by Nigel West
The FHW’s assessment on 9 June (D+3), which was not available contemporaneously, reiterated the danger from FUSAG:
Since the present grouping of forces, as well as technical considerations of command, make it seem unlikely that further forces of Montgomery will take part in any far distant action, it is conceivable that the dividing line between the English 21st Army Group and the American Army Group, which is still standing by in the South East of England, will be the same. The fact that not one of the formations still standing by in the south east and east of England has been identified in the present operation strengthens the supposition that the strong Anglo-American forces which are still available are being held back for further plans.
This crucial estimate conformed closely with the conclusions reached by GARBO that had been relayed from Madrid the previous evening. When this signal was examined by Allied analysts post-war, the original OKW message form was found to have been annotated, firstly by Friedrich-Adolf Krummacher at FHW, who underlined the words ‘diversionary manoeuvres designed to draw off enemy reserves in order then to make a decisive attack at another place’ and inserted the comment ‘confirms the view already held by us that a further attack is to be expected in another place (Belgium?)’.
The words ‘south-east and east England’ were underlined by General Jodl, and a further pencil mark indicates that it was also read by Hitler. SHAEF concluded that, based on this document, the German strategy had undergone a significant change, one of the few examples where cause and effect could be accurately gauged.
On 10 June the FHW interpreted the latest intelligence, about reinforcements for the 21st Army Group, and declared that they did not mean any reduction in FUSAG’s strength:
The arrival of the 51 English Infantry Division (hitherto thought to be in the Cambridge area) – compare Situation Report of the 9th June, 1944 – is not to be regarded as an encroachment on the group of forces in south east England since this division had already been transferred to Montgomery’s Army Group before the invasion began. The strength of the group of forces in south east England has therefore not been reduced.
On 11 June the FHW contacted the Madrid KO to offer an overall evaluation of GARBO’s signal, and a request in connection with FORTITUDE NORTH, the fabricated threat of a landing in Norway:
Appreciation: The report is credible. The reports received in the last week from the ARABEL undertaking have been confirmed without exception and are to be described as especially valuable. The main line of investigation in future is to be the enemy group of forces [in] south-eastern and southern England. It would also be especially valuable to learn in good time when the formations which are at present assembled in western Scottish ports put to sea and what their destination is.
The War Office Y Service reported to SHAEF that on 9 June the 11th Panzer Division, garrisoned north-west of Paris, had been deployed to the Somme, away from Normandy. Furthermore, the 1st SS Panzer Division had been ordered to move from Turnhout to Ghent. Similarly, the 85th Infantry Division, which had received instructions to prepare for operational deployment, had the signal cancelled. At Ops (B) these three recalls were seen as proof positive that the bait was being taken, and the OKW’s counter-orders were directly attributed to GARBO.
On D+7, the five bridgeheads linked up, and by midday on 13 June, a total of 427,000 men and 105,175 tons of materiél had been landed by 62,238 ships. By D+10 the Allied strength in Normandy amounted to eighteen divisions, confronted by twenty-five German divisions. Meanwhile, following BENEDICT’s arrival in London to assist his chief, GARBO only had one remaining sub-agent left in Scotland, the Greek seaman code-named BEN who had deserted his ship. At the request of the Germans, this agent had moved from Methil on the east coast to Glasgow at the end of May to provide cover for BENEDICT because the Abwehr suspected that some of the invasion ships would sail from the Clyde:
If you consider it advisable to call BENEDICT to help you, please ask him to consider carefully if in this event the north will be well covered by BEN, since it is very possible that some action will start up from those ports.
This move had proved fortuitous because just before D-Day the Greek had spotted the notional 58th Infantry Division and the notional British II Corps in Motherwell, apparently heading south.
On 15 June DAGOBERT reported to GARBO on a visit he had just made to Liverpool to check on rumours of American troops embarking for an attack on Bordeaux.
Further evidence of the arrival of a new American formation over and above the number already mentioned is at present lacking. Nevertheless reports of the arrival of fresh American transports deserve attention. We must therefore reckon with an early increase in the number of American divisions in England.
On the very same day, the Japanese ambassador told the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, in a telegram designated BJ/73, that the Normandy invasion had taken the Germans by complete surprise:
Leaving for a moment the Anglo-American claim that the landing was a surprise, it is a fact that although the Germans had long been warning their people of the danger of enemy landings, there is a tendency to think the German military authorities were making preparations with July in their minds and that the present landing occurred rather too early to suit them …
The following day, GARBO received a message from DONNY in Dover, identifying the shoulder flashes of both the units known to have recently left Scotland. GARBO remarked:
I attach the greatest importance to the reference by this agent to these insignia as it is an indication that all the troop concentrations seen by BEN in Motherwell have been moved South.
