by Nigel West
The Army Group was obliged to gather its own military and political intelligence by stealth. Even the Field Marshal was not kept officially informed of the course of operations in Italy and on the Eastern Front. It was thanks only to his own good connections that he was able to keep in touch with the situation on other fronts. The telephone and other means of contact had to be used with the greatest caution.
Lack of information made itself felt when the Army Group had to assess the likelihood of a second landing operation taking place. The Supreme Command failed to keep its Field Commanders informed of technical developments of weapons, whether the progress and probable effectiveness of V-weapons, atomic bombs, naval weapons or jet-aircraft.
The Allies seemed to have their three dimensional invasion forces assemble in readiness in the British Isles by the end of April. Army Group B Headquarters was absorbed in calculations on the probable date of the invasion. There were restrictions upon travel in the United Kingdom, the Home Guard was called up, and British industry complained of the dislocation that this produced. The sign that was most ominous was the intensifying of air attacks against the mainland, which indicated an attack to be imminent, though its exact timing would depend upon weather conditions. The High Command of the Wehrmacht was advised by the German Navy that indications pointed to 8th May and named this day as ‘the certain date’ for the beginning of invasion. This ‘zero-day’ came and went, and the Naval Command in the West then expected the attack to be delayed until August.
Field-Marshal Rommel expected invasion daily and prepared his troops for it. He was thankful, however, for every delay that gave him more time for political and military preparations and working up the efficiency of his men. He suggested repeatedly that the Allied concentrations should be reconnoitred, attacked and destroyed. His intention was that U-boats should attack the ports and anchorages, that controlled minefields should be laid, but Hitler did not favour production of the pattern of mine required, that there should be bomber sorties on the Allied assembly areas, where vehicles were thick on the roads and vehicle parks, and that V-1 rocket bombs should be used although there was certainly much delay in bringing this invention to readiness.
The Field-Marshal assumed in April 1944 that the invasion would be directed against the mouths of the Somme, Bresle, Arques and Seine and the harbours of Abbeville and Le Havre, the coast of Calvados and the Cotentin peninsula with its port, Cherbourg. He considered it to be vital to the Allies to capture a sizeable port at an early stage. He had no means of knowing that an artificial harbour would spring into being in June on the coast of Calvados. Allied air supremacy had to be assumed under all circumstances. The German Navy did not expect landings in the mouth of the Seine or along the Calvados coast. They thought it improbable that the enemy would risk a landing on the Calvados coast particularly, because of its rocky shallows. It was for this reason that the coastal defences on this part of the Normandy coast were not formidable. Then intelligence reports confirmed that the enemy was definitely taking a special interest in the Normandy coast, and Rommel demanded at the beginning of May that the III Flak Corps, scattered over the whole of central and northern France, should be concentrated and put under his command. Its four regiments and twenty-four batteries would have provided considerable fire power against aircraft and tanks. The Field-Marshal wished to place it between the Rivers Orne and Vire. Goering turned down this request. The Navy sent a few flak ships, improvised coastal vessels with anti-aircraft guns mounted on them, and these were anchored in the mouth of the Vire.
Field-Marshal Rommel, unlike Hitler, did not expect a landing on the Channel coast at Cap Gris Nez. After the beginning of May his impression was that the enemy would not ram his head against the hardest spot in the defence just for the sake of a short sea voyage and having his supply bases close. He thought Brittany to be an unlikely area, despite its favourable harbours, because the terrain would restrict operations after the landing.
The Army Group was sceptical about the High Command view that the Allies would attack in strength on the coast of Belgium and the mouth of the Scheldt. That did not seem to us likely as the main shipping concentrations were in South Coast ports, in the West Country and in Wales. The pattern of the Allied air war could not be interpreted as preparing for landings so far north. Rommel believed that several landings would take place simultaneously or in rapid succession in areas that were linked in the Allied plan of operations. He believed also that there might be a feint landing. The coast between the Somme and the Bay of St Malo, he thought, was the most dangerous sector.
There were reports that landings might take place on both banks of the Gironde estuary and also on the Mediterranean coast of France. The Army Group did not believe in a landing in the Bordeaux area. It considered an invasion of the Mediterranean coast of France on both banks of the Rhone as probable but of secondary importance. Such landings might be aimed at taking the German Atlantic defences in a pincers movement. The possibility was examined in the course of operational studies. The Field Marshal assumed that the intention of the Allies, after a successful landing either north of the Seine or south of the Seine, having cut off Brittany, would be to make the Paris area their first target. They would advance thence with concentrated forces against Germany. It was vital to the Allies for operational, political and psychological reasons that they should win the Ile de France.9
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The OKH’s initial reaction to the landings was encapsulated later that same day in an intelligence summary:
The enemy landing on the Normandy coast represents a large-scale undertaking; but the forces already engaged represent a comparatively small part of the total available. Of the approximately sixty divisions at present in the South of England, it is likely that at the most ten to twelve divisions are at present taking part, including airborne troops. The main objective of the undertaking must be regarded as the capture of the port of Cherbourg, and the simultaneous closing of the Cotentin Peninsula to the south … Within the framework of his group of forces Montgomery still has over twenty divisions available to reinforce his operations, which allows us to expect further air and sea landing attempts in the area of the Cotentin Peninsula, to force the capture of his objective.
