by Leo Barron
27 “That’s when we saw those four tanks on the ridge… that probably would have been the end of us” (Fowler, 2nd Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2010); “Then these four German tanks show up there… I took off my helmet and peeked over the foxhole” (Fowler, Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2009).
28 “Christmas Eve was not special…. We had tanks come up later” (Lindemann, 2010).
29 “They shot flares into a totally dark sky and we took advantage of them. They fired haystacks and then got in between us and the blazes to form perfect silhouettes and down they went” (Goldmann, 1945).
30 “Suddenly, I heard what sounded like a moan from the direction of the machine gun…. The German who had fired at me from the flank made a getaway” (Koskimaki, 2008, 288).
31 “25 December 0350 from Rcn D/90—75 rds mortar and 88 from 0250 to 0305 still falling… 0400 Enemy is about 8 to 10 houses in North end of town. From Rcn D/90” (S-3 Section, CCB 10th Armored Division, 1944).
32 “We were in the upstairs of a farmhouse near Champs…. TDs not supposed to do that job for a tank, but we had to make do” (D’Angelo, 2009); “This 2nd Section maintained their two positions… instead of returning to their usual daylight positions” (Long, 1945, 2); “At 1000, 22 Dec the Recon section and 2 TDs reported to Captain Swanson of Co. ‘A’ 502… canister flowing in a northwesterly direction to deny that route to the enemy” (Duvall, 1945, 3–4); “Yes. I got the tank ready. We [Vallitta and Stoling] went in and we blew up a house” (Stoling, 2009); “The other action that helped out was by the tank destroyers… using the tank destroyers direct firing into the enemy position even though close in contact with our men” (Koskimaki, 2008, 298).
33 “The Germans sent us Christmas Greetings when they bombed Bastogne for the first time. We were alerted at 0330 for an attack…” (Cleaver, 1944, 4); “DATE & TIME RECEIVED 12/25 0350: BN NO: NB : DESCRIPTION COORDINATES: Infantry (530-652) REC’D FROM: 41 TIME COMPLETED 0355: OBS BY 41: NO RDS 22: EFFECT Excellent… DATE & TIME RECEIVED 12/25 0400: BN NO: W2 : DESCRIPTION COORDINATES: Infantry (5300-6512) REC’D FROM: 51 TIME COMPLETED 0420: OBS BY 51: NO RDS 57: EFFECT Excellent” (Brubaker, 1944).
34 “J. Huesken, Lieutenant. In the field, 25 Jan 1945 Dearest Mrs. Adorf… Please accept my apologies for writing to you on a typewriter” (Husken, 1945).
35 “Around 0300 AM on Christmas morning, 1944… which burst in the air above the woods where his O.P. as well as some 502 listening posts had been overrun during darkness” (Bando, 2000).
36 “About 4:00 A.M. there was another lull in the firing and at this time… I remained at our outpost with Private Grovesnor for the remainder of the night” (Wise, 1948).
37 “Prior to Company ‘A’ moving to Champs there had been another road block along the road south of Champs and due west of Rolle… if it pushed on into town and the Germans came around it” (Cassidy, 1945, 7–8); “The Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Steve A. Chappuis, was awakened and given a resume of the situation by Colonel Cassidy… This sector was thinly held by the 3rd Battalion [1/401st] 327th Glider Regiment” (Phillips, 1948, 21–23); “0440 Our 1st BN is now committing its reserve Company (C Company) in support of ‘A’ and ‘B.’ We also have notified Division of our present situation” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944, 8). It’s hard to estimate when B Company sent out the additional platoon to secure the southern flank of 2nd Battalion. There are no reports with time hacks associated with the order, and it doesn’t seem clear when the order was given. Phillips’s account gives the impression that it was before Hanlon arrived. Unfortunately, Chappuis’ account is not clear either. This is a best guess, since the only time hack we have is around 0440, when the regimental staff logged that they were bringing up other units to support 1st BN. “Christmas morning we noticed quite a bit of activity to our front… and we dug in” (Nichols, 1990).
