Under Özbek’s rule, this balance shifted in favor of the khan’s authority, and the Russian tradition of succession was severely disrupted. The transformation was precipitated by changes in Russian politics following the Mongol conquest of the 1240s, long before Özbek’s rise to power. In the course of the conquest, major centers such as Kiev and Vladimir were ruined economically, and their elites were decimated. The princes of Moscow and Tver rushed to fill the vacuum. Both towns had recovered relatively quickly, in part by taking in laborers fleeing from the devastated areas. Situated on the upper Volga, Tver was the first northeastern town to show signs of resurgence. By the 1280s inhabitants were already building the monumental Church of Transfiguration.34
For its part, Moscow had a great deal of catching up to do. Despite its growth in the wake of the conquest, it was, in the early fourteenth century, still something of a backwater. Its walls were made of earth and its kremlin of wood. Compared to important cities such as Novgorod, Tver, Vladimir, and Kiev, Moscow looked modest and rural. But the rulers of Moscow were ambitious. According to the old succession pattern, the princes of Moscow, descendants of Alexander Nevsky’s youngest son Daniil, did not have priority for the position of the grand prince. Yet the Daniilovichi were about to seize the throne and turn Moscow into the most powerful principality in northeastern Russia.
The Muscovites’ first opportunity came in 1304, during the reign of Toqto’a Khan. That year, Grand Prince Andrei died, and two candidates vied to replace him: Iurii of Moscow and his uncle Mikhail of Tver. They asked the khan to decide between them, and Toqto’a chose Mikhail. Mikhail was a loyal subject of the Mongols, and as Iurii’s senior and the son of a former grand prince, he had a proper claim according to the lestvitsa. Yet Iurii did not accept the result, and Moscow rebelled. It took Tver two military campaigns to call Moscow to order and finally assert Mikhail’s authority. For the time being, Iurii had to give up his claim. But the mere fact that the Moscow line was ineligible, and yet tried to appropriate the throne, marked a critical turn in Russian politics.35
The next major development came soon after Özbek replaced Toqto’a, in 1313. Grand Prince Mikhail traveled to the lower Volga to pay his respects to the new khan and have his grand princely rights confirmed. Mikhail stayed for two years in Özbek’s horde, a lengthy absence of which Iurii took advantage. In 1314 Iurii made a play for Novgorod, which though not the seat of the grand prince was under Mikhail’s direct control. Iurii’s men entered Novgorod and captured Mikhail’s lieutenants. During subsequent negotiations, the Novgorodians offered to turn their throne over to Iurii. Enraged, Mikhail returned to his domain—with the khan’s permission and a contingent of Mongol troops—to punish the Novgorodians. In 1315 Mikhail stormed Novgorod and reaffirmed his rights there. To settle the issue, the khan ordered Iurii to present himself at the Horde’s court.
Iurii came as called, but when he returned to Moscow, he did so in unexpectedly grand fashion: he brought with him Özbek’s envoys, twenty thousand mounted archers, and a Mongol document conferring on him the title of grand prince. A clever politician, the kniaz of Moscow had sworn total loyalty to the Mongols during his time at the khan’s court. Iurii convinced the khan that he was a more suitable grand prince than Mikhail because he, Iurii, could deliver taxes more efficiently. Özbek also understood that elevating Iurii would mean the grand prince was in his debt. The bond between them was sealed with the wedding of Iurii to Konchaka, Özbek’s sister.
Building on his success, Iurii launched a campaign against Tver in 1317 and faced Mikhail on the battlefield. Mikhail won the contest, forcing Iurii to flee, and captured Konchaka. Mikhail intended to release the Mongol princess, but she died in a Tver jail. The death had been an accident, but Özbek summoned Mikhail to be tried anyway. Under other circumstances, a party believed responsible for the death of a khan’s sister might have been executed forthwith, but Mikhail was the Mongols’ old friend and a former grand prince, so caution and deliberation were required. The outcome, however, was foreordained. After a trial lasting several months, Mikhail was publicly declared guilty on a number of charges, including withholding taxes, treason, and rebellion. He was executed around November 1318.36
With Mikhail removed and the khan’s authority behind him, Iurii became the first grand prince to bear the title in opposition to the old dynastic rules. But he had lost the respect of his peers and struggled terribly in his efforts to collect taxes for the Mongols. Iurii also faced attacks from Mikhail’s sons, Dmitrii and Alexander, princes of Tver. In 1322 Özbek had no choice but to remove his confidence from the house of Moscow and transfer the grand princely title back to Tver, restoring the old system of succession. Özbek first confirmed Dmitrii, but after Dmitrii avenged his father by murdering Iurii in 1325, Özbek withdrew the title and turned it over Alexander.
