by Leo Barron
During that meeting, a mere two days before the date set for the attack, Maucke learned of Wacht am Rhein for the first time. Like his comrades in the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, Maucke had to sign a document swearing secrecy punishable by death. He also got the customary reading of Hitler’s speech, and a staff officer’s emphasis on how this effort would be all or nothing. For the original plan, the 15th Panzergrenadier Division was going to advance toward the town of Liège from the town of Roermond. This evening, however, there had been a change in orders, and to Maucke’s chagrin, the 15th Panzergrenadier would now play a backup role, supporting the offensive as part of a secondary wave.
Maucke’s 115th Panzergrenadiers received the news of Wacht am Rhein on the sixteenth. They understood the gravity of the situation, and perhaps had a better understanding of how hard the enemy (the Amis) could fight than many in Kokott’s division. Most of the men hailed from the region around the city of Darmstadt, and the unit was one of the oldest regiments in the German army. It had served the kaiser before it had served the führer, and the men knew they had a distinctive and proud heritage to uphold.
As the column of vehicles began to move down the roads out of Germany, a nervous Maucke was just relieved to be on the move. While his command vehicle weaved its way along the snow-covered roads, Maucke wondered where OKW would eventually direct his portion of the division. Little did he know at the time that generals and staff officers were making decisions that would send his regiment to a fateful Christmas meeting outside Bastogne.41
Morning, Friday, 22 December 1944
Headquarters, XXXXVII Panzer Corps
Château de Roumont, Belgium42
Sitting in his temporary headquarters, General Baron von Lüttwitz marveled at his new abode. He couldn’t have asked for a better building to house himself and his staff. The château at Roumont was built in 1912, near the town of Libin. With its conical spires and landscaped forests, the château resembled the mighty Renaissance châteaus of the Loire region in France. The freshly fallen snow had given the palatial home a fairy-tale appearance, as if it were caked in frosting. Now it was von Lüttwitz’s headquarters.43 Despite the luxurious and spacious surroundings, von Lüttwitz could not relax and enjoy them. He had an offensive to manage and a great many problems to solve.
One problem in particular was Bastogne, and Bastogne was quickly becoming the biggest problem. He needed to solve it, and quickly. As he sat in a fine chair in the luxurious château, von Lüttwitz mentally ticked off the disadvantages that the Americans must now be confronting: They were surrounded, could not get resupplied, and were cut off from the rest of the Allied army. The artillery fire seemed to have slackened. That could mean the Amis were running out of shells. There had been no major reports of clashes with American armor, so it was logical to suspect that they had only a scant number of tanks. Von Lüttwitz knew the 101st Airborne Division, the unit the Allies called the “Eagle Division,” was the primary unit ensconced behind Bastogne’s walls. A Fallschirmjäger unit was not designed to fight very long without supplies, armor, or additional infantry support. Also, the recent turn in the weather could only be making the situation miserable for the Americans.
He casually fingered the reports that lay on the table next to his chair. There was another option—a gamble at best, but a gamble backed with some power and based on some good news that had recently been received. Finally bending to von Luttwitz’s request, von Manteuffel had asked OKW for reinforcements to divest Bastogne. Von Manteuffel knew there were few to come by, and such a commitment of releasing reinforcements to Fifth Panzer would have to be approved by Hitler himself. Also, Fifth Panzer Army had reported to him that almost an entire American division had surrendered in the Schnee Eifel four days earlier after the LXVI Corps surrounded them in a whirlwind attack reminiscent of the early days of blitzkrieg. There was also the recent news that the American attempt to defend St. Vith, a town north of Bastogne, was failing. It looked like the Americans would be lucky to withdraw their forces in time.
Von Lüttwitz was well aware that Kokott had successfully closed off Bastogne the previous day, so it was not impossible that the Americans might be desperate and running out of supplies, possibly in the same situation as the Ami troops at the Schnee Eifel or St. Vith. He knew what he would do. It could only be wise to give it a try first before committing Kokott’s forces to an all-out attempt to break into Bastogne. He would throw the dice and see whether the Americans were willing to see things the German way. He would formally request the American garrison at Bastogne to surrender that afternoon. If it worked, it would free up the entire 26th Volksgrenadier Division and a regiment of Panzergrenadiers from the Panzer Lehr Division to continue the drive west.
