by Nigel West
Another willing post-war interviewee was Wolfgang Blaum, the head of the KO’s Abwehr II branch, who had adopted the alias Friedrich Baumann and whose activities had been monitored closely by ISOS analysts.12 Aged 34, he was arrested in Bremen and, when questioned by Captain Leroy Vogel, appeared entirely co-operative, explaining that before the war he had been employed by the Nord-Deutsche Lloyd shipping line, and for five years had been in Cristobal, Panama. He had been drafted into the Brandenburg Regiment in February 1940, and posted to Madrid in March as deputy to Krueger in the KO’s Referat II office at Calle Miguel Angel 24. He remained in Spain until February 1945, when he was expelled and flown to Italy on a new assignment, to join a new unit designated FAT 259.
Under interrogation by the CIC’s Peter Stern, Blaum was described as ‘cooperative and has an excellent memory’. He was also exceptionally shrewd, and remarked during his interviews that he had suspected two of his agents, Gwilym Williams in Swansea and Eddie Chapman in London, both to ‘have been a British counter-intelligence agent’.
Blaum revealed that the Madrid KO had been instructed in early 1943 to extend its operations to South America, and had dispatched a Falangist, Bernardo Carrsasco, on a mission to Buenos Aires but, having survived the British inspection at Trinidad, he had simply disappeared. A pair of agents were also deployed to Spanish Guinea, to supervise operations across central Africa, but they found themselves very isolated and were forced to abandon their over-ambitious plans.
Blaum also described sending agents on missions to Mexico, and recalled how Mary Mains, an Irish Republican Army supporter, had been sent to Dublin to create a sabotage network. Coincidentally, Blaum’s brother, Rudolph, was appointed the Abt. II chief in Portugal in early 1942, even though there was a political ban in Portugal on what the Abwehr termed ‘S-operations’:
The order to proceed with German sabotage of Allied shipping was received from Berlin in 1940. By 1942 the sabotage program was well under way, and it had reached its high point in 1943 when an explosion in a Spanish harbor led to a cease-action order from Berlin.
The first actions, in 1940 and 1941, were directed by Heinrich Schomler, who was later killed in Russia. In Seville and Huelva, two five-kilo explosive charges were to be camouflaged as chunks of iron ore and smuggled aboard Allied freighters. The fact that the explosions never materialized was attributed to two possible reasons: either the Spanish sub-agents did not place the charges in the loads of ore, or the German time fuses broke when the ore was loaded into the hatches. Later Schomler attempted to have home-made mines, each holding about 15 kilos of explosives in an iron container with chain and shackle, fastened near the keel of Allied ships by Spanish divers, once at Seville, twice at Mellila [sic], and once at Huelva.
At the time, however, there had been no technical research to establish how and where the bombs could be most effectively attached, and the pull exerted by the moving ship had not been correctly estimated. Thus the early attempts were merely the work of enthusiastic amateurs, and showed doubtful results.
One Spanish agent insisted that, outfitted in a Draeger diving suit, he had dived more than 12 meters to attach a charge to the bottom of the British freighter Greenwood. It was later learned that diving with the Draeger hood required extensive training as well as courage, and it was therefore considered doubtful whether the mine, if fastened, ever exploded. It was definitely established that the Greenwood had gone down off Mellila [sic] at the exact tine predicted by the agent, in December 1944, and Major Rudolf immediately reported the success of the mission to Berlin. The Navy later announced that without doubt the Greenwood had been sunk by a submarine’s torpedo.
Other mine-laying undertakings were reported to Berlin by the II chief during 1941, but the ‘sabotaged’ ships reappeared repeatedly with no signs of damage. These false claims of success finally led to the recall of Rudolf and his specialist assistant, Schomel. This ended the first phase of German sabotage activities against Allied shipping.
