by Benny Morris
well- placed, well- timed massacre would expedite and escalate Armenian flight.
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
Historically, Maraş proved to be a milestone in the last stage of the destruc-
tion of the Armenians of Asia Minor.
But in the short term, Maraş had contradictory, consequences. In mid-
March, the Allies occupied Constantinople, taking over key government
buildings and arresting dozens of Nationalists.363 The “main object” of the
occupation was “to impress on all Turks,” especially the Nationalists in the
provinces, the need for “good conduct.” The “high commissioners were un-
able to devise any better means of minimizing [the] danger of massacres,” de
Robeck wrote.364 On the other hand, the British left the Turkish civil admin-
istration intact and withdrew their troops stationed along the railway lines
leading from the interior to Constantinople. The French and Italians also with-
drew units, from railway lines and from Konya, respectively.365
Among Anatolian Muslims, Maraş caused “ great excitement.” “The vali of
Sivas describes the feeling in his district as ‘an extraordinary national and re-
ligious ferment,’ ” British intelligence observed. The Nationalist leadership
deliberately promoted the furor. Kemal launched a mobilization drive, and
“preachers [ were] reported to have been sent to work up the Kurdish and
Arab tribes” around Antep and elsewhere.366 In Samsun Nationalist speakers
called on the people to be ready to shed their “last drop of blood” in defense
of the empire. “The Christians whom we have defended and protected up to
the pres ent like beloved beings . . . have thrown off the mask and have revealed themselves to us like vipers,” one Nationalist thundered to the Samsun crowd.
Get “ready,” he said, “to crush the heads of these vipers.”367 On the Arme-
nian side, Maraş triggered revenge attacks against Muslims around Zeytun and
in a few other locations.368
After Maraş and the Allied occupation of Constantinople, Kemal stepped
up the rhe toric of jihad. “We are obliged to continue our holy strug gle until
the impure feet of these men are removed from our national soil,” he declared
in an official May 1 message to the British government.369 Dozens of Anato-
lian muftis issued a fatwa authorizing jihad against the infidels.370 Ahmad
Sharif as- Sanussi, an exiled Libyan chieftain and militant preacher, toured
Anatolia and drummed up support for holy war. In Sivas he declared, “War
for religion and for Allah is a trea sure which Heaven bestows on its beloved. . . .
It is you who have made the Koran live again.”371 In summer 1920 the Amer-
ican consul in Samsun noted that the Nationalists are trying to inflame the
Turks and Armenians, 1919–1924
population “by preaching a Holy War. Of late the lit er a ture . . . emanating
from Ankara has become particularly violent and great stress is placed on the
religious side of the question.”372
Such appeals worked, according to the American consul- general in Izmir,
because “the common Turk is intensely religious. At the base of his psy chol ogy
is religious fanat i cism, founded on genuine and sincere beliefs. No Methodist
deacon in Central Michigan can have the pity and contempt for Moham-
medans or Buddhists that the Hodja of a Turkish village and his flock feel
for . . . unbelievers.” The consul drew an illustrative analogy to his own
land, suggesting that a Turk would feel being governed by Christians as “an
American of the Southern States of the United States would were he put
under negro rule.”373
The British concluded that Kemal was personally responsible for Maraş;
Curzon said that “ there was . . . reason to think that he had inspired or insti-
gated . . . [the] terrible atrocities” there.374 But Bristol blamed the French and Armenians. “The French used black colonial troops and Armenians and at
the same time bombarded a defenseless city,” he wrote, reflecting the view that
Turks naturally would object to military control by Christians and racial
others. “That the Turks have ruthlessly . . . massacred Armenians . . . seems
true,” Bristol allowed, but he thought the killing in Maraş “was all brought
about by the French occupation of Cilicia.” Indeed, he believed “the Turks
do not intend to massacre non- Moslem races at the pres ent time, and they are
doing every thing in their power to prevent massacres.”375 Bristol informed
Washington that “the French destroyed villages, outraged women and killed
the natives.”376 As was often the case, Bristol’s fairly uncritical ac cep tance of the Kemalist narrative placed him in the minority among Western diplomats.