38 “After giving this order by radio… This sector was thinly held by the 3rd Battalion [1/401st] 327th Glider Regiment” (Phillips, 1948, 22–23).
39 “We were at Champs and our company had the job of protecting the town…. We were clearing out house to house all day and taking prisoners” (Asay, Interview with Charles Asay, 2009).
40 “We’d be very quiet and inconspicuous…. I’m not sure whether I killed every one of them or not but I’m sure I killed some” (Koskimaki, 2008, 290).
41 “We were sleeping in this potato shed there, along the road going out of Champs…. I tell you, we had a pretty rough time there for a while” (Fowler, Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2009).
42 “Look on the map…. There four tanks were driven off by aerial burst from the hoarded supplies of artillery ammo which we had practically none of, and by the appearance of four P-47’s” (Goldmann, 1945); “At 0530 hours, 22 December 1944… After their vehicle was knocked out the crew of this vehicle was used by the 609th TD bn. in relief roles at Bastogne” (Brownfield, 1959).
43 “25 December 0530… Tanks… (5120-6345) Rec’d From: 51… Time Completed… 0550… Observed by 51… Number of Rounds… 22… Effect… Very Good” (Brubaker, 1944).
44 “Lovely artillery, beautiful TD’s wonderful Air Corps; we had been hurting for sure and now we had won” (Goldmann, 1945).
45 We were sleeping in this potato shed there, along the road going out of Champs…. I tell you, we had a pretty rough time there for a while” (Fowler, Interview with Corporal Willis Fowler, 2009).
46 “The Germans were at the end of their ropes by now; grenades and submachine gun fire were beginning to slow down…. Everyone was relieved, but no one dared go outside” (Cercle d’Histoire de Bastogne, 1994, Chapter 14).
47 “By 8 am Champs had been taken back from the Germans…. Dozens of prisoners were gathered near Raviola’s farm, with an American soldier (and Mr. Raviola himself) supervising them” (Cercle d’Histoire de Bastogne, 1994, Chapter 14).
48 “The village heights resembled a necropolis…. Torn arms, slashed legs, gaping wounds flooded with blood the Raviola kitchen where dozens of the injured awaited aid” (Heintz, 1984, 73).
49 “0500 from Rcn D/90 fighting continuing believe line is holding same position… 0600 from Rcn D/90 Situation quieting down 6 or 8 Germans trapped in town will mop up at day light” (S-3 Section, CCB 10th Armored Division, 1944).
Chapter Nine
1 Morris, 1958.
2 “Shortly after midnight, a stocky young 2nd lieutenant, John Adams, of Stillwater, Oklahoma… These were Mk IV panzers and not Tiger tanks since the 15th panzergrenadier had no Tigers attached to it (Smith, 1945, 92); “The II./115 received resistance 1st along the Flamizoulle Stream in the small forest north of Flamizoulle” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949). Though Maucke claimed this was his 2nd battalion, his memory might have been off, which he freely admitted in the beginning of the document. His start times seemed to corroborate American sources, but once the battle started his times did not coincide with American reports.
3 “Reconnaissance had already convinced Division that this was the most likely avenue in the whole defensive circle for a thrust by enemy armor… which were just entering the battle” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 5); “That night [Christmas Eve], we could hear the tanks and knew the Germans were up to something, near Flamierge” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2009); “We had seen the Germans building up west of our lines for two days…. At 10 p.m. the men on the front line could hear panzers arriving near Flamizoulle, a small village about two miles west of our line” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 54–55); “1735 [24 December] Division notified our Regiment [502] to be alert for a possible enemy attack from the West tonight” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944); “Around 2200 hours, the battalions prepared for the attack in the following order: I./- Tank, Regimental troops, II./-, III” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive
from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).
