26 Ibid., Aug 16, 1939.
27 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 17, 1939.
28 For JG’s 1939 domestic staff see BA file R.55/945.
29 Details, correspondence, estimates, and inventories in BA files R.55/421, /423, /1360.
30 Unpubl. diary, Aug 17, 18; and see Jul 3, 1939. On No.20 Hermann-Göring Strasse see
BA files R.55/421, /423, /430, /1360.
31 Ibid., Aug 19, 1939.
32 Ibid., Aug 17, 19, 1939
33 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 18, 1939. ‘In propaganda it has always proved
very effective to personalize a political issue.’
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 559
34 Ibid., Aug 18, 1939.
35 Unpubl. diary, Aug 19, 20, 1939.
36 Ibid., Aug 20, 1939.
37 Major Percy G Black, loc. cit.
38 Unpubl. diary, Jul 9, 1939.
39 RPA Frankfurt, special briefing, Jul 12, 1939.
40 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Jul 27, 1939.
41 Ibid., Aug 7, 1939.
42 RPA Berlin, press circular, Aug 5, 1939.
43 Unpubl. diary, Aug 21; RPA Frankfurt, special briefing, Aug 21, 1939.
44 Unpubl. diary, Aug 22, 1939; the Forschungsamt ‘intercepts’ will be found in David
Irving, Breach of Security (London, 1968), 92ff; and Das Reich hört mit, loc.cit.
45 Unpubl. diary, Aug 22, 1939.
46 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 22, 1939, in Oberheitmann collection (BA
file ZSg.109).
47 Unpubl. diary, Aug 23, 1939.
48 Ibid.
49 Louis Lochner, who obtained Canaris’ report on the meeting from General Beck, knew
more than JG; see his interrog., Jul 25, 1945 (NA film M.1270, roll 12) and What about
Germany?
50 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 23, 1939.
51 The London Daily Express revealed that the pact had a secret clause relating to the partition
of these states. (Johnny von Herwarth, a traitor in Hitler’s Moscow embassy, had leaked
the text.) JG issued a denial: RPA press circular, Aug 26, 1939.
52 Unpubl. diary, Aug 24, 1939.
53 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 24, 1939.
54 RPA Berlin, press circular, Aug 24, 1939, No.192/39.
55 Ditto, Aug 25, 1939.
56 Unpubl. diary, Aug 25, 1939.
57 Ibid., Aug 25, 1939.
58 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 25, 1939.
59 Ditto: 1. Ergänzung.
60 Photo in Eva Braun collection, NA, RG.242-EB.
61 Unpubl. diary, Aug 26, 1939.
62 RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 26, 1939.
63 Ettore Slocovich, Alfieri message to JG, Aug 26, 1939, 12:30 P.M.—See PWB report
No.6, Documents found in the Italian Ministry of Popular Culture, item No.6: telephone
conversations between Alfieri or Slocovich and JG, Aug–Sep 1939; cf. PRO file FO.371/
43877. The originals are in Mussolini’s files, NA film T586, roll 415, 6577ff. JG noted (unpubl.
diary, Aug 27, 1939): ‘Alfieri phones. He wants to pump me. But I act dumb.’
64 Backe to his wife, Aug 1939 (Ursula Backe papers).
65 Ibid., Aug 27, 1939.
66 Gutterer MS (loc. cit) and interview, Jun 30, 1933; JG diary, Aug 28, 1939.
560 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
67 Ibid; Bormann diary, Aug 27; diary of F W Krüger, Aug 27 (Hoover Libr: Krüger papers);
and the diaries of General Franz Halder and Lt. Col. Helmuth Groscurth, Aug 28, 1939.
68 Unpubl. diary, Aug 28, 1939.
69 Ibid.,, Aug 30, 1939.
70 Ibid.; on Aug 30, 1939 JG had a further talk with Dietrich—‘He sees the situation quite
clearly. He loathes Ribbentrop.’
71 Ibid.,, Aug 29, 1939.
72 Ibid., Aug 30, 1939.
73 Ibid., Aug 31; and RPA Frankfurt, confidential briefing, Aug 30, 1939.
74 Special briefing, Aug 30, 1939.
75 RPA Berlin, press circular, No.198a/39, Aug 30, 1939.
76 Unpubl. diary, Aug 31, 1939.
77 Ibid., Sep 1, 1939. JG added later, ‘Polish attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter. We make a
big thing of this.’ In fact the attack was by SS men in Polish uniforms.