Attacks against the Channel Islands, coupled with attacks against the west coast of Normandy, seem possible here, as well as surprise thrusts against Brest. The entire group of forces which make up the American First Army Group, comprising about twenty-five divisions north and south of the Thames, has not yet been employed. The same applies to the ten to twelve active divisions held ready in the Midlands and in Scotland. The conclusion is, therefore, that the enemy command plans a further large-scale undertaking in the Channel area which may well be directed against a coastal sector in the central Channel area.
On the evening of D-Day, BRUTUS reported how the events of the past few hours had taken him by surprise, but introduced the idea that another assault was likely as FUSAG remained uncommitted:
Received, this morning, news of the beginning of the invasion. Extremely surprised because our FUSAG remains unmoved. It is clear that the landing was made only by units of the 21 Army Group. I do not yet know whether all units of the 21 Army Group are taking part. Am returning to Wentworth and will seek the details. Am surprised that the army groups, although independent, are attacking separately. The general opinion at Wentworth was that it should arrive simultaneously. FUSAG, as I reported, was ready for an attack which is capable of being released at any moment, but it is now evident that it will be an independent action.
By the following day, D+1, Hitler’s conviction that another invasion was imminent had become orthodoxy, as the OKM War Diary confirmed:
Other large scale landing operations had to be expected almost certainly. Enemy landings in the eastern part of the Channel carried out by about 25 formations kept in readiness on the Thames were expected to take place after the consolidation of the enemy bridgehead which had so far been established.<
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This view was reinforced the following day by a further OKM War Diary entry:
According to a reliable source of our agents on 9 June, many landing craft are kept in readiness perfectly camouflaged in the Thames mouth and further north.
On 8 June the Lagebericht West appeared to endorse the authenticity of the threat from Patton’s FUSAG:
The opinion was also expressed that the Seine might form the dividing line between Montgomery and Patton. Since for reasons of concentration of forces as well as for tactical reasons of command, the employment of other of Montgomery’s forces at any far distant place seems unlikely, it is conceivable that the dividing line between the 21 Army Group and the American Army Group standing ready in South-East England (Patton?) will be roughly along the Seine. Within the framework of the operations so far carried out, we must, therefore, reckon with the rapid arrival of further Montgomery formations in the Normandy area, and here new landings, especially on the west coast of Cotentin, seem possible. The employment of strong forces against Brittany or against the Atlantic front seems at the moment not very probable, on account of the Anglo–Saxon concentration and of the fact that both the enemy armies held ready in South-West England have been used against Normandy … The fact that still no formations of the forces held ready in South-East and Eastern England have so far been identified in the landing operations strengthens the view that the strong Anglo-American forces still available in that area are being held together for further designs in other areas.
On D+4 the Lagebericht West assessed that most of the Allied invasion force was still in England:
Of the English 21 Army Group concentrated in South-West England, approximately sixteen divisions have so far been in action in Northern France, while a further nineteen divisions of this group of forces are available and uncommitted in England. Reinforcement to the extent of three further divisions from the West of England and the West of Scotland is possible. Since nearly half of all Montgomery’s formations are employed in Normandy it is to be expected that his remaining formations will also be used here. The group of forces in South-east England, which has not yet been touched, comprise at the moment about twenty-seven divisions and could possibly be joined by a further five divisions from the centre of England and three more from Scotland.
On 11 June FHW reported that ‘the Army Group in south-east England and the close combat formations belonging to it did not take part in the operations on D-Day’ and then recorded news from the RSHA:
An agent report from the same source provided correct information about the landing at Cherbourg, that a landing operation will be staged in the area Dieppe, Abbeville, Le Touquet on 14 or 15 June.
The precise nature of this information is unclear, and not immediately attributable to any of the FORTITUDE channels who were emphasising the continuing second wave threat, but not offering a timescale. Whatever the source, it may have contributed to the deliberations at the Berghof on 12 June when Dönitz noted that:
Keitel and Jodl consider the situation very serious although they still see a hope of an unsuccessful enemy landing attempt at another point … The most likely point would be the coast between Dieppe and Boulogne or between Calais and the Scheldt.
Impetus had been given to the assessment by a report that two American airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st, had been replaced because they had been selected for participation in another major engagement. This view was reinforced by the OKM War Diary, which mentioned receipt of:
a report of a reliable agent in London on the evening of 11 June. According to the report it was the general impression that considerably more forces were engaged than had originally been provided for in the invasion plan. The operation against the Seine mouth (Le Havre) was openly admitted by military circles in London to have been a failure … Neutral observers in London expected a new operation against the Channel coast, possibly in the direction of the Belgian coast.
