937 In the Brahmajāla Sutta sixteen varieties of this view are mentioned, the eight given here and two other tetrads: the self as finite, infinite, both, and neither; and the self as experiencing exclusively pleasure, exclusively pain, a mixture of both, and neither. In the present sutta these two tetrads are incorporated under speculations about the past in §14 , but at SN 24:37-44/iii.219-20 they describe the self after death.
938 Evidently, in the above list the views of the self as immaterial, percipient of unity, and percipient of the immeasurable are based on attainment of the base of infinite space. MṬ explains the consciousness-kasi˚a as the base of infinite consciousness, stating that these theorists declare that base to be the self.
939 The perception within the third immaterial meditation—the base of nothingness—is the subtlest and most refined of all mundane perceptions. Although there is still a kind of perception in the fourth immaterial attainment, it is so subtle that it is no longer appropriate to designate it perception.
940 MA paraphrases thus: “All those types of perceptions together with the views are conditioned, and because they are conditioned, they are gross. But there is Nibbāna, called the cessation of formations, that is, of the conditioned. Having known ‘There is this,’ that there is Nibbāna, seeing the escape from the conditioned, the Tathāgata has gone beyond the conditioned.”
941 The second tetrad of §3 is dropped here since the self is conceived as non-percipient. In the Brahmajāla Sutta eight varieties of this view are mentioned, these four plus the finite-infinite tetrad.
942 MA points out that this statement is made with reference to those planes of existence where all five aggregates exist.In the immaterial planes consciousness occurs without the aggregate of material form, and in the non-percipient plane there is material form without consciousness. But consciousness never occurs without the three other mental aggregates.
943 The Brahmajāla Sutta mentions eight varieties of this view, these four plus the finite-infinite tetrad.
944 Sammoha, here obviously having a different meaning than the usual “confusion” or “delusion.”
945 MA explains the compound diṭṭhasutamutaviññātabba as meaning “what is to be cognized as the seen, heard, and sensed” and takes it to refer to sense-door cognitions. However, it can also comprise all grosser mind-door cognitions as well. To enter the fourth immaterial attainment, all the ordinary “mental formations” involved in other cognitive processes must be overcome, for their persistence is an obstacle to entering this attainment. Hence it is called “not percipient” (n’eva saññı̄).
946 Sasankhārāvasesasamāpatti. Within the fourth immaterial attainment a residue of extremely subtle mental formations remains. Hence it is called “not non-percipient” (n̄saññı̄).
947 The Brahmajāla explains seven types of annihilationism, here all collected together as one.
948 The “fear and disgust with identity” is an aspect of vibhavataṇhā , the craving for non-existence. The annihilationist view to which it gives rise still involves an identification with self—a self that is annihilated at death—and thus, despite his denial, it binds the theorist to the round of existence.
949 So far only four of the original five classes of speculations about the future have been analysed, yet the Buddha speaks as if they were all explicated. MA tries to resolve the problem by explaining that assertions of “Nibbāna here and now” were comprised by the terms “percipient of unity” and “percipient of diversity” in §3. This explanation, however, is not convincing. Ñm, in Ms, had added the heading “Nibbāna Here and Now” over §17, and §§17–21 do seem to correspond with the last four of the five doctrines of Nibb̄na here and now in the Brahmajāla. However, this interpretation seems contradicted by §13 and by the phrase used in §17, §19, and §21, “with the relinquishing of views about the past and the future,” which would exclude the doctrines of Nibb̄na here and now from views about the future (though it is placed among such views in the preamble). The problem seems insoluble, and raises the suspicion that the text was to some degree corrupted in the course of its oral transmission. The insertion of the views about the past just below is also problematic. Not only are such views not mentioned in the preamble, but the placing of the past after the future inverts the normal time sequence. Skilling suggests this passage may have been part of an oral commentary on the sutta which, at some point, was absorbed into the text.
950 This view includes all four of the eternalists who speculate about the past mentioned in the Brahmajāla.
951 Since this is a view referring to the past, it may be taken to imply that at some point in the past the self and the world arose spontaneously out of nothing. Thus it would comprise the two doctrines of fortuitous origination of the Brahmajāla, as MA maintains.
952 This includes the four types of partial eternalism.
953 This may include the four types of endless equivocation or “eel-wriggling” of the Brahmajāla.
954 Views 5–8 correspond exactly to the four extensionists of the Brahmajāla.
955 The eight views (9–16) are, in the Brahmajāla, included among the doctrines of percipient immortality comprised under speculations about the future.
956 That is, they must accept their doctrine on some ground other than knowledge, one involving belief or reasoning. At MN 95.14, it is said that these five grounds of conviction yield conclusions that can turn out to be either true or false.
957 MA: That is not really knowledge but wrong understanding; thus it is declared to be clinging to views.
958 MA says that at this point all sixty-two of the views set forth in the Brahmajāla Sutta have been incorporated, yet this sutta has an even wider range since it includes an exposition of identity view (most notably implied by §24).
