Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book II

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Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book II Page 29

by Giano Rocca


  Chapter 25:

  Sociology and other “social sciences”: the their ideological elements and attempts embodiment of the science of reality historical structural

  Robert Nisbet highlighted as sociologists of XIX century (who advocated the creation of a new feudal phase) have identified the foundations of democracy in the feudal community (1). This demonstrates how the ideology tending to feudalism tries to save the concept of democracy, believing it to be valid, while trying, at the same time, to distort it and nullify the same, while retaining the name same. The sociology, as had demonstrated Nisbet, since its inception, was an expression of reaction to the capitalist system competitive, and expression of the various attempts, theoretical and practical, to overtake him (2), naturally, with the return to a new phase feudal. The sociology was, therefore, historically, an articulation of the ideologies which tend to feudalism. Already the first sociologists, as Comte, attacked the term and the concept of “Metaphysics” so derogatory, in order to counteract the political and social rights, from positions that they have defined, of course, “Progressive” (3), although they have criticized scientific development, technical and technological, justifying the their, alleged, “progressivism”, on the fact of considering the metaphysics as a remnant of the “feudalism” (4). Nisbet showed as the “progressivism” Comtean, rejecting the technical progress and productive, although they had proposed, in its turn, a “dogmatic scientism”, hoping and favoring, the evolution of structural reality statual, he not has did nothing but cultivate the hope, and favoring, the coming of that which we defined a new feudal phase decentralized, like that of the historical cycle that we have defined the historical cycle of the “Ancient age and of the High Medieval” (5), also because it was a society with a low level of technical-productive (and that , therefore, is not in contradiction with his ideal society: the feudal society) (6). The “positivism” Comtean is it consisted thus, essentially, in proposing the cult of structural reality historic, he came to idealize it, at the point of deifying the same, directly, though without transcendental allegories, unlike the traditional religions (7). This operation was resumed, and extended, by Karl Marx and by “Marxists”.

  Sociologists speak of “individualization” (8), with regard to the possibility of distinction between individuals, through the regained freedoms: social and political, which occur with the return, and consolidation, of mercantile phase. The “Marxism” does not can deny the value of the individualisation, but it proclaims that the same will be obtained, in greater quantities, in the future society of the “personal dependencies”, namely in the new feudal phase, that Marxism had identified with “socialism made or real” (9).

  Positivism, at first, professed a “methodological collectivism”, which is counterposed, very soon, the “methodological individualism”, used, for example, by Vilfredo Pareto. The latter method seems more scientific, as well as, most consonant with the mercantile phase (10).

  Filippo Barbano stated that the language and methodology, imposed at researchers, in the social field, from the academic world, constitute a limitation at the advancement of science (11). Barbano remarked that the contemporary sociology is substantially a comparison between Positivism and “social dialectic”, namely between “Comtism” and “Marxism”. In this way the sociology appears as a fake science, subject to the conditioning of various ideologies, of which is impregnated.

  Dario Antiseri had defined “convenzionalist moves” or “stratagems convenzionalist” (12): the mutation, made at a theory, so that it is not confuted, where such mutation makes this theory no longer falsifiable in principle, namely makes the same openly ideological, where the theory was, before the mutation, falsifiable, namely potentially scientific. Antiseri stated that such stratagems have been adopted for the theories and the forecasts which are most exposed to Marx, making everything completely ideological, while remaining here and there some scientific potentiality (submerged by ideological formulations) (13).

  Thomas Sprat had predicted the advent of a “true philosophy”, achievable thanks to the collaboration between the sciences (intuiting the structural conditioning on social disciplines) (14). The ethnologist tends to ignore the ratio of the societies analyzed with the rest of humanity, in relation to its ideological motives. The ethnologist tends, therefore, to use concepts that would explain the part or individual community as an entirely self-sufficient, totally original and unique (15). J. Copans had stated that the ethnology has for object an ideological product. He it sets out to demonstrate the illusoriness of ethnological method and of replace ethnology with alternative ideologies pure and simple (16). Copans stated, that the ethnologist, tent to identify themselves with the object of his study, considering it a microcosm in itself, ignoring, or forgetting of insert, the Community that he had studied within a broader relationship and inside suitable generalizations.

  Nisbet stressed that there was dichotomy between the “Partisan identification” (17) of the terms of current use and their subsequent scientific utilisation (18), although the terms used by the “social sciences” born almost all asjargon, perhaps under the thrust of ideological interests or contingents.

