confectioners, and jewellers however, and announcing the call up of men and women
for labour service, the upper age limit for women was set at forty-five, not at fifty.70
The lack-lustre Lammers committee also showed a marked reluctance to shut down
many businesses. The enemy bombers, Goebbels bitterly pointed out to Hitler eighteen
months later, closed most of them down anyway.71
Infuriated by the committee’s weakness, he decided to go ahead with his plan for a
mass meeting to put pressure on Hitler. ‘Public opinion,’ he noted, ‘is always a powerful
ally.’72 He had honed his skills promoting the images of Hitler, Rommel, Speer,
and others. The time had now come to promote his own.
NEVER had Nazi Germany suffered a disaster like the one approaching in Stalingrad.
Goebbels ordered the magnificent Hitler posters entitled ‘Adolf Hitler is Victory’
called in and stored away for future use; a tenth anniversary poster designed by
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 743
‘Mjölnir,’ the top Nazi artist, ‘January 30, 1933—January 30, 1943: One Fight, One
Victory,’ was called in and pulped.73 On the historic thirtieth itself, British Mosquito
bombers inflicted on Göring of all people the ultimate indignity of having to broadcast
from an air ministry shelter, and an hour later than planned.74 As Dr Goebbels
spoke from the Sports Palace that evening the bombers reappeared; he carried on
regardless.75
Goebbels had become by default the spokesman for the Reich. He had tried in vain
to get Hitler to speak since December.76 During the coming year in fact Hitler would
speak only four times (and Göring only this once). As Hitler reminded Goebbels
before this speech, it was proper even now to compare Germany’s situation now
with 1933. Goebbels had already done this subtly with his Christmas broadcast, bringing
in the voices of soldiers in Stalingrad, Lappland, southern France, and the Caucasus
—in short from the four corners of Hitler’s still vast empire. He now did it again
with the radio preamble to his speech of January 30:
This is the Greater German Radio with the German shortwave stations beamed
to all parts of the world—
The transmitter groups Bohemia-Moravia with the stations Prague, Brno, and
Moravian Ostrau; the stations of the Government-General, Kraków, Warsaw, and
Lvóv; the Baltic transmitter group with the chief station Riga and the stations
Madona, Gdynia, and Libau; Radio Kaunas with Vilnius, Radio Reval and Dorpat,
Radio Minsk with Baranovice.
The transmitter group Ukraine with the chief station Ukraine, the station Vinnitsa
and the shortwave station Kiev; the German Europa stations Alps, Bremen, Calais,
Danube, Frisians, and Vistula—
and so the list went on, as listeners were reminded that their troops were also in
Belgrade, Athens, Salonika, the occupied eastern territories, Norway, Holland, Belgium,
Paris, Argenteuil, Bordeaux, Lille, Normandy, Rennes, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary.77
744 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
The British thought his delivery diffuse and nervous; the Americans considered
that he threw in his climax sooner than usual. Twice he was actually heckled: ‘The
German people want to know,’ one voice was heard shouting, ‘won’t we be hearing
from the Führer?’ As he then read out Hitler’s proclamation, the radio microphones
picked up applause but also a voice shouting, ‘Cease! Stop!’78 Even so, as he finished
speaking, no foreign listener could assume that Germany was near collapse—‘And
that was the object of the exercise,’ he dictated afterwards. His audience of Berliners
had acted ‘with sound political instinct’ throughout. As he climbed into his armourplated
Mercedes he asked his adjutant what he had thought of it, and back at No.20
Hermann-Göring Strasse he had his chauffeur Rach read aloud, from Nietzsche’s
‘Will to Power,’ the recipe for ‘what the masses call a great man’. ‘He must be outrageous,
jealous, manipulative, designing, flattering, fawning, inflated,’ this ran: ‘In short
all things to all men.’ Goebbels unconsciously slipped into his speaking posture, his
hands planted on his hips. ‘Make no mistake,’ he shrilled. ‘You can’t change the masses.
They will always be the same: dumb, gluttonous, and forgetful.’79
In this January 30, 1943 speech he had made no reference to U-boats, Churchill,
Roosevelt, or North Africa; nor for that matter to unconditional surrender. Sixty
percent of his speech had dealt with Russia, ten with Britain, and only three with the
United States. He had used the word total ten times, and ninety-three different negative
words like danger, inconceivable, strain, difficult, hard, menace, catastrophe, superhuman,
trials, misery, anxiety, hopeless, defeat and desperate.80 Twenty-three times he had
spoken of ‘faith’ (‘Glaube’ and ‘gläubig’). ‘Defeat,’ the Americans unkindly concluded,
‘drives the Nazi orators into the arms of historical analogies, bombastic heroizations,
and empty irrational appeals.’
