by Nigel West
Four days later, the issue was raised again:
Haddon spoke to me about Eisenhower’s despatch. He said that we ought to submit our observations to Colonel Moore of the Ministry of Information. Later in the day I called on Moore and left with him a paper giving our views (a) on the question of revealing strategic deception as a whole contrary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruling and (b) on the danger to both GARBO and BRUTUS in the light of recent revelations which made it clear that the Battle of Normandy was fought almost entirely on their information. I said that I could see no reason why Eisenhower, rather than disclosing deception on a major scale, should not confine himself to stating what Jodl in fact believed, namely that the Germans made a miscalculation as to the purpose for which our reserves in the South-East of England were going to be used. I said that if the Chiefs of Staff intended to give way on the former agreed policy Ronald Wingate’s draft was the best that could be made of a bad job. It would still however involve a considerable risk to the agents. Moore then asked me to provide him with some alternative draft, which I did.
On 25 February Liddell received both the Hesketh brothers, who expressed concern about Eisenhower’s intentions:
I saw Roger and Cuthbert Fleetwood-Hesketh when they produced for me documents showing the part played by GARBO and BRUTUS in the deception plan. I was intending to use these if there was any difficulty at the COS meeting when publication of Eisenhower’s despatch was to be discussed. Actually however the meeting was postponed. The documents are of the highest interest. They constitute the daily reports on which the battle was fought by the General Staff and contain whole chunks of GARBO and BRUTUS and in one instance the comments of General Krummacher. He was the Ic representative at OKW and the receiving point for Abwehr information. In the telegram dated 9 June which contained information from GARBO, Krummacher has underlined an important passage about the threat to the Pas-de-Calais and written a note drawing Jodl’s attention to the matter. Jodl has initialled the telegram and also made a special mark indicating that it was passed to Hitler. A report on 19 June states ‘Attention is drawn to a report from a particularly trustworthy source according to which FUSAG will be supported in action by strong operations by the heavy bomber force which points to its employment against strong fortifications and so fits in with our existing preparation, middle channel coast.’
Cuthbert had prepared a note of his interview with Jodl who had been shown many of the documents and asked to explain the various signatures, etc. He says that he had a conversation with Jodl on 11 December 1945 when Jodl explained his view that the very excellence of the German High Command’s insight into the geographical distribution of the Allied forces in the UK prior to and during the invasion had caused a false appreciation to be made. ‘We knew’ he said ‘that you had one Army Group in the south of England and one in the south-east. We know now that the South-East Army Group was not in fact launched against the Channel coast but its continued presence in the south-east of England constituted a threat which it was not possible for us to ignore. We therefore did not feel justified in authorising any large-scale release of 15th Army formations for use in Normandy until a considerable time after the invasion had started. Had our picture of your dispositions in the UK been less complete and had we not been aware of the presence of the 1st U.S. Army Group in south-east England we would have despatched more of the 15th Army to Normandy earlier, which might have had very serious results for yourselves.’ Jodl himself considered the FUSAG Pas-de-Calais threat was off by the middle of July when formations of the 3rd U.S. Army began to appear in Normandy. He admitted reluctantly, since his loyalty to Hitler’s memory is absolute, that the retention of a considerable part of the 15th Army in the Pas-de-Calais until long after was due to the Fuhrer’s own persistent belief in the continuing possibility of a landing in that area. The interview convinced Cuthbert of Jodl’s complete acceptance of the existence of FUSAG in south-east England.
On 27 February Liddell attended the weekly meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, but was not called in to make MI5’s case against Eisenhower, so instead proposed to fly to Washington to confront him:
I was again in attendance at the Chiefs of Staff and was not called. Afterwards deception was discussed by the Joint Intelligence Committee when it was disclosed that the Chiefs of Staff were prepared to stand on their ruling and to substitute something on the lines of ‘German miscalculations’. These paragraphs will follow Jodl’s line of thought. Meanwhile a telegram is being sent to [Field Marshal Sir Henry] Maitland Wilson, telling him that I am coming out and suggesting that I should explain the whole position to him and to Eisenhower.
The subject came up again on 4 October when Liddell’s former subordinate, John Gwyer, who had returned to his university teaching post, enquired about the ban on all discussion of signals intelligence and strategic deception. As the MI5 officer who had investigated the Dutch spy Alfred Meiler in 1942, Gwyer had been well-acquainted with ISOS and Most Secret Sources:
John Gwyer came to see me about deception in relation to the history of the war, a part of which he is engaged in writing.
I said that as far as I knew the ban on global deception still existed, and that as far as D-Day was concerned it would not be possible for anybody to go further than General Eisenhower’s despatch.
