Recent scholarship has offered additional explanations for the sudden retreat. One factor may have been resource scarcity in Hungary. Several modern historians argue that the Hungarian plain could not sustain the Mongols’ numerous camps, herds, and cavalry horses. Notably, the Mongols, who tried as hard as possible to be self-sufficient, were obliged to ask locals for provisions for troops and animals.55 The winter of 1241–1242 was particularly cold. While the freezing temperatures helped the Mongols cross the Danube, heavy snowfall reduced their mobility elsewhere and prevented them from accessing a number of cities and castles. The harsh winter was followed by heavy rainfall, which caused harvest failure, widespread famine, and rapid depopulation. Villages that had supported the Mongol occupation since spring 1241 could no longer do so. In Dalmatia the thaw turned the ground into mud fields, forcing the Mongols to retreat because they could not pull their siege engines and carts.
By the mid-1200s, the Mongol Empire covered nearly half of Eurasia.
Another factor explaining the Mongols’ retreat was likely the military challenge of the campaign. In western Hungary, at least twelve cities and castles successfully repelled Mongol assaults. When the Mongols left after two months, the region was almost untouched and reconstruction had already begun in Transylvania where, according to Master Roger, “many people had survived” Mongol assaults. The Mongols had lost a significant number of men and faced an acute leadership problem, as Batu and Sübötei disagreed with each other on strategy. According to Sübötei’s biographers, Batu made several poor decisions during the battle of Muhi and even wanted to abort the operation.56 But the tension between Batu and Sübötei went beyond strategy; it also reflected discord between the branches of the golden lineage. Sübötei’s biographers were pro-Toluid; they sought to paint the Jochids in a bad light, for in the 1240s relations between the Jochids and the other branches of the golden lineage were growing more strained, as the powerful Jochids grew to resent the authority the Ögödeids exercised over them. The withdrawal from Hungary reflected the familial tension: Batu went home to the Qipchaq steppe and Sübötei to Qaraqorum. In 1246, after a five-year regency under Ögödei’s chief wife, their eldest son Güyük was elected great khan. Sübötei joined the election quriltai and supported Güyük, but Batu refused to attend. He stayed in the Qipchaq steppe to consolidate his horde and would never return to Mongolia.
Home in the Qipchaq Steppe
The Qipchaq integration into the Mongol Empire had started around 1210 and was completed in 1240. The conquest had led the Mongols to Hungary, the western end of the Eurasian steppe belt that forms a grass highway between East Asia and Europe. It was no accident that the Chinese called the Mongols’ military offensive of 1236–1241 the Qipchaq campaign: the primary goal of Chinggis Khan and his sons was to subjugate the steppe nomads, not to annihilate the “civilization” of the sedentary peoples—Russians, Poles, Hungarians, and others. The Mongols wanted to inhabit, control, and populate the steppe; their onslaught against the Russians and their invasions of Hungary, Poland, and Austria were side effects of a war among nomads. The Russians and Hungarians had allied with the Qipchaqs, and the Mongols made them pay for their choice.57
Historians have pointed to a number of advantages that enabled the conquest. One is the Mongol mastery of cold-weather warfare, whereby they fought when their enemies were unprepared and, when their enemies were better prepared, retreated to distant and well-defended camps to recover. The western steppe was not ideally suited to this strategy; the early thaw severely compromised the Mongols’ military efficiency. But they adapted to climactic differences, moved to more hospitable terrain, and modified their goals to ensure that they focused on the key, winnable battles. In doing so, they constrained their enemies to participate in a new form of warfare for which the Mongols had set the rules.58
The Mongols not only disturbed their enemies’ seasonality, but they also forced their enemies to rush into poor strategic decisions, as they did at the battle of the Kalka River, in Vladimir, and in Muhi. The Mongols’ tempo was fast and tight, catching sedentary people off guard. While Central and Eastern European lords spent months mobilizing their forces of peasant farmers, the Mongols were continuously conscripting and mobilizing. Throughout their campaigns, the Mongols forcefully brought people in their ranks. Finally, the heavy and slow European knights and armies were no match for mounted archers and siege experts equipped with the most technologically advanced weapons. The ability to attack and withdraw in a flash became the hallmark of Mongol strikes. Experienced commanders like Sübötei were able to take instant decisions, including his timely retreats from Russia and Hungary.