Tver would not have the upper hand for long. Like Iurii before him, Alexander of Tver had difficulties collecting taxes. In 1327 Özbek sent his deputy to Tver to test the grand prince’s loyalty and obtain the amount due. But the inhabitants of Tver refused payment and instead revolted, killing the deputy and his delegation. The Tver uprising infuriated the khan, all the more so as the murdered deputy had been his relative. This was a major transgression, for which Alexander had to be expelled from the throne and his people severely punished. Özbek dispatched a Russian-led punitive force, which sacked the city and drove out Alexander, who fled to Lithuania. Later Alexander would, with Özbek’s blessing, reestablish himself in Tver. But the khan’s forgiveness was short-lived, and Özbek had Alexander and his son executed in 1339.37
The Russian who led the Mongol force that defeated Alexander was Ivan of Moscow, Iurii’s brother. Ivan had no right to the throne by virtue of the lestvitsa, but he knew that the true power to confirm the grand prince’s appointment came from the khan and so pursued Özbek’s favor. At some point between 1327 and 1332—the sources are unclear on the exact date—Ivan presented himself before Özbek, lavished the khan with precious gifts, and was granted the title of grand prince of Vladimir. The khan once again was raising the Daniilovichi above the other ruling families, despite the old ways of succession. The question was whether the new line would hold, for of course Iurii had been elevated by the same means, only to lose the khan’s indulgence.38
To secure his position, Ivan expanded the Daniilovichi territories through military means, land purchases, and marital and religious alliances. The land purchases enabled Moscow to absorb surrounding principalities, a policy reflected in Ivan’s distinctive sobriquet: Kalita, meaning money bag. Ivan Kalita developed strategies to turn the Daniilovichi lands into rich and well-protected dominions that would attract people and produce the resources the Daniilovichi needed to sustain their influential position.
Ivan’s ties to the Orthodox Church proved especially profitable. The seat of the metropolitan had moved from Kiev to Vladimir in 1299, and from Kiev to Moscow in 1325. The following year Metropolitan Peter joined with Ivan to embark on the most impressive construction program ever launched in Moscow. They sponsored the building of the Church of the Assumption and four additional stone churches, all erected in Moscow’s kremlin. Byzantine and Slavic craftsmen would later add wall paintings and install massive church bells. The buildings’ magnificence announced Moscow’s piety as well as the city’s claim to the legacies of Kiev and Vladimir.39
Ivan Kalita’s heirs maintained good relations with the Orthodox Church, for the church brought them what they badly needed: an image of legitimacy, prestige, and morality. Yet the church had its own agenda, and the successors of Metropolitan Peter remained cautious. They supported the Muscovite grand prince as long as his policies served the unity of the Russian church, which worked diligently to assert itself over and above the division of the principalities. Thus, on the one hand, the metropolitans accepted land grants and cash donations from the Daniilovichi. On the other hand, the church was careful not to openly promote Moscow’s interests over those of other
princely houses.