On 16 June, GARBO submitted several reports from DAGOBERT’s agents, describing their observations:
DICK: Brighton: the situation has changed little with the following exceptions. Troops with the insignia of the knight on horseback have left the area. They left for Normandy. U.S. troops with the insignia of a blue circle cut in four have arrived in the area of Lewes. The insignia was reported by DORICK on his last journey to London as having been seen in his area. DONNY has also seen some troops with the insignia of the red fish on waves and the stag’s antlers. I have written to DONNY telling him that he should let me know urgently if he sees there … troops of the 55th Division which BEN also reported in the concentration at Motherwell.
In fact, DONNY was to discover the genuine 55th Division a few days later in Dover, apparently preparing to cross the Channel. The following day, on 17 June, GARBO made a further attempt to keep the FORTITUDE threat alive. The reference to training exercises involving landing craft was intended to be interpreted as a sign that further amphibious landings were planned:
DORICK communicates that the American division at present occupying the camps in which the 28th U.S. Division has been before they left for the South, is the division which has the insignia of a serpent which the Americans call a rattlesnake. The Division recently arrived in England. In his letter he sets out in detail the manoeuvres which the 28th U.S. Division carried out on the beaches of Felixstowe.
On 18 June BRUTUS joined in the speculation about another major attack, emphasising FUSAG’s likely role, and reported:
I have learnt that FUSAG will receive during the assault very strong support from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, composed of heavy bombers. This last appears to indicate an attack against a strong position and the possibility of an attack across the Channel is discussed.
This message, predicting massive air support for FUSAG’s assault on a heavily fortified area, certainly caught the interest of FHW which the following day issued an updated Lagebericht:
Attention is deserved by a report from a particularly trustworthy source according to which FUSAG will be supported in action by strong portions of the heavy bomber force, which points to its employment against strong fortifications and so fits in with our existing appreciation (Middle Channel coast).
On 12 June GARBO reported on another of his casual conversations with the American sergeant he h
ad befriended, whom he designated Agent CASTOR:
I attempted to find out from CASTOR where the headquarters of General Bradley are to be found but as he is at present under Montgomery’s orders in 21 Army Group CASTOR has been unable to say where this headquarters might be. I asked him who then was now in charge of FUSAG to which he replied that it was General Patton who had taken over the command which had temporarily had been held by Bradley during the first phase of its formation. In the conversation held, I was able to find out that the headquarters of General Patton, that is to say of FUSAG … is situated near Ascot.
By 15 June the Luftwaffe estimated that between 23 and 25 Allied divisions had landed in France. The following week, on 20 June, FHW repeated information just received from GARBO:
28th American Infantry Division last reported carrying out landing exercises in the Ipswich area has now returned to Kent. In the Ipswich area there is said to be a new Division which has arrived from the U.S.A, possibly the 8th American Infantry Division. This has still to be confirmed. The intensification of resistance in Brittany which is being supported by the continuous provision of supplies and commanders by air is possibly intended to tie down German forces. There are so far no signs of further plans directed against this area apart from an air attack on a location apparatus at Brest, neither does the concentration of troops in England provide any clue in support of such a plan. On the contrary, all movements which have been recognized during the last weeks have been in a south easterly direction and the south western area has been correspondingly denuded. There are further indications from south eastern England that the formations of the First American Army Group are closing up in the direction of the south east coast. The move which has been reported but not yet confirmed of formations of the 2 British Corps (assumed to be in central England) to Kent comes within the scope of this south eastern concentration. There are as yet no documents to show the target date for operations.
On the same day GARBO reported on a further encounter with the talkative NCO, who revealed that his uncle was also posted to England.
I today learned some very important news. I casually asked him in which division his uncle was. He replied in the 48th U.S. Division. To my question as to whether this division belonged to the First U.S. Army Group, he replied that it did not, nor did it belong to 21 Army Group, thereby drawing the conclusion that there are many American troops here who belong to other large units. As is natural, I will investigate this matter as much as possible.
On 23 June the FHW expressed concern about FUSAG in a routine bulletin that, of course, did not become available to Ops (B) for several months, but it demonstrates the extent to which the Germans had miscalculated Allied strengths:
The portions of the English Army Group under Montgomery which are still in the south of England may, with the exception of the three Airborne Divisions already recognized there, be regarded as a reserve for future employment probably after the capture of the port of Cherbourg. Their employment in another sector of the coast is not anticipated since parts of the ten remaining Divisions already identified by number in England are most probably already being brought into the Second English Army (for 12 English Army Corps.)
The readiness for invasion of the First American Army Group (which need not be considered for any undertaking against Brittany) is emphasised by the evidence in the hands of Luftwaffe Command/Ic according to which there are recognizable indications of completed preparations for air landing and parachute operations. The reported concentration of landing craft in the harbours on the middle east coast (Harwich–Yarmouth) also deserves attention.
