by Nigel West
Hans Ruser, who has gone to Camp 020, has told us that he was given a promise by the assistant military attaché in Madrid that if he came back to this country he would be allowed his liberty. He has also told us that his mother, who is still in Madrid, is known to the Germans, and so is his desertion to the British. Since the Germans are looking for the mother, it has been decided if possible to get her out since she might conceivably compromise ARTIST. Meanwhile, we are trying to find out what promises were in fact made to Ruser. This is, of course, a matter on which we should have been informed before Ruser came here. TRICYCLE has got a questionnaire from the SD, which is the first that we have had from the organisation. It deals almost entirely with political matters in this country. Ian Wilson has returned with quite a lot of interesting information. Amongst other things ARTIST has told him that Fremdeheere do not do more than say that a report is reliable or unreliable, confirmed or unconfirmed; they have no knowledge of the antecedents of the agent. Abteilung I do not appear to assess the information. They generally leave this to Fremdeheere, whose comments are somewhat colourless. In ARTIST’s view Abteilung I will always be led up the garden [path] till they have the antecedents of their agents carefully vetted by Abteilung III. Mercifully, there seems very little chance of this coming about.
Ruser’s interrogation resulted in a ninety-page report that described his background in Hamburg, his connections to Norddeutscher Lloyd shipping company, where his father was the master of the Leviathan, and his work for the Madrid KO. A few days after receiving the report, Liddell conferred with J.C. Masterman, the chairman of the XX Committee:
I had a long talk with J.C. Masterman about Hans Ruser. J.C.’s view is that although SIS got Ruser out in case he should be kidnapped and betray ARTIST, there is a greater danger to ARTIST if Ruser’s presence in this country is discovered. The Germans will conclude that he has blown TRICYCLE and possibly also ARTIST. Ruser could be of little use to us here, but might do good work in Spain. I said that I thought the presence of Ruser’s mother in Spain was a danger and that SIS should continue their endeavours to get her out. This would ease Ruser’s mind and not in any way prejudice his chances of working in Spain.
The following day, Liddell held a conference to weigh the implications for ARTIST:
I had a meeting with Kim Philby, Peter Lloyd, J.C. Masterman, T.A. Robertson, Ian Wilson, John Marriott and Edward Reed, on the subject of the future of Hans Ruser. We came to the conclusion that before making up our minds as to whether Ruser should go back, it was necessary to put the proposition to ARTIST and get his views. An endeavour would be made to persuade him that Ruser was far more valuable to us in Spain than here, and that unless he thought Ruser would constitute a serious menace to his own position, we should like to send him back. Meanwhile, J.C. Masterman will talk to Ruser and find out whether he would prefer his mother to be got over here if he himself goes back. SIS will endeavour to ascertain whether Ruser’s mother’s passport has run out and whether either the Germans or the Spanish authorities have tried to make contact with her.
At the end of the month, on 28 December, Liddell went to Camp 020 to interview Ruser himself:
I went to see Hans Ruser with J.C. Masterman and Ronnie Reed. He was very pleasant and civil and I think of honest purpose. There is no doubt to my mind that he is anxious to return to Spain and confident that he can get away with it. His proposal is to live somewhere just outside Madrid and to maintain contact with some six or eight agents who are rather on the fringe of the Abwehr. He would not have any contact with the regular officials of the Abwehr. He would move about only at night. He says that now that the Falange militia has been abolished, there is little danger from the Spanish police. He would like, if possible, to return with Costa Rican papers or, failing these, with Brazilian. I suggested to him that if he were going back it might be better for his mother to remain in Spain since people would consider it rather odd if she disappeared. He seemed to agree about this and thought that he would be able to gauge the situation better when he got back. He would in many ways prefer to see his mother in this country.
Two days later, Liddell consulted SIS about the advisability of infiltrating Ruser back into Spain:
I had another meeting with SIS and B1(a) on the subject of Hans Ruser. It is agreed by all except Ian Wilson that Ruser should go back and that ARTIST should have the position explained to him either by Frank Foley or by Ruser. He would be told that after a thorough examination of the case we had come to the conclusion that Ruser did not constitute any real menace to ARTIST’s own security, and that in any case he had strict instructions not to make contact with ARTIST. SIS will try to supply Ruser with the necessary papers and to get him back as early as possible. Ruser will explore the position of his mother when he gets there.
