exploit the latent hatred of Moscow as he advanced. ‘Probably,’ wrote Goebbels, ‘our
soldiers will never have been welcomed with such enthusiasm.’49 He learned of Hitler’s
policies on Russia only at second hand and, as it turned out, most imperfectly.
Rosenberg was to become minister for the occupied eastern territories with his
chief of staff Arno Schickedanz in the Ukraine. Goebbels was uneasy about these two
men, they were too doctrinaire.50 But Rosenberg told Taubert that he planned to
dismantle the Soviet Union and restore each constituent republic’s liberty, which
seemed sound enough.51
Goebbels’ dummy Task Force England was unobtrusively disbanded. The East Prussian
Joachim Paltzo, with Dr Friedrich Mahlo and Adolf Mauer, both of the ministry’s
tourist office, would direct the real Task Force Russia.52 Thirty propaganda companies
would fan out behind the armies, making propaganda for the first time among
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 647
the liberated peoples—one Propagandatrupp for each city—and they would bring
reports back to Germany. Goebbels’ propaganda guidelines to the Soviet Union also
bore little comparison with Hitler’s later policies. Their enemies, he defined, were
Stalin and his Jewish backers; German propaganda was not, of course, to be antisocialist,
not was there to be a reversion to Tsarism; since the Red Army was fiercely
nationalist there would also be no hint of dismemberment. The kulaks should get
back their land, but only after the harvest had been brought in.53
He was therefore shocked at the scope of Hitler’s plans for the Soviet empire when
he saw them. Only the far eastern regions were to be left untouched.54 He decided
that he would have to forget his past feuds with Rosenberg. ‘If you handle him right,’
he wrote after meeting him on June 14, ‘you can get along with him.’55
Behind closed doors and under a Gestapo guard, on Wednesday June 18 his ministry
began printing three million copies of Hitler’s proclamation to the eastern front.56
To distract attention, Goebbels invited Italian diplomats out to Schwanenwerder for
the weekend. On Saturday afternoon Hitler phoned to summon him to the chancellery,
and he left his guests in his private cinema watching ‘Gone with the Wind.’
For three hours he and Hitler paced up and down the long chancellery drawing
room, examining the dangers of attacking Russia, this malignant tumour in the east.
Hitler felt that there must still be an influential peace faction in England—why had
London otherwise systematically played down Hess’s mission ever since he landed?
For an hour he listened to the different Barbarossa fanfares, then approved of Goebbels’
own choice—the pompous, brassy opening chords of Franz von Liszt’s Les Préludes
with a short added motif from the Horst Wessel anthem. They separated at twothirty
A.M. It was now Sunday June 22, 1941, the anniversary of Napoleon’s illstarred
invasion of Russia. ‘He has been working on this since July,’ wrote Goebbels.
‘And now the hour has struck.’
At three-thirty A.M. Hitler’s armies and air force fell upon the Soviet Union. Unable
to sleep, Goebbels paced his office, watching the minutes pass, listening to the
sigh of history. Two hours later, he sat tautly before the microphone in the building’s
new studio, flanked by Gutterer and Hadamowsky, and heard the new fanfare her-
648 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
alding Hitler’s new campaign blaring from the loudspeakers. He broadcast Hitler’s
proclamation, then drove out to Schwanenwerder and his guests. The birds’ dawn
chorus was in full cry.57
1 For Berlin’s announcement of May 14, 1941 see BA, Schumacher collection, file 236;
and PRO files PREM.3/219/4 and INF.1/912.
2 Semler, ‘May 14, 1941.’
3 And again: Diary, May 14, 1941.
4 Diary, May 13, 1941.
5 MinConf., May 13; diary, May 14, 1941.
6 MinConf., May 15, 1941.
7 Diary, May 14, 1941.
8 Stenogramm of MinConf, May 15, 1941. Sander quotes him as saying, ‘Hess should have
fallen into my hands!’
9 Diary, May 14, 16, 1941; in fact Churchill had expressly forbidden any exploitation of
the Hess affair.
10 In his memo of May 21 (IWM file AL.2525) Hans Frank said he had never seen him so
distressed since the death of Geli Raubal. And see Frank diary May 13, 19, and conference,
May 20, 1941; the interrogation of Ernst Bohle, Aug 5/8, 1945; Hewel diary, May 13, 1941.
11 Lutze diary, May 13, 14, 1941 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung); he added, ‘my views on Hess
have been known for years.’
12 Diary, May 16; circular by Tiessler to the party (Gauringleiter), Jun 24, 1941 (NA film
T581, roll 16; BA file NS.26/291).—See the RPL file on combatting occultism, containing
correspondence with Bormann’s chancellery and JG’s views, Jun–Jul 1943 (BA file NS.18/
211).
