of Forestry supports, applications for aff
fforestation, grant payments and
on-going premia payments. Accurate mapping was a critical part of this as
on-going payments are made in respect of specifi
fic areas. Mapping is also
critical for determining the suitability of plantation areas. Consequently,
many layers of spatial information are necessary against which applications
must be checked before approval.
A Green Revolution 55
Given the overlap, the department was able to leverage the developments
that were happening on the agriculture side and develop an integrated for-
estry system that used the same spatial database as the agriculture schemes,
giving access to over thirty layers of spatial information. This was subse-
quently expanded to provide an online service to forestry companies, where
they could prepare their maps using the department’s mapping tool.
By 2004, as a direct consequence of all of these strategies and despite a
shortfall in the resources available to it, the department had delivered on
the 5-year program ahead of schedule and gone beyond what was envisaged
in many areas. The capabilities of ICT had increased beyond recognition,
and it had changed from being regarded as an overhead expense to a stra-
tegic tool.
5 DEVELOPMENTS POST 2004—APD
In 2004 an Operational Strategy Group, chaired by the CIO was set up to
inform a new ICT Strategy facilitating identifi
fication of those processes that
through re-modeling and ICT support would off
ffer the greatest potential
benefi t ac
fi
ross the organization.
This shift in focus prepared the ground for the much greater shift in
2006 when ICT, in conjunction with the veterinary inspectorate, proposed
it would trial a new approach to develop generic agile business processes
supported by generic, confi
figurable ICT applications that could be used
across vertical business units. This would be known as agile process devel-
opment or APD. That top management was prepared to take this risk indi-
cates how far ICT in the department had traveled in 5 years.
A third strategy document was prepared in 2007. In this APD was incor-
porated as the standard preferred approach to all new developments and
indeed to refl
flect the shift in focus the name of the function was changed
from ICT to IMT (Information Management and Technology). Table 5.3
illustrates the change in emphasis in the three plans.
Table 5.3 Principal Stages in Adding Value
56 Frank Bannister, Regina Connolly, and Philip O’Reilly
In any large organization there is a tendency for complexity to increase and
with vertical business units this eff e
ff ct can be amplifi e
fi d resulting in infle
fl x-
ibility (Golden & Powell, 2000). By 2005 a strategy of avoiding large projects
had been well established, in favor of phased releases with each subsequent
release enriching the functionality as necessary. Indeed by this time, despite
the myriad of applications that the department historically had and the 250
EU schemes being implemented, the application layer and the business process
layers of the architecture were each being represented on a single A4-sized
graphic that could be related to by all. Consequently, by the time it came
to moving up the value chain to agile business processes and more fle
fl xible
generic ICT applications, the ethos of simplicity was well embedded.
6 REFLECTIONS: THE TRANFORMATION OF ICT
6.1 A Decade of Achievement
By 2010 the department had an integrated set of information systems
underpinning all of its operations based on a coherent base of corporate
data with a single view of the customer, a single view of the land with its
parcels uses and features and a single view of the animals with their move-
ment history and health status.
The geographical information system displays more than thirty layers
of information about land including its parcels or divisions, its usage, its
conservation or habitat status and can immediately identify if it is accept-
able for aff
fforestation. Integrated information about all of the department’s
customers is available in real time. The reputation of the department’s ICT
function is today such that it has been approached by a number of other
public service agencies to take on their ICT support.
The overall result of the strategy adopted in 2000 and subsequently is
that DAFF is now seen as an exemplar of IT use. Well-architected business
processes and ICT solutions mean that DAFF is particularly agile in its
operations, something which is critical in this sector. By exploiting these
capabilities, the department has reaped the fi
financial dividends too in terms
of public expenditure. It now delivers a wider range of services to a much
higher standard of customer service, with almost one third fewer staff than
just fi
five years ago.
6.2 Some Lessons Learned
Some of the lessons that have emerged from this decade are unsurprising,
whereas others confl
flict with accepted wisdom.
• Ad hoc initiatives, projects, or services will not deliver e-government
transformation. Any organization seeking such e-transformation
A Green Revolution 57
needs strategy, a coherent programme and adequate skilled resources
(Weill &Vitale, 2001).
• A successful program needs a combined business and ICT perspec-
tive. It is therefore critical that the CIO is at management board level.
If the CIO is not at “board” level, he or she may not have the ability
to get the necessary attention focussed on e-government opportuni-
ties. The lower status of the head of IT pre-1998 was reflected in the
systems the department had.
• For any CIO to achieve successful e-government transformation, he
or she needs to have the appropriate focus, experience, credibility and
authority.
• In a situation where ICT’s reputation is poor, quick wins are impor-
tant. Although they must not be allowed to derail the success of the
long term plan, intelligent compromises between the ideal way of
tackling a problem and immediate business and political needs must
sometimes be found.
• Achieving early successes changes the morale of the ICT team and
raises their credibility with their colleagues elsewhere in the organiza-
tion. This increases the confi
fidence and productivity of the ICT people
and their willingness to be creative and ambitious. It likewise creates
a confi
fidence throughout the organization that they can successfully
deliver on ambitious projects and an awareness of the scale of the
operational gains of such projects.