In the wake of Maraş the French adopted a schizophrenic strategy. On the
face of it, they sent in reinforcements in order to hold the line against the Na-
tionalists. By March 1920 they had deployed two divisions in their embat-
tled areas of occupation. In Cilicia the troops were under the command of
General Julien Dufieux, headquartered in Adana; in northern Aleppo vilayet,
they were initially headquartered in Katma, and later Kilis, under the com-
mand of General Marie C. M. de Lamothe. Another brigade was deployed
along the coast south of Alexandretta. But the forces were ill- equipped and
unsuitable. Most of the troops were Algerians and Senegalese, who were
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
reputed to be poorly trained. Among them were also 2,000 Armenians,
whose presence could only reinforce anti- French sentiment. These forces had
almost no aircraft, tanks, or armored cars. An American diplomat, taking
note of the poorly armed and largely colonial force, thought that the French
generals were pessimistic about their “prospects” of beating back the Na-
tionalists “and frankly look forward to complete withdrawal.”377 “Many
French officers,” he wrote, are “sick of the whole expedition which they con-
sider work of politicians at home who believed that French would be received
with open arms.”378
Kemal apparently was at least marginally impressed by the French military
build-up, but the Nationalists’ actions demonstrated their continuing confi-
dence.379 Just a few weeks after the close of hostilities in Maraş, the Turks were challenging the French throughout Cilicia and northern Aleppo vilayet. On
February 29– March 1, Turks, including uniformed gendarmes, raided the Ar-
menian village of Keones (Kunez), near Islahiye. They separated men from
women, and killed six men. Then they bayoneted and shot fourteen of the
women and girls, one of whom they first raped. Three women survived.
Dr. William Dodd, the Near East Relief director at Adana, who interviewed
the survivors, remarked that Turkish gendarmes in Cilicia generally crossed
over to the Nationalists “whenever they came in contact with them.”380
Dodd reported another massacre in late March, at Kizli Aghaj (Kızlı Ağaç),
where eighty- three Armenians were alleged to have been killed.381 Around
April 6 Turkish bands attacked Hach Kiri (Haçkiri?) and Gelebek (Ke-
lebek), villages just south of the Taurus Mountain tunnels. Several hundred
Armenians as
well as Greeks and Frenchmen were reportedly slaugh-
tered.382 “Everywhere the bands are supported by regular troops, well-
commanded, well- armed, fighting ‘Eu ro pean style,’ ” French intelligence
reported. “It is thus no longer a matter of guerrilla [fighting] on a grand
scale, but of real battle operations against well- organized and numerous
forces.” These troops would “not flinch at anything to force the population
to do their bidding.”383
In much of Cilicia and northern Aleppo vilayet, and especially in the coun-
tryside, the French proved too weak to protect the Armenians, even had they
wanted to.384 Armenian and French- held towns, including Hacin and
Hasanbeyli, were besieged. Hacin appealed to the French for help. Col o nel
Turks and Armenians, 1919–1924
Brémond replied that “ after thinking long and hard,” the French had deci ded
not to send troops. But he offered to send a thousand rifles and suggested
that women and children be evacuated.385
Antep, Urfa, and Adana
After winning Maraş and consolidating their dominance in Cilicia, the Nation-
alists shifted focus to the eastern extremities of the French zone: Antep, Urfa,
and their access roads. The French had a small presence in Antep. In Jan-
uary 1920 the garrison numbered 1,500–1,700, in a town with 16,000–
30,000 Armenians.386 Most, with artillery, were positioned next to the Amer-
ican missionary college, in a compound overlooking the town center.
As the battle for Maraş progressed, tensions built in Antep. On January 22
a jittery French soldier killed a Turk. Turks closed their shops and Armenians
began to evacuate the Turkish quarters. On the 31st several Armenians were
wounded and one killed in the market. Turks in turn began evacuating Chris-
tian areas and boycotted Christian shops.387 The Turkish authorities were
playing “a double game,” publicly calling for quiet while distributing arms and
organ izing Muslims in surrounding villages for action.388 On the approach
roads, Turkish forces ambushed French patrols and supply convoys and at-
tacked Christians. Jackson wrote of “complete brigandage.”389 According to
the Turks, the local French commander aggravated the situation by demanding
control over the local police and gendarmerie.390
By late March the Christians were holed up in their homes and churches,
suffering “all sorts of privations and menaces.” The food situation was “crit-
ical.” The Armenians had much to be afraid of: one of the leaders of the Maraş
massacres, Kılıç Ali Pasha, was occupying two khans outside Antep with 1,500
men. He apparently commanded the Turkish forces in the region.391 The
Turks were demanding that the Armenians surrender their arms.392 Turks, too,
were on edge. On March 28 a French column, with 400 wagonloads of
provisions, reached the town after fighting its way from Kilis.393 The Turks
completed the evacuation of the Christian quarters.