4 “At 2200 on Christmas Eve, on order from Division… But it was too late to be effective” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 5–6); “The 327th reports 8 tanks at north of FLEMIERGE. Shells are falling in rear of Regimental CP and in court-yard” (S2 Section, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1944); “Harper was called at 0500 by Company ‘A’ 3rd Bn who informed him that 14 tanks were forming for attack just east of Mande St. Etienne. He got this message from Lt Howard Bowles, Comdg the company.” Though Harper claims the report said fourteen tanks, the radio log mentions only eight (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 21).
5 “At 0300 hours, all the units reported entered the preparatory positions… which was not out of the ordinary” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).
6 “The enemy has now sufficient forces in the western area to attack in strength from that direction” (L. C. Danahy, No. 4 G-2 Periodic Report, 22 December 1944, for the 101st Airborne Division, 1944); “At 1800 Harper was told that he had the sector all the way from Marvie to 511610 [south of Champs]. He said to Higgins, ‘Look at it; this is half of the Div perimeter.’ Higgins replied, ‘It’s all yours; do what you can with it. There isn’t any other solution’” (Harper, 327th Regiment at Bastogne, 1945, 20); “At that time the 327th was holding all the way from Marvie around here to the 502, a good 8 miles—maybe a little more; it looked bigger to me” (Harper, Bastogne Speech, 1975).
7 “0430—2nd Platoon Co. A… Two of the four enemy tanks destroyed and enemy infantry dispersed” (Harris, No. 116, S-3 Report, 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 242400, December 1944, to 252400, December 1944); See map, C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6; “The TDs were now attached to Co ‘A’ 401st and at 1600 [24 Dec] moved to a position behind two wooded areas just north of their former position at the cut… All men dug in” (R. B. Miller 1945); “Around 0620 hours, the I./115 reported flanking fire from the south from anti-tank or tanks guns” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949). Though the time was off, this might have been 2/B/705th TD BN’s flank shots at the column as it emerged from Monty.
8 “Commitment of two battalions in the forward most line… The tank destroyers were to follow the II./115, in order to engage and neutralize enemy tanks during the offensive or defensive situations” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); For Maucke’s Order of Battle, Concept Sketch, and Officer Chart, see the Tabs in back of his account (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949, Appendix 5, Appendix 6, Tab a and b); “Distribution of orders… The II Battalion shall be in reserve” (Operations Section, 1944).
9 “Commitment of two battalions in the forward most line… The tank destroyers were to follow the II./115, in order to engage and neutralize enemy tanks during the offensive or defensive situations” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949); For Maucke’s Order of Battle, Concept Sketch, and Officer Chart see the Tabs in back of his account (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949, Appendix 5, Appendix 6, Tab a and b).
10 Reports from several American soldiers mention repeatedly that the Germans appeared to be acting “drunk” during the attack. Hardly a stretch, if one considers the holiday, the need for “liquid courage,” and the stress on the tired and hungry German soldiers that night. “The Germans were wearing white uniforms and shooting their guns point-blank at us, yelling. I heard some say they were drunk” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2009); “Screaming and shouting as they advanced, the grenadiers seemed to be drunk” (Arend, 1987, 213); “To the rear of the armor were men on foot. They came up the hill in an unstoppable numbers, hundreds of them, many yelling. MacDonald assumed they were drunk” (MacKenzie, 1968, 221).
11 “0405 Hours Flamizoulle free of the enemy. Both battalions made good forward progress. The enemy withdrew without a defense” (Operations Section, 1944).
12 “After crossing their preparatory lines… which proved especially costly for the II./115” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949, 17–18). However, Maucke makes no mention of a panzer receiving damage. Lieutenant Miller in his account reports that the Germans were towing one of their tanks, which meant that the tank suffered a mechanical failure or had sustained damage before the main assault. We assess that it had received damage because of the flank shots from 2/B/705th TD BN (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6).
13 “The Chief of Staff emphasized the moment of surprise when the enemy was attacked during the early morning on the 1st day of Christmas…. My objections to attack without a plan were dismissed” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).