He said that the leading historians had been indoctrinated as regards ULTRA, and of course had seen minutes of the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet, which made frequent references to deception. It seemed, therefore, desirable that something should be said to them. I suggested that Noel Wild perhaps might give them a lecture on what happened, so that they would not be searching about for the answer to something they did not understand. Any application for his services should go through General Leslie Hollis.
Thus the veil of secrecy, enforced without exception from the end of hostilities, remained intact until 1972, when the first disclosures were made regarding strategic deception, but even then the full extent of the FORTITUDE campaign stayed classified and would not emerge for a further two decades.
APPENDIX I
FÜHRER DIRECTIVE NO. 51, DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1943
The Führer
OKW/WFSt/Op.N. 662656/43 g.K. Chiefs Top Secret Führer Headquarters
3 Nov 1943
27 copies
Directive No. 51
For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and the overall situation. The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany’s chance for survival.
Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier.
For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favor of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to strengthen the defenses in the West, particularly at places from which we shall launch our long-range war against England.* For those are the very points at which the enemy must and will attack; there – unless all indications are misleading – will be fought the decisive invasion battle.
Holding attacks and diversions on other fronts are to be expected. Not even the possibility of a large-scale offensive against Denmark may be excluded. It would pose greater nautical problems and could be less effectively supported from the air, but would nevertheless produce the greatest political and strategic impact if it were to succeed.
During the opening phase of the battle, the entire striking power of the enemy will of necessity be directed against our forces manni
ng the coast. Only an all-out effort in the construction of fortifications, an unsurpassed effort that will enlist all available manpower and physical resources of Germany and the occupied areas, will be able to strengthen our defences along the coasts within the short time that still appears to be left to us.
Stationary weapons (heavy AT guns, immobile tanks to be dug-in, coast artillery, shore-defense guns, mines, etc.) arriving in Denmark and the occupied West within the near future will be heavily concentrated in points of main defensive effort at the most vulnerable coastal sectors. At the same time, we must take the calculated risk that for the present we may be unable to improve our defenses in less threatened sectors.
Should the enemy nevertheless force a landing by concentrating his armed might, he must be hit by the full fury of our counterattack. For this mission ample and speedy reinforcements of men and materiel, as well as intensive training, must transform available larger units into first-rate, fully mobile general reserves suitable for offensive operations. The counterattack of these units will prevent the enlargement of the beachhead, and throw the enemy back into the sea.
In addition, well-planned emergency measures, prepared down to the last detail, must enable us instantly to throw against the invader every fit man and machine from coastal sectors not under attack and from the home front.
The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be relentlessly countered by Air Force and Navy with all their available resources. I therefore order the following:
Army:
The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me as soon as possible a schedule covering arms, tanks, assault guns, motor vehicles, and ammunition to be allocated to the Western Front and Denmark within the next three months. That schedule will conform to the new situation. The following considerations will be basic:
Sufficient mobility for all panzer and panzer grenadier divisions in the West, and equipment of each of those units by December 1943 with 93 Mark IV tanks or assault guns, as well as large numbers of antitank weapons.
Accelerated reorganization of the 20 Air Force Field Divisions into an effective mobile reserve force by the end of 1943. This reorganization is to include the issue of assault guns.
Accelerated issue of all authorized weapons to the SS Panzer Grenadier Division Hitler Jugend, the 21st Panzer Division, and the infantry and reserve divisions stationed in Jutland.
Additional shipments of Mark IV tanks, assault guns, and heavy AT guns to the reserve panzer divisions stationed in the West and in Denmark, as well as to the Assault Gun Training Battalion in Denmark.
In November and December, monthly allotments of 100 heavy AT guns models 40 and 43 (half of these to be mobile) in addition to those required for newly activated units in the West and in Denmark.
Allotment of large numbers of weapons (including about 1,000 machine guns) for augmenting the armament of those static divisions that are committed for coastal defense in the West and in Denmark, and for standardizing the equipment of elements that are to be withdrawn from sectors not under attack.
Ample supply of close-combat AT weapons to units in vulnerable sectors.
Improvement of artillery and AT defenses in units stationed in Denmark, as well as those committed for coastal protection in the occupied West. Strengthening of GHQ artillery.
The units and elements stationed in the West or in Denmark, as well as panzer, assault gun, and AT units to be activated in the West, must not be transferred to other fronts without my permission. The Chief of the Army General Staff, or the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me a report through the Armed Forces Operations Staff as soon as the issue of equipment to the panzer and assault gun battalions, as well as to the AT battalions and companies, has been completed.
