No Silent Night

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No Silent Night Page 46

by Leo Barron


  20 “Company C held… Marche 18 miles or so to the north-west” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 164).

  21 “The battalion organized to defend from the North West… as we dug in deeper to defend our area” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 7); (Quarrie, 2000, 87); Also, (S. Marshall, 1946, 153).

  22 “The exec was 1st Lt. Preston E. Towns, a lanky six foot seven beanpole from Atlanta who could curse like a sailor and who took no guff from anyone…” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 24); “The CP was in the garage…. I could see nothing through my binoculars” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 163–65).

  23 “A 37mm anti-tank gun was set in the trees facing down the road… to stop anything coming down the road” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 164).

  24 “Besides the financial incentive… He had not, and John received the Purple Heart for the wound” (K. Parker, 2009, 22–25); “On 21 December, Company ‘A’… which successfully beaten off” (S. A. Chappuis, Historical Record, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, December 1944, 3); “21 Dec… 0740 Division orders our 1st Bn. to move to 555-619… to fill in gap between the 506 and the 502 lines” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 3); “On 21 Dec pressure continued against the 506th flank… to back-stop anything coming that way” (Cassidy, 1945, 3–5); “21 Dec… 1130 An S-2 patrol will move out to an known objective and establish an OP. They will report into Regiment by 300 radio every 30 min… 1215 S-2 patrol crossed 1st phase line. No contact made with the enemy” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 4).

  25 “CC 901 with two companies of tanks and one battalion of artillery still engaged southeast of Bastogne and attached to the 26 Volksgrenadier Division” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 81); “At dusk… as long as there was no shortage of ammunition and supply” (H. V. Luettwitz, The Assignment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes MS A-939, 1950, 10).

  26 “The losses for the day (21 December) amounted for the division to 300 to 350 men (including officers) killed, wounded, and missing… for the final closing of the gap between Senonchamps and Champs” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, MS # B-040, 1950, 90–93) .

  27 “The snow began covering the ground and quickly got deeper… shelter halves and sleeping bags and still cold” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 166–67); “22 December… 0050 Blue Able heard… 0730 Blue reports an increase in enemy activity and movement during the night” (S2 Section, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944, 4); “I plowed through the knee-deep snow…. I decided to check with Felker to get an idea of the dispositions of the enemy” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 167); “0825 Blue reports 2 half-tracks and two other vehicles approaching their positions in the vicinity of 498589, about 30 personnel with the vehicles” (S2 Section, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944, 5); “To the Northeast in Blue’s sector… about 30 men approaching their positions from 498589” (Abernathy, S-2 Periodic Report for the 327th GIR—from December 211800 to December 221800, 1944); “Company A had two squads dug in…. “I’ve been in shit since D-Day plus 12 and seen a lot of things. But I never saw anything like this. You guys are tops in my books” (Bowen, Fighting with the Screaming Eagles: With the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Bastogne, 2004, 166–71); “…at 0825 Blue reported two half-tracks and a jeep with trailer… and clearing the area of the enemy” (Abernathy, S-2 Periodic Report for the 327th GIR—from December 211800 to December 221800, 1944); “0910 Blue reports 30 enemy troops… the jeep and trailer were left on the road” (S2 Section, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944); “Thereupon they discovered that what had been reported as a jeep and a trailer…. ‘Good. We’ve got two or three jeeps holding for us out there’” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945).

  28 In an experiment conducted by author Don Cygan, a standard one-man-size foxhole was dug in the frozen and snow-covered ground in a forest in Colorado in January of 2011. Two adult males working on the three-foot-deep-by-six-by-four-foot-wide position took approximately four hours and almost destroyed the WWII–era M1910 entrenching tool that was used. Both author and comrade were exhausted when finished.

  29 “So they’ve got us surrounded, the poor bastards!” (Prior, 2007).

  30 “The 20th dawned without incident and we spent the morning digging in… but shared willingly again, bread, butter, and chicory [coffee substitute]” (Goldmann, Letter to Mrs. Ballard, 1945).

  31 “22 Dec… 1015 ‘A’ Co is now in position at Regimental road-block” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 5); “22 Dec 44 0935 Able attached to Kickoff. Move in defense of CHAMPS, Able 2 on left, Able 1 on right and Able 3 in center. Three TD’s and crews attached. One forward observer and two EM from 377th. One 57 AT gun and crew. Artillery fire on F.O. orders” (A Co Headquarters Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry, 1945).

  32 “The next day (21 Dec), Hill and Ortega continued their performance as an evacuation team with great success… by the church to cover the high ground to the NW and the N road” (Duvall, 1945, 2); “On 14 December 1944 Company C, 811th TD Bn… This position was held for 3 days and nights” (Brownfield, 1959).

  33 “The M-8’s position was on the NW side of town near the CR (520621)… where it could affect fire for 270 degrees and fire down three roads” (Duvall, 1945, 2); “22 Dec… 1050 1 TD-2 M-8’s and a few jeeps will support ‘A’ Co. for a possible enemy attack” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 5); “While the 1st section remained with Co. ‘H’ on the high ground near RECOGNE… Movement would be undertaken under the cover of darkness” (Long, 1945, 2).