Mongol strategy was effective in part because it paired large-scale military operations with pastoral economics, combat acumen with effective resource management. In all their military campaigns, including the Westward operations, warriors brought along their families, tents, baggage, and herds. Servants, workers, herders, women, and children all took an active part in daily logistics and made the final conquest of the Qipchaq steppe possible.59
The Qipchaq campaign exemplifies the political ambition so often missing from conventional wisdom concerning the Mongols. The Mongols did not fight in the western steppe for the sake of fighting, nor of plunder, nor even of revenge, although revenge was an element of their motivation in taking on the Qipchaqs. More important was the effort to colonize the entire steppe belt. Batu accomplished his father Jochi’s unfinished task and fully integrated the Qipchaq territories into the Mongol Empire. With this conquest, the Mongols dominated the nomadic world; there was no more steppe to conquer. In a short time, the descendants of Jochi would establish a durable and powerful political community in the western steppe. That community was the Horde, an independent actor on the world stage that drew on Mongol traditions but developed its own ways of life and governing institutions and took a foremost role in the future of its Russian, European, and Mediterranean neighbors.
3
New Hordes
Batu was the leader of the ak orda, the white horde, and his brother Orda led the kök orda—the blue horde. The colors marked the two princely hordes that dominated the others. The Chinggis Nāme, a sixteenth-century collection of oral narratives on the history of the Jochid ulus, records that the natives of the Volga-Ural still remembered the political birth of the ak orda and kök orda. The locals said that Ejen Orda (Lord Orda) and Sayin Batu (Batu the Good) were the sons of Jochi, born of a woman of the Mongol elite. When Jochi died, Orda wanted Batu to sit on the throne of their father, although Batu was the younger brother. But Batu could not simply agree to ignore the birth order: permission was needed from their grandfather, Chinggis Khan. The two heirs, accompanied by seventeen of their brothers, brought the case to Chinggis and the begs. The Chinggis Nāme notes that the yasa, the khan’s law and teaching, “gave Sayin khan the right wing with the regions surrounding the River Itil [Volga], and he gave Ejen the left wing with the regions near the Syr Daria River.” The natives said that Chinggis reserved for Batu the best share, but Batu could not accept his inheritance before it was confirmed by a quriltai. But what was Orda’s motivation? This the people could not explain.1
Although the stories circulating among the people of the lower Volga probably do not get every detail right, they do capture the essential point that Jochi had left no indication of how his succession should proceed, which meant that his father would have to settle the matter. Chinggis’s decision reflected both tradition and iconoclasm. On the one hand, he followed tradition by selecting an heir from the two sons of Jochi’s Qonggirad wives; all Jochi’s other sons were by different mothers. On the other hand, Chinggis’s decision went against the principle of seniority, which created political tension between Batu, Orda, and their followers. Jochi’s succession became a major turning point, as it split his horde in two. Batu assumed military and political leadership, but Jochi’s warriors were divided between the two brothers. Batu and Orda parted to avoid an interne
cine war, Batu pursuing independence and Orda remaining closely tethered to the Mongol center. When necessary, steppe peoples knew how to split on good terms and thereby prevent bloodshed.2
Batu benefited from the open-ended territory Chinggis had granted him. The great khans officially recognized that Batu, as the Jochid chief, had a claim on all territories lying beyond the Irtysh River, which, in Batu’s view, meant that any land and people of the far northwest belonged to him and his children. This expandability was Batu’s great advantage over Orda, who received a huge but bounded territory, with no possibility of enlargement. Orda’s territory was surrounded by territory of other Mongols, so he could not move outward without attacking his next-of-kin. Batu, on the other hand, was poised to complete the conquest of the Seljuq Sultanate, the Georgian kingdom, and the numerous principalities of Syria and Iraq.3
