by Leo Barron
7 “With rigid regulations for secrecy… Minefields beyond and along the front were cleared or shifted” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne 1950, 5-6); “Since mid November the Army… It was obvious something big was about to take place” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010); “We thought it would take… It took nearly 900 trains to bring troops and supplies up to the assembly area” (Buechs, 1945, 1–2); “I heard for the first time of the planned offensive… Present were: General Manteuffel, General Krueger of the LVIII Panzer Corps, the commanders of the Panzer Lehr, 2 Panzer and 26 Volksgrenadier Divisions” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 66); “At the end of the first week of in December… the division was subordinated to the latter—detailed information was given with regards to the planned offensive…” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne 1950, 6); (Meinrad von Lauchert would replace Schönfeld as the commander of the 2nd Panzer on 15 December).
8 Berger, 2006.
9 Mitcham Jr., Panzer Commanders of the Western Front, 2008, 113–41.
10 Ibid., 207.
11 See chart (Schramm 1945, 197); “To plug the forested Ardennes… employ every available division in the November offensive to kill Germans” (Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 1999, 437–38); “On 6 Nov 44… The most important factors will be first—SURPRISE, and next—SPEED!’” (Brandenberger, 1946, 14–16).
12 See Figure 21, on page II-26 (Handbook on German Military Forces TM-E, 1945. 30–451).
13 “Although the numerical strength… their artillery was more mobile” (Schramm 1945, 200–01).
14 “…the Offensive therefore got underway with approximately 850-900 tanks and assault guns. 80% of these were to be considered as ready for immediate commitment” (Schramm, 1945, 200).
15 See Figure 5 on II-8 (Handbook on German Military Forces TM-E, 1945, 30–451).
16 “OKW expected… thus, altogether four days” (Schramm, 1945, 184–85).
17 “…the Luftwaffe could be expected to accomplish 8 to 900 sorties a day, 60 of which would be made by the new rocket planes (Messerschmitt 262 and Arado); this would mean a considerable relief for the ground forces” (Schramm, 1945, 175–76); “The Fuehrer informed… a number which will guarantee a really noticeable relief” (Schramm, 1945, 209); “After 24 Dec 44 heavy air attacks made impossible almost all daytime transport, either of troops or of their supplies. Even regrouping of troops in occupied positions was rendered extremely difficult by the bombardment” (Rundstedt, 1945, 8).
18 “For the period 10–20 December… is extremely rare in December” (Dr. Herrmann, 1944, 2); “The Luftwaffe meteorologists played a big part in 1940, in the campaign in the West…. Mid-Dec 44 was a very foggy, high-pressure period, and on 13 Dec 44, an extended period of fog was predicted, broken only about midday” (Jodl, 1945).
19 “XLVII Panzer Corps… Südflanke gegen Feindeinwirkung über Linie Brüssel—Dinant—Givet einzusetzen” (Wehrmacht, 1944, 3–4); “66 Corps (18 and 62 VG Divs) to encircle from both sides… and to be employed for a quick thrust to the Meuse” (C. Wagener, Fifth Panzer Army—Special Questions (Ardennes), 1945, 2–3); “The 26 VGD was to cross the Our… so as to free the Pz Lehr Division to reach the Meuse quickly” (Manteuffel, The Fifth Panzer Army during the Ardennes Offensive, 2006, 86); “In my opinion… whose commanders had neither adequate tactical nor strategic qualifications” (Manteuffel, Fifth Panzer Army (11 Sep 44–Jan 45), ETHINT 45, 1945, 8–9).
20 “3.) XXXXVII Panzer Corps crosses with spearheads the Our (River)… The Maas bridges between Namur and Dinant are able to be captured and kept open by way of a lightning strike (surprise attack)” (Staff, 1944); “For the Breakthrough: right: reinforced 2nd Panzer Division left: reinforced 26th Volks-Grenadier Division Corps reserve: Panzer Lehr Division” (Staff, 1944); “After Crossing the Clerf: right: reinforced 2nd Panzer Division left: Panzer Lehr Division behind (following): 26th Volks-Grenadier Division” (Staff, 1944); “26th VGD: Following entry into preparatory positions east of Fischbach… for further use by the general headquarters” (Staff, 1944); “a) Forward Battalion in the area of Karlshausen… hold open and defend the Maas and Sambre River bridges” (Staff, 1944); Though the order mentioned Waxweiler, I believe the authors meant Eschweiler, which is along the Dasburg/Eisenbach axis to Bastogne. This is confirmed in the book Bayerlein: The After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander; From D-Day to the Ruhr.