959 This section title, and the following Roman numeral “V”, were inserted by Ñm on the supposition that this passage presents the doctrines of Nibbāna here and now, mentioned but not explicated earlier.
960 MA: This section is intended to show how all sixty-two speculative views arise predominated over by identity view.
961 Pavivekaṁ pı̄tiṁ. This refers to the first two jhānas, which include pı̄ti.
962 MA explains that this is the grief caused by the loss of the jhāna. The grief does not arise immediately upon the cessation of the jhāna, but only after reflection upon its disappearance.
963 Nirāmisaṁ sukhaṁ. This is the pleasure of the third jhāna.
964 The fourth jhāna.
965 Santo’ham asmi, nibbuto’ham asmi, anupādāno’ham asmi. In the Pali the expression aham asmi, “I am,” reveals that he is still involved with clinging, as the Buddha will point out.
966 MA takes this to be an allusion to identity view. Thus he is still clinging to a view.
967 MA states that elsewhere the expression “liberation through not clinging” (anupādā vimokkha) signifies Nibbāna, but here it means the attainment of the fruit of arahantship.
968 The Brahmajāla Sutta too points to the understanding of the origination, etc., of the six bases of contact as the way to transcend all views.
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969 Bhavābhavahetu. MA: “Do you think that he teaches the Dhamma as a means of gaining merit so that he can experience happiness in this or that [higher] state of being?”
970 Abhidhamma. MA says that this refers to the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment mentioned in the previous paragraph. See n.362.
971 Meaning (attha) and phrasing (byañjana) are the two aspects of the Dhamma taught by the Buddha. The following passage, §§5–8, should be compared with DN 29.18–21/iii.128–29, which also expresses a concern for the preservation of the correct meaning and phrasing of the Dhamma.
972 This statement is made because slight deviations from the correct phrasing are not necessarily an obstacle to a proper understanding of the meaning. But elsewhere (e.g., AN 2:20/i.59) the Buddha points out that the wrong expre
ssion of the letter and the wrong interpretation of the meaning are two factors responsible for the distortion and disappearance of the true Dhamma.
973 The general principle underlying §§10–14 is this: If the offending bhikkhu can be rehabilitated, then despite the hurt to him and the trouble to oneself, one should try to correct him. But if he is not susceptible to being rehabilitated, one should just maintain one’s own equanimity.
974 “The Recluse” (samaṇa) is glossed by MA with satthā, the Teacher, referring to the Buddha. A similar use of the term is found at MN 105.18, 21.
975 The “thing” (dhamma) intended, MA says, is quarrelling.
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976 The opening of this sutta is the same as that of DN 29, which is also concerned with preserving harmony in the Sangha after the Buddha’s demise.
977 MA: The “shrine” and “refuge” are the Niga˚ṭha Nātaputta, who is now dead.
978 The novice Cunda was the younger brother of Ven. Sāriputta.
979 Even while the Buddha was still alive such a dispute had already broken out among the bhikkhus at Kosambı̄, referred to at MN 48.2.
980 This would be a dispute about the Noble Eightfold Path or the other aids to enlightenment.
981 The first four pairs are included among the “imperfections that defile the mind” at MN 7.3.
982 Adhikaraṇa. Horner translates “legal questions.” They are dealt with at length at Vin Cv Kh 4/Vin ii.88–93; see Horner, Book of the Discipline, 5:117–25. Briefly, litigation because of a dispute (vivādādhikaraṇa) arises when bhikkhus dispute about the Dhamma and the Discipline; litigation because of an accusation (anuv̄d̄dhikaraṇa) when bhikkhus accuse a bhikkhu of committing a transgression of the monastic rules; litigation because of an offence (āpattādhikaraṇa) when a bhikkhu who has committed a transgression seeks to exonerate himself from it; and litigation concerning procedures (kicc̄dhikarana) deals with the enactment of the formal functions of the Sangha.
983 Adhikaraṇasamatha. They are dealt with in detail in Vin Cv Kh 4. How the seven means of settlement are to be applied for the resolution of the four kinds of litigation is discussed at Vin ii.93–104; see Horner, Book of the Discipline, 5:125–40.
984 Sammukhāvinaya. Horner translates “verdict in the presence of.” At Vin ii.93, this is explained as confrontation with (or presence of) the Sangha, the Dhamma, the Discipline, and the individuals who are parties to the dispute. This kind of settlement applies to all four kinds of litigation, with minor differences in formulation.
985 Dhammanetti samanumajjitabbā. MA gives as an example of dhammanetti the ten courses of wholesome and unwholesome conduct, but says that here the Dhamma and Discipline themselves are meant.
986 Sativinaya. Horner renders “verdict of innocence”. At Vin ii.80, it is said that this is given when a bhikkhu is pure and without offences and he is reproached with an offence; he must ask the Sangha to give him such a verdict by appeal to his full and accurate recollection of his behaviour.
987 An offence involving defeat, a pārājika offence, requires expulsion from the Sangha. An offence bordering on defeat is either a sanghādisesa offence, which requires a formal meeting of the Sangha and a period of temporary penalisation, or the preliminary steps leading to a pārājika offence. I follow BBS and SBJ, which have one bhikkhu as accuser, rather than PTS, which uses a plural form. So too below.