78 Ibid., Sep 1, 1939.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 561
Goebbels
36: War
UNTIL the last moment, Dr Goebbels hoped that the western powers were
bluffing, but feared that they were not.1 After Hans Fritzsche provided an
opinion analysis showing that the British were determined to fight, Goebbels submitted
a thoughtful memorandum to Hitler.2 At his press conference that Friday
September 1, after Hitler’s historic speech to the Reichstag, Goebbels was able to
use plain talk again—which he called ‘a real blessing.’ Be that as it may, he directed
editors to avoid using the word war and to adopt instead the formula: ‘We are fending
off Polish attacks.’3 On the morning of the third his press attaché Moritz von
Schirmeister briefed him on the latest news from Reuters.
Goebbels asked: ‘What about Britain?’ Schirmeister replied that they had not declared
war yet.
‘Now you see!’ triumphed the minister. But an hour later Chamberlain’s ultimatum
reached them. ‘Well, so it did happen,’ conceded Goebbels. Until that moment
he had not believed it.4 He repeated to the editors the injunction to use the word war
only sparingly.5 ‘Believe me,’ he told Göring, ‘we have not done all we have for six
years to throw it all away in a war.’
‘This will be a war about political ideas,’ he wrote in a twenty-five page memorandum
for Hitler entitled Thoughts on the Outbreak of War 1939. He described the
German public mood at that moment as being ‘grim but calm.’ The disaster of 1918
was fresh in many minds— ‘So there is nothing of the hooray-atmosphere of 1914,’
562 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
he warned. With each victory, however, their determination would grow—he himself
would see to that. Foreshadowing the great dispute with Ribbentrop that was
beginning, he insisted that the entire foreign propaganda effort be concentrated in
one hand—namely his own. He saw great propaganda opportunities this time: unlike
1914, the declarations of war had come from the enemy; and the British and
French were repeatedly overflying neutral Holland and Belgium, and committing
other violations of international law. ‘Britain,’ he pointed out to Hitler, ‘is governed
by the old men of 1914 who are incapable of thinking straight or logically because of
their hate complexes.’ Poisoned by ‘Jewish capital,’ Britain would fight to the last
man, he prophesied—the last man, that was, of every other nation but herself, and
particularly the French. Only the foreign propaganda weapon, he suggested, would
defeat Britain. Even bombing would not yield victory, given the famed tenacity of
the British people.6
The diary and other documents provide intrinsic evidence of how low he still was
in Hitler’s esteem. Hitler had barely consulted him about his war plans. He barely
saw Hitler during the Polish campaign; once he tried to reach Hitler by phone, but
was told he was away at the front.7 Ignoring Goebbels’ lengthy memorandum, he
awarded all foreign propaganda work to Ribbentrop—a terrible rebuff to Goebbels.
Hitler had an an enduring respect for Ribbentrop which subsequent historia
ns have
been unable to explain or share. ‘It is totally incomprehensible to me,’ Goebbels
recorded, hearing of the draft decree. ‘It will destroy my entire ministry.’8 As will be
seen, Hitler would thereafter keep from Goebbels vital information, for instance
about the sinking of the British liner Athenia9, about the attempt on his life in November10,
and, in 1940–41, about his intention to attack the Soviet Union.
HITLER announced the opening of hostilities to the Reichstag on Friday September 1,
1939. He wore a field-grey tunic adorned with the simple Iron Cross he had won in
the world war. Morale in Berlin that day was ‘grave but resolute,’ the deputy gauleiter
reported. Chamberlain threatened war if Hitler did not pull his troops out of Poland.
