8 JG, letters to colleagues in the field, Jan 24, Aug 10, Sep 3, Oct 23, 1940 (ZStA Potsdam,
Rep.50.01, RMVP, vol.765).
9 Diary, Feb 1, 1940: Berndt had joined the colours on Jan 31, 1940. And BDC file,
Berndt.
10 Diary, Apr 29, May 21, 1941.
11 Ibid.,May 13, 1940; Feb 20, Apr 21, May 21, 25, Jun 6, 8, 10, 12–15, 1941.
12 Ibid., Jul 4, 1941.
13 Wilfried von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende (republished as Finale Furioso. in Tübingen
in 1974), 22ff.—Oven’s ‘diary’ was evidently written up only later (it was first published in
Buenos Aires in 1948). His dates are often late (e.g. Mussolini’s overthrow, Italy’s capitulation);
he writes on ‘Nov 25, 1943’ without evening mentioning the colossal air raid two days
before on Berlin; Ciano & Co ‘have been shot’ on ‘Jan 13, 1944’ (in fact in Feb 1944); Speer
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 603
has ‘recently’ taken over air armament on ‘Feb 2, 1944’ (in fact in Jun 1944). Some parts,
e.g. JG’s views on Gauleiter Weinrich and the entry of Jun 5–6, 1944 seem derived from
Semler (whose ‘diary’ had been published in London in 1947). There are syntactical oddities:
e.g. ‘Jul 27, 1944,’ which begins ‘yesterday afternoon’, proceeds (p.438f) to ‘on the
next morning’: why not ‘today’?—However Oven probably did use contemporary notes:
his reference to JG phoning Morell on ‘May 7, 1944’ is supported by Morell’s diary of May
8, 1944; his references to air raids on Mar 6 and May 7 and 8, 1944 are accurate, and on ‘Sep
3, 1944’ he correctly gives the departure time of the courier train to Rastenburg as 20.13hrs
(see the corresponding itinerary in (ZStA Potsdam, Rep.50.01, vol.956).
14 Diary, Apr 25, 1940.
15 Ibid., Apr 26, 1940.
16 Ibid., Apr 28; MinConf., Apr 29, 30, May 3, 19. See too Jodl diary Apr 23–27, naval
staff war diary Apr 27, and Eduard Wagner’s letter of May 7. The White Book No.4, Dokumente
zur englisch-französischen Kriegsausweitung (Berlin, 1940) was issued on Apr 27, 1940.
17 Diary May 8, 9, 1940.
18 Speech to 500 Reich orators, VB, Feb 14, 1940.
19 Diary, Apr 21, 1940.
20 Ibid., Apr 25, 1940.
21 Ibid., May 5, 1940.
22 Ibid., May 7, 1940.
23 Ibid., May 6, 8, 9, 1940.
24 MinConf., May 10, 1940.
25 Diary, May 11, 1940: ‘Klare Fronten!’
26 Ibid., May 11, 12, 13, 16, 1940.
27 MinConf., May 13, 14; diary, May 15, 17, 1940.
28 Ibid., May 14–16, 1940.
29 Diary, May 11, 1940.
30 Ibid., May 16, 1940.
31 Ibid., May 13, 14, 1940.
32 Ibid., May 16, 17, 1940.
33 Ibid., May 19, 1940.
34 Ibid., May 29, 1940.
35 MinConf., May 14, 17, 21; diary May 30, 1940.
36 Ibid., Jun 15, 1940.
37 Gutterer MS, 83.
38 MinConf., 17, 20–22, 25, 29, 1940.
39 Ibid., May 23, 24, 25, 31, Jun 11, 1940.
40 On Albrecht see US intelligence files (NA: RG.319, IRR, file XE.131670) and his
interrogation, Nuremberg, Jan 27, 1948 (NA film M.1019, roll 2). Born in Weingarten,
Württemberg, Nov 8, 1897 he had joined the Spartacus League in Dec 1918, served in
Russia from Apr 1924 to Dec 1935, been sentenced to death there in 1934, returned to
Germany, and turned his back on Moscow in Mar 1938 after the Soviet execution of 22
commissars. He wrote the book Der verratene Sozialismus.
604 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
41 Diary, May 22, 30, Jun 1, 2, 8, 10, 1940. For JG’s subequent relations with Torgler see
BA files R.55/567 and /1289.
42 Ibid., May 28; MinConf., May 17, 1940.
43 David Cesarani and Tony Kushner (ed.) The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century
Britain (London, 1993).
44 Ibid., Jun 9; for the dangerous—and still widely quoted—Rauschning book Gespräche
mit Hitler see diary, Feb 13, 14, and Mar 14, 1940.
45 Diary, Jun 6, Jul 8, 1940.
46 MinConf., Jun 7, Jul 7, 1940.
47 Ibid., Jun 22, 1940.
48 Diary, May 17, Jun 3, 1940.
49 Ibid., May 28, 1940.
50 Ibid., Jun 3, 1940.
51 Ibid., Jun 2, 3, 1940.
52 Ibid., Jun 18, 21–23, 1940.
53 MinConf., May 27; according to William Shirer, Berlin Diary, it was shown to the press
on Jun 10, 1940.