14 “The II./115 received resistance 1st along the Flamizoulle Stream in the small forest north of Flamizoulle…. At this time, the regimental command post relocated Flamizoulle” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).
15 “The attack in the direction of Isle-la-Hesse against stubborn resistance at 1st gained good ground. At the same time, the Fusilier Regiment 39 fought its way up to Isle-le Pre” (H. Kokott, Employment of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division from 16 to 31 Dec 1944, 1945); “Reconnaissance Battalion 26—starting out from the area around Mande St. Etienne… to capture Isle-la-Pre as its 1st objective” (G. H. Kokott, Ardennes Offensive—Battle of Bastogne, MS #B-040, 1950, 123).
16 “At 0300 hours attack of regimental strength was launched against the town of CHAMPS (5262)…. Activity on the remainder of the Division perimeter consisted of only light probing attacks which were easily repulsed without incident” (L. C. Danahy, No. 7 G-2 Periodic Report, 25 December 1944).
17 “At 0645 hours, a radio message from the I./115 arrived, ‘Standing before west rim of Bastogne!’” (Maucke, Report Over the 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive from 16 December 1944 to 2 February 1945: MS P-032c, 1949).
18 “Almost coincidentally, Private Allie Moore got back from the 2nd Platoon outpost and told Bowles that a considerable force of infantry and ‘many tanks’ were moving directly on his front” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6); “Battalion outpost reported enemy tanks approaching at approximately 0630 hour in area (530-605)” (C. T. Moran, 1944).
19 “Them tanks came rolling off those hills, from behind the woods, and spread out. Scary, but we had heard German tanks before and you did what we had to do” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2009).
20 “Bowles ran forward to the outpost on his left flank…. Bowles doubled back to his main position” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6).
21 “On reporting back, he [Lt Adams], Lt. Bowles and I decided we were in the path of attack and to withhold fire until the tanks had gone through us… but headed toward Hemroulle” (L. R. Nelson, unknown); “When the four tanks materialized (0830) there were eleven tanks, two armored half-tracks with 200 infantry supporting the armor… because the enemy was far too strong numerically to handle at this point” (A. W. Johnson, 1945).
22 “When the report was called in to Lt. Bowles at his CP… He phoned my CP and asked for artillery fire on the tanks” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 55).
23 “I was aleep upstairs in my CP when Bowles called… and I told him, No, tell the men to hold their fire” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 55-56).
24 “The nighttime was definitely to my advantag
e… they would have seen our positions and we would have been quickly wiped out” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 56).
25 See map in C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6.
26 “Perhaps the best measure of the fighting élan of this unit is that on the morning of the attack they were covering their ground with five .50 caliber machine guns and two light machine guns… its men never overlooked the chance to build up weapon power” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 5); “We had two .50 caliber machine guns we had got from our scouting mission…. Anyway, those .50 calibers came in handy during that battle [25 December]” (C. Gisi, Interview with PFC Carmen Gisi, 2009).
27 “Christmas morning 1944 came peacefully…. Their gas masks clanking, other equipment rattling, and all of them screaming at the top of their lungs” (R. J. MacDonald, Another Von Rundstedt Blunder—Bastogne, 1948, 20–21).
28 “On 25 December 1944 the 1st Platoon of ‘B’ company, 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry Regiment, theoretically in reserve…. Morale was superior. The troops were seasoned veterans…” (O’Halloran, 1948, 8).
29 “For 2nd Platoon, which was looking right down the muzzle of the enemy thrust, the ‘right thing’ was to fold over to the vastly better cover on the flank position held by 3rd Platoon” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6).
30 “From that time on… and continue firing into the enemy column” (C. S. Marshall, 1948, 6); “One of my men on the far left flank began firing a .50-caliber machine gun, but no one else did any firing. This added to the deception. The German tanks thought they had passed a weak outpost and kept on going. They didn’t know they had passed through a well-fortified, frontline positions” (D. R. Martin, 2009, 56–57).
