by Benny Morris
the massacres was not a novel practice. What changed were the scale and
motivations. In the early 1890s, before the massacres, many hundreds of
Armenians— routinely including prominent businessmen, priests, teachers,
and lawyers— were jailed on flimsy allegations of sedition or rebellion. But
often the real motive was pecuniary: officials could extort bribes in exchange
for release or better prison conditions.
During the massacres, thousands were arrested for po liti cal crimes and
for allegedly initiating vio lence or planning to kill Muslims. Prominent
among the detainees were those who tried to fight off Muslim mobs. Mass
imprisonment was a logical corollary to the dominant Ottoman narrative
that Armenian rebellion and outrages had triggered the disturbances. In
the minds of the credulous, incarcerations proved Armenian guilt and jus-
tified retaliatory vio lence against them. At the same time, the authorities
almost uniformly refrained from arresting or charging Muslims, as doing
so would have strengthened allegations of Muslim responsibility. Moreover,
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Muslims were carry ing out the official will; their arrest might lead to em-
barrassing revelations.
Armenian prisoners were held in the same horrendous conditions that
Muslim criminals were familiar with. Many were tortured in order to elicit in-
formation, confessions, and the names of supposed accomplices. Professor
Artin Thoumaian of Merzifon, who was tried in Ankara for sedition, recounted
“that he was beaten” on the order of the kaymakam of Çorum, “ until three
strong sticks were broken over his back.” That was only the beginning. “A
round hole” was made in his head “into which a nut- shell, half- filled with lice, was pressed down by means of a heavy stone until it stuck there by itself. He
fainted several times, and each time he was restored to consciousness . . . only
to have the nut- shell pressed into his head again. . . . For a whole night he was hung up by the head and legs between two suspended chains. In addition,
hot iron rings were applied to his ankles, which were severely burnt.” When
confronted by Cumberbatch, the British consul, the local vali denied the pris-
oner’s allegations. The vali also asserted that “many Armenians have been
known to purposely inflict injuries on their persons in order to create an ill-
feeling against the authorities.” Cumberbatch demanded that the vali investi-
gate the allegations. He declined.491
Sometimes the Turks dispensed with torturing prisoners and went straight
to murder. On June 26, 1894, between the massacres at Yozgat and Sason,
six Armenians escaped from prison, were almost instantly recaptured, and ex-
ecuted at a police station.492 Another especially cruel form of punishment
was internal exile. The Turks often sentenced po liti cal prisoners to serve time
in distant parts of the empire, far from home, family, and workplace. Prisoners
incarcerated near home at least enjoyed visits and food sent by their families
and friends. There is no way of calculating the number of Armenians thus ex-
iled. In July 1895, before the big wave of massacres, a list of Armenians ex-
iled to the fortress- prison of Acre contained seventy- seven names, including
Petros Marimian, a thirty- five- year- old painter from Trabzon; Aristakes Ad-
jemian, forty- seven, a priest from Constantinople; and Gaspar Gulbenkian, a
fifty- year- old “advocate” also from Constantinople.493
The Massacres of 1894–1896
Emigration
The massacres resulted in large- scale emigration of Armenians as well as tem-
porary internal migration. The trend was vis i ble even before Sason. In early
1894 some 20,000 Armenians reportedly emigrated from Erzurum province
to Rus sia, about 3,500 with passports and the rest clandestinely.494 After the
Yozgat affair, one observer wrote that “ every Armenian who can manage it has
made up his mind to abandon the place as soon as pos si ble.” 495 The pressure
mounted especially after the massacres of late 1895. Often men would leave
first, expecting to establish themselves abroad and then bring their families.