54 Diary, Jun 23, 1940; he correctly deduced that Churchill had ordered these raids only
to provoke Germany to counter-attacks which would dispel the British public’s growing
war-weariness.
55 Ibid., Jun 27, 1940.
56 Ibid., Jun 29, 1940.
57 Ibid., Jul 3; Bormann diary, Jul 2, 1940. Other sources confirm that Hitler had at this
time no desire to destroy the British Empire: e.g., naval staff war diary, Jun 17, quoting Jodl;
the Weizsäcker diary, passim; and a private letter by Hitler’s secretary Christa Schroeder
dated Jun 25, 1940 (IfZ, Irving collection).
58 See e.g. Halder’s diary Jul 2, 3, and comments under interrogation; Major Hasso von
Etzdorf, diary, Jul 10, 1940; Bernd von Lossberg, private letter of Sep 7, 1956 (Irving collection);
Jodl’s speech to the gauleiters on Nov 7, 1943 (ND: 172–L).
59 For JG’s preparations for the homecoming and speech see ZStA Potsdam, Rep.50.01,
RMVP, vol.7.
60 British analysis of German propaganda output, Jul 1–16, 1940 (PRO file FO.898/30).
61 Diary, Jul 5, 1940.
62 Ibid., Jul 6, 1940.
63 RMVP programme for the Führer’s return from the battlefield in BA file NS.10/26.
64 Diary, Jul 7, 1940.
65 Darré diary, Jul 8, 1940 (BA, Darré papers, vol.65a).
66 Diary, Jul 9; Bormann diary, Jul 8, 1940.
67 G Sander, ‘Unbekanntes über Goebbels’ Rolle im Krieg’, Unser Land Illustrierte, a wellinformed
supplement to Deutsche Bauernzeitung (Cologne-Deutz) Oct 16, 1949 (IfZ archives);
Semler diary, ‘Jul 24, 1941.’
68 Diary, Mar 6, Jun 7, Dec 6, 1940; Hans Dieter Müller (ed.), Facsimile Querschnitt durch
Das Reich (Munich, 1964), and ‘Das Reich. Porträt einer Wochenzeitung,’ in Der Spiegel, Aug
19, 1964, 32ff.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 605
69 See e.g. the remarks by a captured bomber navigator on Feb 18, 1941: ‘The best
magazine is Das Reich. It costs thirty pfennigs. It’s got all sorts of interesting things about
politics, economics, art and the armed forces.’ CSDIC(UK) report SRA.1360 in PRO file
WO.208/4123.
70 Diary, Feb 26, 1941.
71 Conversation between Lieutenant-General Lindner, air raid protection section, Reich
air ministry, and Lieutenant-General Veith, Military Governor of Brunswick, Apr 29, 1945.
CSDIC(UK) report SRGG.1149 (PRO file WO.208/4169).
72 Diary, Jul 19, 1940; some were unimpressed. Milch wrote in his diary, ‘6 P.M. entry of
a Berlin division before Fromm, Goebbels. Awful.’ (Author’s film DI-59).
73 MinConf., Jul 19, 1940.
74 Ibid., Feb 8, 1940.
75 Diary, Jul 23, 1940.
76 Ibid., May 3, 1940.
77 Canaris memo, Sep 12 (IWM file AL.1933); RSHA department heads conferences Sep
1939 (NA film T175/239); Heydrich memo of May 1941 (VfZ, 1963, 197ff); David Irving,
Hitler’s War (
London, 1991), 222ff.
78 Diary, Jan 16, 1940.
79 The journalist was Wladyslaw Studnicki. Diary, Feb 9, 13, 21, 23, Jul 26, 1940.
80 His informant was Gauleiter Arthur Greiser. Diary, Mar 13, 1940.
81 Diary, Mar 14, 1940.
82 Ibid., May 1, 1940; Jan 31, 1941. Bouhler, as chief of the Führer’s private chancellery,
had found himself in charge of the infamous ‘T4-Aktion.’
83 Ibid., May 9, 1940; on Jul 4, 1940, Hans Frank, governor-general of Poland, reported
to JG . ‘Jewish Problem almost beyond solution,’ he noted. Ibid., Jul 5, 1940.
84 Ibid., Jun 6; MinConf., Jul 19, 1940.
85 MinConf., Jul 19; and see diary, Jul 23, 1940. Jewish population statistics were chronically
vague. In Sep 1940 Hinkel would report that there were still 71,800 Jews in Berlin; the
plan was to expel 60,000 in the first four weeks after the war, and the rest four weeks later.
86 Diary, Jul 26; he had seen Hitler on his return from Bayreuth at midday on Jul 24,
1940.
87 Ibid., Jul 20; for Hitler’s speech see Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol.460, 65ff.
88 MinConf., Jul 19, 1940.
89 Diary, Jul 22, 1940.
90 MinConf., Jul 20, 1940; Boelcke, 421.
91 Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich, 420ff; JG diary, Apr 3, 1941.
