Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death

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Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death Page 117

by Roger Manvell; Heinrich Fraenkel


  day what had happened. A German Channel convoy had stumbled on the invasion

  force. ‘Thus,’ dictated Goebbels in his diary, ‘we had the first report that something

  was afoot out there in the murk and fog as early as 4:28 A.M.’ A German submarine

  chaser had rammed one landing craft, a second German warship had opened first on

  the British motor torpedo-boats. After an exchange of fire at point-blank range which

  left eleven German dead and ten missing, the British raid developed into a debâcle.

  The enemy lost one destroyer, thirty-three landing craft, 106 planes, and 4,350 men

  (including 1,179 dead). London claimed that the raid was merely an ‘exercise with

  live ammunition.’ Goebbels dismissed this: ‘Obviously the British planned to execute

  a major operation here,’ he wrote. ‘At very least they tried to bring about a

  Second Front … thereby complying with Stalin’s orders. There can be no doubt

  about that.’ Not even Churchill, he argued, would have sacrificed all those planes,

  destroyers, and troop transporters, not to mention three thousand dead and missing

  men, for a mere exercise.63 ‘All of a sudden,’ he scoffed the next day, ‘the British are

  declaring that everything went just the way it was planned. From the fact that it was

  all over in nine hours they are now inferring that it was in fact only planned to last

  nine hours.’64 He noted with glee that Churchill had ordered a strict clamp-down on

  quoting the American newspaper reports on the fiasco. ‘The reality is,’ he commented,

  ‘that he is the prisoner of the Kremlin. He can no longer conform to the dictates of

  commonsense. He has to act at the Soviet behest.’65

  In glorious sunshine he left Hitler’s HQ and drove back to the airfield, past rolling

  cornfields lush with the new Ukrainian harvest. If only they could transport it all

  back home, he sighed. The previous day’s Völkischer Beobachter had carried a foolish

  article by Erich Koch, the local dictator, boasting of the agricultural riches now

  flowing to the Reich. As soon as he got back to his ministry, Goebbels warned against

  propagating such false illusions.66

  714 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH

  1 MinConf., Mar 18; Propaganda Slogan No.22, Mar 23, and note of Mar 24 (NA film

  T81, roll 672, 0928ff); see Office of War Information (OWI) confidential report No.6, Jul

  25, 1942 (NA file RG.226, entry 16, box 115, file 18962).

  2 Propaganda Slogan No.20, Mar 13, 1942 (NA film T81, roll 672, 0905ff): Germany had

  to feed 2·5m foreign workers and the occupied territories too now.

  3 Diary, Apr 5, 13; MinConf., Apr 12; Propaganda slogan Mar 10 (NA film T81, roll 672,

  0918ff) and BA file NS.18/43; NYT, Apr 17, Jun 22, 1942.

  4 Führer decree, referred to in JG diary, Mar 28, 1942.

  5 Diary, May 2, 23, 1942. Included in the 350,000 marks furnishings were 500 phonograph

  records and silverware for twenty-four guests (ZStA Potsdam, Rep.50.01, RMVP,

  vol.766).

  6 MinConf., Apr 11; diary, Apr 14, 1942.

  7 Note for JG, Jun 10, 1942 (Hoover Libr., Goebbels papers, box 2).

  8 Unpubl. diary, Mar 11, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).

  9 Ibid., May 14; cf. Mar 16 and May 28, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).

  10 Diary, Apr 9, 1942.

  11 MinConf., Apr 27, 1942.

  12 Diary, Apr 24; 163 people died in Rostock, and the centre was 70 percent destroyed. To

  JG’s annoyance the foreign ministry sent Countess (Edda) Ciano and a gaggle of Italian court

  ladies to visit Rostock (Diary, May 4). Foreign ministry official Braun von Stumm coined the

  phrase ‘Bædecker raids,’ saying the Germans would now attack anything awarded four stars

  in the famous guide book to Britain (Ibid., May 2–4, 1942).

  13 Diary, Apr 27, 1942.

  14 Unpubl. diary, Jun 2 (NA film T84, roll 267); at the MinConf., May 26 he announced

  the arrest of seven Jews for firebombing his anti-Soviet exhibition. Cf. MinConf., May 27,

  1942.

  15 Diary, May 28, 1942. According to NYT 258 Jews were shot at Lichterfelde on that day.

  16 Stapo-Leitstelle Berlin to Oberfinanzpräsident, Jun 5, 1942; cit Reitlinger, Endlösung,

  111; Reuth, 502.—An Apr 26, 1938 decree had required all Jews to list assets in excess of

  5,000 marks to local tax offices and police HQs. Wolfgang Scheffler, Judenverfolgung im Dritten

  Reich 1933–1945 (Berlin, 1960), 27ff.

  17 On Tonak: see Hitler’s table talk, Apr 29, 1942 (Picker edition).

  18 Diary, May 30, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267); Reuth, note 74, makes a brave attempt to

  reconcile this entry with a Hitler Plan to liquidate the Jews.