One American missionary wrote of the would-be émigrés, “They gener-
ally seem to feel that what ever may be the outcome of the pres ent situation it
will be quite impossible for them to remain in this country and large numbers
seem . . . determined at every cost to get away somewhere. Cyprus, Egypt,
England, Amer i ca, anywhere out of Turkey.” 496 In the Alexandretta area, Armenian clergymen banded together to petition the British consul “to help us
in quitting this country for the safety of our lives for we feel certain we shall be killed one after the other in a short time.” 497 Bulman wrote from Sivas that, where emigration was permitted, “a very large number would avail themselves
of it.” 498 British Consul William Shortland Richards, writing from Ankara,
made a similar observation. Noting that Armenian families from Kayseri were
passing through on their way to Constantinople, presumably headed for parts
abroad, he pointed out that only “comparatively well- to-do” families could
afford to emigrate; travel was expensive, and obtaining tezkereh (travel permission) often required large bribes. But if a “general permission” to emigrate
were issued, “half, if not more, of the Christian population would leave . . . at once.” 499
Even with the impediments, Armenians departed in large numbers. In Feb-
ruary 1896 the British consul in Trabzon reported that 1,725 had emigrated
from the town and altogether 4,797 from the vilayet since the previous Oc-
tober.500 The following September Graves reported from Erzurum— whence
20,000 had already departed— that since October, 566 families and 507 single
men, amounting altogether to “3,000–4,000 souls,” had their passports “vi-
seed” for emigration to Rus sia. A “much larger number . . . prob ably” crossed
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II
the frontier without permission.501 In February 1896 the French vice- consul
in Erzurum, one M. Roqueferrier, transmitted the request of a thousand rural
Armenian Catholics to emigrate to Algeria. He estimated that 50,000 more
might follow.502
The massacres seem to have precipitated emigration among other minority
communities, who feared that their day would come once the Turks were fin-
ished with the Armenians. Fitzmaurice wrote, “The Jewish population of
Urfa is leaving the town. They have a presentiment that the next ‘incident’ here
will be directed not solely against the Christians. . . . In fact, the exodus of the Children of Israel possibly reminds one of the action of certain small animals
when the ship is about to sink.”503
Sometimes authorities allowed emigration where it offered financial ben-
efits: officials would withhold permission to leave until tax arrears and bribes
were paid.504 When permission to leave the country could not be obtained
locally, Armenians might instead bribe their way to permits for internal travel
and then leave via Constantinople, Smyrna, or Samsun.505
Another sort of self- interested response came from Raouf Pasha, the vali
of Erzurum. Cumberbatch reported that
the administration placed “no ob-
stacles in [emigrating Armenians’] way” because “Raouf Pasha . . . tacitly ap-
proved of their departure.” What ever the vali thought of Armenians and their
plight, he had at least two reasons for wanting them gone. First, he lacked the
means to care for the destitute thousands left in the wash of the massacres.
Second, he had to take account of “the animosity of the Mussulman population”
toward the Armenians. Muslims wanted Armenians gone, and Raouf was
willing to give them what they wanted.506
Missionaries were ambivalent about emigration. Some, including Americus
Fuller of Antep and F. W. Macallum of Maraş, busily arranged departures,
especially of widows and orphans. Others, including Corinna Shattuck, op-
posed the idea. She argued that the émigrés would suffer from adjustment
prob lems and that emigration would engender Turkish hostility toward those
Armenians left behind. But if the Armenians stayed, they could take part in
what she hoped would be Turkey’s “new future.”507 Perhaps she also wor-
ried that if the Armenians moved away, the missionaries, herself included,
would lose their raison d’etre.
The Massacres of 1894–1896
American missionary F. W. Macallum. After the massacres of 1894–1896, some
American missionaries argued that the Armenians should immigrate to the West, as they would never be safe among Turkey’s Muslims.
In October 1896 the central government stepped in. Embarrassed by the
wave of emigration, which showed that “ there is no security for life and prop-
erty in Turkey,” or perhaps concerned by the economic damage caused by
the departure of the highly productive Armenians, the government announced
a new policy intended to curb Armenian emigration.508 Now Armenians
wishing to emigrate would have to face a “Special Commission,” which
stripped them of citizenship and made them sign guarantees that “they
will not return to Turkey.” Armenians who had already left clandestinely
would be given six weeks to apply to return, and Ottoman consular offi-
cials would decide whether to allow it. Failure to return would mean for-
feiture of citizenship.509
The new policy had some effect on the be hav ior of Armenians, who feared
that departure would lead to loss of property and, should they return, impris-
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onment. Before the new policy was in effect, the Rus sian consulate in Erzurum
was approving forty to fifty passports daily, for “entire families.” The day after the new rules were in place, Graves observed that “not more than half a dozen
single men, with no property to lose, have presented themselves.”510
Local exercise of discretion ensured that the situation remained con-
fused. In some locations, officials were still allowing Armenians, albeit in
small numbers, to leave without going through the prescribed procedures.511
In November 1896 a group of fifty Armenian widows and orphans was de-
nied permission to leave for Cyprus; that same month a diff er ent group of
orphans and widows, from Trabzon vilayet, was permitted to emigrate to
the same destination.512 (In general Ottoman authorities opposed the emi-
gration of orphans. Missionaries put this down to the authorities’ desire to
lay hold of and “educate” them “as Mohammedans, and so to bring a wel-
come reinforcement of intelligent minds.”513)
It is unclear how many Armenians emigrated during and immediately after
1894–1896; perhaps tens of thousands left, but they were not always welcome
elsewhere. British officials discussed a variety of pos si ble settlement locations, ranging from Cyprus to northwestern Canada.514 Some felt Cyprus was appropriate because of “its proximity to Asia Minor and its climate and other
features to which the Armenian agriculturists might [readily] adapt.”515 But
the island’s British high commissioner ruled against.516 Canada also refused
to accept Armenian refugees.517
Casualties
There is radical disagreement among historians about the casualty figures for
the massacres of 1894–1896. Armenian historian Vahakn Dadrian cites Ernst
Jäckh, a German Foreign Ministry operative, who said 200,000 were killed
and one million “pillaged and plundered.” Taner Akçam, a Turkish historian
living in the United States, has compiled estimates ranging from 88,000 to
300,000 killed.518
The con temporary documentation is unreliable. Ottoman figures were in-
variably on the low side, while official Armenian figures— tabulated by, say,
the patriarchate— may have been inflated. It appears that, in 1896–1897, no
one tried to compile accurate casualty figures for the whole 1894–1896 pe-
The Massacres of 1894–1896
riod in all of Asia Minor. The best figures exist for individual sites, sanjaks,
and vilayets during the October– December 1895 period. In general, figures
from the cities are more reliable than those from the countryside, about which
there is little detailed documentation. The missionaries and consuls, who did
much of the counting, tended to focus on the towns where they lived. They
rarely went into the villages, which could be distant or other wise inaccessible.