Indeed, the interests of many kniazia diverged from those of the Daniilovichi, whom other princes saw as usurpers. It was easier for these kniazia to accept the khan’s authority than Moscow’s. Resentful princes from Tver, Pskov, Beloozero, Iaroslavl, Rostov, and elsewhere allied against the Daniilovichi, trying to prevent them from collecting taxes and complaining to the khan. But, in spite of the opposition, the Daniilovichi under Ivan Kalita and his successors paid the khan in a timely manner. Critical to their ability to do so was armed domination of Novgorod, the main location through which northern European silver entered Russian lands. The Novgorodians, who historically had supported the grand prince and accepted his direct authority, rejected Moscow’s rule. Yet the Novgorodians lacked the military power to contest the Mongol-backed Daniilovichi. So while Novgorod’s elites tussled with the Daniilovichi politically, the Novgorodians also paid the silver. Novgorod was thus the Daniilovichi’s key to the Mongol door. As long as the silver flowed, the Daniilovichi could count on the support of the khan’s army, whom none of the disaffected kniazia dared face. In Jochid terms tax delivery was proof of loyalty, and the Jochids were loyal in return.40
The rise of the Daniilovichi was never a smooth and linear process. Under Ivan Kalita’s sons and successors, Moscow’s authority eroded, and the grand princes were often unable to convince other kniazia join their military campaigns. When Ivan II died in 1359, Moscow’s territorial expansion had stopped and Daniilovichi rule was tenuous. Still, the house of Moscow cultivated their relationship with the Mongols by actively involving themselves in the Horde’s domination system, strengthening kinship ties, and communicating in face-to-face meetings. The bond Ivan Kalita and Özbek shared was passed on to their heirs. But the Daniilovichi also knew that bond would be severed as soon as the grand prince proved unable to deliver the tax receipts the Mongols expected. After all, Özbek had temporarily withdrawn his confidence from their family when Iurii, the first Muscovite grand prince, had failed to perform his tax-collecting duties. The khan’s displeasure was a sword of Damocles hanging over Moscow.
Trading Far and Wide
Özbek capitalized on Mongol fame. He knew that his horde was powerful because he received gifts from exotic kingdoms. The rulers of faraway lands sent tangsuq, the marvelous and unusual things that delighted Mongol elites and demonstrated the esteem in which the Horde was held. If diplomacy and trade were expressions of one’s position in the world, then in the first decades of the fourteenth century, the Horde was secure in its place of prestige.
Security, though, did not come automatically. The game of power was complicated and required investments of time, effort, money, and sometimes blood. Özbek’s greatest predecessors—the likes of Batu, Berke, and Möngke-Temür—knew this, and so did Özbek himself. No matter how powerful he was, he faced foreign-policy challenges that had to be handled delicately. One consistent difficulty was control of the Caucasian passes, which the Jochids and Ilkhanids shared. Özbek sought to wrest undivided authority over the passes. On two occasions during Özbek’s rule, in 1318 and 1335, the descendants of Hülegü faced succession crises, and the Jochids attacked during both of these moments of weakness. The Ilkhanids repelled them both times. Between attacks, though, Özbek took a more peaceful approach and managed to build alliances among the Ilkhanid elite. For instance, around 1330 he married his son Tinibek to the daughter of an influential Ilkhanid emir. This could be seen as part of the Jochid plan to seize control of the Transcaucasian passes, by obtaining kinship rights.41
While negotiating with, and sometimes assaulting, the Ilkhanids, Özbek appeased the Toluids in the Far East in an effort to protect long-distance commerce along the east-west axis—the Silk Road. He promoted peace with the great khan and openly refused an invitation from the Chagatayids to ally against the Yuan, the Toluid dynasty Qubilai had founded in 1271. Özbek distrusted his Chagatayid neighbors and preferred to see them stuck between the Toluids and himself.42 In the west Özbek strengthened his ties to the Mediterranean world, especially the Mamluks and the Italians. In 1316 he pardoned the Genoese, whom Toqto’a had expelled from the Horde in 1307–1308, allowing them to return to Caffa and rebuild the city. Özbek offered them the best possible terms to trade and travel in his territories, and in exchange he expected them to orient the flow of goods toward Jochid commercial hubs rather than Ilkhanid ones.43
Within a few years, the fortified harbor of Caffa was again a prospering trade center and seat of Franciscan activities. And once more, Franciscans extended their missions to the Horde’s center, integrating themselves into the seasonal circuit of the khan’s court. The friars even reached out beyond the Volga and claimed numerous conversions among the herders of western Siberia. Taking advantage of the Mongol politics of tolerance, the missionaries founded at least ten convents in Özbek’s territories. From the khan’s perspective, as long as the Italians brought wealth and fortune, they were welcome to penetrate the deep steppe.44
Özbek intended to use the Genoese as go-betweens to strengthen his ties with the Mamluks. This was a longstanding role for the Genoese. Since the 1260s they had worked for the Jochids and Mamluks mostly as freelance seafarers, and some of the most successful among them became ambassadors of a sort. For instance, the merchant Segurano Salvaygo was close with both the sultan and the khan and often stayed at the khan’s court, where he conducted business for the sultan, the Mongols, and himself. His activities helped secure the Horde’s commercial connections.