The corps commander concluded that it was worth a shot. The day before he had already ordered the Panzer Lehr Division to be prepared to send an emissary to Bastogne, demanding its surrender sometime today. He knew Kokott would carry out these orders, whether he was in agreement with them or not. (News of the impending ultimatum traveled fast, and Colonel Kokott mentioned hearing about it on the twenty-first in his interview after the war. The bespectacled division commander even remarked that the possibility of a looming capitulation raised the morale of his men.)
Von Lüttwitz gave the responsibility to one of his staff, a Major Wagner, and together with Lieutenant Hellmuth Henke, the personal adjutant of General Fritz Bayerlein (commander of the Panzer Lehr Division), he would deliver the ultimatum sometime around noon today. Von Lüttwitz expected to hear back from the party soon. Hopefully the Americans would be sensible and they would agree to capitulation.
The general slumped back into his chair. Von Lüttwitz realized that he was issuing this ultimatum without General Hasso von Manteuffel’s approval. He hoped his gamble would work, for if it did, he would probably be hailed as a hero. If it didn’t, von Manteuffel, and probably all of Germany, would unleash their wrath on him instead of the Americans.44
1205 through early afternoon, 22 December 1944
101st Division Headquarters, Heinz Barracks
Bastogne, Belgium
About the time that Maucke’s regiment was heading toward Bastogne, Major Alvin Jones, Colonel Joseph H. Harper’s S3, took an incoming call from the 2/327th at Marvie. A trooper from Fox Company manning a roadblock had reported a bizarre sight: A group of four Germans—two officers and two enlisted men—carrying a white flag, had approached the 327th’s outposts near Remoifosse. The Germans had walked right up to the American foxholes on the Arlon road leading straight south out of Bastogne.
The glidermen blindfolded one of the German officers, Leutnant Henke, who spoke English, and escorted him back to their command post.45 The word was relayed to divisional headquarters at the Heinz Barracks. As headquarters staff and duty officers went to notify McAuliffe, the GIs in the know tried to guess the nature of all the excitement. Were the Germans surrendering? Had they had enough of American tenacity? Or were they asking the defenders to submit? The rumors and unanswered questions spread.
Major Jones carried the message to the division headquarters and McAuliffe.46 When Jones arrived, McAuliffe was with Lieutenant Colonel Kinnard. The two men were discussing the success of Allen’s 1/401st in holding the Marche road roadblocks. The day had started well, so McAuliffe was surprised to hear the news that the German commanders were demanding that the Americans surrender. A member of his staff read the typed message aloud:
December 22nd 1944
To the U.S.A. Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne.
The fortune of war is changing. This time the U.S.A. forces in and near Bastogne have been encircled by strong German armored units. More German armored units have crossed the river Ourthe near Ortheuville, have taken Marche and reached St. Hubert by passing through Hombres Sibret-Tillet. Libramont is in German hands.
There is only one possibility to save the encircled U.S.A. Troops from total annihilation: that is the honorable surrender of the en
circled town. In order to think it over a term of two hours will be granted beginning with the presentation of this note.
If this proposal should be rejected one German Artillery Corps and six heavy A.A. battalions are ready to annihilate the U.S.A. Troops in and near Bastogne. The order for firing will be given immediately after this two hour’s term.
All the serious civilian losses caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the well known American humanity.
The German Commander 47
McAuliffe could not believe it. He knew that his men were beating back the Germans every time they attacked. Not one German had made it into Bastogne, and yet the Germans were seeking their surrender. He laughed as the staff officer finished reading the message. “Aw, nuts,” he blurted out. Without missing a beat, he left the command post for a jeep ride to congratulate members of the 1/401st on their work recapturing the roadblock near Mande.