The experience gained from the failures of 1941, together with the efforts of Hummel, who had taken charge of Referat II in early 1942, were the main factors [that] led to the decision to intensify the sabotage program. A new type of mine, intended to be fastened to a ship’s Schlingerleiste, was designed in Berlin according to instructions prepared by Hummel. The mine was constructed in three separate parts, thus facilitating its handling and transportation. The air contained in the empty head of the mine kept it afloat. The middle part held 15 kilos of explosives, and the rear part consisted of a fuse, set for distance rather than time, which could be adjusted to a maximum distance of 80 miles. The fuse was simply a small wheel, kept revolving by the current produced by the motion of the ship. Several pincers were welded on to the mine so that it could be easily fastened to the Schlingerleiste. It was discovered that the mine could be used successfully only if diving and fastening of the device were repeatedly practiced by the agents who were to execute the operation.
The German freighter Lipari, anchored in Cartagena bay, was selected by Hummel as the location for a sabotage diving school.
At first only Hummel was able to swim and dive with the Draeger outfit, since II-T in Berlin had failed to provide the necessary aids, such as artificial flippers, to be fastened to the swimmer’s feet and adequate weights to counteract the updraft of the Draeger mask. In summer 1942 Hummel and Wabel, assisted by Memmel and Alejandro Mejias, made numerous attempts to fasten the mine to Allied ships docked at Seville. At that port it was possible to guide a rowboat underneath the piers and thus to approach to within a few feet of the target without being detected. Hummel would dive silently while Waber held a thin guide and emergency rope.
Many of the first attempts failed because of the diver’s physical exhaustion and the danger of discovery of the mission. Finally a mine was attached to a freighter, the Inber (Blaum is not certain of the name). The freighter later turned up in Gibraltar as scheduled.
In September another graduate of the Lipari school, Francisco Lopez, of Melilla, succeeded in attaching a mine to a British vessel. Not only did the mine fail to explode, but the I-M observation post in Algeciras reported that a British diver had been observed removing the mine from the Schlingerleiste. Thereupon all training at Cartagena ceased, and it was decided that the sabotage of ships from the outside would be abandoned.
It was then attempted to smuggle explosives aboard British ships at Seville. In late 1942 two successes were reported. In both instances, orange crates loaded on barges awaiting transfer to Allied freighters had been partly filled with explosives fitted with time fuses. The operations were performed at night from rowboats. In both cases, 15–30 kilos of explosives were packed into each of several orange crates. One ship, the Ravonspoint, was blown up at Gibraltar, while the other, The City of … had to put in at Lisbon because of the heavy damage it sustained.
A similar project was started in late 1943. Explosive charges had to be planted in crates farther upstream, along the banks of the Guadalqivir river, instead of Seville harbor, since the British anti-sabotage organization was maintaining a close watch over the orange barges in the harbor. Three crates were filled with sabotage materials of British origin and loaded onto one or possibly two vessels. The results of this operation were never discovered by the Germans, although they made extensive efforts to learn of the fate of the two vessels.
At Valencia sabotage along similar lines was committed. Onion and orange crates were filled with charges at night along the road leading to the harbor where the cargo ships were docked. A serious blunder was made when German fuses were used in several bombs instead of the usual British fuses, of which there was a temporary shortage, ‘The sabotaged orange ships’ were widely publicized by the Allies, who in this case had definite proof of German complicity. Further evidence of German origin came to light when several crates exploded aboard a British cargo ship in Valencia harbor, following an unexpected postponement of the ship’s sailing date. (Once the charges were p
laced inside the crates it was impossible to regulate the time fuses.)
No further sabotage of this sort was attempted in Spanish ports. Numerous investigations by Blaum and his associates showed conditions everywhere to be adverse. Very few Spaniards were implicated in the sabotage of orange ships, Hummel and Blaum having both planned and executed this project.
Two final attempts to sabotage Allied ships were made in Seville and Huelva respectively. Bombs camouflaged as chunks of coal were thrown in the coal bins of two freighters. Neither attempt was successful.
Sabotage of Italian Ships in Spanish Harbors after Italy’s Surrender
Shortly after Italy’s surrender it became known in Berlin that Spain, under Allied pressure, was to deliver to the Allies Italian ships that had remained in Spanish harbors. KO Spain was thereupon ordered to prevent these ships from sailing to Allied ports. As a result the following sabotage missions were undertaken:
The Fulgor, a tanker in Cadiz harbor: Screw and rudder damaged by an explosive charge of 15 kilos fastened to the ship’s Schlingerleiste by [Victor] Ante.