However, by 24 February, ARTIST himself had been consulted, and he voiced his opposition to Ruser’s reappearance:
J.C. Masterman and Ronnie Reed came in to tell me about Hans Ruser. ARTIST does not want him to go back to Lisbon, and this view is supported by SIS. The argument is that the Germans are already looking for Ruser and his mother, and that if he were taken he might be forced to talk, and possibly to compromise ARTIST, although in fact he can have only a suspicion that ARTIST may be working for us. He knows that ARTIST offered his services, but thought they were turned down. I cannot help feeling that this case has been rather mishandled. There have been endless delays through [XXXXXXXX] in Lisbon not getting into touch with ARTIST. Personally, I think, it is a pity that Ruser does not go back. He can only be an embarrassment to us here as we cannot give him anything to do.
The upshot of these deliberations was that Ruser was installed in an MI5 safe house in London and his mother was exfiltrated from Madrid by SIS, leaving the Germans to speculate on their mysterious disappearance. Ruser was disappointed at not being allowed to return to Spain, and his request that a newspaper should report his arrest by the British while fleeing to Argentina was politely declined. MI5’s dilemma over ARTIST would be eliminated when Jebsen dropped from view in April 1944, having been abducted by an Abwehr colleague, Dr Aloys Schreiber, to face charges of embezzlement. On instructions from Berlin, Schreiber had lured Jebsen to his office with an invitation to discuss his award of a coveted decoration. Jebsen, accompanied by an Abwehr friend from Cologne, Heinz Moldenhauer, suspected nothing and walked into the trap. With Jebsen beyond reach in Berlin, the TRICYCLE network in London was suspended.
ISOS revealed that Jebsen had fallen under suspicion, and the SD’s reaction had been predictable, but Section V could not warn ARTIST of the danger he was in. De Salis did obtain permission to send a veiled ‘be careful’ message, which had prompted the reply ‘When have I ever not been careful?’, and de Salis later blamed himself for not having argued for permission to be more explicit and wrote an angry letter to Frank Foley, who passed on the complaint to MI5’s unrepentant Tommy Robertson.
At the end of the war Schreiber, a Bavarian who had been a lawyer before the war, was interned by the PVDE at Vizela, and then repatriated in December 1945 for interrogation at Asberg. When questioned, Schreiber was co-operative, and after he had undergone the routine cross-examination on his activities and the work of the Lisbon KO, he was recalled in May 1946 to give an account of his involvement with Jebsen, a document entitled ‘ARTIST’s Refusal to Attend Meeting in Biarritz’:
In the early part of April 13, Schreiber received a telegram from Obst/Lt Kuebart, Leiter Abw Abt I, ordering both him and Jebsen to report to Nest Biarritz for an official conference on or about 20 April 1944. The telegram was addressed to both Schreiber and Jebsen.
When presented with this order from Berlin, Jebsen showed extreme surprise and displeasure and finally refused to leave Portugal. Schreiber warned him that such an action would be considered desertion by any court martial, since Jebsen must consider himself a soldier with a special mission in a neutral country and thus subject to military law. Jebsen remained adamant, despite Sc
hreiber’s insistence that he comply with the order and despite his warning that he would have to report this refusal to Berlin.
In reply, Berlin once again urgently ordered Jebsen to proceed to the meeting in Biarritz and in a separate dispatch to Schreiber ordered him to proceed alone to the meeting should Jebsen still refuse. Jebsen again informed Schreiber of his decision to remain in Portugal and Schreiber went to Biarritz alone.
The Conference with Kuebart in Biarritz
In Biarritz Schreiber conferred with Kuebart and his adjutant Sdf Weiss. Kuebart was given a verbal order by Hansen to see personally that Jebsen reached German-occupied territory or at any rate to thwart any attempt on his part to reach Allied territory. Desertion to the Allies was to be prevented by any means. Kuebart further informed Schreiber that this order was of extreme importance to the war effort. Berlin had proof, he stated, that Jebsen had been working for both sides for some time and was now preparing to go over to the Allies.