13 Diary, May 14, 1941.
14 G Sander, op. cit.
15 MinConf., May 14; diary, May 15, 1941.
16 Stenogramm of MinConf., May 15, 1941.
17 Diary, May 19, 1941.
18 Ibid., May 18; MinConf., May 19, 1941.
19 Ebermayer & Meissner, op. cit., Revue, Nos.24–25, May 1952; their source is Ello Quandt.
20 Diary, May 24, 25, Jun 1, 1941.
21 The book was his anthology, Die Zeit ohne Beispiel. Reden und Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1939/
40/41 (Munich, 1941).
22 Diary, May 28, 1941; the entry concludes, ‘To bed late, tired, and quite sad’—the latter
possibly because of the day’s sinking of Bismarck.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 649
23 Diary, May 31, 1941: ‘… Particularly since the report of German prisoners being mutilated.’
24 Ebermayer & Meissner, Revue, No.25, 1952.
25 Diary, May 20, 1941.
26 Ibid.,, May 22, 1941. Tiessler headed the Hauptamt Reichsring in the RPL. For his
personal papers see BA file NS.18/5; career to 1934: NS.18/251. His 1941–43 submissions
to JG are in file NS.18/194. His MS memoirs are in IfZ files. He died in 1984.
27 Diary, May 21, Jun 9, 10, 12, 13, 1941.
28 MinConf., May 21. In fact Abwehr special forces did wear Polish uniforms in 1939 and
Dutch uniforms in 1940.
29 Interrogation by Frank Korf, Apr 4, 1948 (Hoover Libr., Korf papers.)
30 For the Barbarossa deception plans (‘Shark,’ ‘Mercury’) see naval staff war diary May
12, 16, 1941.
31 Diary, May 25, 1941.
32 Ibid., Jun 6, 7, 14; Semler, ‘Jun 1, 1941.’
33 Diary, Jun 1. Semler dates this conference ‘Jun 5’, as does Borresholm. Schirmeister
(IMT, xvii, 277) testifies that it was in May.
34 Memo for Dr Schlegelberger, ministry of justice, BA file R.22/4087; Borresholm, 157.
35 On the Bömer affair see the interrogation of Paul K (‘Presse’) Schmidt, Jul 28, 1947 and
his affidavit of Dec 1947 (NA film M.1019, roll 64); and of Rolf Hoffmann, PWB/SAIC/22,
Jul 12, 1945 (NA file RG.332, Mis Y, Sect., box 116).
36 Hewel diary, May 25; JG diary, May 26, 1941.
37 Ibid., May 23, 31; JG warned his MinConf., May 26, on the perils of alcohol and bragging.
38 Diary, May 26, 27, 1941.
39 Ibid., May 27, 1941.
; 40 Schmidt; and Heinz Lorenz, testimony of Dec 3, 1947 (ND: NG4321; and IfZ, ZS-266).
JG said (Diary, Jun 13, 14, 27) he would plead for Bömer, but only after Barbarossa; in fact
on Aug 13 he recorded that he had submitted a memo on Bömer’s behalf to the public
prosecutor and hopes for his release.
41 Diary, May 30, 1941. Bormann to Party treasurer Schwarz, Feb 22, 1942 (BDC file,
Bömer). Bömer had been press chief in Rosenberg’s Aussenpolitisches Amt, 1934–38.
42 Diary, Jun 5; May 28, 1941.
43 Ibid., May 23, 1941.
44 Ibid., Jun 11, 1941.
45 Ibid., Jun 15.—On this ploy see ibid., Jun 7, 11, 12, 1941 and Werner Stephan’s interrogation
of Oct 29, 1947 (NA film M.1019, roll 71). Borresholm, 152f (‘May 24’), the
OKW WFSt war diary (‘Jun 16’) and Semler (‘Jun 8, 1941’) all give the wrong dates.
46 Diary, Jun 15, 1941; Oven, ‘Oct 29, 1944’, 507f; Sander, op.cit.
47 Diary, Jun 14, 1941; Schaub MS, IfZ: Irving collection.
48 Taubert report (Yivo, G–PA–14).
49 Diary, May 1, 1941.
50 Ibid., May 23, 1941; he added that Koch was to get the Ukraine, and Lohse the Baltic
states.
650 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
51 Ibid., May 24, 1941.
52 Ibid., Jun 12, 1941.
53 Ibid., Jun 7, 1941.
54 Ibid., Jun 8, 1941.
55 Ibid., Jun 15. That day, Jun 14, JG wrote to Rosenberg to urge the centralisation of all
eastern propaganda withint the RMVP (Rosenberg files, IfZ film MA.803, 277f).On Jun 18,
1941 he noted that Rosenberg also expected a rapid Soviet collapse.—For their later squabbles
about jurisdiction over propaganda in the eastern territories see Rosenberg’s papers,
especially BA file R.6/11.