21 “The Staff of the XXXXVII Pz Corps arrived on 7 Dec at KYLLBURG/EIFEL… Bastogne is to be mopped up first, then the bulk of the Corps continues its advance” (H. V. Luettwitz, The Assignment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes MS A-939, 1950, 3–4).
22 “After Field Marshal von Rundstedt… placed a manuscript before him and put on his glasses” (H. V. Luettwitz, XLVII Panzer Corps (16 Dec–24 Dec 44), ETHINT 41, 1945, 12).
23 “As usual Hitler began with the general phrases of the Nazi party attainments… who was not completely acquainted with the real situation at the front” (Heilmann, 1946, 13).
24 “Hitler presented the offensive plan… war would be largely dependent on the success of the offensive” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 70).
25 “At the end of his speech Hitler pointed out… With these words. Hitler closed his speech” (Heilmann, 1946, 16).
26 “The plan of attack for the Division was as follows… The Army Group strictly declined these proposals” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 9).
27 See Wolfgang Knecht’s book Die Geschichte des Inf. Rgts. 77 for the history of the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment. Also, for a more succinct history, see http://infanterie-regiment77.org/. “At the end of September… Were it not for the steel faith that became hardened; the tears of disappointment, grief, and anger should have flowed” (Knecht, Die Geschichte des Inf. Rgts. 77, 1964, 155).
28 “The commander of the Volksgrenadier Regiment 77 was Lieutenant Colonel Schriefer…. Captain Raab, who led the battalion until the end” (Knecht, Die Geschichte des Inf. Rgts. 77, 1964, 155); “Anton Becker… Anton Becker verstarb am 13.08.1995 in Lohmar-Wahlscheid” (www.ritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de 2011); For Martin Schriefer’s Iron Cross, see Axis History Forum (Marcus Wendel, 2005); For Raab’s Iron Cross citations see Lexikon Der Wehrmacht (Andreas Altenburger, 2011).
29 “Against instructions by Army Group and Army… as soon as the bridge near Gemuend would be passable” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne 1950, 9–10); “For the performance of its mission, the Battalion further had the following… a. The Pursuit Tank Company and an anti-aircraft platoon from the Anti-tank Battalion. b. A motorized engineer platoon of the Engineer Battalion. c. A caterpillar tractor ‘East’ motorized battery of the First Anti-tank Gun Battalion Regiment 26. d. A motorized platoon of heavy 12cm mortars” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 12); Kokott’s memory was a little off. According to the order of battle from the actual operations order, the reconnaissance battalion had a towed battery of 10.5-cm light howitzers, and not antitank guns. The AA platoon comprised tracked vehicles with mounted 37mm AA guns. (Staff, 1944, Frame 620).
30 “Regiments 77 and 39… the thrust was then to be continued west over the Hosingen road” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 10).
31 “The bulk of Regiment 77… to the bridge near Drauffeld” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne 1950, 10–11); “The division artillery was to form a solid group in the area west of Herbstmuehle, participate in the preparatory fire together with the artillery reinforcements (I. Volks Artillery Corps and 1st Volks Projector Brigade) and keep their limbers nearby so that they could move across the Our River as soon as the GHQ engineers completed a bridge near Gemuend” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 9).
32 “The Reconnaissance Bat
talion of Panzer Lehr (ALA)… via Nieder Wampach or Doncols–Bras toward Bastogne” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 90–93).
33 “My experiences during the Ardennes Offensive in Kingdom of Luxembourg… In September 44 we came north of Posen in a holding camp, part of the military training grounds” (Lindemann, Questionaire to Ludwig Lindemann, 2010); “Joined Army 10/3/41 as was required compulsory service… close combat sword in silver, at age 22” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010).
34 “Again we were mixed into [an] existing division…. By sending via radio the enemy may intercept data” (Lindemann, Questionaire to Ludwig Lindemann, 2010); “Only two commanding officers knew of the mission [Ardennes Offensive]…. I was in charge of 6th company IR 77” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010).