In 1315, in an unexpected turn of events, Mamluk sultan al-Nāsir Muhammad requested a bride from the khan. If the deal was sealed, it would constitute the first kinship-based alliance between Jochids and Mamluks. It took three years for the parties to come to terms, but finally, in spring 1320, Tulunbāy Khatun reached Alexandria, where she was to be wed. She was accompanied by a retinue of three thousand, including Salvaygo. The princess was probably Özbek’s niece, but she was introduced to the sultan as the khan’s daughter.45
Although the marriage was established with great care, it was ill-fated from the start. The trouble was that Mamluks and Jochids had very different ideas about what marriage alliance meant. Al-Nāsir Muhammad thought he was boosting his stature by marrying a Chinggisid heiress, but the Mongols believed the sultan was offering himself as their vassal. After all, the few other non-Mongol husbands of Jochid daughters were among the Horde’s most trusted vassals. The misunderstanding bore considerable consequences, as the Jochids now saw the Mamluks as debtors and immediately demanded financial and military favors. To begin with, the khan required that the sultan pay a bride price and wedding costs amounting to 27,000 dinars, a sum the Mamluks were forced to borrow from the khan’s traders. And the wedding ceremony had hardly ended when Özbek asked the sultan to ally in a war against the Ilkhanids.
Al-Nāsir Muhammad saw the bride price as pure extortion, and he had no intention of resuming the Mamluks’ longstanding rivalry with the Ilkhanids. In fact, he had just initiated peace talks with the Ilkhan, and the two rulers would soon sign a commercial treaty. Al-Nāsir Muhammad refused to join Özbek’s campaign and even warned the Ilkhanids that the Jochids were planning an attack. If there was a war plan, it must have been called off, as there is no evidence in the sources of a Jochid attack on the Ilkhanids in the 1320s. Instead, an angry Özbek struck back at the Mamluks by forbidding traders in the Horde to sell the Mamluks slaves. Özbek also ordered Salvaygo captured and executed: someone had to pay for the failure of the wedding. Al-Nāsir Muhammad divorced Tulunbāy Khatun around 1327 and arranged for her to be married to a Mamluk emir.46
Despite the frictions, Özbek and al-Nāsir Muhammad continued to exchange embassies. The Mamluks hoped to resume the slave trade because they still depended on the Jochids to acquire skilled warriors. And the Jochids were not so insulted that they were willing permanently to forgo the financial benefits of a relationship with the Mamluks. Moreover, there was always the possibility of a future alliance against
the Ilkhanids because the peace between the Mamluk sultan and the Ilkhan seemed precarious. The threats and intemperate actions Özbek and al-Nāsir Muhammad exchanged were part of their complex dance, as each sought the best possible terms of partnership for his own people. The two leaders never became enemies; such a breach would have resulted in profound changes to the world order, but it did not come to pass.
In general, commerce was a rough-and-tumble line of work, and traders went on engaging with the Mamluks and Jochids no matter their conflict. Even the killing of Segurano Salvaygo did not dissuade the Genoese, who continued to ply their merchandise in the Horde and take advantage of the robust Jochid web of trade. Throughout Özbek’s reign, Europeans were major players in the lucrative human-trafficking and grain businesses. The best wheat in central Eurasia grew in the fertile lands of the Danube Valley, where farmers also cultivated barley, rye, oats, millet, sorghum, and peas for local consumption and trade. In the early fourteenth century, the center for this trade was the Jochid settlement of White City, at the mouth of the Dniester River. The other main granaries were located to the west, in Crimea and the area of the Azov Sea. To reject the Jochids was to reject access to the breadbasket of the entire Black Sea region and thereby lose out on an opportunity to supply the population centers of the area, above all heavily populated and grain-hungry Constantinople.47
Although the Jochid territories were full of productive granaries, the Mongols themselves rarely grew and consumed grain, except for millet. They also did not trade the grain themselves. Instead, in keeping with their expertise in developing and exploiting trade networks, the Mongols facilitated trade carried out by others, mainly Genoese, Germans, and Greeks. The Jochids levied taxes on every transaction. Taxes were light, but there were several of them, including customs duties, weighing fees, and levies on shipping and sales. Moreover, as grain, slaves, and other goods were purchased and resold over their long journeys from the Horde to their far-off destinations, the Jochids collected their fees several times on the same merchandise. Collectively the taxes yielded substantial profit.48
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