  19 Diary, Jan 25–27; JG express circular to ministries, Jan 30: ‘I have had the circulation of

  Seehaus material stopped with immediate effect.’ (Reich Chancellery files, NA film T120,

  roll 2474, E.255399).—The other agencies were DNB, Transozean, and Johannsen’s service

  in Hamburg (ibid., Jan 30, 1942).

  20 Unpubl. diary, Apr 6, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 261). David Irving, Breach of Security

  (London, 1967) and Das Reich hört mit (Kiel, 1990); unpubl. diary, Sep 25, 1942 (IfZ, ED.83/

  2; author’s film DI-52), recording a visit from the FA’s Ministerialdirektor Walther Seifert.

  21 Unpubl. diary, May 30, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267); for Severitt’s position see the FA

  phone directory in NA file, RG.3198, IRR, XE4986, and interrogations therein of Peipe and

  Rebien; his predecessors were Dr Schippert and Klaus von Klitzing.

  GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 715

  22 Unpubl. diary, May 30, 1942 (unpubl. diary, T84, roll 267).

  23 MinConf., May 29; diary, May 28, 1942.

  24 Diary, May 31, 1942.

  25 Unpubl. diary, May 30 (NA film T84, roll 267); cf. Table talk, May 30, 1942 (Picker,

  365).

  26 Gutterer MS, and interview, Jun 30, 1993. In his diary, Jun 1, 1942, JG reported Hitler’s

  criticism of the other ministers for not having left contact numbers—he did not mention

  his own absence.

  27 Diary, Jun 2 (NA film T84, roll 267); MinConf., Jun 2; on Jun 14, 1942 he pointed out

  that every conceivable bomber type had been shot down, proof that Churchill had scraped

  the bottom of the barrel.

  28 Diary, Jun 2, 5; NYT, Jun 2, 1942 wrote of 20,000 dead.

  29 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.596, Jun 1942 (FDR Libr.,

  PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’); and see JG, ‘Der Luft- und Nervenkrieg,’ in Das Reich, Jun 14,

  1942.

  30 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.581, Jun 5, 1942 (FDR Libr.,

  PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’); and see the PWE analysis of German home propaganda, May 13–

  20, 1942, No.528, ibid.

  31 Diary, Mar 27, 1942.

  32 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.359, Mar 27, 1942 (FDR

  Libr., PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’)

  33 Ditto, No.319, Mar 9, 1942 (Ibid.)

  34 Ditto, No.318, Mar 7, 1942 (Ibid.)

  35 OSS R&A Report No.21, ‘Current German Attitudes and the German War Effort,’ Mar

  19, 1942 (USAMHI, Donovan papers, box 37a).

  36 Memo by William B Donovan to President Roosevelt, No.304, Mar 3, 1942 (FDR Libr.,

  PSF, boxes 165–6, ‘OSS’)

  37 E.g., on Apr 19, May 3, 9: cf. ditto, No.563, May 29, 1942 (ibid.)

  38 Ditto, No.563, May 29 (ibid.); MinConf., Jun 15, 1942.

 
; 39 MinConf. Jul 22; see also Aug 6, 8, 1942.

  40 Ibid., Aug 10, 1942.

  41 MinConf., Jul 3, 1942.

  42 Diary, Jun 5, 1942.

  43 Bormann to JG et. al., Jun 8, 1942 (NA film T175, roll 139, 7362f).

  44 MinConf., Jul 14, 1942.

  45 Diary, May 14, 18; unpubl. diary, May 27, 1942.

  46 JG as RPL., guidelines, Feb 15, 1942 (Yivo, Occ. E20.)

  47 MinConf., Jul 6, 1942.

  48 Diary, Feb 24; in general, see the report by Hadamowsky and Taubert on the administration

  of the east, Sep 17, 1942 (Yivo, Occ. E18).

  49 Unpubl. diary, Apr 25, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 261).

  50 Ibid., Feb 14; and May 2, 1942.

  51 Ibid., May 22, 27, 28, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).

  52 Ibid., Jun 1, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 267).

  716 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH

  53 Diary, Jun 5, 1942.

  54 MinConf., Jul 1, 1942.

  55 Ibid., Jul 7, 9, 1942.

  56 JG, ‘Die sogenannte russische Seele,’ Das Reich, Jul 18; circulated to all Reichsleiter and

  gauleiters, Jul 14 (NA film T581, roll 16; BA file NS.26/291); and see OWI report No.6, Jul

  6, 1942 (NA film RG.226, entry 16, box 115, 18962.)

  57 MinConf., Jul 28, 1942.

  58 Diary, Jun 5, 1942.

  59 MinConf., Jul 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 1942.

  60 Ibid., Jul 23, 1942.

  61 Ibid., Jul 8; on Aug 3, 1942 he added, ‘In particular avoid comments that the air raids

  will not decide the war.’