56 Diary, Jun 19, 1941.
57 Ibid., Jun 22, 1941. He issued a photograph of himself broadcasting the proclamation
(Picture archives, Süddeutscher Verlag).—See Hewel and Bormann diaries, Jun 22 (author’s
films DI-75 and DI-19); and the diary of General Kurt Dittmar, the war department’s radio
commentator, who said JG’s broadcast ‘sounded convincing,’ but added: ‘Less attractive are
the consequences, particularly the shooting of [Soviet] commissars… We obey unwillingly
and with considerable misgivings on this point.’ (Author’s film DI-60).
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 651
Goebbels
42: No Room for Two of Us
GOEBBEL’S diaries, now all retrieved from hiding, chronicle Hitler’s Russian
campaign almost to the last day. Of particular interest is how this crusade,
embarked upon in such a froth of misplaced optimism, impinged upon him as minister:
how he argued for the adoption of more realistic policies toward the ‘liberated’
Russians, and how, when all seemed lost, Hitler finally granted to him the powers he
craved to mobilize the entire nation. But he was a realist too. He prohibited the
publication of maps of the entire Soviet Union, in case readers felt that this time
their Führer had bitten off more than he could chew.1
He justified Barbarossa effortlessly. Mr Churchill came to his aid with a radio broadcast
that same Sunday evening, June 22, 1941, pledging unlimited British aid to
Moscow. Goebbels argued that they had been conspiring together all along.2 In an
article published four days later he argued that the Soviet Union had been banking on
taking over a stricken and war-ravaged Europe. ‘In one hand they clutched the treaty
with us… but in the other they sharpened the blade to plunge into our back.’3 Two
weeks later Das Reich published his pièce justificative, ‘The Veil Falls,’ in which he
described Barbarossa as a war (though not a ‘crusade’—he had forbidden the usage
of that overworked noun) by civilised people ‘against spiritual putrefaction, against
the decay of public morality, against the bloody terrorization of mind and body, against
criminal policies whose perpetrators sit astride mounds of corpses casting about for
whom to select as their next victim.’4
652 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
For six days Hitler ordered a news blackout. On the seventh he ordered twelve
special communiqués broadcast.5 At hourly intervals from eleven A.M. the same trumpets
sounded. Goebbels was livid at this amateurish day-long deluge of fanfares.6 It
allowed the common man to glimpse the workings of high propaganda; precisely
because it destroyed the illusion, he had forbidden newspapers to publish behindthe-
scenes photographs at film studios and reprimanded a weekly magazine for portraying
the hallowed phonograph disc from which the victory fanfares were played
during the battle of France.7 ‘I shall see to it,’ he wrote, wrongly blamed for this
stunt, ‘that this never happens again.’8
For Goebbels, image was everything. War newsreels never showed air-raid victims,
and he persuaded Hitler to suppress lingering shots of battle-casualties in a film on
the heroism of the medical corps during the battle of Crete.9 He wanted the public
to believe in an antiseptic, almost bloodless war.
He injected his propaganda into the Soviet Union initially by means of three ‘black’
transmitters disguised as Trotskyite, separatist, and nationalist.10 Eventually, despite
the lack of receivers in the Soviet Union, he would have twenty-two official transmitters
as well, broadcasting thirty-four daily bulletins in eighteen different languages.
11 He had persuaded the communists Torgler, Kasper, and Albrecht, at a secret
meeting in his ministry during May, to broadcast appeals to the enemy in authentic
communist double-speak to overthrow the ‘traitor’ Stalin and set up workers’ and
soldiers’ councils; Goebbels stopped them from calling for street demonstrations, in
case nobody showed up.12 Hoping to use Ernst Thälmann too, Goebbels sent him
reports on conditions in the Soviet Union; still in a concentration camp, ‘Teddy’
Thälmann disdained to collaborate (and was eventually shot.)13
After a few days in shock, Stalin came back fighting with a famous radio broadcast
on July 3, 1941, proclaiming a patriotic war.14 Hitler now authorised Goebbels to
unleash his main anti-Soviet propaganda campaign.15 There was no lack of material.
Hearing of atrocities in Lvov, where the retreating Red Army had murdered six hundred
Ukrainians, Goebbels rushed twenty journalists there to get eye-witness accounts.
16 There was no need for him to invent horror stories. Hitler’s secret police
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 653
had stormed the Soviet diplomatic buildings in Paris and Berlin, and found some
decidedly undiplomatic equipment including sound-proof execution chambers hidden
behind electrically operated steel doors, a laboratory for the production of exotic
poisons, and electric crematoria for disposing of human remains.17 ‘If a criminal
gang comes to power,’ dictated Goebbels reading the reports submitted by Heydrich
Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death Page 106