Gaeta, freighter, Huelva. Same method as above. Charge, 30 kilos. Results: Screw and rudder damaged.
Tanker (name unknown), Cartagena. An unsuccessful attempt was made by Leutnant Kampen, who planned to use the same method as that used on the Fulgor. As Kampen and his assistant, Richter, rowed from the Lipari to the tanker, the fuse ignited prematurely. Kampen was killed instantly, and Richter and one of the Lipari officers were injured.
A second attempt was carried out with the help of Giuseppe Faber, an Italian Fascist officer residing in Madrid. Faber persuaded two members of the tanker’s crew to assist him. Originally it was intended to destroy the screwshaft inside the ship and some bearings. Some of the charges did not go off, however, and only minor damage was inflicted.
Cesena, freighter, Barcelona. Blaum directed this mission, assisted by the second engineer of the Cesena. Blaum suggested the shaft be destroyed, but the engineer, whose cabin was located nearby, feared his life would be imperiled in the attempt. Without Blaum’s knowledge, the bomb was placed in another section of the ship, and little damage was caused by the explosion. At Vigo an attempt to sabotage an Italian ship failed. Sasso, a friend of Faber’s, claimed to have fastened two British magnetic mines to the ship’s hull. Sasso was probably not well acquainted with the handling of these mines.
At Las Palmas and Tenerife the crews of two Italian ships, acting on their own initiative or at the urging of the German consulates, opened a number of valves and destroyed several engine parts in each ship. The II agent at Las Palmas, Jose Segura, claimed to have smuggled a 15 kilo charge aboard one of the vessels. Neither attempt was successful.
Sabotage of Allied Ocean Cables
In summer 1942, Referat II attempted to cut British cables leading from Vigo to Gibraltar and Lisbon, and in 1943 an attempt to cut the Bilbao–Great Britain cable was undertaken. Both actions were ordered by Berlin despite the fact that the cables were officially out of use. To cut the cables, a three-pronged anchor was dragged along the bottom of the ocean about a mile offshore in the general vicinity of the cables. When the anchor hooked a cable, it was raised, thus exerting maximum tension and causing a break. The participants in these missions, the II staff plus Juan Jose Dominguez at Vigo and Jose Luis Echazarra at Bilbao, claimed success.
Use of Torpedoes for Sabotage
In 1943 a small torpedo was to be fired from a ship outside Huelva harbor. The torpedo, constructed for shipment in sections, had an S-charge weighing about 50 kilos. After being fired in the desired direction, the torpedo could be guided automatically. The torpedo was never used, however, because permission was not received from Berlin. A supply of these torpedoes brought to Huelva in 1943 was returned to Germany in early 1944, when S-operations in Spain were discontinued.
‡
Although Blaum’s principal purpose was Abt. II, his knowledge of the Madrid KO extended far wider, as his American interrogator learned, and is encapsulated in a report dated January 1946 that covered its history:
Abwehr II’s first representative in Spain, sent there in early 1940, was Sonderführer Krueger. Krueger was instructed to set up an office in Madrid and to study conditions in general as well as possibilities for II-operations in Spain. At the time, headquarters in Berlin had not yet devised a plan for carrying out its insurrection and minority program (J-work) in Spain. No sabotage activities were planned, principally because ‘S’ and ‘J’ were still separate departments of Abwehr II, and both Krueger and Blaum, who went to Spain in March 1940, were sent there on orders of the J-section.
Upon his arrival in Madrid, Blaum reported to Kapitan Lenz, Commanding Officer of KO Spanien. Blaum was told that his first mission was to make contacts of possible future value. Permission for Blaum to remain in Spain was obtained by the German Embassy, where he was registered as an employee. Later the entire staff of Referat II was incorporated into the Embassy as a section of KO Spain. Thus Lenz became Blaum’s and Krueger’s superior. Although matters of II interest were settled directly with Abwehr II in Berlin, Lenz still influenced II operations, since all general policies had to be approved by him.
In 1941 Krueger was transferred to Tangier where he was put in charge of a small, independent KO organization. Major Rudolf was appointed new head of II in Spain. The failure of most of the projects initiated under Rudolf was largely due to his inexperience and lack of initiative.