  62 JG, ‘Auch der Versuch ist strafbar,’ Reich, Aug 2; issued as usual by radio and DNB several

  days ahead. See ‘Goebbels über die Zweite Front,’ in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jul 30, and NYT,

  Jul 30, 1942, p.3. In his diary on Aug 1, 1942, JG wrote, ‘Never has an article of mine

  attracted such lively interest as this one. It is quoted under banner headlines on the front

  pages of the entire European press.’

  63 MinConf., Auf 18, 22, 1942.

  64 Unpubl. diary, Aug 14–15, 1942 (BA file NL.118/125).

  65 MinConf., Aug 11, 1942.

  66 See ibid., Aug 19, 1942 (Moscow archives).

  67 Unpubl. diary, Aug 21, 1942 (Moscow archives).

  68 Ibid.

  69 Ibid., Aug 22, 1942.

  70 MinConf., Aug 21, 1942.

  GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 717

  46: The Road to Stalingrad

  GERMANY had now been at war for three years. Her public’s brittle morale was

  troubling Goebbels and he drafted an article on ‘The point of war,’ reviewing

  the events since 1939 from a lofty ideological plane.1 British leaflets were becoming

  more insidious, particularly one appealing, ‘Get rid of Hitler!’2 The message

  seemed unthinkable, but within the four walls of No.20 Hermann-Göring Strasse

  even he began to express reservations about some of Hitler’s decisions. Once he

  stepped out through the padded double-doors and into his morning ministerial conference,

  however, he radiated unswerving loyalty to his Führer.3

  He had recently issued a circular to journalists discouraging inflated terms like

  ‘unique’ or ‘historic’ to describe their victories, and words like ‘warlord’ for anybody

  other than Hitler.4 Morale improved as Hitler’s armies fanned out to the south

  and east across the shimmering, dusty Russian steppe, and Goebbels methodically

  warned the media against overweening optimism.5 They captured the oil cities of

  Maykop and Kraznodar; the Russian population rose against them under the influence

  of Moscow’s propaganda and, as the High Command chided Goebbels, with no visible

  effect from his. Hitler repeatedly warned him to damp down any spreading

  optimism.6 He ordered General Friedrich Paulus to advance with the Sixth Army on

  Stalingrad, a city of two million souls dominating the Volga waterway.

  The Russian summer’s heat was as savage as the late winter’s cold. The temperature

  soared to near fifty degrees Celsius. On August 8 Goebbels dictated: ‘The battle

  of Stalingrad has begun.’ As Marshal Timoshenko withdrew before Hitler’s tank on-

  718 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH

  slaught, Stalin ordered him to stand and fight. Goebbels compared this harshly worded

  order approvingly with Hitler’s order of December 1941. ‘You can see,’ he dictated,

  warming once more to the Soviet leader, ‘that in Stalin we are dealing with a man of

  calibre.’7

  As Soviet resistance at Stalingrad stiffened, so did Goebbels’ instinctive reluctance

  to mention the city’s name. He had not forgotten Otto Dietrich’s blunder of October

  1941. From late in August onward he repeatedly embargoed all reference to the

  battle. Nobody could say how long it would last. But already Stalingrad was on every

  tongue, both friend and foe.8

  FOR a week he vanished from Germany, visiting Venice again for the biennial film

  festival.

  Before leaving he wrote for Das Reich an article entitled ‘Don’t be so righteous!’, a

  critique of the Germans’ pedantic sense of justice and over-objectivity. ‘We’re so

  frightened of doing an injustice to somebody,’ he wrote, ‘that when in doubt we

  prefer that the injustice be done to ourselves… Hating is something we Germans

  still have to learn.’ Too much objectivity, he concluded, would be the death of them.

  Their global mission was, he said, not to purvey culture to the world, but to ‘bring

  home the grain and oil’ to Germany.9 He repeated his attack on his bugbear, overobjectivity,

  in a secret address delivered to about sixty senior Berlin journalists in the

  ministry’s Throne Room on September 23. He warned against harbouring any illusions

  about victory. They must not under-estimate their enemy. ‘The German public

  is not as hardy as the British,’ he pointed out. Britain had yet to lose a single war. ‘The

  German public,’ he repeated, ‘suffers from a craving for righteousness and from a

  craze for objectivity. It keeps looking for the laudable in our enemies.’ Their chronic

  love-affair with Churchill was just one example.10* He dinned into this select audience

  his principle of constant repetition. If he were English, he said, he would have

  * The Germans cheered Mr Churchill when he drove through the ruins of Berlin in 1945,

  and the city of Aachen later awarded him the Charlemagne prize.

  GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 719

  kept repeating ever since 1939 that they were fighting Hitler, and not the Germans;

  he would also have hammered home ad nauseam the eight points of the Atlantic

  Charter. He warned them that their biggest problem in coming months would be the

  resumption of the British air raids. Single-line references to enemy air activity in the

  High Command communiqué would no longer suffice. He set up propaganda companies

  with no other task than to dramatise the coming blitz and the heroism of the

  people.11

  IN this secret speech to Berlin’s top journalists, Goebbels was astonishingly frank

  about the fate of Berlin’s Jews. Justifying the reporting restrictions imposed, he explained

 

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