The Thirty-Year Genocide

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by Benny Morris

journalists, such as the New York Tribune’s John Dos Passos, to Izmit to find out the truth. “I pointed out to him how regrettable . . . it was that the true

  picture of conditions out here was not before our people at home and instead

  they were deceived by Greek and Armenian propaganda.”703 Bristol also ar-

  gued that Greek atrocities had triggered Turkish “reprisals” in the Pontus.704

  Arnold Toynbee implied the same when he wrote, “The Greek or ga nized

  atrocities began about April 18, 1921, the Turkish about June 1, 1921.”705

  Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists

  The Greek army carried out a systematic scorched- earth policy when it

  retreated from the Sakarya- Sivrihisar area in summer 1921. Some 250 vil-

  lages were wholly or partly torched. In most, according to Turkish testimony,

  there had been killings and rapes, and mosques were destroyed, despoiled,

  or damaged. In one village, Gecek, soldiers “tore to pieces and burned.”

  American missionaries visited several villages and confirmed a range of alle-

  gations but reported no massacres.706 The British consul- general in Smyrna,

  Harry Lamb, described Greek policy: “They are deci ded to leave a desert

  behind them. . . . Every thing which they have time and means to move will

  be carried off to Greece; the Turks will be plundered and burnt out of house

  and home.”707

  The Greek army again adopted a scorched- earth policy during its retreat

  to the Ionian coast in August– September 1922. “Retreating Greek army

  burned eighty percent of the smaller villages[,] nearly every chiftlik [farm] and partially burned almost all larger ones,” a missionary wrote. “We did not pass

  a single inhabited place on the road from Broussa.”708 At Bandırma, two- thirds

  of the houses were torched, according to a French consul.709 At Karacabey in

  October Turks told an American officer that Greeks had murdered 300 people

  and torched the town. To the south, the Turks said, Greeks burned the towns

  of Manisa, Kasaba, Salihli, and Alaşehir; murdered Turks; and raped hundreds

  of girls. In Manisa some of the raped girls were “compelled to drink petro-

  leum and . . . were set on fire.” At Salihli, an American lieutenant named Perry

  saw one or two disinterred bodies and was persuaded by Turkish eyewitnesses

  of the veracity of at least some of the allegations.710 Rendel noted that “the

  Greek [government] admit the destruction caused by the Greek army in its

  retreat.”711

  An indication of the difference in levels of atrocity committed by the two

  sides is provided, by default, in a letter sent by Thracian Turkish notables to

  Bristol in July 1922. The letter speaks generally of “misdeeds, the likes of

  which do not exist in the annals of history” and then gives details: “A Greek

  officer, two sergeants, two interpreters and a secretary have occupied the

  building of the Mussulman Community of Eskidje.” Or “a society has been

  formed with the pretext of finding clothing for poor children. This society

  obliges the Moslems to give a minimum sum of 10 drachmas per person. [An]

  Turks and Greeks, 1919–1924

  officer’s wife, accompanied by two soldiers, penetrates into houses and her-

  self gathers this tax.” Most of the alleged offences listed were similarly trivial.

  The complaint also alleged beatings of Turkish peasants, sometimes resulting

  in individual deaths, and occasional rapes. There is no mention of or ga nized

  massacres or mass rape or mass torture.712

  There were other differences. For one, the Greeks punished, or tried to

  punish, perpetrators. For instance, after the Yalova- Gemlik incidents, the

  10th Division commander, General Georgios Leonardopoulos, was removed

  from his post, “severely censured,” and sent back to Athens. Two alleged

  massacre perpetrators were arrested and faced court- martial.713 The Turks,

  as far as is known, never punished perpetrators of anti- Christian atrocities.

  For another, while Westerners were able to verify some relatively small- scale

  instances of persecution, efforts to confirm the worst Turkish charges failed

  repeatedly. General Harington, the British commander in Constantinople,

  wrote that Turkish allegations of Greeks burning villages in Eastern Thrace

  have “so far” not been “confirmed” by Allied air reconnaissance or the Al-

  lied commissions. The British diplomat Eyre Crowe summarized all this un-

  derstatedly: Turkish anti- Greek “allegations [regarding Thrace] . . . are

  seldom confirmed.” Indeed, local Turks were generally so well treated that

  they displayed “unwillingness” to leave Greek territory, “where they enjoy

  considerable prosperity and privileges, and full po liti cal rights.”714 Hole

  reported from Salonica that there is “but very slight foundation for the alle-

  gations” of massacre, though there was “brigandage,” and Greek refugees

  occasionally forcibly entered Turkish homes.715

  An illustrative case is the Turks’ dramatically inflated story of the travails

  of Cretan Muslims under Greek rule. According to the British consul general

  in Crete, the Turks claimed that the Greeks were engaged in a “reign of terror”

