Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book II

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Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book II Page 11

by Giano Rocca


  Chapter 7:

  Conception of the rationality and of the irrationality of human nature and artificiality of reality structural historical

  Socrates had stated that the substantiality (identifiable with the structural reality historic) is such only if recognized by the individual, namely, if the individual is integrated in the structures (1). Socrates, rather than analyze the being, identified by the philosophers with the objective reality (or structural), analyzed the essence or structural reality internalized (2). Hegel spoke of “substantial man” (3) to indicate the actual man or factual, modeled by the structural reality (with the which, basically, he identified him).

  Arnobius, Christian apologist, was pessimistic about the human condition and noted as “human coexistence never comes to be righteous” (4). Since recognized the inhumanity of history, had considered “sacrilegious” the consideration of the history or the society as: created by God. Had considered, however, that the human being is of the same essence of history and had considered, therefore, that even the human being was created by a Lesser God, as are some of the divinities of religions polytheistic, subject to the supreme god.

  Hegel had in mind the irrationality existing in the human nature, as well as in the historical reality. Hegel had distinguished between the self empirical and the human self (5). The young Hegel had theorized the “historical totality (or volksgeist)” (6), meant as total reality, namely, what we defined universe structural statual, and also the same totality of the societies structural historical, in its various structural universes.

  Hegel was opposed to the theory of law of “the Enlightenment”, in their conception egalitarian or liberal of the forehand, which, moreover, have considered the society only as a sum of individuals. Hegel, on the contrary, had theorized the “organicity of the people” and, then, introduced the concept of organicity of law (7), in a conception of feudal type of the forehand itself. Giorgy Lukàcs had noted as, in youth, Hegel had developed the concept of “positivity” as the “dead objectivity” (8), namely, as the structural reality: “alienating” and irrational.

  Kant considered possible to realize a rational knowledge and scientific, independently from the experience, knowledge that he had defined as: scientific metaphysics, understood as the science of human nature (9). For this purpose, Kant proposed its transcendental philosophy as, necessary, propaedeutic to the, predicted, metaphysical science (10). The “Critique of Pure Reason” exposes the transcendental philosophy of Kant. The Kantian metaphysics distinguishes between the reality structural historical and human nature. He defined the first “reality of experience” and second “transcendent reality” (11). The “form”, for Kant, is the scientific means, or natural parameter, (if is not used in an arbitrary manner) of the analysis of reality (12). The study of these transcendental forms (or of the possibility of the transcendence of the reality structural historical, emphasising the human nature and creating the foundations of a society that is consistent with this nature) (13), it was defined by Kant: “Metaphysics”. Mathieu proposed, instead, of embedding it in the mathematics, namely, in the exact science, reserving the term “Metaphysics” to the traditional metaphysics, which is, anyway, a overshadowing of the essence of the historical reality or structural. Kant identified “God” with the “source of bonds absolute moral” (14), and this is conceivable only if you can identify “God” with the very source of the possibility. This, in that, Kant believed that the divinity, consisting in the idealization of historical reality, as is identified by the religions and by the philosophies, and, so, disregards totally by the absolute moral. If, instead, you identify God with the possibility of overcoming the structural reality historic, as did, indeed, Kant, he identifies himself with the human nature fully realized and, therefore, with the human purposes. On the other hand, the divinity, according to the theology, is identifiable, even, with the human purposes. Then, it must not be considered as a superior being at the human being, but a condition to which you can self direct themselves, namely, the full manifestation of the essence and, therefore, occurrence full, even on the spiritual plane, of being. The concept of transcendentality is, also, intended as the needs of the other. In reality, there is no need of the other, but of the relationship with the other (the need of another is only as a function of the ratio with the other) and, thus, there is no any transcendentality, in this or other senses, if not a diversity of nature between human nature and reality structural historical.

  Kant had stated that the organic character of the essence of the statual society make the individual: determined by the state itself “in the position and in its own function” (15). The individual, namely, becomes a mere instrument of the state and, thus, deprived of essence and purpose autonomous. This is the quintessence of the economic oppression - social and political, since subtracts individuals: essence and purpose, transforming them into instruments of the essence and of the purpose of what we call the reality structural statual.

  The Hegelian conception of the spirit leads to an identification between the spirit and metaphysics, where the spirit takes three forms: subjective spirit or ratiocination or intellect (namely: the human nature), objective spirit or structural reality historic (defined by Dilthey: “structural connection of individual living beings, which has its continuation in the communities”) and spirit absolute or self-knowledge (science and conscience). The next philosophy accepts, generally, the Hegelian concept of the objective spirit as: structural reality historic. Luigi Pareyson stated that the Hegelianism has killed the philosophy through the idealization of reality (16). In fact Hegel has killed the philosophy, but not for having idealized the reality, operation already accomplished from Greek philosophy. Hegel placed himself at a crossroads, where on the one hand it exceeds the philosophy, transforming it into an ideology wire-feudal (operation performed by Marx and by “Marxism”), on the other hand you can transform the philosophy and its metaphysical in: Science of structural reality historical and in Science of man.

  Hegel had to acknowledge as the “world” is foreign to science and, then, he transited from an previous monism at a masked dualism (17), which equated divinity to empirical reality (18) (or structural reality historic). Such equivalence is defined as “crisis of theodicy”, since it is possible to pass from a masked allegory of the concept of divinity, as an image of the historical reality or of its causes, to the explicit equalization of two distinct concepts: the divinity, identified with the structural reality historic on one side, and the human nature and science on the other. This conception brought, however, Hegel to a conclusion totally pessimistic, such that it does not to see any solution to the tragedy of history (19).

  Norberto Bobbio spoke of “transcendence” to understand each concept that diverge from the historical immanence or individuals the rationality outside the structural reality of history.

 

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