Orda was the eldest of Chinggis Khan’s grandsons, an ambitious and highly esteemed man who had taken active part in the Qipchaq campaign. In 1236 he joined Sübötei in fighting the Bulgars, in 1237 he participated in the siege of Ryazan, and in 1240 he took part in the conquest of Kiev. A few months after taking Kiev, Orda commanded the army that successfully attacked Leignitz. Thus in the decade after Chinggis Khan had chosen Batu, Orda proved his worth on the battlefield. Great Khan Ögödei, Chinggis’s successor, seems to have considered Orda the equal of Batu, granting both of them lands in northern China.4
But Orda and Batu were not equal in their political leanings. Orda was faithful to Great Khan Ögödei and maintained good relationships with the most powerful members of the golden lineage, while Batu turned away from the empire and instead focused on ulus Jochi. As we saw in the last chapter, Batu refused to go to Qaraqorum after Ögödei died in 1241; Orda, however, was there. Then in 1246, as the regency of Ögödei’s khatun was drawing to a close, it was Orda who represented the Horde at Güyük’s election quriltai. Not only that, but Orda served an important role at the quriltai. After Ögödei’s death, his uncle, Temüge Ochigin, had attempted a coup; during Güyük’s enthronement quriltai, Orda was entrusted to investigate Temüge Ochigin’s power grab. Orda was assisted by Möngke, who was the eldest son of Tolui and was renowned for having captured and killed the Qipchaq chieftain Bashman. Together Orda and Möngke questioned a number of witnesses and ultimately ordered the execution of their great uncle.
The elevation of Güyük rather than an elder such as Temüge Ochigin—like the elevation of Batu over Orda—reflects the combination of tradition and pragmatism that Chinggis Khan promoted during his rule. As a matter of tradition, the political body of the Mongols constituted two generations: aqa, elders, and ini, juniors, and the elders were the superiors. This system was modeled on steppe food-sharing customs: during a meal, senior herders were served first. But elders could choose to give their share to the juniors. The same was true of politics. Elders did not necessarily get to make every decision or act with impunity, and there was room for power-sharing with juniors. Chinggis had combined respect for seniority with a willingness to break genealogical hierarchy. This, too, was a steppe tradition. Under the Türks, contenders to the throne could yield their claims, thereby legitimating the rule of their juniors and demonstrating that seniority alone did not dictate politics. Orda participated in this tradition, according to early sources, when he “gave his consent to Batu’s becoming ruler and seated him on his father’s throne.” By providing avenues for claimants to withdraw and accede to their younger brothers, Chinggis and other steppe rulers sought to prevent fratricide and the wider conflicts that could result.5
To better promote peaceful transfers of power, newly enthroned khans made overt demonstrations of humility, while the elites established their consensus surrounding the enthronement. The sources contain vivid and extensive descriptions of Güyük’s enthronement, which emphasize this performance of harmony. Rashīd al-Dīn’s Compendium of Chronicles reports
after discussion the princes and begs agreed to enthrone Güyük. As was customary, he refused and offered the job to every prince, using his illness and weak constitution as an excuse. After the commanders insisted, he said, “I will accept on condition that henceforth the emperorship remain among my offspring.” All agreed to this and gave möchälgäs [written pledges], saying, “So long as there remains of your progeny a piece of flesh a dog wouldn’t take if it were wrapped in fat and a cow wouldn’t accept if it were wrapped in grass, we will give the khanate to no other.” Then a shaman’s pole was erected, the princes doffed their hats, loosened their belts, and sat [Güyük] on the khan’s throne.