There was more support for the proposition that the Allies were planning another invasion when, on 12/13 June, the long-awaited and much-delayed V-1 bombardment of London commenced. The initial salvo of just twenty-five weapons was launched from the Pas-de-Calais, but the volume would escalate to a daily barrage of 300, and German analysts credited the rockets with a political impact they never merited. Another Blitz, it was thought, would be sufficiently provocative as to transform the strategic balance and likely act as a trigger for another assault on the French coast. On 16 June the OKM War Diary asserted that ‘the American Army Group which is still in England without having taken part in the fighting up to now’ probably would not ‘operate in the near future’. On the same day the War Diary mentioned:
A report of a French Staff Officer from North Africa of 24 May which was obtained by counter-espionage. According to his report the Allied Supreme Command provided the carrying out of one or several of five invasion plans of which Plan No. 1 was now under execution. Plan No. 2 which is to follow in the second half of June in case Plan No. 1 is carried out successfully, covers the tactical air landing to be between the Somme and the Scheldt Rivers … Simultaneously, several secondary diversions are said to be planned … one of the plans provides for an attack against the Mediterranean coast of Southern France.
The source of this information, the French staff officer, was Major André Latham, a St Cyr graduate and Abwehr stay-behind agent in Tunis who had been recruited in Paris by the Abwehr’s Oscar Reile and equipped with a transmitter, designated ATLAS 1. In May 1943 the colourful Latham had surrendered to the Allies upon the city’s liberation to be supervised by de Gaulle’s BCRA under the code name GILBERT. With the guidance of Dudley Clarke’s ‘A’ Force in Cairo, which co-ordinated the information passed to the enemy, Latham sent a message to his Abwehr controller almost every day for fifteen months, first from Tunis and, from November 1944, when he was based in Marseilles.
The material selected for transmission to the enemy was processed through Cairo by ‘A’ Force and then passed to its representative on the 43 Committee in Tunis, Pierre Grandguillot. So, although GILBERT was run by the BCRA’s Captain Germain, he was essentially an instrument of the Forty Committee in Algiers, which was itself subordinate to LCS in London. Monitored ISOS traffic indicated that Latham was highly regarded by the Abwehr, and the quality of his messages reflected the status of his cover story, that he was working on the staff of a French general and would later be posted to SHAEF’s Civil Affairs branch in Paris. The fact that Latham had disclosed the existence of five invasion plans on 24 May, mentioning that the second would be launched in the latter half of June, suggests a very high-risk strategy had been adopted by LCS, but evidently one that paid off handsomely, not least by enhancing the agent’s reputation.
On 17 June Hitler travelled by train to Margival to confer with von Rundstedt and Rommel in the secure bunker complex designated Command Post II that had been built in 1940 in anticipation of SEELÖWE, the invasion of England. Rommel told the gathering that the enemy’s strength in Normandy was assessed at between twenty-two and twenty-five divisions, and was being reinforced at a rate of three divisions a week. He argued that, in the light of the successful Allied beachhead, there was no longer any chance of a second wave, and no need for the enemy to take such a risk. Accordingly, his request was for permission to make an orderly retreat to a line south of the Loire, but it was turned down. Unimpressed, Hitler vowed to inspect the front for himself, but actually returned to Germany the next day, his night having been disturbed by the detonation in a nearby village of a V-1 that had veered off course.
Rommel’s assessment of the Allied strength in Normandy at twenty-five divisions was inflated and premature. In reality, only five divisions had fought their way up the beaches, and this apparently limited commitment had been interpreted by the German analysts as proof that the attack was intended only as a diversion, with SHAEF plotting a much greater assault elsewhere. Actually, the Allied strength in Normandy did not reach twenty-five divisions until 26
June.
A few days after their encounter with the Führer, when even von Rundstedt and his Chief of Staff, Günther Blumentritt, were finally persuaded that the likelihood of another Allied amphibious landing had receded, they applied to OKW for permission to deploy the entire 15th Army on the Normandy front, but in answer received the news that the latest intelligence suggested a concentration of American and Canadian troops in the Dover–Folkestone area where reportedly a large number of ships had assembled. The SIGINT evidence, OKW advised, indicated what exactly Hitler believed: another major assault that would require the 15th Army to remain where it was.
Rommel’s mistaken figures as presented to Hitler at Margival on 17 June, and his declared estimate of the landed reinforcements, resulted on 26 June in Army Group B circulating an even more flawed assessment:
The enemy has employed 27 to 31 divisions in the bridgehead and a large number of GHQ troops … in England another 67 major formations are standing to, of which 57 at the very least can be employed on large-scale operations.
Three days later, on 29 June, FHW circulated a report, mentioned in the OKM War Diary, that the American ‘Army Group concentrated in south-east England will start a new offensive aimed at Paris–Reims in the middle of July’. This continued belief in the FUSAG fiction was perpetuated in the OKW’s situation report for 1–7 July, which confirmed that what was termed ‘Army Group Patton’ was still in England’s south-east, poised for its mission to cross into the Pas-de-Calais. Clearly the danger remained in Hitler’s mind, for he addressed the issue on 8 July when he gave a new directive to his commanders, among them Günther von Kluge who had replaced von Rundstedt five days earlier.