Schreiber claims to have protested to Kuebart that the entire affair was a matter for Gruppe III, counter-espionage, and that the execution of such an order was purely a police measure. Both Kuebart and Weiss agreed with him on this point, but said that Hansen had decided that this case was predominantly of military interest, therefore an exception was to be made and an Eins officer chosen to execute the order. Once Jebsen was in Berlin, he would have to answer only to the military authorities and under no circumstances to the SD. Furthermore, Hansen had given the strict order that neither Gruppe III nor the German Police in Portugal were to know anything about the affair and that the number of those taken into confidence be kept to a minimum.
Neither Kuebart nor Weiss could offer Schreiber any concrete suggestions on the actual way of carrying out the order, especially the way of returning Jebsen to German territory. It was left entirely up to Schreiber, but there was to be no delay.
The Meeting in Madrid
Schreiber was anxious to confirm this order from Berlin, and since there was no rapid means of communication between Biarritz and Berlin, he requested Kuebart and Weiss to accompany him to Madrid, where Kuebart might radio Berlin for confirmation. Kuebart agreed to this and the day after their arrival in Madrid, wireless confirmation of the verbal order for the delivery of Jebsen to Reich territory was received from Hansen, specifically charging Schreiber with the task. In a conference attended also by Obst/Lt Keikebusch, I Chief of KO Spain, Schreiber claims to have assured Kuebart and Weiss that he would try everything in his power to get Jebsen on to German soil in compliance with the order, but would not resort to any extreme measures. The discussions in Madrid led to no clear suggestions as to how Schreiber was to execute the order. Kuebart and Weiss returned to Berlin and Schreiber proceeded to Lisbon.
Moldenhauer’s Connection with the Case
In Lisbon Schreiber learned that a close friend of Jebsen’s, a certain Moldenhauer, had arrived and was staying with him. Schreiber claims Moldenhauer was an Abwehr agent for Ast Cologne. He had come to Portugal on the pretense of contacting V-Maenner, hut Schreiber suspected that he had no intention of returning to Spain, where he had previously been active.
Aware of Moldenhauer’s good connections with Allied circles, Schreiber concluded from his discussion with Kuebart that Jebsen and Moldenhauer were planning to desert to the Allies together in the very near future. He therefore felt it necessary to act sooner than he had intended and also to include Moldenhauer in the abduction, who otherwise might become suspicious and upset the plans. If innocent, Moldenhauer would have no trouble clearing himself with the military authorities in Berlin.
Schreiber’s Plans for the Abduction
Schreiber decided to call both Jebsen and Moldenhauer to his office for a meeting in the late afternoon of 30 April. At that time the office would be completely deserted. They could be knocked out and while unconscious placed in two large trunks in which they could be shipped by car the same evening over the Portuguese–Spanish and Spanish–French borders to Biarritz. To guard against all possible surprises at the borders, Schreiber also decided to drug them by injections.
Two assistants would be neccessary to carry out the action. Schreiber chose Bleil and a signal officer of KO Portugal, in whose name the car was registered and who, according to Portuguese law, had to accompany the car on a trip across the border and Karl Meier, civilian motor officer of KO, who was thoroughly familiar with the car and if necessary could repair it.
Schreiber sent a wire to Hansen in Berlin to the effect that the sudden appearance of Moldenhauer supported their suspicions and necessitated his inclusion in the affair and that the planned action would be initiated without delay.
At noon on 30 April he and Meier purchased the two trunks, which Schreiber claims were large enough for a grown person and were fitted with adequately large openings for ventilation. The sleeping drug for the injections Schreiber obtained in a Lisbon pharmacy.
Upon his return from Lisbon, Schreiber had asked Jebsen to call at his office on the afternoon of 30 April, using as a pretext his intention of giving him detailed information about a decoration which Berlin wished to bestow on Jebsen. He had also asked him to bring along his friend Moldenhauer, ostensibly to question him on his missions.