The Greek seaman followed up his report with a further message on 22 June, D+16, noting an exercise conducted by the British Fourth Army in Ayrshire. In his twenty-second letter, dated 20 July 1944, GARBO finally disposed of the threat posed by these non-existent forces in Scotland and thereby terminated FORTITUDE NORTH, taking credit for the scepticism that he had expressed earlier:
There is something important which I want to stress. If I recall correctly, the British Fourth Army was in Scotland with the formations observed by BEN, that is to say, together with the 2nd Corps, the 55th and 58th Divisions. If, therefore, the British Army moves down, the only division to effect the proposed attack against Norway will be the 52nd Division. I therefore consider that an attack against Norway is impossible for the moment. My present observation goes to show how right I was when I expressed the opinion against the views of BENEDICT and BEN that this operation would not then come off at that time of the year. I therefore consider that a state of alarm in Norway need no longer be maintained.
The removal of FORTITUDE NORTH still left GARBO heavily committed to FUSAG and FORTITUDE SOUTH, even if the original Ops (B) intention was to sustain the deception only until D+14. Naturally, it had been accepted that the deception could not be maintained indefinitely, and some of the real forces in Kent obviously had to move off to France in due course. With DONNY in Dover, it was a little difficult to avoid reporting genuine troop movements, and the 21st Army Group was keen to conceal the number of reinforcements going to France. The solution was for DONNY to travel to Tenterden, where both British and American units were known to be based awaiting their departure to Normandy. On 30 June, GARBO described how DONNY had travelled to Tenterden by train, but had been turned back at the station because he was not equipped with the required documentation. When the 21st Army Group finally gave their consent to the reporting of various troop movements, GARBO sent the following from DONNY, which implied that the units were heading in the opposite direction:
Many troops of the 2nd Canadian Division have been leaving the area. Have seen large convoys of this division moving North on the London road. The 28th US Division is said to be leaving Tenterden.
On 25 June FHW relied on the Luftwaffe’s aerial reconnaissance flights to predict a move towards Paris, but nevertheless remained concerned about FUSAG:
Evidence obtained from photographic reconnaissance tasks of formations in Montgomery’s Army Group show that the objects of this Army Group may shortly be found to lie in an easterly direction towards Paris. The direction of the attack again brings into relief the idea of a corresponding and supporting attack by Patton’s Army Group (First U.S. Army Group) in the Seine–Somme area. As regards the concentration of this group of forces it is noteworthy that two further formations of the group of formations in Central England (II Army Corps and 58 English Infantry Division) have been reported in the Dover area. This concentration of forces in the area south east of London and the intention in the Channel area is thus given renewed emphasis.
Four days later, on 27 June, FHW was still preoccupied with FUSAG, at a time when the Allied strength had grown to twenty-four divisions, and the German forces had increased to thirty divisions.
The significance of the concentration of forces in south eastern England is continuously underlined by troop movements recognized in this area. In this connection it must be emphasised that the composition of the First Canadian Army in the area London–Brighton–Dover, primarily English and Canadian formations with their higher value (by comparison with the Third American Army) points to an action against the central channel area.
On 2 July GARBO had lunch with the NCO and, as he reported the same day:
brought the conversation round to the subject which interested me, which is to say about the American units which have recently arrived in England. He told me that FUSAG will undertake a more important task and that in order to be able to accomplish it, four American divisions have recently arrived in this country under the command of another American army. These divisions are stationed in the Liverpool area. He insinuated that the war was about to enter a new and decisive phase. In view of this interesting news I intend to send SEVEN immediately to investigate what is going on in the Western area, which I am not controlling at the moment. I intend to clarify this matter and will invite CASTOR out frequently.
Even by D+30, when the Allied str
ength in France had reached thirty divisions, the German forces had grown to just over thirty-seven.
In the absence of definite news from either GARBO or BRUTUS, the OKW was left in a quandary about Allied intentions, and on 8 July the dilemma became apparent when General Osamu Otani, the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, reported on a briefing he had received:
The following British units are believed to be in Great Britain … HQ of the VII Corps, and the 52nd Infantry Division (in Scotland). The XX Corps and the 58th Infantry Division arrived in Kent from Scotland.
This message was further proof the deception scheme was working, for VII Corps at Beith and the 52nd Infantry Division were completely bogus and had been invented by BRUTUS while on a visit to Scotland in April. VII Corps was especially significant as it would shortly be moving to Folkestone. The reference to XX Corps was briefly a mystery as there was no such unit, real or notional, but most likely it was a misprint for II Corps, which was imaginary and had been reported by GARBO.
German faith in these units was complete, and it later emerged that the FHW had mentioned them in a situation report on 8 June:
It is noteworthy that two English divisions are getting ready for embarkation in the Firth of Clyde area (West Scotland). They are the 52nd and 58th English Infantry Divisions which a short time ago were standing by on the east coast of Scotland. It follows that these divisions will not be included in any operation in the Norwegian area. It can thus be seen that the enemy will have recourse to forces in the Scottish area to extend his operations in France.
