The same thought about a Great Power intervention settling the war with Italy had naturally enough also occurred to Gabriel. Indeed, the Ottoman ambassador in London, Ahmet Tevfik Pasa, had urged just such a course on him on 29 September.53 Gabriel declined to pursue the matter, and on the same date that Giolitti issued the ultimatum, he decided that the war had to be brought to a close. It is undoubtedly the case that Gabriel was right to ignore Tevfik’s advice, because it soon became clear that the peace that the Great Powers sought basically involved the Ottoman Empire conceding on Italy’s terms. That this was so became clearly evident when the negotiations stalled yet again on 12 October. Giolitti immediately notified the Great Powers that the Ottoman government was prevaricating, and that the talks were in danger of collapse. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Herbert Dering, the British chargé d’affaires at Rome, telegraphing Sir Edward Grey that he had been informed by the Italian Ambassador that the Ottoman delegation had withdrawn from the negotiations and that Italy might, using her navy, broaden the conflict.54 A cable from Paris to the New York Tribune, dated 12 October, outlined the situation rather well, albeit from a somewhat pro-Italian perspective:
The threatened rupture of the negotiations between the Italian and Turkish representatives at Ouchy has occupied the diplomats of Europe today almost to the exclusion of the Balkan Imbroglio. The powers have concentrated their efforts to prevent Turkey from placing in the hands of the Balkan federation such a trump card as would be the failure of the pourparlers, which have been a large factor in causing the hesitation of Bulgaria, Greece and Servia to declare war.
It is pointed out that while Italy is still fighting the Mussulmans the position of the Balkan States is so enormously strengthened that the powers feel that nothing could restrain them. But with Turkey free from the Italian danger an entirely new perspective is created. The Greek fleet then would be practically put out of action, and large contingents of the Greek army would be tied up guarding the coasts, while Turkey would be able, without restriction, to move hordes of her finest fighting men from Asia Minor against the Balkan invaders.
Italy, in granting a fresh delay in the peace settlement, is seconding the efforts of the powers. The Italian Ambassador, Signor Tittoni, had no fewer than three conferences today with M. Poincare, the French Premier. Italy’s desire for peace is explained on the ground that she fears complications might follow an attack by her on a port in European waters, or in the vicinity of those waters.55
The non-mention of Montenegro amongst the Balkan states that were ‘hesitating’ to declare war is accounted for by the fact that Montenegro had already declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 8 October; the first shot of the war being fired the next day.56 It had become very clear to Gabriel, as to all other European politicians, that war in the Balkans was imminent and that peace with Italy must be secured. Accordingly on 14 October he gave his team at Ouchy instructions to settle, though to attempt to extract some last minute compromises from the Italians.57 These were unsuccessful.
Peace between the Ottoman Empire and Italy came via two separate, though intimately related, treaties. The first, signed on 15 October 1912, was a preliminary, and secret, treaty that established a sequence of events. Under Article 1, the Ottoman government, in the name of the Sultan, would within three days issue an imperial command (ferman) addressed to the populations of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. A draft of this edict was attached, and it basically granted autonomy to the vilayet, though the Sultan would nominate a representative to safeguard Ottoman interests in the country. These would essentially consist of maintaining and adjudicating the sharia amongst the Islamic population. The identity of this representative, and other religious leaders, ‘must be agreed to in advance’ by the Italian government.
The Italian government agreed under Article III that, after a delay of no more than three days following the issuing of the Sultan’s command, it would issue a Royal Decree. Again the draft text of this was attached, and the crucial sentence as far as the Italians were concerned, and one that had proved an obstacle in the negotiations, was the opening line after the preamble. It read: ‘In view of the Law of 25 February 1912 […] with which Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were placed under the full and entire Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy […].’ Article 1 of this decree stipulated that a ‘full and entire amnesty’ was granted to the inhabitants who had participated in the hostilities, and that individuals detained or deported ‘will immediately be liberated.’ Religious freedom was also granted to the population, and the Sultan’s representative recognised as ‘safe-guarding the interests of the Ottoman State and of Ottoman subjects.’
Article IV concerned Rhodes and the other islands occupied by Italy. The Ottoman government agreed, no more than three days after issuing the imperial command referred to in Article 1, to issue a decree granting ‘administrative and judicial reforms’ to the ‘inhabitants of Islands of the Aegean Sea’ so that they would have ‘equal enjoyment of justice, security, and well being, without distinction of cult or religion.’ An amnesty was also granted to those inhabitants who had sided with the Italians, worded in almost exactly the same terms as was granted to those in Article III.