‘Wait and see,’ was Goebbels’ private comment.11 He ordered the press to
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 563
mute its remarks about London and Paris, reserving its full venom for Warsaw.12 ‘The
situation has undergone one remarkable change,’ he noted. ‘Mussolini has intervened
and propose a Six Power conference. A cease-fire until then. The Führer says he’s not
disinclined to go along, once he gets his hand on something worthwhile. Thus all
military efforts are concentrated on shutting off the Corridor.’13
The civilian minister, Goebbels, had real cause to fear that the military would henceforth
command Hitler’s undivided attention. Although his diary had frequently displayed
real admiration for the junior officer corps, he detested the older, knucklebrained
army generals and found words of admiration only for Blomberg and Fritsch.14
When Polish machine-gun bullets shortly ended Fritsch’s life, Goebbels demonstratively
attended the state funeral while Keitel, Himmler, and the S.S. generals stayed
away.15
HIS fear that war would marginalize him proved well-founded. He was invited to visit
Hitler’s field headquarters only twice during the entire Polish campaign.16 In Hitler’s
absence, Goebbels’ critics became more vociferous. ‘The party veterans reject him
to a man,’ wrote Rosenberg. ‘Gauleiters tell me that if the Führer would only dump
him, they’d eat him for breakfast.’17 The tension between Goebbels and his colleagues
was evident whenever Göring’s ministerial Reich Defence Committee met. Presiding
buddha-like over these cabinet-style meetings, Göring did nothing to protect
Goebbels. ‘Goebbels appears to be finished,’ wrote one rival happily after seeing the
field marshal. ‘What a blessing.’18 That Göring had the upper hand was evident on
Day Two, as he unexpectedly ordered most of Goebbels’ radio stations to shut down
in the evenings so that the enemy air force could not use them as radio beacons.19
The conflict of personalities became plain on the very first day of war, September
1, 1939. Since Hitler’s dream of nationwide cable radio was still unfulfilled, Goebbels
had circulated that midday a proposed new law making it a criminal, even capital,
offence to listen to foreign radio broadcasts and calling for all radio sets to be turned
over to the authorities.20 He met an immediate storm of protest from other ministers.
Justice Minister Gürtner pointed to the damning effect it would have at home
564 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
and abroad on the credibility of their own propaganda, besides creating an army of
petty snoopers and informers.21 The Göring committee unanimously turned down
Goebbels’ proposal, citing obvious technical difficulties.22 The next day however the
minister of the interior Dr Frick persuaded Hitler to accept a ban on listening to
foreign political broadcasts, and that evening Goebbels’ radio announced the new
‘law.’23 As both Frick and Rudolf Hess pointed out to Hitler that if Goebbels called in
everybody’s radio sets the people would be unable to hear their Führer, that suggestion
—which was surely one of Goebbels’ less intelligent plans—was abandoned.
The confiscation was restricted to Jewish owned radios.24 He circularised all party
officials that ‘under the Reich Defence Committee ordinance of September 1’ even
they were forbidden to tune in to foreign broadcasts.25 He found it hard to prevail on
other issues too. He objected that printing the party’s eagle emblem onto ration
cards would link it too closely with an unpopular measure. ‘I fear, Dr Goebbels,’
retorted Darré sarcastically, ‘that this is a war which is not going to be won by popularity.’
26
‘The Russian military mission arrives in Berlin,’ he noted on September 3. ‘A great
advantage for us.’ But his jubilation was short-lived, as London dictated an ultimatum
to Hitler at nine A.M., timed to expire at eleven. ‘Straight over to the Reich
Chancellery,’ he recorded. ‘The Führer is indignant and has no intention of accepting
the ultimatum. He dictates a biting memorandum in which he justifies this.’ Even
after listening to Chamberlain’s radio declaration of war Goebbels was still asking:
‘Will London really go for broke?’
In a discussion with Hitler shortly after, he mapped out his propaganda tactics. He
would try to detach Chamberlain, Churchill, and Eden from their people. They would
spare France for the time being. Before departing for the ‘eastern front’ that evening,
Hitler reassured him that he anticipated only a phoney war in the west. Goebbels
was sceptical: ‘Now that Churchill is known to be in the Cabinet [as First Lord of the
Admiralty] I find that hard to believe.’ Göring too had his doubts, he discovered in a
lengthy conversation with the field marshal that night: economically and militarily,
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 565
Germany could see it through—but even Göring secretly wondered whether the
German people would.27
For a few days, Goebbels was overwhelmed by the new problems of propaganda in
a shooting war. Hearing of the sinking of the Athenia (‘it can’t have been us,’ he
assured his private diary28), he dismissed it at once as ‘a fresh bluff and propaganda
trick by Churchill & Co’ and started ‘the denial machine’ rolling. When Poland claimed
that Nazi troops had destroyed the Madonna of Czestochowa, Goebbels flew American
journalist Louis Lochner thither in a bomber to see that it was a lie. He had eight
hundred banners erected along the western front proclaiming to the French, ‘We
won’t shoot if you don’t. We’ve no quarrel with you!’29 Leopold Gutterer, one of his
most imaginative men, suggested they cascade tons of forged pound notes over Britain
—thirty percent of its entire currency. Goebbels liked the idea until it occurred
to him that the British might well retaliate in kind.30 A file of Goebbels’ phone conversations
with his Italian counterpart confirms his early tactics. He suggested the
Italians concentrate on driving the British and French apart, reserving their most
Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death Page 92