But at dawn on April 1, the French convoy, along with hundreds of gar-
rison troops and their heavy artillery, withdrew. “Much to the surprise and
consternation of the [Antep] Christians,” they headed back to Kilis. They left
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
behind “only 1,200 Senegalese troops.” A few hours later, a shot rang out in
the marketplace, followed by two shots from the surrounding hills. The Turks
began shooting Armenians. They also detained Armenians and thirty French
soldiers. The battle for Antep had begun.394
American missionaries later claimed that they had “convincing evidence
that a general massacre had been planned by Nationalist forces, with the . . .
consent of the government.”395 About 2,000 Armenians rushed to the mis-
sionary compound while the bulk of the Armenians stayed put and fortified
their positions in town.396 The Turks demanded that the Armenians raise
Turkish flags. The Armenians refused. In the ensuing battle, they would be
largely on their own. The French grudgingly sent soldiers to protect the
compound while complaining that they had barely enough troops to defend
their own strongpoints. They supplied the Armenians with some rifles and
machine guns, but other wise stayed out of the fight, leaving the Armenians to
their own devices.397 “French indifferent, refuse interfere,” one Armenian
cabled weeks after the fighting had begun.398
During the following weeks the Armenians showed “praiseworthy courage”
and organ ization in defending themselves; the Turks repeatedly broke prom-
ises and ceasefire agreements. “We have come to know the Turks so well,” one
missionary wrote, “that the anger is not mingled with surprise.”399
The French refused to send reinforcements. Two French columns did reach
the town’s outskirts on April 16 and 17; they shelled the Turkish quarters,
Turks fled, and the French pursued them with machine gun fire.400 But the
French intended only “the revictualling of the Christians” and to obtain the
release of Christian prisoners, not to crush the Turks.401 The se nior French
officer, General de Lamothe, told the missionaries that entering town would
“stir the Turks up to fury.” He seemed to believe that “a siege would be enough
to bring them to terms.” The missionaries found French be hav ior “puzzling
and disturbing.” 402 The French, who deployed two tanks, apparently killed
hundreds of Turks, but they also urged the Armenians to reach “some sort of
compact with the Turks.” 403 It was reported that Muslim French troops “re-
fused to fire on the Turks.” 404 The Nationalists were also confounded by the
ambiguous French be hav ior but accused them of backing the Armenians.405
The French somewhat confusingly argued that if they lost troops in Antep,
“the Armenians would be left at the mercy of the Turks.” 406
Turks and Armenians, 1919–1924
On the po liti cal level, the French believed that perfidious Albion— and the
Germans and Americans— were “encouraging the general hostility” toward
them, under the guise of “assisting the [Armenian] refugees.” 407 The British
even wanted to move orphans to Cyprus “to demonstrate the incapacity of
the French.” 408
As the fighting raged in Antep, the French sent mixed signals about the
future of Cilicia. According to the British ambassador in Paris, the French in
late April denied that they “intended to retire from Cilicia.” 409 Yet by early
May, Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand said France would leave most of
Cilicia to “the Sovereignty of Turkey” while retaining a mandate over a “small
part” consisting of Alexandretta and Payas as well as Syria. But what of the
Armenian population who had “collected [in Cilicia], trusting to the French
protection?” Boghos Nubar, the Paris- based head of the Armenian Del e ga tion
to the peace conference, and Armenian Patriarch Zevan asked. “Unfortu-
nately, I cannot send [one] hundred thousand soldiers,” Millerand replied.
He agreed only to secure the departure of Armenians who had “taken part in
[the] fighting.” 410
It is not clear why the French announced contradictory positio
ns. The pur-
pose may have been tactical deception. Or maybe there was no purpose. In-
dividual representatives of the government were at loggerheads, a symptom
of real indecision; or those who wished to soldier on in Cilicia were in denial.
Certainly the po liti cal winds were blowing against them. The po liti cal and
military elites were clearly losing their will to fight. Given that French forces were also skirmishing with Arab guerrillas in Syria, many in Paris— and
Beirut— believed that Cilicia should be sacrificed so that Syria and Lebanon
could be held. And many French leaders did not believe the Armenians were
worth the expenditure of French blood. During early 1920 French officials
steadily grew disenchanted with the Armenians and began voicing “accusa-
tions of treachery, cowardice, barbarity, and ingratitude against them,” as one
historian put it. First, they were disenchanted with the Armenian Legion, then,
with “all Armenians.” 411
By spring the Nationalists were certain of the French lack of resolve. In both
Cilicia and Syria, Bristol wrote, “French soldiers inspire[d] the Turks and
Arabs . . . with no re spect or fear.” 412 “The Nationalists thought the French
“inferior . . . fighters” and demonstrated as much by attacking them directly.413
Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists
Kemal’s regulars and irregulars besieged French garrisons in northern Aleppo
vilayet and areas to the west, along the coast.414 French columns were regu-
larly ambushed. Kemal sent a letter congratulating Kılıç Ali on his “successes”
and urged him to further efforts.415
An impor tant source of Nationalist confidence was the fight in Urfa, which
raged as the battles for Antep and Maraş unfolded. Urfa was France’s east-
ernmost position. The French had turned it into “a French city,” removing
Ottoman flags and “trampl[ing] upon the imperial rights of our Sultan,” a local
cleric complained. The French, he said, claimed that “the place had belonged
to France 800 years ago”— referring to nearby Edessa, which had been a
Crusader state during the twelfth century.416 On February 7, 1920, the Turks
presented the French with an ultimatum: evacuate Urfa within twenty- four