The Ottoman edicts under the treaty were promulgated on 18 October as agreed, and the delegates then moved to sign the public treaty of peace at 15:45 hours that afternoon. Under Article 1, the two governments agreed to ‘take the necessary dispositions for the immediate and simultaneous cessation of hostilities’ and to despatch ‘Special Commissioners’ to ensure that this occurred. Article 2 specified that the two governments would, ‘immediately after the signature of the present Treaty,’ order the return of their armed forces and civil functionaries from, in the Ottoman case, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and, in the Italian, of ‘the islands it has occupied in the Aegean Sea.’ There was however an apparently minor caveat to this; the ‘effective evacuation’ of the islands would only take place after the removal of Ottoman personnel from North Africa. The next two articles dealt with the return of prisoners of war and hostages and reiterated the terms of amnesty as set out in the Secret Treaty, whilst Article 5 stated that the various treaties and agreements that had applied between the two states prior to the outbreak of hostilities were reinstated as if there had been no war. The remaining six articles related to commercial and other matters, though under Article 10 Italy agreed to pay an annual ‘annuity’ to the Ottoman Empire that ‘cannot be less than two million Italian Lire.’58 When the representatives of both sides signed the Treaty it was deemed to have come into force, and the Italo-Ottoman War was formally over.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Peace?
‘Know that the great Italy, after having conquered your mother Tripoli, has become your father.’
Italian proclamation to the Arabs1
Take up the white man’s burden – The savage wars of peace.
Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden: A Poem, 18992
According to European international law, Libya is now under the undisputed and entire sovereignty of Italy. On the other hand, the firman of the Sultan agreed to at Ouchy, and the subsequent Royal Decree of 17 October 1912, have gravely hampered the entire exercise and led the native population to consider that they are jointly governed in an Italian-Turkish condominium. […] It is clear that the state of affairs created by the arrangements between Italy and Turkey creates uncertainty concerning our governing of Libya.
Aldobrandino Malvezzi, L’Italia e L’Islam in Libia, 19133
IT is doubtful if the news of the peace agreed at Ouchy gave much cause for concern to the Ottoman government and peoples; they had much greater matters to grapple with. What became known as The First Balkan War had effectively begun on 8 October 1912 with the Montenegrin attack on Ottoman positions at Podgoritza. It became general following the demand by the Balkan League that the European vilayets be granted autonomy and divided according to nationality on 13 October. This was followed the next day by the Greek
government signalling that the union of Crete with Greece was imminent. In response to these ‘provocations’ the Ottomans declared war on 17 October and the Balkan League responded by beginning military action the following day.4 The League also had a naval arm, courtesy of the Greek Navy, and of course Greece had a separate agenda of its own. This quickly manifested itself when the Hellenic fleet was dispatched to the Aegean and began landing on the Ottoman islands that had not been occupied by Italy. Eleven of them were taken by the end of November; Lemnos (21 October), Imbros (31 October), Thasos (31 October), Samothrace (1 November), Psara (4 November), Tenedos (7 November), Nikaria (17 November), Mytilene (21 November), Chios (24 November), Samos (24 November), and Agios Efstratios (24 November).5 Once again, the Ottoman Navy did not seek to contest matters, not even leaving the Dardanelles until December. To be fair however it did deploy into the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, supporting the successful defence mounted by the army at Catalca and harassing the Bulgarian coast.6
The Ottoman military plan in the case of a concerted attack by the states of the Balkan League was relatively simple; to defend from prepared positions and await reinforcements. It failed comprehensively and the army was routed, retreating in disorder to strong fortified lines at Çatalca, which extended from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara but were only some thirty kilometres to the west of Constantinople. Thus virtually all of the European portions of the Empire were overrun. These areas, which included some of the most developed and economically profitable vilayets, had been Ottoman territory for over five hundred years and contained over four million inhabitants or about 16 per cent of the population of the Empire. There was massive suffering amongst the civil population as the ‘innocent’ Christians turned on their neighbours:
[…] the Moslem population endured during the early weeks of the war a period of lawless vengeance and unmeasured suffering. In many districts the Moslem villages were systematically burned by their Christian neighbours. […] In the province of Monastir, occupied by the Serbs and Greeks, the agents of the (British) Macedonian Relief Fund calculated that eighty per cent of Moslem villages were burned. Salonica, Monastir, and Uskub were thronged with thousands of homeless and starving Moslem refugees, many of whom emigrated to Asia.7
The arrival of these emigrant refugees produced, according to Arnold J Toynbee, ‘an unexampled tension of feeling in Anatolia and a desire for revenge.’8 Indeed, the cycle was to be repeated when some of the lost Ottoman territory was subsequently regained. Powerful forces had been unleashed, and to quote Richard C Hall: ‘The Balkan Peninsula was aflame, a conflagration that would rage for the next six years.’9 There were other implications for the future; the CUP openly stated that they would never have countenanced peace with Italy.10 They were of course in opposition in October 1912, but that would change.