Rashīd al-Dīn describes a similar process at Ögödei’s enthronement, with his brothers rejecting the supreme power and the new khan declaring that he was carrying out the orders of his family.6
These rituals of acceptance and consensus were crucial to Mongol government, for they confirmed that the khan was legitimate and would enjoy authority over his people, including old adversaries. It was essential that the whole political body—meaning the aristocracy, not the entirety of the empire’s subjects—assemble and designate a candidate unanimously. The enthronement rites demonstrated subjects’ loyalty, while signals of consent, which were carried out before witnesses, made it clear that power had not been seized by force. The candidate offered the throne had to refuse it and claim that others were worthier. Serious additional contenders had to be named. All of them had to publicly declare that they did not want the throne, or that they gave up any claim to it. Only then was the consensual candidate free to accept the position. At least two members of the golden lineage would take him by his arms, carry his belt, and lead him to the throne, where they would seat him. These supporting men were often the chief runners-up to the throne. In the case of Güyük, the supporting men were Orda and a son of Chagatay.7
These rituals were not some fig leaf. Under Chinggis’s system, genealogical and political hierarchies were important but were not immutable, which meant that competition for power within the golden lineage was real. Any male descendant of Chinggis Khan with a high maternal pedigree had a right to claim the throne, so that there was always a range of legitimate contenders and thus several aspirants had to abandon their claim in order for the group to achieve consensus. One of the purposes of the election and enthronement quriltai was to dramatize the tension among competitors and also definitively salve that tension. Face-to-face unanimity, accompanied by acceptance and withdrawal from competition by the runners-up, were fundamental principles of steppe law.
The Horde’s political culture was a hybrid of Chinggis’s rules, steppe institutions such as the keshig, quriltai, and tümen, and pragmatic Jochid innovations. Orda represented the elders and Batu the juniors. Together they established a consensus that would hold for generations. Each had his horde and a distinct territory: the Batuids’ centered on the lower Volga in the West, and the Ordaids’ centered on the middle Syr-Daria and upper Irtysh in the East. Each horde created two different pools of contenders for the Jochid throne, shaping two separate lines of succession. In the early Horde, the descendants of Orda and Batu could not claim each other’s assets, territories, or peoples.
When Güyük was elected, Batu and Orda abandoned their right to claim the position of the great khan. Batu was not a contender, because he was absent from the quriltai. After Orda, none of Jochi’s descendants would emerge as strong candidates for Chinggis Khan’s throne. Yet the Jochids had other means of shaping the political life of the empire, as they would soon demonstrate.
In time the Jochids would come to rule a hugely diverse empire of their own, and they showed a particular genius for ruling a multiethnic population. Like Mongols generally, the Jochids were pragmatic about cultural differences. The Jochids both cajoled and threatened their vassals. Sedentary workers were accommodated and exploited. They enslaved some sedentary subjects and allowed others to go on with the lives they had known, taking part in crafts, warfare, animal husbandry, administration, entertainment, religious services, and me
dicine. Some conquered peoples experienced little social change—they might not have known they were dominated, except that they had to pay taxes to the Mongols. Other local peoples were thoroughly incorporated into the hordes, requiring constant effort, organization, coercion, and tolerance. Old loyalties needed to be broken and new ones forged to ensure the stability of the varied and expanding Horde.
Major divisions of the Horde. The White Horde (Batu) controlled the modern territories of Russia and Ukraine in the west; the Blue Horde (Orda) held the modern territories of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in the east.
The Birth of the Jochids
The great khans’ nominations, such as those of Ögödei, Güyük, and later Möngke, reveal that the Mongols had established patterns of succession. The candidates were all Chinggis’s descendants though the male line, and they were also grown men whose fathers had died and who needed the support of other members of the elite. As these were the only requirements, a large number of individuals could compete for the throne. Juvaynī explained the rule for ranking: “According to the custom of the Mongols the rank of the children of one father is in proportion to that of their mothers, so that the child of an elder wife is accorded greater preference and precedence.” In this system, the khatun, the khans’ wives, had a crucial role. But what the Mongols meant by “elder wife” was again not a simple matter of seniority.8
Decorated bowl showing a Mongol couple (Kashan, Iran, early thirteenth century). The Mongols were the ruling group in Iran at the time this piece was created. (David Collection, Copenhagen, Denmark / Pictures from History / Bridgeman Images)
The status of a khatun was based on multiple factors. One was her date of marriage: the earlier in her husband’s life, the higher her rank. A second marriage often gave the first khatun greater responsibilities. The khatun’s age was also important: younger wives obeyed older ones. Character and reputation counted, too. And, finally, the wife’s personal pedigree and extended social network were of utmost importance. Chinggis Khan considered Qonggirad, Kereit, and Oyirad women the highest-ranking, not least because these peoples were key political allies. His sons carried on the tradition.9
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