35 “During the evening hours of 15 December… After dark, the commanders informed the attack troops of the attack order” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 13–14).
36 C. B. MacDonald, 2002, 97.
37 “Yes, in December 1944 I thought it was a good idea to fight this battle and to win the war” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann—Second Interview, 2010).
38 “The troops accepted it with utmost seriousness… were directed to their assembly areas through special leaders” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 13–14).
39 “Many were ersatz [replacement] soldiers and were from flak [antiaircraft crews], naval, [and] excess personnel from the Luftwaffe…” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010).
40 “Around midnight on 16th… we were laying on the ground freezing and very tense for the next move” (Lindemann, Questionaire to Ludwig Lindemann, 2010); “The evening before… with MG-44 Sturmgewehr automatic rifles” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010).
41 “At 0500 hours on 16 December… The nocturnal silence was interrupted only by the occasional salvo of an enemy battery or the sound of some individual guns on our own in normal harassing fire” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 15); “At 0500 hours on 16 December 1944… located along the heights where previous combat outposts [listening posts] were stationed” (Operations, 1945).
42 “At 0530 hours—suddenly—all of the German barrels roared out with a raging fire…. After a short period of time, the forward enemy line was torn open at many points along a broad front” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, 1950, 15–16); “Under the cover of a tremendous 17-minute preparatory artillery barrage… capturing the surprised enemy positions” (Operations, 1945).
43 “Around 0530 artillery and nebelwerfers [rocket launchers] fired for about half an hour. We were woken up at 0600 and our company was ordered to march to engage the enemy. Our goal was to take over Hosingen” (Lindemann, Interview with Ludwig Lindemann, 2010); “After 30 minutes of heavy artillery… We all spread out and headed towards a forest and road which led to Bockholz-Enscheringen” (Lindemann, Questionaire to Ludwig Lindemann, 2010).
Chapter Two
1 “Head Quarters, at the Gulph, December 17, 1777… October 3, 1777” (Chadwick, 2004, 198).
2 Pierce, 1974, 1–209.
3 “Divisions operations centered in the barracks area at the northern edge of Bastogne…. Close against the north end of it, aimed at the gate to deal with armor, a self-propelled gun squatted” (MacKenzie, 1968, 72); To this day, there is still German writing faintly visible on some of the sheds and buildings.
4 Pierce, 1974, 215; 28th Infantry Division Headquarters, 1944.
5 “28th Inf Div: Enemy patrols reached vic of (P 795583) and (P 801628) at 1015A in Z of 110th Inf. Co A 707 TK Bn and Co B 110th Inf committed to clear the area. 2d Bn 112th Inf committed to restore the line of 3d Bn 112th Inf penetrated by estimated 3 Bns enemy inf” (Middleton, SITREP No. 505, HQ VIII Corps: For Period 152400A DEC to 161200 DEC 44, 1944).
6 “Estimated before breakthrough that there were 2 VG and 2 Pz Divs in the BITBURG-TRIER area… which he said was extremely optimistic about the situation on the Corps front” (Reeves, 1945, 17); “Captured 1 PW Lt… This information is from captured document—IPW will look it over for further information—they have not seen it yet” (Nelson, 1944); Though Reeves claimed he received the information from Slayden, judging by the similarities in the 112th Infantry Report, it was likely he got it from them.
7 “The high command could not have been alarmed… that a German attack would be made on VIII Corps’ front” (Middleton, Questions Answered by Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton, 1945, 1–2).
8 “162035 Msg from CG VIII Corps… which will be held at all costs. Letter of instr. follows” (28th Infantry Division Headquarters, 1944).
9 “In my questions about the decision… He felt that ST VITH and BASTOGNE were the critical road centers in the Corps zone and worth almost any sacrifice to hold” (Middleton, Interview with Troy H. Middleton, 1945).
10 Tolhurst, 2002, 8–9; “Origins in the early Middle Ages: Bastogne Plateau has been inhabited since the prehistoric period…. We must recognize that the choice of Hitler was wise” (Commune de Bastogne, 2011); Guy Franz Arend: (through interpreter) “The town of Bastogne had no military importance. The proof of it was in the plan of attack. There wasn’t even a plan to take the town itself. The Germans got taken into the game. Once they saw Bastogne was becoming for America a symbol of resistance, then the Germans set out to destroy that symbol” (Zwonitzer, 1994).