On the last day of January 1943 Hitler dramatically promoted the doomed Sixth
Army’s commander to field marshal, thus pressing a pistol into his hand. As a German
officer Friedrich Paulus had no alternative but suicide. ‘Fate,’ Goebbels argued
in his diary, ‘has put him in a situation where, now that so many of his men have died
in battle, he must forego fifteen or twenty years of life to achieve immortality.’81 He
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 745
asked Fritzsche, who had been with Paulus most recently, for his view. ‘Herr Minister,’
responded Fritzsche. ‘I’d take a bet on it. The field marshal won’t surrender.’82
That same night Moscow radio announced that Paulus had surrendered. Two days
later they added the names of thirteen of his generals. Goebbels was thunderstruck.
Having ordered their men to fight to the death, these generals had meekly turned
themselves over to the Russians? Hitler phoned. Goebbels called him back and recommended
they postpone any comment—they could not be certain one way or the
other.83 Paulus’ surrender made him more determined than ever to take his own life
if the time ever came.
He broadcast the prepared communiqué on Stalingrad at four P.M. on the third—
it was ‘grave, objective, sober, without pathos but also not without warmth’—accompanied
by the heroic ceremonial which he had elaborated with Hitler in advance.
‘Loyal to its oath of allegiance to the last breath,’ the communiqué read, the
Sixth Army had ‘succumbed to the superior enemy strength and to the disfavour of
the circumstances.’ Goebbels ordered three days of national mourning.84
Three days later at the Wolf’s Lair Goebbels was among the gauleiters who heard
Hitler’s explanation for Stalingrad. ‘You are witnessing a catastrophe of unheard-of
magnitude,’ Hitler began, before again blaming his allies. ‘The Russians broke through,
the Romanians gave up, the Hungarians didn’t even put up a fight.’ He estimated
their own losses at one hundred thousand dead.85 It was a setback, he admitted, but
by no means fatal. ‘Besides,’ he said, brightening, ‘worl
d history has a deeper meaning
and it does not consist of having the supreme race of Europe finished off by one
of the most inferior.’86 It was a novel argument, and Goebbels frequently advanced it
thereafter.
746 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
1 Schirmeister interrogation, May 6, 1946 (NA film, M.1270, roll 19).
2 Unpubl. diary, Dec 12, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 262; BA file NL.118/48).
3 Das Reich, Sep 25, 1942. Ernst Hanfstängl quoted this passage in one analysis for the OSS,
Dec 21, 1942 (NA file RG.219, IRR, X7141141).
4 Paul Anderson, broadcasting on BBC, Nov 26, 3:30 P.M., cited in RMVP monitoring
report, Dec 1, 1942 (BA file R.55/1270).
5 Wilson (PWE) to Rex Leeper, Notes on Propaganda to Germany, Dec 18–24, and Dec
25–31, 1942 (ibid.)
6 Unpubl. diary Dec 19; Semler diary, ‘Dec 19, 21, 1942’; BDC file, People’s Court: Hans
Kummerow. He was the source of the famous Oslo Report, which gave British Intelligence
advance notice of his country’s most important secret devices.
7 Semler diary, ‘Dec 24, 1942.’
8 Unpubl. diary Dec 7, 13, 20, 1942; Jan 1, 1943.
9 Magda to Daluege, Jan 11, 1943; from Daluege’s papers (BDC file, JG; author’s film DI-
81).
10 For the BBC monitoring report on JG’s speech of Dec 31, 1942, see PRO file FO.371/
34454; for the German people’s reaction, see NA film T175, roll 264, 8353ff.
11 E.g., MinConf., Dec 7, 1942.
12 Propaganda directive No.15, Dec 14, 1942 (NA film T81, roll 672, 0656f).
13 For a report by Herbert Uxküll, United Press correspondent in Stockholm, on JG’s
propaganda guidelines—e.g. always calling Maxim Litvinov ‘Finkelstein,’ banning the use of
‘Second Front’ and ‘Russian’, see his despatch of Jan 15, 1943 in NA file R.226, CRR, entry
16, box 323, file 33393.
14 Propaganda Parole, Nov 21, 1942 (NA film T81, roll 672, 0651f).
15 Propaganda directive No.15, Dec 14, 1942 (Ibid., 0659ff). Ti[essler] advised Bormann
on Jan 6, 1943, ‘For the same reason he [JG] now has to insist for the last time that the phrase
Fortress Europe disappear once and for all from our vocabulary.’ (Ibid., 0895); and see
MinConf., Dec 7, 1942, and Jan 5, 1943, and unpubl. diary, Apr 12, 1943.
16 See unpubl. diary, May 13, 1943 (NA film T84, roll 264).
17 Ibid., May 19, 1942.
18 Diary, Dec 16; Gienanth had briefed JG earlier (unpubl. diary, Jun 3 on NA film T84 roll
267) about the Roosevelts’ unpopularity, but also that ‘the German people and particularly
we Nazis’ were hated; he addressed propaganda officials Jul 13–14, 1942 on his impressions
of the USA 1937–41 (BA file R.55/606); and see his interrogation of Apr 30, 1946 (NA film
M.1270, roll 5).