When he returned a short time later, McAuliffe was reminded by a staff officer that the German officers were waiting for a reply. McAuliffe realized that protocol required that he provide an answer to the German demands. He looked back at his operations officer, Kinnard, and asked his subordinates what they thought would be a satisfactory response, knowing there was no way he would ever consider surrender.
“That first remark of yours would be hard to beat, General,” Kinnard said.48
And with a grin from McAuliffe, one of the shortest, yet most famous military quotes in history was born. A staff sergeant typed up the formal reply:
To the German Commander:
N-U-T-S
—The American Commander
While they waited, “Bud” Harper arrived at McAuliffe’s headquarters after inspecting his defenses to the south of Bastogne. Located in the dark basement of the Heinz Barracks, staff wags had taken to calling the 101st’s HQ the Cave. McAuliffe told the 327th’s commander about the surrender ultimatum and handed it to him to read. He asked Harper what he thought might be a good answer to the German demands. Before Harper could respond, a clerk handed him another sheet of paper. Harper looked down and read it himself.
Harper laughed and told McAuliffe he would be more than happy to deliver it in person on his way back to the 327th’s command post near the Arlon road. He wanted to see the faces of the German officers when they read the note. “I will deliver it myself. It will be a lot of fun.”49
When he arrived at his own F Company’s battle positions, Harper placed the folded piece of paper in the German major’s hands. “I have the American commander’s reply,” he announced.
The guards removed the lieutenant’s blindfold. Henke read the message, translating it for his major. Hearing the response, the puzzled major spoke briefly to the lieutenant, who then asked for his superior. “Is the reply in the negative or affirmative? If in the affirmative, we have the authority to negotiate further your surrender.”
The lieutenant spoke perfect English with a British accent. Harper thought the German’s tone dripped with condescension. He emphasized that it was clearly a refusal: “The reply is decidedly not affirmative. If you continue this foolish attack your losses will be tremendous.”
The negotiations were over. With the deadline fast approaching, Harper rode with the German officers in a jeep, driving them back to the front line, where they met up with the two German enlisted men carrying the white flag, who were being watched by the men of Fox Company. As he removed their blindfolds, Harper felt his face flush with anger. He still wasn’t sure the Germans got it, so he decided to make sure the message was understood loud and clear.
“If you don’t understand what ‘nuts’ means, in plain English it is the same as ‘Go to hell.’ I will tell you something else—if you continue to attack, we will kill every goddamn German that tries to break into this city.”
The German officers saluted stiffly. “We will kill many Americans. This is war,” Henke allegedly retorted.
“On your way, Bud,” said Harper, pointing the envoys down the road. As they stepped smartly away, Harper called after them, “Good luck to you.”
Harper and the glidermen of F Company watched the emissaries trudge through the snow, back to their own lines. For years, Colonel Joseph H. Harper would always wonder what at that moment could have possibly possessed him to wish his enemies good luck.50
Von Lüttwitz had gambled and lost. Bastogne would have to be crushed, and he knew he was running out of time. General George S. Patton and the U.S. Third Army were coming up from the south, and fast. He knew he had only a few more days before they reached Bastogne. The next forty-eight to seventy-two hours were critical.