  34 “Besides the financial incentive… and John received the Purple Heart for the wound” (K. Parker, 2009, 22–25).

  35 See the University of New Hampshire, 2011.

  36 “It was just an ordinary bed sheet… but they were well concealed” (Hanlon, 1962).

  37 “I was commander of the 115th Pz. Gren. Regiment of the 15th Pz. Gren. Div… I returned to my post as the regimental commander” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).

  38 “20.12.44 0715 Hours Call from the 01… and regimental units travel into the new area eastward of Prüm” (Operations Section, 1944).

  39 “The 15th Pz.Gren.Div… in the area of Wassenberg-Erkelenz” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); See order of battle for the 15th Panzergrenadier Division (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949, Anlage 1).

  40 Samuel Mitcham, 2007, 104–06; “I was the commander of the 115th Pz.Gren. Regiment of the 15th Pz.Gren.Div… I returned to my post as the regimental commander” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); To find his age, see www.das-ritterkreuz.de (Andreas Düfel, 2006).

  41 “Around 12.12.44, under strict secrecy and camouflaged against their own troops… The division reached the area around Pruem in the early morning hours on 23 December” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); “16.12.44 Circular from the headquarters regarding their own successful larger offensive… The regimental staff arrived at 2345 hours in Roggendorf and entered quarters” (
Operations Section, 1944).

  42 “On 22 Dec 44… I saw to it that the people were not moved out” (H. V. Luettwitz, ETHINT 41, An Interview with General Panzertruppen Heinrich von Luettwitz: XLVII Panzer Corps (16 December to 24 December 1944), 1945, 5–6).

  43 Tourist Federation of Belgian Luxembourg, 2011.

  44 “Consultation about the capitulation proposals to be addressed to the garrison of Bastogne were composed by Manteuffel and Lüttwitz and transmitted by a spokesman (adjutant of the Panzer Lehr) on 22 December” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 70); “Details of this adventure were relayed in detail to the author by Mr. Hellmuth Henke, Bayerlein’s English speaking adjutant, and published in Bayerlein; From Afrikakorps to Panzer Lehr. Mr. Henke confirmed the accuracy of the events he experienced as written in Bayerlein’s biography” (Bayerlein, Bayerlein: After Action Reports of the Panzer Lehr Division Commander, From D-Day to the Ruhr, 2005, 104) “The emissaries included two enlisted men, Maj. Wagner from the XLVII Panzerkorps and Lt. Helmuth Henke from the operations section of the Panzer Lehr Division” (D. S. Parker, 1994, 199); “In a television interview early in 1960 General von Luettwitz admitted that he was responsible for the ultimatum to the Bastogne garrison. This confirms a like statement made to Colonel Marshall in 1945 but later denied by Luettwitz” (Cole, 1965, 468); “Pz Lehr Div sent a parlementaire to Bastogne without my authorization. The demand to surrender was refused as was to be expected” (Manteuffel, Fifth Panzer Army (11 Sep 44–Jan 45), ETHINT 45, 1945, 11); “As I have stated previously, I did not authorize the surrender demand which was made of the Bastogne garrison, and I am still not sure exactly who did authorize this ultimatum” (Manteuffel, An Interview with General Panzer Hasso von Manteuffel: Fifth Panzer Army (Nov 44–Jan 45), ETHINT 46, 1945, 8); “21 Dec… Panzer-Lehr Division: The Division was ordered—because BASTOGNE was encircled and the Army had announced that the occupants of the SCHNEE EIFEL had surrendered after having been summoned to send a negotiator to BASTOGNE” (H. V. Luettwitz, The Assignment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes, MS A-939, 1950, 9); “The negotiator, who was sent out to BASTOGNE returned with the well known answer ‘nuts’” (H. V. Luettwitz, The Assignment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes, MS A-939, 1950, 11); “In the course of the morning, corps had informed the division that, by orders of corps… i.e. capture of Bastogne—would be approached on that, or at least the following day” (H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, MS #B-040, 1950, 85–86).

  45 “22 December… 1205 A German Major with an ‘Ultimatum’ came to our lines with a white flag. He was received and blindfolded and brought to the Fox C.P.” (S2 Section, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 1944, 5).

  46 “The two officers were blind folded… who was then Acting Chief of Staff” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 8).

  47 “The fortune of war is changing… would not correspond with the well known American humanity” (P. A. Danahy, G-2 Periodic Reports No. 4 from: 220004 to 222400 December 1944).

  48 “Now as to the request of our surrender… and because they thought it was alright, I sent it along” (A. C. McAuliffe, Merry Christmas, 1944).

  49 “When the two Germans arrived at the outpost… to deliver it to the German officers to see their reaction” (Harper, Letter to George Koskimaki, 1969), (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 7–9).