  with “armed bands proceed[ing] up and down about the country, killing and

  wounding Mussulmans.” The diplomat called this “a great exaggeration.”716

  He reported in March 1923 that, since September 1, there had been only four

  murders in the Canea (Chania) district, one of which was “a vulgar ‘ crime pas-

  sionnel.’ ” He wrote, “In view of the amount of bloodshed which goes on

  normally in Crete between Christians, these figures really cannot be consid-

  ered in any way out of the ordinary.”717

  Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists

  The British chargé d’affaires in Athens, Charles Bentinck, was astounded

  by the chutzpah under lying Turkish allegations of Greek abuses. He had seen

  the difference in Turkish and Greek be hav ior with his own eyes, embodied

  by the prisoners of war at Piraeus. The Greek arrivals looked like “ human

  wrecks.” The departing Turks, on their way to Constantinople, resembled

  “nothing so much as fatted cattle.”718

  Conclusion

  Between 1894 and 1924 the Christian communities of Turkey and the

  adjacent territories of eastern Thrace, Urmia, and parts of the Caucasus—

  Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians— were destroyed, in staggered fashion, by

  successive Ottoman and Turkish governments and their Muslim agents. The

  pro cess of ethnic- religious cleansing was characterized by rounds of large-

  scale massacre, alongside systematic expulsions, forced conversions, and

  cultural annihilation that amounted to genocide. At the end of the nineteenth

  century, Christians had constituted 20 percent of the population of Asia Minor.

  By 1924 their proportion had fallen to 2 percent.1

  The destruction of the Christian communities was the result of deliberate

  government policy and the will of the country’s Muslim inhabitants. The mur-

  ders, expulsions, and conversions were ordered by officials and carried out

  by other officials, soldiers, gendarmes, policemen and, often, tribesmen and

  the civilian inhabitants of towns and villages. All of this occurred with the ac-
/>   tive participation of Muslim clerics and the encouragement of the Turkish

  press.

  This is the inescapable conclusion that emerges from the massive

  documentation— American, British, French, German and Austro- Hungarian—

  that we have studied over the past de cade. The hundreds of thousands of

  reports, letters, and diary entries produced by Western diplomats, officers,

  missionaries, businessmen, and travelers who lived in Turkey or passed

  through it— especially Anatolia— during 1894–1924 are clear and unchal-

  lengeable. Moreover, the Ottoman- Turkish archives, which over the past

  Conclusion

  century have been purged of directly incriminating evidence, corroborate this

  conclusion through a mass of indirectly supportive documentation.

  The number of Christians slaughtered between 1894 and 1924 by the

  Turks and their helpers— chiefly Kurds but also Circassians, Chechens and,

  on occasion, Arabs— cannot be accurately tallied and remains a matter of dis-

  pute. For de cades, Armenian spokesmen and historians have zoomed in on

  World War I and have referred to 1-1.5 million Armenians murdered during

  1915–1916, the core genocidal event during the 30- year period. Recent

  works, including by Armenian historians, have revised that figure substan-

  tially downwards. A major initial prob lem is that there are no agreed figures

  for the number of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1914. Secondly, no

  proper count was made of the number of Armenians who survived and

  reached foreign lands. Most historians estimate that on the eve of WWI, there

  were 1.5–2 million Armenians in the empire, mostly in Anatolia, and that be-

  tween 800,000 and 1.2 million of them were deported. Raymond Kevorkian

  has written that 850,000 were deported and that “the number of those who

  had perished exceeded 600,000” by late 1916.2 Presumably he believes that

  more died during the following years. Fuat Dündar maintains that about

  800,000 were deported and that altogether 664,000— consisting of those

  who were slaughtered in place, died during the deportation marches, or died

  in their places of resettlement— were dead by war’s end.3 Taner Akçam has

  estimated, mainly on the basis of Talât’s calculations in late 1917, that some

  1.2 million Armenians were deported. Of these only 200,000 or so were alive

  by late 1916, implying that one million were murdered in 1915–1916.4 None

  of these estimates include the number of Armenians killed before and after

  World War I.

  There is general agreement that about a quarter of a million Armenians

  fled the empire during the war, most of them to Rus sia, and that a similar

  number survived the deportations. Moreover about 300,000 Armenians re-

  mained in Turkey through the war, never deported. A hundred thousand of

  them were in Constantinople and smaller numbers lived elsewhere, mainly

  in Smyrna, Edirne, and Konya.5 Looking at the whole 1894–1924 period, to

  those murdered during the Great War should be added at least 200,000 Ar-

  menians who died during and as a result of the massacres of 1894–1896 and

  their aftermath. Another 20,000–30,000 were slaughtered in 1909 during

  Conclusion

  the Adana pogroms. Many thousands more were slaughtered by the Turks

  during 1919–1924. It is therefore probable that the number of Armenians

  killed over the thirty- year period, 1894–1924, exceeded one million, per-

  haps substantially. In this number we include not only those murdered out-

  right but also those deliberately placed in circumstances of privation and

  disease that resulted in death.

