by Benny Morris
murdered by Kurds in the de cade preceding the massacres of the mid-1890s.
“Hardly one of the murderers has been brought to justice,” he added. The
Kurdish tribes, he said, “subsist principally by preying on” Christian villages
and could “kill and rob with impunity.” One favored method was to take on
debt with Armenian merchants and then refuse to pay them back. Emin Pasha,
a Kurdish chieftain in the nearby Adelcevaz District, ran up a debt of 400
pounds and then forced the lending merchant to write it off without payment.
The merchant went to the authorities, to no effect. “ These Kurds not only
have carte blanche as to the property and lives of the Christians, but as to the sanctity of their homes as well,” Allen reported. “In many villages no Christian dares refuse his daughter, or wife, to a Kurd. In a village near Arcış, a certain Dervish Bey ravishes women, in open daylight, in the presence of their
husbands.”
Such brazenness was pos si ble because the vilayet’s officials— from the vali,
Bahri Pasha, down— allowed it. They were, Allen claimed, leading the prov-
ince to “the verge of financial and moral ruin” and appeared especially bent
Nationalist Awakenings
on “bringing ruin upon the Armenians as fast as pos si ble.” When an honest
or efficient official arrived, the vali and his colleagues made sure he was dis-
missed. Van’s courts, Allen wrote, “are places where under a legal name, the
most shameless and heartless injustice is perpetrated.”
According to Allen’s calculations, each of the fifty- one Armenian villages
in Shadakh and Norduz was compelled to pay the government, on average,
10,949 piastres per year in taxes “or turn Moslem.” In addition, each village
paid local Kurdish agas 2,690 piastres and another 1,000 piastres in tribute to
“Shakir, the brigand chief.” The hundred Kurdish villages paid almost no
taxes. Christians provided “five- sixths” of the vilayet’s revenues, which paid
officials’ salaries and for “building Turkish mosques and sustaining Turkish
schools.” At the same time, basic infrastructure in Armenian areas languished.
“The roads are never repaired,” Allen wrote. “Is it any won der that in three
years more than two hundred families have moved away?”76
The Radicalization of the Armenian National Movement
In 1878 the sultan overturned the reformist constitution enacted just two
years before, dissolving the parliament and undermining many of the gains
minorities— and even the Sunni majority— had enjoyed. In short order, the
Armenian National General Assembly became a hollow edifice without au-
thority even in the Constantinople community. One by one the privileges of
the lay leadership were stripped away. They were barred from making au-
tonomous decisions about school curricula and community taxation. The
teaching of Armenian history and display of Armenian historical images
were banned. Out spoken newspapers were closed, and the General Union
of Armenian Schools, established by the National General Assembly several
years earlier, was abolished. The sultan was restoring the pre- Tanzimat status
quo, in which millet autonomy would be largely spiritual in nature, with civil
authority entirely in the hands of the state.
Proving, as ever, that their interest in the Ottoman situation lay in geopolitics
rather than protecting the persecuted, the outside powers did little to object.
Bismarck, who had been a major player in the Berlin Treaty, congratulated
the sultan for dissolving the parliament and advised him to prioritize the sur-
vival of the empire.77 And, as we have seen, the British only made noises
Abdülhamid
II
about enforcing Article 61. They backed off as soon as the Sultan promised
to investigate reports of persecution in the east.
Small won der, then, that some young Armenians abandoned the idea of
autonomy within a reformed empire and looked for more radical solutions.