988 Amūḷhavinaya. A verdict of past insanity is given when a bhikkhu commits offences during a period of madness. The criterion for determining insanity is that he must have no recollection of his behaviour during the period for which the verdict is requested.
989 The procedure described is the established method by which a bhikkhu obtains exoneration for his transgression when he has fallen into any offence that can be cleared by confession.
990 Pāpiyyāsikā. Horner renders “decision for specific depravity.” This verdict is pronounced against a bhikkhu who is a maker of strife and quarrels in the Sangha, who is ignorant and full of offences, or who lives in unbecoming association with householders.
991 Tiṇavatthāraka. This means of settlement is resorted to when the Sangha has been involved in a dispute in the course of which the bhikkhus committed many minor offences. Since to pursue charges for these offences might prolong the conflict, the offences are cleared by the means described in the sutta. MA explains that this method is like throwing grass over excrement to remove the bad smell, hence the name “covering over with grass.”
992 Offences calling for serious censure are those of the pārājika and sanghādisesa classes. Those connected with the laity are cases where a bhikkhu reviles and disparages householders.
993 As at MN 48.6.
994 At MN 21.21, this is said with reference to the simile of the saw.
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995 See MN 12 and n.177.
996 Adhimānena. MA: They declare this out of conceit, considering themselves to have attained what they have not attained.
997 MA: To make clear to them their level of attainment.
998 MA: Because they are motivated by desire, the Tathāgata’s thought of teaching the Dhamma, which arises towards true practitioners, changes (i.e., fades away).
999 Lokāmisa. These are the five cords of sensual pleasure.
1000 Āneñja (BBS); āṇañja (PTS). This is a technical term for the meditative attainments from the fourth jhāna through the four immaterial attainments. But since the highest two immaterial attainments are dealt with separately, it seems that in this sutta only the fourth jhāna and the lower two immaterial attainments are intended as “the imperturbable.”
1001 The Buddha.
1002 Reading with BBS, evaṁmāni assa atathaṁ samānaṁ. CPD suggests atathaṁ samānaṁ may be an accusative absolute. This passage refers back to the problem of self-overestimation with which the discourse began.
1003 I follow PTS here, whose reading seems supported by all versions prior to BBS. Because the surgeon is later compared to the Tathāgata, and the text cannot ascribe an error in judgement to the Buddha, BBS insists on a strict application of the simile and has thus “corrected” the text to read sa-upādiseso ti jānamāno. I followed this reading in the first edition, but now believe it was a mistake on the part of BBS to alter the received text; strict parallelism in the application of the simile need not be expected. SBJ follows BBS in reading sa-upādiseso, but retains maññamāno, which verges on incoherence. All eds. have janamāno as the participle in the contrasting version of the simile found below. Where PTS has alañ just below, we should read analañ with BBS and SBJ, also supported by the gloss in MA.
1004 Any offence of the two classes, pārājika and sanghādisesa; see n.987. The analogy is difficult to apply with complete precision, since if craving and ignorance had truly been removed from him with only a trace left behind, the bhikkhu would be a sekha; yet it is inconceivable that a sekha would abandon the training or commit a defiled offence. It seems that in this case the analogy must be applied loosely, and the bhikkhu should be understood as one who falsely imagines that craving and ignorance have been removed from him.
1005 See MN 66.17. MA: The arahant, liberated in Nibbāna, the destruction of craving [by taking it] as object, would never divert his body or arouse his mind to indulge in the five cords of sensual pleasure.
1006 As at MN 46.19. I follow BBS and SBJ, which include rasasampanno, missing in PTS.
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1007 See n.1000. Here, too, the term “imperturbable” seems to comprise only the fourth jhāna and the two lower immaterial attainments.
1008 MA says both objective sensual pleasures and sensual defilements are intended.
1009 MA glosses: “having transcended the sense-sphere world and having determined with a mind that has jhāna as its objective.”
1010 MA explains the phrase “his mind acquires confidence in this base” to mean that he attains either insight aimed at reaching ar
ahantship or the access to the fourth jhāna. If he gains access to the fourth jhāna, this becomes his basis for attaining “the imperturbable,” i.e., the fourth jhāna itself. But if he gains insight, then “he resolves [upon it] with wisdom” by deepening his insight in order to reach arahantship. The expression “resolution with wisdom” may explain why so many of the following sections of this sutta, though culminating in attainments along the scale of concentration, are expressed in phrasing appropriate to the development of insight.
1011 MA explains that this passage describes the rebirth process of one who could not realise arahantship after reaching the fourth jhāna. The “evolving consciousness” (saṁvattanikaṁ viññāṇaṁ) is the resultant consciousness by which this person is reborn, and this has the same imperturbable nature as the kammically formative consciousness that attained to the fourth jhāna. Since it is the fourth-jhāna consciousness that determines rebirth, this person will be reborn in one of the exalted realms corresponding to the fourth jhāna.
The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha Page 144