11 “Bastogne was a particularly indispensable point…. Basic order for the sudden capture of Bastogne by a coup-de-main within the framework of the whole offensive” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 75).
12 “The still resistance of the Americans at Hosingen… That was decisive for the battle of Bastogne” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 93); “The combat strength of the 110th Inf Regt during the period 16–23 December… and reflect the highest traditions of the Armed Forces” (Perry, 1945, 2–3).
13 “On December 16, 1944… Bradley and I discussed the probable meaning” (D. D. Eisenhower, 1997, 342).
14 “I was immediately convinced that this was no local attack…. It seemed likely to Bradley and me that they were now starting this kind of attack” (D. D. Eisenhower, 1997, 342).
15 “Operative: The quick reaction of the American Command, following the German assault… because it is always the greater, which licks the smaller” (C. Wagener, Main Reasons for the Failure of the Ardennes-Offensive MS #A-963, 1945, 5–6).
16 “We called a number of SHAEF staff into our conference room… the 82nd and the 101st. Both had been assembled at Reims for refitting after Arnhem” (Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 1999, 464).
17 “As early as December 17 the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were released from SHAEF Reserve to General Bradley” (D. D. Eisenhower, 1997, 348).
18 Zaloga, U.S. Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944–5, 2007, 24; The division had a nominal strength of 824 officers and 12,211 enlisted men. They left for Bastogne with 805 officers and 11,035 enlisted men (Frank R. Brower, 1945, 6).
19 Zaloga, U.S. Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944-5, 2007, 24.
20 “The 101st Airborne was told to go to Bastogne at 0800 on 17 Dec… by personal conversation in a few minutes” (H. W. Kinnard, G-3 Account of Bastogne Operation, 1945, 1).
21 “Danahy and Kinnard both were 29 years old…. Kinnard was Army brat: born on a military post, son of a professional soldier, West Point–trained and graduated five years before” (MacKenzie, 1968, 10, 16).
22 “The G-2 was a volunteer from civilian life… lived in a Buffalo, NY, neighborhood where Danahy was reared” (MacKenzie, 1968, 14).
23 “The party was going along so well under its own steam around 6 o’clock…. Dismissed by the General, Danahy ret
urned to his billet, where the guests remaining at his and Kinnard’s housewarming party were watching the old Gary Cooper movie” (MacKenzie, 1968, 11, 13–15).
24 Pigalle, or “Pig Alley,” as it was known by several generations of GIs, was named after the eighteenth-century sculptor Jean-Baptiste Pigalle. For most of the war years, Pigalle was known in various nightclubs, such as the famous Moulin Rouge, as well as a variety of brothels.
25 Koskimaki, 2003, 26–27.
26 An interesting side note on the famous pre-Christmas game: Depending on who you ask, the answer differs on who actually won the game. Not surprisingly, Army Air Corps veterans say they won, while the 101st swears they won the game. Obviously some of the confusion involved in the interruptions that day may have led to a misconception on one part or the other, or perhaps on memory.
27 “Captain Wallace Swanson, CO of Company A, 502nd Parachute Regiment of the Screaming Eagles… But like France, it involved offensive and defensive maneuvering for the best position against an enemy trying to regroup and push out” (Astor, 1994, 215–18).
28 “As a boy on the farm I’d spent untold hours passing a football back and forth through an old rubber tire hanging from a limb of a giant elm tree…. That’s how I heard about the German breakthrough” (Black, The Last First Sergeant, 1998, 225–27); Black, The Unedited Manuscript of Layton Black’s Memoirs to George Koskimaki, n.d.
29 “McAuliffe set up a General and Special Staff meeting at 2100 and in briefing his assistants on the situation his words were these, ‘All I know of the situation is that there has been a breakthrough and that we have got to get up there” (H. W. Kinnard, G-3 Account of Bastogne Operation, 1945, 3); “Without any preliminaries… to Werbomont, Belgium” (MacKenzie, 1968, 15); “At 2030 on 17 December 1944… for immediate action” (Moore, 1944, 1).