Moreover, casualty figures in con temporary documents usually refer to those
killed on the day of massacres, not to those who died later of injuries, expo-
sure, starvation, or disease.
Missionaries tended to rely on Armenian body counts, often provided by
priests. In some localities, these were highly accurate because each victim was named. But even these counts would have omitted the deaths of Christian wayfarers caught up in a massacre in a specific site. Missionaries and consuls also
might come to incompatible conclusions, as the former usually compiled fig-
ures relating to their stations’ areas of operation, while the consuls hewed to
Ottoman administrative districts or their own areas of jurisdiction, which usu-
ally were larger than Ottoman districts. The counters then tried to extrapo-
late more general estimates or simply passed on the figures they had been
given.
The examples below provide a sense of the partiality of the con temporary
tabulations, but also a win dow on the magnitude of what tran spired.
In January 1896 Cumberbatch provided estimates for the massacres of the
previous October– November in Erzurum vilayet. He conceded that the fig-
ures, compiled by “Armenian sources,” were prob ably exaggerated, but added
that this was offset by the fact that they did not include input from “vari ous
places” in the province, so the provincial total is prob ably “near to the truth.”
He wrote that, all told, 2,855 people had been killed and 11,173 homes and
shops pillaged.519 The American mission station in Harput estimated that
15,834 people had been killed in its area and 8,049 houses and shops burnt,
but added that details from 130 villages were unavailable.520 The Anglo-
American Relief Committee at Trabzon provided harrowing figures for the
Karahisar- Şarki sanjak of Sivas vilayet: 21,034 killed and 2,444 houses looted
and 168 destroyed.521 The relief committee also supplied figures for Trabzon
and Gümüşhane sa
njaks: 507 Armenians killed and 5,197 emigrated, 1,510
houses and shops looted and 320 burnt.522 A table of depredations in Sivas
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II
vilayet during 1895–1896, based on Armenian sources and possibly compiled
by missionaries, gives a village- by- village breakdown totaling 5,263 Armenians
and 241 Turks killed, as well as over 2,000 houses “burnt or ruined.”523
Terrell sent Currie a tabulation of Armenian losses in Harput vilayet pro-
vided by a local “Turkish official . . . whose nature revolted at the barbarities around him.” According to the official, 29,544 Armenians were killed
throughout the vilayet, 5,523 dead in Harput town and its immediate sur-
roundings; 7,550 in Arapgir and its villages; 2,670 in Eğin and nearby vil-
lages; 6,540 in Malatya; and so on. But the official also provided a table listing 39,234 “total deaths.” This figure included those “burned” (1,380), those
who “died from hunger and cold” (3,266), those who “died in fields and on
the road” (4,330), and those who “died from fear” (760). It is not clear ex-
actly what this final category refers to. The official also counted separately fifty-one “ecclesiastics and teachers killed.”524
The German pastor Johannes Lepsius counted a wide range of outcomes,
in addition to Christian dead. He estimated that 1,300 Muslims had died in
the massacres, “645 churches and monasteries had been destroyed, about 560
villages had converted to Islam, about 330 churches had been converted into
mosques, and more than half a million destitute people had been left
behind.”525
Altogether, it appears that about 100,000 Christians, almost all of them Ar-
menians, were murdered by Muslims during 1894–1896. In addition, be-
tween 100,000 and 200,000 more died of causes related to the massacres.
The Aftermath
By autumn 1897 the eastern provinces had returned to a state of near- normalcy.
“The people appear to be taking heart again,” Vice- Consul Waugh wrote from
Diyarbekir. “In some cases I found them rebuilding their homes . . . the pro-
gress towards recovery appears to me as quick as could be expected.”526 Re-
porting from Bitlis in October, British Vice- Consul Francis Crow wrote, “The