• Large projects are best avoided. As projects get larger, risk tends
to increase exponentially rather than linearly. The risks associated
with very large projects are enormous (Hana, 2009). Furthermore
, in
the case of the DAFF organization, besides technology changes, the
occurrence of signifi
ficant operational change, beyond national con-
trol, would mean any long project could be “shooting at a moving
target.” Therefore, while a number of very large projects had to be
completed at the start of this program (e.g., the animal health sys-
tem) it was decided that large individual multi-year projects would
be avoided. Instead, functionality would be built and delivered on a
phased basis in line with the overall architecture.
• Early progress cannot be confi
fined to easy projects and quick wins.
The big tasks have to be progressed too. These are essential to
build capability, to address big needs of the organization and are
often the building blocks upon which future sustainable success
can be delivered.
• While quick wins and the early delivery of large projects will build
the reputation of an ICT over time, it is innovation that will sustain
that reputation (Courtright & Smudde, 2007). As it builds, the ICT
function can be more ambitious in what it proposes to do for the
organization, and if it wants to deliver greatest results, then it needs
to move up the value-chain.
58 Frank Bannister, Regina Connolly, and Philip O’Reilly
• Organizations that have an in-house ICT function should fully exploit
this. Just because the ICT function is centralized in an organization
should not mean that it is separated from the business. It must be an
integral part of the business and carry the responsibilities that go with
that. In-house ICT and other business units should relate as equals
within the business rather than reducing the relationship to that of a
supplier-customer with Service Level Agreements (SLAs) or insourc-
ing. The experience in the DAFF demonstrates the potential for a very
creative symbiotic relationship.
• Whereas ICT people work a lot with technology, it is critical to remem-
ber that ICT staff a
ff re “human” resources. In assigning ICT staff to
roles or projects, it is worth paying attention not just to the technical
skills and experience, but to their own personality and work-style
preferences (Morgeson et al., 2005). This will result in motivated staff
and incomparable results.
• Government agencies are among organizations most likely to depend
on bespoke software, given that their operating models are often
unique and are driven by political and administrative structures and
policies. To be capable of reacting to business changes or events with
suffi
fficient agility, there needs to be a mind shift in their in-house ICT.
The in-house ICT function needs to think and act more like the pro-
ducers of commercial off
ff-the-shelf software—thinking not of today’s
needs for one “customer,” but the needs of all its “customers” today
and tomorrow. If it does this, it can design agile business processes
and confi
figurable ICT solutions.
• Whereas on the one hand the organization must push ahead with its
coherent program, it should be alert for the unplanned opportuni-
ties along the way, be they new technological developments such as
web services technology which emerged during the decade as a major
enabler for the department new business challenges or crises that
arise that create an opportunity for innovation and learning. A cri-
sis, besides its pain, invariably presents and opportunity to progress
the capabilities of the organization and to improve its performance
(Lalonde, 2007).
There is an old and somewhat cynical saying that one should never
waste a good crisis. Faced with a series of crises in the 1990s, DAFF took
the opportunity to tackle a problem that they had failed to address for 30
years. While this account has focused on the ICT group, it must not be
forgotten that it was the top management of the department that made the
decision to commission the plan and appoint a new CIO at senior level.
One unspoken lesson is that the willingness of top management to put its
trust in its CIO and his team is also critical to success in ICT. The story of
the DAFF from 2000 to 2011 illustrates that the most dysfunctional of ICT
operations can be turned around and in a relatively short time. It requires
A Green Revolution 59
leadership, commitment, courage, hard work, and a willingness to take
some degree of risk. The latter is not always a characteristic found in public
servants, but where sensible risk taking is combined with these other fac-
tors, the results can be remarkable.
NOTES
1. Like many Irish government departments, the Department of Agriculture has changed its name several times over the years. For simplicity the abbreviation DAFF will be used throughout this chapter.
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6 Bridging E-Government and
Performance in the Italian
Public Sector
Carlotta del Sordo, Rebecca Levy Orelli,
Emanuele Padovani, and Enrico
Deidda Gagliardo
Carlotta del Sordo, et al.
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The chapter presents an account of the likely consequences that per-
formance monitoring systems have on public service transparency and
accountability through e-government technology. The research draws
upon a study on the Brunetta reform (from the name of the Ministry
of Public Administration) to foster public sectorproductivity, whose key
principles are effi
fficiency, meritocracy, accountability, and transparency.
Specifi
fically we outline the rationale for introducing performance moni-
toring technologies in public central administrations (ministries), the use
the central government made of the system and the ways in which cen-
tral public administrations responded to such compulsory performance
monitoring system.
1 INTRODUCTION
E-government is about a process of reform in the way governments work,
share information, and deliver services to external and internal clients. Spe-
cifi
fically, e-government harnesses information technologies (such as Wide
Area Networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) to transform relations
with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government. These technologies
can improve public sector performance in a variety of ways: better deliv-
ery of government services to citizens, improved interactions with business
and industry, citizen empowerment through access to information, or more
effi
fficient government management. The resulting benefits can be less cor-
ruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and
cost reduction.
The chapter presents an account of the likely consequences that perfor-
mance monitoring systems have on public transparency and accountability
Bridging E-Government and Performance 61
through e-government technology. The research draws upon a study of the
Brunetta reform (from the name of the Italian Ministry of Public Admin-
istration) to foster public sector productivity, whose key principles are
effi
fficiency, meritocracy, accountability, and transparency. One of its key
elements is represented by its linkage to the Italian ongoing e-government
Public Sector Transformation Through E-Government Page 11