The Great Powers were also deeply concerned over the Balkan situation, but nevertheless took the step of recognising Italian sovereignty over the North African former vilayet; both Britain and France soon followed the example of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. Whilst Italian occupation of Tripoli was of little or no consequence in terms of the ‘Balance of Power’ between the Great Power groupings, the Italian acquisition of the islands, even if ostensibly at least this was only on a temporarily basis, had major implications. Whilst it would be untrue to assert that neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany had any interests in the Mediterranean area, it was undoubtedly the case that they were relatively weak there in the naval context. On the other hand the French and British fleets exercised almost complete control of the Mediterranean. This was achieved by the deployment of significant naval assets, which together with the necessary bases to support them and the fact that the two states acted in concert guaranteed superiority. That there was effective liaison was exemplified by the withdrawal of British forces to northern waters to face the growing strength of Germany’s High Seas Fleet, and their replacement by French squadrons. Newspapers in September and October 1912 carried reports of the French Government transferring a third battle squadron from Brest to the Mediterranean ‘with the scarcely concealed intention of carrying out an understanding with Great Britain that the North Sea should be left to the care of that power.’11
This reallocation of resources and division of responsibility made little difference to the naval balance in the Mediterranean, which remained overwhelmingly on the side of Britain and France. Indeed, the British navy still intended to deploy significant force there including, from the end of October 1912, the eight pre-Dreadnoughts of the ‘King Edward’ class and, from July 1913, four battle-cruisers.12 When combined with virtually all the heavy units of the French Navy, Entente superiority was overwhelming. Even a combined Italian and Austro-Hungarian fleet would have struggled to prevail. This of course also meant that, in terms of the recently acquired territories at least, Italian interests would probably be best served by remaining friendly with Britain and France. If this were taken to its logical conclusion by an Italian Government, then a realignment of Italian foreign policy was implied at some point. That though was for the future, and the most immediate effect of the treaty was on the Italian domestic scene.
The Boiling Point. This cartoon, taken from the 2 October 1912 edition of the British magazine Punch, depicts figures representing Russia, Britain, Germany, and Austria-Hungary attempting to prevent the pot containing the ‘Balkan Troubles’ from boiling over. The Italian figure looks on having, in contemporaneous opinion, materially contributed to the turbulence within by initiating war with the Ottoman Empire the previous year. When the pot did boil over the Ottomans lost most of their European territory to members of that ad hoc formation, the Balkan League. (Author’s Collection).
Italian ‘public opinion,’ as expressed through the various press organs, took a generally favourable view of the outcome. The Corriere della Sera ran an editorial arguing that the struggle had succeeded in restoring Italian pride and confirming its position amongst the Great Powers.
We wished to confirm to ourselves, and have Europe attest to, our national progress, to our energy and the great revival of our power, and to have full consciousness of our place in the world and our strength and ability to enforce it.13
There were however dissenting voices. In his memoirs, Giolitti characterised some amongst these as being ‘humanitarians’ who wished Italy to undertake a ‘crusade’ against the Ottoman Empire in order to liberate all the oppressed peoples, with particular emphasis on those who were Christian. There were also the nationalists of the jingo-right. They were disappointed that the war had been terminated with a negotiated peace and had wanted an all-out struggle with no holds barred. This would have involved attacking the Ottomans at vital points, including those in the Aegean and on the European and Anatolian mainland, ignoring all international complications that might have arisen. They also criticised the inaction of the army in North Africa, arguing that it should have advanced inland and conducted military operations ‘with greater speed and energy.’ This viewpoint, of course, ignored the realities pertaining on the ground. Giolitti also made the point that conducting operations in Europe or Asia Minor would have resulted in a great loss of life, and argued that whilst such considerations might be ignored in a struggle for national survival it was a ‘strict duty’ to avoid bloodshed in a colonial war.14 The nationalists also disapproved of the government’s willingness to evacuate the Aegean islands. If, in their somewhat febrile imagination, the venture in North Africa offered a modern parallel to Roman imperialism, then Italian conquests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean demonstrated an analogous resurgence of the Venetian Empire.15 Other aspects of the treaty also caused some concern, one being the payment of an indemnity; victors did not indemnify those they had vanquished.16
Whilst much of the criticism can be discounted, there is no doubt that the Treaty of Ouchy, or of Lausanne as it was also known, was somewhat ambiguous. It was, as the modern Italian historian Mariano Gabriele has noted, ‘rather stra
nge and full of implications.’17 Other contemporary scholars have tended to agree that the treaty had major flaws. Mario Montanari has written that the government wholly underestimated the importance to the inhabitants of Tripoli of the Sultan’s official representative (Naib es-Sultan) and the judges (Cadi) who were to oversee the sharia. He notes that the intimate linkage between political and religious authorities and civil and religious law inherent in Islamic societies, completely escaped them and quotes approvingly the observation that ‘history probably does not record another example of a treaty discussed and concluded with such complete ignorance of the opponent’s institutions.’18 Indeed, under its terms as published, both Italy and the Ottoman Empire were ‘two states which appear, at the same time, to be sovereign over the territory and people of Libya.’19 Giolitti simply ignored such matters when, on 26 November 1912, he presented the treaty to those assembled for the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies. His references to Italian successes and the ‘happy conclusion’ of peace was greeted with ‘great cheering,’ and when he read out the various protocols he emphasised ‘the complete recognition by Turkey of Italian sovereignty [over] Libya.’20 Under the Italian constitution the treaty had to be approved by parliament because it involved financial responsibilities, and to this end a committee of deputies was appointed by the Speaker to examine it. When the matter of sovereignty was submitted for parliamentary approval 431 of 470 Deputies voted in favour, whilst it passed through the senate unanimously.21
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