  50 “‘Will you see that it’s delivered?’ Harper replied… It was then 1350” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 9); “They [German officers] were waiting still blindfolded in the Company F C.P…. I knew that as soon as the weather cleared, we’d receive more ammunition” (Harper, Letter to George Koskimaki, 1969).

  51 “6. Own firing—A. Type of Fire… Call fire—16. B. Results—Good. 7. Ammunition expended during this period… M48—57 M54—152 M57—48…” (V. E. Garrett, S-3 Report from: 212400 Dec 1944 to: 222400 Dec 1944, Unit: 463 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, No. 207, 1944); “1. STATUS OF SUPPLY… Critical shortage of ammunition and rations with no source of supply available in present combat situation” (M. A. Johnson, 1944); “Own firing—A. Type of Fire… Registration -1 Call fire—25. B. Results—Good. 7. Ammunition expended during this period… M48—394 M54—154 M57—108…” (V. E. Garrett, S-3 Report from: 202400 Dec 1944 to: 212400 Dec 1944, Unit: 463 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, No. 206, 1944); “Own firing—A. Type of Fire… Registration -8 Call fire—27. B. Results—Good. 7. Ammunition expended during this period… M48—785 M54—102 M57—79…” (V. E. Garrett, S-3 Report from: 192400 December 1944 to: 202400 December 1944, 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, No. 205, 1944); “Dec 22: the Gp established officer liaison… 327 Glider Inf which battalions were protecting the western and southern approaches to BASTOGNE” (Brewster, 1944, 6); “Direct support of the 502nd Prcht. Inf… Heavy damage could be done in [if] ammunition was available” (Brubaker, S-3 Report from: 1200 December 22, 1944, to: 1200 December 23, 1944, Unit: 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 1944); “We then got down to 10 rounds per gun… but no more than two rounds.” (A. C. McAuliffe, Merry Christmas, 1944); “The days prior to Christmas… We had 20 rounds per gun of hollow charge anti-tank ammo that were never used or counted in ammo reports except to be used for direct fire” (Koskimaki, 2004, 275).

  52 “Having surveyed the terrain in front of ‘Silent Steve’ Chappuis’s 502nd Regiment on the northwestern perimeter, Higgins concluded it would be ideal for massed tank operations if the sodden fields froze” (MacKenzie, 1968, 160); “22 Dec… 0955… He also stated that enemy is also in town of ROUETTE” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 4); “0955 22 Dec Our Battalions have been alerted for possible enemy attack from GIVRY. ‘A’ Co. has been alerted to move up to Regimental road-block” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 5); “On 22 Dec… A Regimental S-2 patrol was sent to Rouette to check an enemy build-up to north of Champs” (Cassidy, 1945, 5); “22 Dec… 1215… They had American vehicles and equipment” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944); “1520: BN NO: Div 20: DESCRIPTION COORDINATES Enemy CP (5032-6398) : REC’D FROM K’fish: TIME COMPLETED 1530…” (Brubaker, S-3 Report from: 1200 December 22, 1944, to: 1200 December 23, 1944, Unit: 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 1944); “A Regimental S-2 patrol was sent to Rouette… and the patrol returned to our lines at 1630” (Cassidy, 1945, 5); “22 Dec 1715 Our 1st Bn. is moving up to a new position” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944); “General Summary… The enemy has now sufficient forces in the western area to attack in strength from that direction” (P. A. Danahy, G-2 Periodic Reports No. 4 from: 220004 to 222400 December 1944); See accompanying map number four with Danahy’s report. He labeled on the map the report of four to five hundred Germans and forty to fifty tanks in Givry.

  53 “The first message from the 4th Armored said, ‘Hugh is coming’… for on the day before VIII Corps had told him to prepare for ‘resupply tomorrow if weather permits’” (S. Marshall, 1946, 134–35); “Communications would present no major problem… had to be couched in ambiguous—sometimes quite meaningless—terms” (Cole, 1965, 461); “Instead of repairing old lines… had one line laid to the switchboard and one to the field artillery radio operator located in the servant’s quarters” (Phillips, 1948, 16–17); “There was a delightfully ironic touch even to that restriction…. At the same time, the Bastogne defenders were running low on small-arms ammunition” (S. Marshall, 1946, 133–34); “We then got down to 10 rounds per gun…. (If you see four hundred Germans in a one hundred yard area and they have their heads up, you can fire artillery at them—but no more than two rounds)” (A. C. McAuliffe, Merry Christmas, 1944); “The busiest member of the staff was Colonel Kohls…. The G-4, his eyes inflamed, and the flesh around them swollen and red, seemed to be in constant misery” (MacKenzie, 1968, 169–70); “On 21 December 1044, the AC of S… was notified that the resupply mission was canceled b
ecause of bad weather” (Robbins, 11 January 1945); “For by noon of December 22… he would have to ration his guns to ten rounds per day” (S. Marshall, 1946, 133); “The airdrop laid on for the 22d never reached Bastogne—bad flying weather continued as in the days past… to the men in the line this was heartening news” (Cole, 1965, 467).

 

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