The Abduction
On Saturday 30 April 1944 at 1800 hours, Jebsen and Moldenhauer arrived together at Schreiber’s office. Schreiber carried on a general conversation with both of them for a short while and then called Jebsen into another room. There he claims to have informed him of the true outcome of the discussions in Biarritz and of Hansen’s order to have him brought to Biarritz by force, since he would not go of his own free will. Jebsen made a move for the door and Schreiber knocked him out. Meanwhile Meier had also overpowered Moldenhauer in the adjoining room.
According to Schreiber, he then informed both Jebsen and Moldenhauer, after they had recovered in the presence of Bleil and Meier, how he intended to get them across the border and both of them submitted to the injections.
The party started out at about 2100 hours to Badajoz with the two drugged victims in the trunks and Schreiber, Bleil and Meier as the other occupants of the Studebaker sedan. The Portuguese–Spanish border was crossed without incident between midnight and 0200 hours, since Bleil and Meier knew border conditions and officials personally from previous trips both here and at the Spanish–French border in Irun.
The trip through Spain was only interrupted by a few rests in the open and the Spanish–French border at Irun was crossed at about 2100 hours of the following night without incident. In Biarritz Jebsen and Moldenhauer were immediately turned over to the local Stellen Leiter, Obst/Lt. Fuchs.
Schreiber’s version of what had happened to Jebsen introduced the new participant, Heinz Moldenhauer, who in fact had not as yet approached the Allies in the hope of defecting, but it was evident that Georg Hansen had suspected Jebsen of treason, even if the rumours suggested he had been accused of financial embezzlement. In any event, Jebsen and Moldenhauer were held in Biarritz by Paul Fuchs until Hansen sent a plane from Berlin to collect them.
As the head of I-H in Portugal since 1943, Colonel Schreiber had no particular reason to mislead his interrogators about what had happened, and his account was accepted as ‘reliable’, having been corroborated in May 1945 by Wilhelm Kuebart, who was interrogated on the same issues at Camp 020.
After the war MI5 and SIS made strenuous efforts to find out Jebsen’s fate, and learned some details from the last people to visit him at Oranienburg concentration camp. The first was Otto Kurrer, in June 1944, who thought he had negotiated his release, but the 20 July plot intervened. The second was Petra Vermehren, mother of the defector Erich Vermehren, who was interviewed in Hamburg in February 1947, and described how she had gained access to the prisoner in February 1945. Apparently Jebsen had been taken to the RHSA in Berlin to be interrogated by Walter Schellenberg’s personal assistant, Sturmbannführer Walter Schmitt, who accused him of having stolen a large quantity of counter
feit currency from the SS. The original accusation had come from one of Jebsen’s former associates, an SD officer named Lengeling, who had denounced him to Kriminalrat Hofmeister. Allegedly Jebsen had been employed to buy gold bullion with forged notes, and had taken rather too large a commission for himself. From this sketchy evidence it seemed that Jebsen’s role as ARTIST had not played any part in his ultimate demise.
‡
Another of the BODYGUARD spies in wireless contact with the Abwehr was a Polish Air Force officer, Roman Garby-Czerniawski, who had escaped from Paris to Madrid in October 1942. Code-named BRUTUS by MI5, Garby-Czerniawki was to make an important contribution to FORTITUDE because he was a professional soldier, so knew what to look for when making observations of military units, had plenty of espionage experience, having been working as an agent in France throughout the German occupation, and appeared unlikely to betray his German masters as they had much of his blown organisation in prison as hostages. However, Garby-Czerniawski was a patriot as well as an opportunist, and had declared his role as an Abwehr spy to MI5, which, after lengthy consideration, decided to run him under control. As a pilot, later attached as a liaison officer to FUSAG, not at the main headquarters at Wentworth, but at a special unit in Staines, he would be exceptionally well-placed to provide details of Allied troop movements in the weeks before D-Day, and in December 1943 he had reported his recruitment of a fellow pilot, code-named CHOPIN, who would act as his wireless operator from a house in Richmond upon Thames.