The defenders inside Bastogne agreed: Von Lüttwitz’s estimate was correct. They were running out of supplies, chiefly artillery shells. Without artillery support, the paratroopers and glidermen had little chance to defeat the panzer onslaught that was surely coming.51 Moreover, the division staff reckoned that the next major German push would be from the west, against the 1/401st Glider Infantry and perhaps the 1/502nd Parachute Infantry. Reconnaissance had indicated a buildup in those sectors.52 The frozen terrain in the northwest was perfect for large-scale armor operations, perfect for panzers.53
Evening, Friday, 22 December 1944
26th Volksgrenadier Division headquarters
Hompre, Belgium
Unknown to the Americans, General Heinz Kokott’s troops were having supply problems of their own. Kokott, who was still stressed about his recent and confusing directive to both envelop and capture Bastogne, was having difficulty restocking ammo for his big guns and mortars. In short, the clogged supply lines were beginning to seriously hamper the German operations, particularly around the massive Allied-held roadblock known as Bastogne. For the Germans, the town was like a giant boulder that had become dislodged, falling into a small stream of water. German forces were forced to swing wide around the town, taking backroads many miles out of their way to continue the drive west. Moreover, the siege of Bastogne had become truly medieval when the besiegers were suffering as much as the besieged, Kokott mused. The only good news in terms of supply was his small-arms ammunition, of which he still had plenty on hand.54
Kokott heard later that day from his corps headquarters that the American commander had rejected the surrender ultimatum. It only added to his level of stress. Now Kokott was forced to back up the threat with firepower that didn’t, at the moment, really exist.
In an interview after the war, Kokott wrote, “… the commander in charge of the Bastogne forces had declined a surrender with remarkable brevity.” According to Kokott, McAuliffe’s forces also backed up their general’s insolence with dogged resistance.55
That morning, as Kokott’s forces had jabbed here and there, especially down the Marche road approaches, the Americans seemed as strong as ever. In the battles around Villeroux, Senonchamps, and Assenois, Kokott’s grenadiers were inching forward, but the Americans seemed to have an inexhaustible supply of artillery, which always seemed to hit at the right place and right time with the right amount of concentrated fire.56
Still, despite the failed surrender attempt, and despite all the losses and shortages, Kokott believed the initiative remained with his division. As Kokott looked over the map and read the reports, he believed they were getting closer and closer to finding a way into the American defenses and breaking the hard shell that surrounded Bastogne. Most important, he knew that supplies and reinforcements were on their way, even if it might take them some time to arrive. The additional artillery battalions from corps had already arrived, which would provide him the necessary firepower to match the American advantage in that arm. Moreover, his regiments that had not seen much combat had accomplished their respective missions that day. To the north, the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment was still in the process of assuming the security mission of the 2nd Panzer Division in the northwest sector in the vicinity of Champs, as the panzer division moved on. Colonel Martin Schriefer reported that his regiment would complete th
is task sometime next morning.57
Kokott then looked up and asked himself, What are the Americans trying to do? The heaviest American effort in the last few days had resulted in the fighting in the southwestern/western sector around the town of Mande Saint-Etienne. Everywhere else the Americans had remained quiet. Kokott nodded to himself. He was more convinced than ever that the Americans were trying to break out from the Bastogne kessel (cauldron), and the most likely area for such an operation would be along the Marche or Neufchâteau highway.58
To Kokott, the reports of panic within the city of Bastogne, the Americans’ desperate use of the Marche–Bastogne highway despite the exposure to German fire, and the lack of aerial resupply coupled with the continued resistance in the south meant the Americans were trying to find a way out of Bastogne.59 In essence, just like what had occurred at St. Vith the day before, the Americans must be planning some way to execute a massive retreat from Bastogne. Basically, it was an escape. The only difference was that Bastogne was completely surrounded. The Americans would be in for a slaughter if they tried now, Kokott thought. He smiled. Unlike the American forces who had withdrawn from the pocket at St. Vith, for the defenders of Bastogne, it was far too late.
Acting on this assessment, Kokott reached a conclusion that night. He would use the 26th Volksgrenadier Division to choke off those western areas, and when the reinforcements arrived, he would be in position to use them for an all-out attack. Kokott sent instructions out to Schriefer’s 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment to attack south from the Champs area while Kunkel’s 26th Reconnaissance Battalion would strike north toward Mande Saint-Etienne. Von Lüttwitz’s operations staff agreed with Kokott’s conclusion and green-lighted his plan to cinch the knot even tighter. Furthermore, as a gesture of his faith in Kokott’s new optimistic assessment, the corps commander ordered 2nd Panzer Division to give up one panzer kampfgruppe to assist the 26th Reconnaissance Battalion’s attack on Flamierge and Mande Saint-Etienne.60