19 Unpubl. diary, Dec 18, 1942. For the rumours, see Dec 15, and the SD reports of Dec
17 and 21, 1942 (NA film T175, roll 264, 8279ff and 8298ff).
20 Dittmar diary, Dec 21, 1942 (author’s film DI-60).
21 Unpubl. diary, Aug 13, 1941 (NA film T84, roll 267).
22 Ibid., Sep 24: a briefing by his former adjutant Günther Wittmütz; and Sep 27, 1942, a
similar discussion with Major Ihlefeld.
23 Ibid., Sep 29, 1942.
24 Ibid., Sep 30, 1942.
GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH 747
25 Dittmar records in his diary of Dec 22, 1942, being invited to luncheon at Horcher’s
with Fritzsche, Luftwaffe general Quade, Transozean’s Mr Schneider, and the Berlin correspondent
of the Essen Nationalzeitung.
26 Unpubl. diary, Mar 8, 1942 (NA film T84, roll 261); already on May 13, 1941 he had
noted that Hitler had once more shelved the female labour issue. ‘I plead for compulsion…
The fine ladies won’t come of their own volition.’ On May 23, 1941 he noted that Hitler had
rejected compulsion.
27 Ibid., Dec 17, 1942.
28 Hans Kehrl, 249ff.
29 Minutes of Zentrale Planung, Oct 30, 1942 (Milch Documents, vol.46, 9014f); cf.
David Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe (London, 1967).
30 Bormann diary, Dec 27–28 (Libr. of Congress); he returned to the Wolf’s Lair on Dec
30, and sat alone with Hitler on Dec 31 until 4:15 A.M. next day; cf JG diary, Jan 5, 1943.
31 Oven, ‘Jul 25, 1944’, 430f.
32 Semler, ‘Dec 28, 1942.’
33 Diary, Dec 31, 1942.
34 Ibid., Jan 1; similarly in MinConf., Jan 5, 1943.
35 Oven, 434.
36 JG, ‘Der totale Krieg,’ in Das Reich, Jan 17; for public reactions, see the SD report of Jan
18, 1943 on NA film T175, roll 264, 8488ff.
37 MinConf., Jan 4; JG diary, Jan 5; Semler, ‘Jan 4.’ Sauckel spoke in the same vein about an
all-out labour effort in Weimar on Jan 6, 1943 (IMT, vol.xli, 225ff.)
38 MinConf., Jan 5, 1943.
39 Draft letter from JG to Göring, Jan 12, 1943, in Hoover Libr., JG papers, box 2. ‘I am
proud to have stood at your side during the hardest times of our movement, and shall always
be glad to place myself at your disposal if called upon for advice or assistance.’
40 See his remarks at the MinConf. on Jan 6, 1943: reported by Tiessler to Bormann that
day (NA film T81, roll 672, 0895)
41 Diary, Jan 7, 1943.
42 Ibid., Jan 9; Bormann records (Jan 8, 1943) that JG, Bormann, Funk, Sauckel (with
Timm), Speer, and Keitel attended as well no doubt as Lammers.
43 Diary, Jan 16, and MinConf., Jan 16, 1943.
44 Führer decree on a comprehensive effort of men and women for Reich defence purposes,
Jan 13 (BA file R43II/655; IfZ film MA.470, 4910ff.); see Himmler’s telephone note
on a call on Jan 14 to SS Obersturmbannführer With (‘Gen von Unruh’s misgivings about
the Führer’s decree’); and MinConf., Jan 13–14, 1943.
45 Lammers to JG, Jan 15, 1943 (BA file R43II/655).
46 Diary, Jan 16, 1943.
47 Semler, ‘Jan 18, 1943.’
48 Oven, ‘Jul 25, 1944’, 434.
49 Diary, Jan 21, 1943. Lammers had brought in besides JG: Sauckel, Funk, and Gen Walter
von Unruh, the army’s Sonderbeauftragter für Überprüfung des zweckmässigen
Kriegseinsatzes (special manpower commissioner).
50 Semler, ‘Jan 20, 1943.’
748 GOEBBELS. MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH
51 Dittmar diary, Jan 7, 1943 (a phone conversation with Colonel Martin).
52 Diary, Jan 7, 1943.
53 Dittmar diary, Jan 11, 1943.
54 See ibid., Jan 16; for the public shock at this, see SD report, Jan 25, 1943 (NA film
T175, roll 264, 8535f.) The communiqué referred to German troops in Stalingrad ‘who
have been fighting a heroic defensive battle against the enemy attacking from all sides’.
55 Dittmar diary, Jan 21, 1943.
56 Oven, ‘Jul 25, 1944,’ 434.
57 Diary, Jan 23; Semler, ‘Jan 24, 1943.’
58 Diary, Jan 23, 1943.
59 Naumann confirmed this to the RMVP department heads on the evening of Jan 23,
stating that the Führer was now resolved to implement the total war measures proposed by
Doctor Goebbels: His Life & Death Page 122