Early stirrings of an or ga nized national movement could be seen in the platforms and manifestoes of groups such as the Black Cross Society and the Ar-menakan Party, established in Van in 1878 and 1885 respectively, and The
Protectors of the Fatherland, formed in Erzurum in 1881.78 In 1887 a group
of Russian- Armenian students in Geneva founded the first nationalist po liti cal
party, the Social Demo crat Hunchakian Party, better known as Hunchak
(meaning “bell” or “clarion”). Armenian youths from Constantinople and
Anatolia were quick to join and take leadership positions. Although mission-
aries publicly opposed revolutionary activity, Protestant Armenians teaching
at Anatolia College in Merzifon, such as Karabet Tomayan and Ohanes
Karayan, also became covert Hunchak leaders.79 Influenced by Marxism
and the populist anti- tsarist group Narodnaya Volya, the Hunchaks adopted
violent tactics widespread among the era’s Rus sian movements. The
Hunchaks’ strategy was to pursue ideological indoctrination and train the
masses for revolt whenever an opportune moment, such as a future Ottoman-
Russian war, arrived.80
Three years later, another group of Armenians, based in Tiflis, founded the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, better known as Dashnaksutyun (“Fed-
eration”) or simply Dashnak. Their aim was to unite under one roof the vari ous
groups of Armenian nationalists and revolutionaries in Rus sia and the
Ottoman Empire. The two parties, Hunchak and Dashnak, tried to work
together, but, though the ideological differences between them were slight,
they split on tactics. While the Hunchaks had no faith in the possibility of
Ottoman reform, the Dashnaks believed that working together with opposi-
tion and progressive ele ments within the empire might lead to better prospects
for Armenians. The two movements would become competitors for leadership
of the national movement and in resisting the Ottoman authorities.81
Soon after they were established, the two parties began to attack Ottoman
targets. From bases in the Caucasus and northern Iran, they hit troops, gen-
darmerie bases, and police posts and assaulted Kurdish bands believed to have
perpetrated crimes against Armenian villa gers. One of their aims was to
Nationalist Awakenings
provoke the authorities to take harsh countermea sures that would trigger
Eu ro pean intervention.82 These rebels sent operatives into rural Anatolia to
indoctrinate Armenians and sow subversion. Armed bands installed them-
selves in the mountains, close to Armenian villages. Here and there, villa gers
joined them; others were persuaded to stop paying taxes and confront the
authorities. Acts of re sis tance mounted.83 Arms were smuggled from Rus sia
into Anatolia, though the number was prob ably small and vastly inflated
in Ottoman propaganda. Revolutionaries extorted from wealthy Armenians
and murdered internal enemies. The authorities reacted with a heavy, undis-
criminating hand, and “many of the law- abiders were persecuted by the gov-
ernment for [allegedly] conniving at a revolt.” 84
The increasing assertiveness and scope of the Armenian in de pen dence
movement during the 1870s— embracing both western cities a
nd eastern
provinces— frightened not just the Ottoman state but also the rural tribes that
enriched themselves at Armenian expense. Following Berlin, Kurdish and
Turkmen tribal leaders began to worry that the eastern provinces would ulti-
mately fall under Armenian rule. In 1879 this concern triggered a rebellion
along the Ottoman- Persian border. Led by a Kurdish chief, Sheikh Ubeydullah,
the rebels believed that the moment was ripe for the Kurds to take control in
a region under weak Ira nian and Ottoman governance. Mistakenly thinking
that the uprising was aimed at Iran only, the Ottomans initially supported
Ubeydullah and his band. But the state soon recognized the danger and sent
in the army. The Kurds took to the hills, and southeastern Anatolia descended
into chaos. Muslim peasants who had only recently come under the govern-
ment’s sway refused to pay taxes, and communications were disrupted.
Disarray also plagued the northern frontier, where Rus sia allowed Cossack
militias free rein. The Cossacks frequently mounted cross- border raids
against Muslim communities and effectively pushed the international
boundary southward.85
The sultan realized that the old tactics— sending troops to quash local tax
rebellions, delaying reform, installing sham commissions of inquiry, reneging
on promises to the powers— were no longer sufficient. A comprehensive so-
lution was needed, one that would respond to the deteriorating situation across
the empire.86 The answer the sultan found was sectarianism, a policy of po-
liti cal Islam that would replace the multiethnic commitments and religious
Abdülhamid
II
toleration of Ottomanism. The idea was that, by explic itly and unapologeti-
cally favoring Muslims and elevating their status, the sultan would win the
loyalty of restive Muslim tribes. Ideally, they would stop pressuring the state
and also do the sultan’s bidding in the marchlands they shared with the
Armenians.87
Thus in 1891 the authorities formed the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments
(Hamidiye hafif süvarı alayları), composed mainly of Kurds and Turkmen.
They were equipped with guns and horses, given a command structure,
dressed in military- style uniforms, and allotted state salaries.88 Officially the cavalry were tasked with defending the border and combating Rus sian encroachment; their job was “to incorporate or at least to neutralize the non-
state spaces” that the state “could claim, but perhaps not yet govern.” 89 But
the sixty- four regiments were deployed mainly in areas of Armenian concen-
tration, suggesting that the government had one par tic u lar set of disobedients
in mind.90
Regardless of their stated purpose, the Hamidiye would go on to join in
the massacre of Armenians. Kurdish commanders understood that sup-
pressing Armenians was their mission. In his memoirs, Sadettin Pasha, who
was governor of Van vilayet after the Hamidian massacres, recalled a par tic-
u lar conversation. On his way to his new posting, he had reprimanded a group
of Kurdish Hamidiye officers for excessive zeal and disobeying orders. The
Kurds responded that controlling the Armenians was their duty, that Arme-
nian insubordination and insurrections were a blow to their honor as soldiers
of the sultan, and that a firman (imperial edict) had made seizure of Armenian property halal, a religiously permissible act. Denying that such a firman
had been issued— indeed, it prob ably had not— Sadettin Pasha admonished
the Kurds to re spect the chain of command.91
The establishment of the regiments further radicalized the eastern Armenians.