The appointment of Friedrich Hummel, a well-known swimmer, to succeed Rudolf in 1943 paved the way for the most successful period of II KO Spain’s history. Missions were completed against Gibraltar, Allied orange freighters, and, after Italy’s surrender, Italian vessels in Spanish harbors. A ‘cease action’ order was received from Berlin in March 1944, however, and Hummel was recalled for a more important assignment as head of Leitstelle II West, FA.
The new chief of Referat II, Hauptman Naumann zu Koenigs-Brueck, was handcuffed by the order prohibiting S-operations in Spain. He had only begun work on an R-organization (Rueckzugs Organisation – withdrawal plan) when he was ordered to return to Germany. In February 1945 Blaum was also recalled, and Referat II’s remaining activities were entrusted to Werner Schulz, an inexperienced man from Berlin.
Blaum also detailed the Abwehr’s relationship with the Spanish government on the subject of sabotage, and his organisation’s reliance on British equipment captured from SOE:
At no time did Referat II cooperate with the Spanish General Staff or any official Spanish agencies, according to Blaum. Such contact was restricted to Referats I and III. It was never officially admitted that II was active in Spain, and therefore Referat II was not permitted official outside assistance. Referat II was, of course, very unpopular in Spain, and the KO chief was repeatedly advised by the Spanish General Staff to cease all S-operations. Blaum emphasizes that Spain does not have an equivalent to the German Abwehr II.
Orders from Berlin
No specific orders concerning the nature of sabotage work were ever given by Berlin headquarters, which merely issued statements of general policy. Changes in policy were frequently necessitated by political or military reverses, the exact nature of which were unknown to the lower echelons. One rule, however, was always emphasized: all sabotage against Allied shipping was to be timed so that the explosion would occur outside Spanish territorial waters, that Spanish neutrality would never be openly violated, and that no proof of German origin would be found at the scene of the sabotage. (Proof of German complicity in the explosion of an orange ship at Valencia brought a succession of reprimands from the Foreign Office, the High Command, and Spanish authorities, directed against Abwehr II in Berlin and passed down to Hummel in Madrid.)
Only one exception was allowed to this regulation. At the last minute, permission was granted to sabotage Italian ships in Spanish harbors, but again, it was emphasized that no clue of German complicity be found, and that, should the Spanish Government make an official pro
test, blame be placed on the Italian crews.
A last and definite order from Berlin was received in early 1944, prohibiting all S-operations in Spain and ordering the destruction or removal of all remaining S-materials.
Origin of Sabotage Materials
Whenever possible, II KO Spain used British sabotage equipment. The reason for this was twofold: (a) British material was far superior to, as well as more reliable and safer to handle than, the German equivalent; (b) its use also prevented detection of German origin in case an action was prematurely discovered. This equipment, sent from Berlin under diplomatic privileges, had been captured in France, either after the British withdrawal of 1940 or from underground forces, to whom great quantities had been parachuted by the Allies.
Efficiency of Abwehr II
Personnel of Abwehr II was [sic] generally ill-suited for its job, according to Blaum and Amende. In most cases the KOs were headed by old reserve officers, intent on keeping their position and rank but lacking intelligence training and knowledge of the country to which they were assigned. Strict adherence to the rigid military hierarchy prevented abler, more experienced, subordinates from making their voices heard in the operations of the KOs. As a result, plans were always vague, specific operations had little chance of success, and throughout the war the slogan in Berlin remained, ‘Something must be done, no matter what.’ Abwehr II was characterized by a marked tendency to claim tremendous successes and to report constant activity, even when nothing was going on.
Blaum’s account of the German stay-behind plans proved to be a revelation, describing how the Abwehr had anticipated an Allied invasion of Spain:
In late 1942 KO Spain began to fear an Allied invasion of Spain. This attitude, based in part on persistent reports from Berlin pointing to the probability of Allied landings in Spain, prevailed throughout 1943. Shortly after the Allied invasion of North Africa orders were received to build up an R-organization in the Iberian peninsula. Referat II’s part in the project consisted of burying small quantities of S-materials in south and south-east Spain, where the invasion was anticipated. To avoid possible indiscretions, only the German staff was allowed to participate in the burying parties.