Beyond similar measures taken in the past, the Commander in Chief West will establish timetables for, and conduct maneuvers and command post exercises on, the procedure for bringing up units from sectors not under attack. These units will be made capable of performing offensive missions, however limited. In that connection I demand that sectors not threatened by the enemy be ruthlessly stripped of all forces except small guard detachments. For sectors from which reserves are withdrawn, security and guard detachments must be set aside from security and alarm units. Labor forces drawn largely from the native population must likewise be organized in those sectors, in order to keep open whatever roads might be destroyed by the enemy air force.
The Commander of German Troops in Denmark will take measures in the area under his control in compliance with paragraph 3 above.
Pursuant to separate orders, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will form Kampfgruppen in regimental strength, security battalions, and engineer construction battalions from training cadres, trainees, schools, and instruction and convalescent units in the Zone of the Interior. These troops must be ready for shipment on 48 hours’ notice.
Furthermore, other available personnel are to be organized into battalions of replacements and equipped with the available weapons, so that the anticipated heavy losses can quickly be replaced.
Air Force:
The offensive and defensive effectiveness of Air Force units in the West and in Denmark will be increased to meet the changed situation. To that end, preparations will be made for the release of units suited for commitment in the anti-invasion effort, that is, all flying units and mobile Flak artillery that can be spared from the air defenses of the home front, and from schools and training units in the Zone of the Interior. All those units are to be earmarked for the West and possibly Denmark.
The Air Force ground organization in southern Norway, Denmark, northwestern Germany, and the West will be expanded and supplied in a way that will – by the most far-reaching decentralization of own forces – deny targets to the enemy bombers, and split the enemy’s offensive effort in case of large-scale operations.
Particularly important in that connection will be our fighter forces. Possibilities for their commitment must be increased by the establishment of numerous advance landing fields. Special emphasis is to be placed on good camouflage. I expect also that the Air Force will unstintingly furnish all available forces, by stripping them from less threatened areas.
Navy:
The Navy will prepare the strongest possible forces suitable for attacking the enemy landing fleets. Coastal defense installations in the process of construction will be completed with the utmost speed. The emplacing of additional coastal batteries and the possibility of laying further flanking minefields should be investigated.
All school, training, and other shore-based personnel fit for ground combat must be prepared for commitment so that, without undue delay, they can at least be employed as security forces within the zone of the enemy landing operations.
While preparing the reinforcement of the defenses in the West, the Navy must keep in mind that it might be called upon to repulse simultaneous enemy landings in Norway and Denmark. In that connection, I attach particular importance to the assembly of numerous U-boats in the northern area. A temporary weakening of U-boat forces in the Atlantic must be risked.
SS:
The Reichsfuehrer-SS will determine what Waffen-SS and police forces he can release for combat, security, and guard duty. He is to prepare to organize effective combat and security forces from training, replacement, and convalescent units, as well as schools and other home-front establishments.
The commanders in chief of the services, the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief West, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, the Inspector General of Panzer Troops, as well as the Commander of German Troops in Denmark will report to me by 15 November all measures taken or planned.
I expect that all agencies will make a supreme effort toward utilizing every moment of the remaining time in preparing for the decisive battle in the West.
All authorities will
guard against wasting time and energy in useless jurisdictional squabbles, and will direct all their efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power.
[signed] Adolf Hitler
* The ‘long-range war against England’ was interpreted to mean the V-1 flying bomb.
APPENDIX II
BARON OSHIMA’S INSPECTION OF THE ATLANTIC WALL, OCTOBER 1943
The ambassador’s report was transmitted in three parts on 9 and 10 Novem-ber 1943.
Part I
On the morning of the 3rd I returned from my trip of inspection and I will wire you separately what I saw and my opinion about German defences. The trip itself was in general as follows:
1. On the 24th, accompanied by Secretaries Ushida and Ushiba and Lieutenant-Colonel Nishi, I went directly from Berlin to Brest by way of Paris. We arrived at Brest on the morning of the 26th and inspected the defences there and along the neighbouring coast. That night we put up at St Bourg d’Iré. On the 27th we observed the defences around Lorient and the coast southward. That night we stopped at La Baule. We observed night manouevres and on the 28th inspected St Nazaire and its neighbouring defence encampments. We put up at Nantes that night and on the 29th returned once again to Paris. There we were feted by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt; his chief of staff kept telling us about the military situation [corrupt text] Early on the morning of the 30th we left Paris for Bordeaux where we inspected the coastal defences and General Johannes Blaskowitz, commander of the 1st Army, gave us a dinner. On the 31st we left Bordeaux and headed for La Rochelle and observed the coast along the way. We inspected the defences in the neighbourhood and we spent the night there. On the 1st we left Bordeaux and went to Poitiers. We left there the same day.