  The number of Greeks murdered during 1894–1924 is also uncertain, for

  many of the same reasons. The number of Greeks living in the Ottoman

  Empire in 1913 is in dispute, though most historians speak of 1.5 to 2 mil-

  lion. Few Greeks were killed in 1894–1896. But hundreds, and perhaps

  thousands, died during the first half of 1914 as the Turks tried to ethnically

  cleanse the Aegean coast and western Asia Minor. Many tens of thousands,

  and perhaps hundreds of thousands, were murdered by the Turks during the

  Great War, in the course of the brutal deportations inland of Greek coastal

  communities and in the army’s labor battalions. Most significantly hundreds

  of thousands were murdered during 1919–1924, when the Turks systemati-

  cally massacred army- aged men and deported hundreds of thousands of

  men, women, and children to the interior and then, in a second stage, to the

  coasts, from which the survivors were shipped off to Greece. Prominent

  among the victims in 1920–1922 were those deported from the Pontic coast

  and Smyrna.

  Tessa Hofmann, a historian of the ethnic cleansing of the Ottoman Greeks,

  has argued that there were 2.7 million Greeks in the Ottoman Empire before

  1914, and 1.2 million reached Greece in 1922–1925; hence, 1.5 million were

  murdered.6 But the figure 2.7 million is likely an exaggeration. Moreover, sev-

  eral hundred thousand Ottoman Greeks fled to Rus sia and other countries

  during 1914–1924, and several hundred thousand escaped deportation

  altogether.

  Most Greek historians accept the League of Nations’ estimate from 1926

  that about half of Asia Minor’s estimated 2,000,000 Greeks died during 1914–

  1924.7 At the opposite extreme, Justin McCarthy, a pro- Turkish demographer

  and historian, has written that “between 1912 and 1922, approximately

  300,000 Anatolian Greeks were lost . . . from starvation, disease and murder.” 8

  This phrasing omits from the count Greeks murdered before 1912— admittedly,

  a very small number— and those killed after 1922, a larger number. McCarthy

  Conclusion

  also omits altogether what befell Greeks in Thrace, Constantinople, and the

  Caucasus.

  The number of Assyrian Christians murdered during 1894–1924 is also

  uncertain. Donald Bloxham has estimated that “perhaps 250,000” Anatolian

  and borderlands Persian Assyrians, of a total population of 619,000, were mas-

  sacred by the Turks and their helpers during World War I.9 But his estimate

  does not appear to take account of Assyrians massacred before the war or

  during 1919–1924.

  The preceding assessments suggest that the Turks and their helpers mur-

  dered, straightforwardly or indirectly, through privation and disease, between

  1.5 and 2.5 million Christians between 1894 and 1924.10

  In recent de cades historians have written well and persuasively about the

  Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916. But what happened in Turkey over 1894–

  1924 was the mass murder and expulsion of the country’s Christians—

  Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians. All suffered massive loss of life, all were

  equally shorn of their worldly goods, and nearly all who survived— save the

  Christians of Constantinople— were expelled from the country. In the wake

  of their demise, the ethnic- religious infrastructure and culture of all three

  groups were erased, their homes, neighborhoods, towns and villages, churches,

  schools and cemeteries demolished or appropriated and converted to Muslim

  use. In the end, no denomination was shown “favoritism”; all suf
fered the

  same fate.

  It is true that the ruling Turkish elite was consistently most hostile to the

  Armenians, who suffered the largest number of fatalities during the thirty- year

  period. And the purge of the Christians kicked off in 1894–1896 with the mass

  murder of Armenians, though some Assyrians also were killed. During the fol-

  lowing de cades the Turks and their helpers intermittently killed and expelled

  Armenians en masse, all the while designating them a disease that deserved

  and necessitated extirpation. (The Turks’ language— “cancer,” “microbes”—

  would be echoed years later in the Nazis’ description of the Jews.) Even in

  1922, when few Armenians remained in the country and the Greek Army had

  just massacred Muslims in its helter- skelter retreat to the Ionian coast, the

  Turks initially and deliberately murdered thousands of Armenians and only

  subsequently turned their guns and knives on Smyrna’s Greeks. Overall,

  during 1894–1924, the Turks seem to have murdered most of the empire’s

  Conclusion

  Armenians while expelling rather than murdering most of its Greeks. Another

  indication of the overriding animosity toward the Armenians is that, through

  much of this period, they were barred from leaving the country— and marched

  to destruction— whereas Greeks were generally encouraged to expatriate.

  There are several reasons for this differential treatment. Some are rooted

  in specific circumstances of time and place; others are more general. Most im-

  portantly the Armenians posed the first nationalist challenge to the Ottoman

  Empire and did so in its Asiatic core. Their intellectual elite took to na-

  tionalism a de cade or two earlier than the Ottoman Greek elite (and, for that

  matter, the intellectual fathers of Arab nationalism). Moreover, the Armenian

  nationalist claim was for autonomy or even in de pen dence in the Turks’ Ana-

  tolian heartland, not in its coastal peripheries. And the Armenians resorted

  to terrorism. This terrorism was no doubt a consequence of the Armenians’

  desperation, a desperation partly resulting from the blighting vassaldom of

  their rural masses. Unlike the Ottoman Greeks— who, since 1830, had the

 

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