Although the revolutionaries were still just a tiny fraction of the populace,
many villa gers now came to believe that the Hunchak and Dashnak diagnosis
was accurate. The battle lines had been drawn, with the Kurds (briefly) made
favorite sons and Armenians cast as enemies of the state, their oppression
tacitly permitted and sometimes actively encouraged. For the Kurds, this
meant official recognition of their local power, state medals and honors, and a
set of privileges that often entailed carte blanche to appropriate land held by
Nationalist Awakenings
Armenians for centuries. (Ironically, it was also a first step on the road
toward the Kurdish in de pen dence movement that, to this day, resists the
Turkish state.92)
Abdülhamid was to rule the empire as absolute monarch for thirty- two
years, until he was deposed following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.
During his reign, Armenian autonomy all but vanished.93
2
The Massacres of 1894–1896
By early 1894 mass murder was in the air, and by mid-1896 at least 100,000
Armenians lay dead— shot, stabbed, and axed to death by Turks and Kurds
in a succession of horrific massacres. More died through starvation and ex-
posure in the weeks and months that followed, an indirect result of the de-
struction of their homes, the confiscation of their property, and the wholesale
murder of breadwinners. Some historians put the total death toll as high as
300,000.
The Turks then and later largely blamed so- called Armenian revolution-
ists for what had happened, even as they denied that it in fact had happened.
There were no massacres, the Turks claimed. Only Armenian attacks or
“ battles” between Armenians and Muslims.
Western observers often criticized the Turks, but they were not uncritical
of Armenian be hav ior. They blamed supposed Armenian revolutionaries, on
three counts: they promoted murder— mainly of informers, but also, on oc-
casion, of Turkish police and officials; they provoked Turkish responses,
which included mass imprisonment and massacre; and they caused Ottoman
antagonism toward Westerners, who were believed to be supporting and in-
citing the Armenian “cause.” In par tic u lar, the Ottomans were upset at Amer-
ican missionaries, of whom there were 176 in 1895, working with locals to
run 125 churches and 423 schools with more than 20,000 pupils.1 “The Gov-
ernment did not like to have foreigners going about among the people,” one
official said.2
But foreign influence was only a small factor in the instability in the eastern
provinces. It stemmed in large part from the triangular relationship between
The Massacres of 1894–1896
Armenians, Kurds and other tribal groups, and Ottoman officials, which ad-
mixed economic envy and covetousness, religious antagonism, disputes over
disparate traditions, and an Armenian revolutionary frisson that was vastly ex-
aggerated in Muslim minds.
Since 1876 routine depredation had steadily impoverished rural Arme-
nians.3 The court system, police, and prisons figured large in this system of
debasement and exactions. Armenians were punished for resisting Kurdish
raiders, parrying extortion, or trying to obtain payment when coerced into
lodging Muslims.
The palace was well aware of the Armenians’ plight but did very little to
alleviate it. The palace received a stream of reports from the provinces about
these depredations. Osman Nuri, Sultan Abdülhamid’s biographer, later
&
nbsp; conceded that “there were a few things which caused the conflict between
the Armenians and the Muslims. [These included] the aggression of the
Kurds and the corruption of the local officials.” Disappointed by the state’s
failure to implement any semblance of reform, some Armenians pinned their
hopes on the great empire to the north, but the Russians were reluctant to
interfere directly and even quietly supported the formation of a Kurdish con-
federation, which they hoped eventually to place under their own tutelage.4
Van missionary Herbert Allen related an occasion in early 1895 when
gendarmes came to the village of Kurubaş to collect taxes: “ After gorging
themselves with all they could get out of the villa gers, they demanded a cer-
tain woman. . . . Fi nally [she was given] up to the lust of these shameless
brutes.” A few weeks earlier, tax- collecting gendarmes arrived in the district
of Müküs. An Armenian who could not pay was shut up in a room full of
smoke. He was “told that if he would become a Moslem they would release
him.” He refused “and before many hours he was dead. Seeing his fate, nine
others, including women and children, were frightened into declaring that
they would become Moslems.”
If the police were bad, the prisons were even worse. In these overcrowded,
“vile dens,” Christians received “no food except bread from the Government.”
Food sent by relatives was plundered by the guards. Christians regularly died
in the cells from poison, disease (“no medicine allowed”), beatings, and tor-
ture. The experience of Mesak Shadvorean, a Van Armenian, is illustrative.
In 1893 he was arrested with seven family members for the murder of a
Abdülhamid
II
policeman. Mesak and a son died from beatings; another son was hanged a
year later. Another Armenian, one Yeghiazar Pambagisian, “was kept chained
in a dungeon in winter weather till his feet froze, and fi nally the toes of both
dropped off.”5 Muslim prisoners were prob ably not treated much better.
In early 1895, months before the large wave of massacre swept eastern Ana-
tolia, the local British consul described the situation in one Van district:
“The oppressions, murders, and forcible proselytizing in the district of