  Carlos Barbé, as many “intellectuals” contemporaries, he has come to define: “political society”, the structures statual, while making a distinction them from the “state of nature”, meaning with this definition all universes structural that have preceded the structures statual themselves (20).

  Barbano had recognized as sociology cannot be wholly scientific, receiving its determination from his same object (21), namely, undergoing the influence of the historical moment in which it is produced (22).

  Nisbet showed as the French Revolution, as well as the same concept of revolution, have been mythologizednby the sociologists (23), which have contributed to feed the myth “revolutionary” “Marxist”.

  Sociologists, moreover, have feared, already in the nineteenth century, the dangers of the evolution of the “industrial society” (namely, the capitalist system competitive) (24), although they had not detected, explicitly, the advent of a new phase feudal (25), despite having some scent, as he had, for example, Jacob Burckhardt (26). They spoke, however, of inversion of progress, and they meant, with this, especially a regression of human progress and, above all, a reversal of the progress, in the process of individualization (27), which occurs actually and inevitably, with the return of a new feudal phase.

  Sociologists that operate in the era of capitalist systems, define the society (meaning, perhaps, that which we call the mercantile phase of the universe structural statual), as an ideal projection, that would manifest itself, only in the systems capitalists (28). This ideal projection, would be based on contractual consensus, as is defined by the design “of natural law”. The “community”, they had contemplated the resurgent social nuclei, of type totalitarian, such as: the trade unions, the churches and the political parties (29). These nuclei reappeared embryonically, towards the end of the nineteenth century, after having been overcome, almost entirely, on the end of the XVIII century and in the first half of XIX (30).

  The anthropology, tends to distinguish the structures antecedents the universe structural statual, in: societies based on the organization of kinship and, societies based on the territoriality. This distinction is linked to the difference between the nomadic life and the permanence, distinction similar to that between the various types of techniques used, and therefore, substantially irrelevant for the purposes of the analysis of the evolutionary stages of historical structures (31).

  Many “social scientists” are fleeing from a total knowledge of reality historical structural, because they are afraid that the total clarification of the essence of the structural reality should necessarily lead to recognize the irrationality of structural reality historic. They ssume this position, while recognizing that the further deepening of the knowledge of reality structural, leads to better know the human being, without undermining the freedom, but indeed exalt
ing it (32).

  Popper had stated as sociology denies the possibility of realising a rational world (33). This position, common to all the “sciences” social and human, denounces the its subjection to the logic of structural reality.

  Some sociological theories, already in the middle of the seventies of the twentieth century, have posed to themselves the aim of overcoming the ideologies. Making themselves aware, perhaps, to be too impregnated of ideologies, the sociologists, posed themselves the objective of acquire greater scientific validity. Some sociologists they placed themselves, in this way, in a perspective anti-structural (34), even if their real objective was only to not be crushed by what felt to be imminent, and was called the “end of the ideologies”, of which they felt, distinctly, the crunches.

  Charles Fourier sought, without find minimally, the law of social evolution. He thought that, through the knowledge of this law, it would be possible to mutate the society, in such a way as to no longer having to curb the human passions, satisfying these, entirely, without destroying or damaging the society. He wanted, namely, the overcoming of historical structures and the realization of a society capable of fully meeting human needs. The science is, in itself, amoral. However, the application of science, in general, may, or may not, be moral. However, science applied to the society and at humanity, it will be moral, if it will be really scientific or consistent with human nature. For this reason, in the presence of structural reality historic, the science applied at the human being and at the society, cannot be fully scientific, since it cannot be fully moral, if not putting themselves in antithesis to the same structural reality historic. It is necessary to realize the science of sociality of individuals and of the modes of expression optimal of this sociality. It needs a social technique suitable to allow the realisation of a society in keeping with the sociality of individuals and such as to allow the fully satisfaction of the needs of social type, avoiding the contrasts between the needs: as well that strictly individual and the ones social; and between the social reality and the sociality of the individuals. The scientific knowledge proceeds in stages or levels (defined as paradigms). Until the knowledge, in the field social and human, has not reached a stage of sufficient scientific rigor, the overcoming the structural reality historic remains utopian. When, however, knowledge of the structural reality has reached a stage which allows to know the its true essence, its evolutionary dynamics and the human nature, in its essential elements, the omission of use this knowledge to achieve a social technique able to create an alternative to structural reality historic, would constitute an inhuman action, since it would become fruitless a knowledge which, in itself, constitutes the main instrument of human progress.

  Part VI:

  The sciences of the reality structural historical, and of the human nature

 

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