92 Diary, Jul 21, 1940.
93 MinConf., Jul 22, 1940.
94 Diary, Jul 23–24, 1940.
95 Ibid., Jul 24, 1940.
96 Ibid., Jul 25, 1940.
97 MinConf., Jul 24, 1940.
98 Diary, Jul 26, 1940: ‘The Führer’s still pondering on it.’
606 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
Goebbels
39: Breaking Even
THE short campaigning weeks of the English summer flitted past unused. Hit
ler allowed Reichsmarschall Göring’s two thousand bombers to tackle only
Britain’s war industries, shipping, and ports. Dr Goebbels hungered for the day when
they would be unleashed on London.
Britain’s intransigence dominated his diaries. ‘Feelers from here to Britain without
result,’ he recorded on the first day of August 1940. ‘Via Spain as well. London is
looking for a catastrophe.’1
He began his own war in the air. There was no limit to his evil inspiration. His
mischief-making black transmitters went into stage two of their campaign, advising
British listeners on how to defend themselves against Nazi poison-gas attacks, and
how to make Molotov cocktails (a few days later the same transmitters warned that
some designs had been found spontaneously igniting).2 Listeners were lectured on
how to detect the ‘Fifth columnists’ in Britain .3 The transmitters ‘denied’ rumours
that a hundred thousand British army uniforms had fallen into Nazi hands at Dunkirk,
then spread word that thousands of agents wearing these uniforms had already
been parachuted into Britain.4 Then they began broadcasting strings of meaningless
ciphers to these non-existent Fifth Columnists.5 Studying photographs in British society
magazines Goebbels devised a particularly cruel scheme to alienate the working
class: his transmitters announced that Churchill was provided funds for twenty
thousand working-class children to be evacuated to Canada like the privileged chil-
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 607
dren of the rich and influential; families were to take their children to a meeting
place in the centre of London, on the basis of first-come, first-saved. ‘There’s going
to be some pushing and shoving there,’ cackled the minister heartlessly.6 His ‘English’
transmitters also ordered all gas masks to be handed in for special filters to be
installed.7 They followed with educational broadcasts for those English listeners who
had not yet witnessed German air force Schrecklichkeit at first hand.8
In the air war however the British were now taking the initiative, although Göring’s
bomber bases were much closer to London than the British were to Berlin. Churchill
sent his squadrons to Hamburg and announced it had been ‘pulverised’.9 The American
press seized upon that word. Goebbels flew two planeloads of neutral journalists
to the port to see for themselves that it was undamaged.10
Goebbels began to feel ill. He felt overworked and under-nourished, his nerves
were frayed, his eyes swam from scanning the incoming dispatches for any signs that
Britain was collapsing.11 The doctors diagnosed a nervous complaint resulting from
overwork and vitamin deficiency.12 The Gestapo reported gloomily that the German
public was keyed up, waiting for Göring’s Grand Slam, but that many people secretly
feared they were in for a second winter at war.13
Hitler returned to Berlin on Aug 4. He explained to Goebbels that he was about to
launch sudden and unheralded mass air raids on Britain and ordered the propaganda
barrage to be intensified. Goebbels postponed a trip he had been planning to occupied
Norway and turned the barrage up to half-volume.14 But still Hitler held back
his bombers. He explained that the Reichsmarschall was still testing the sinews of
Britain’s defences. ‘If the losses we sustain are within reason,’ wrote Goebbels after
seeing Hitler again on the sixth, ‘then the operation will proceed. If they are not,
then we shall try new ways. Invasion not planned,’ he noted almost casually.* ‘But we
shall hint at it subliminally in our propaganda to confuse the enemy.’
* Thereby settling one major historical controversy. This author has long maintained, e.g.
in Churchill’s War (London, 1987) and Hitler’s War (London, 1991), 311ff., that Hitler never
intended to invade Britain and that Operation Sea Lion was only strategic deception. Traditional
historians have been slow to accept this.
608 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
Goebbels briefed only a few of his staff on Hitler’s startling disclosure. ‘The Führer
has still not ordered the air attack on Britain,’ he noted after a further visit to him
that day. ‘He’s still rather hesitant.’ Anxious to exculpate his vacillating idol in his
diary, Goebbels conceded: ‘It is a tricky decision.’15 And it was: bombing London
would finally close the door to peace. Churchill knew this too, and this was one
reason why his bombers were trying to provoke Hitler. Goebbels found himself his
unwitting ally. ‘The people,’ he wrote privately, meaning himself, ‘are afraid that
we’re missing the opportune moment.’ Over lunch on the eighth Hitler however
said that the weather was not good enough. Goebbels squirmed, but noted: ‘Perhaps
it’s all for the best.’16
To his dismay Churchill’s information machine proved slicker than his as the battle
of Britain began. He did not mind that Churchill inflated his victories, claiming fiftythree
Luftwaffe planes when the real total was ten; but the British announced this
Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death Page 99
