector North, or 22 Sector, from Shyok to Daulet Beg Oldi. It had an infantry battalion, a Scouts battalion, and a 12-tube heavy mortar regiment. Presumably, by now, the brigade has established itself at Daulet Beg Oldi. A tank regiment is supposed to be posted there; an excellent idea, but hopefully, it is not taken from the new independent armored brigade raised for XIV Corps. This should rightly be used from Demchok for offensive operations. And the corps also should
have a new independent brigade as a corps reserve. Why all these “supposeds” and “should”? Because GOI can be counted to to stock to plans the same way a hole in the sand can be counted on to hold water. Nonetheless, to give GOI some credit, it has also raised an offensively oriented brigade in Shipki La to replace 36 Sector, which had the same ad hoc orbat as 22 Sector.
Overall, our position in Ladakh against the Chinese is much stronger than was the case in 2013. At that time, we had three brigades – 70, 114, 102 – deployed. 28th Division, raised for the Dras-Kargil area, had gone to the Valley for CI operations, leaving only 121st Brigade which had protected the sector since the 1960s. The 2013 Ladakh crisis led to the additional inducted of four brigades, three of them newly raised. As the table is compiled from memory, some dates may be wrong.
North Ladakh
Year
India
Pakistan
