Why We Fight

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Why We Fight Page 20

by Guillaume Faye


  (see ethnomasochism; xenophilia)

  * * *

  Mercantilism

  The theory according to which the market is the sole basis of order and prosperity.

  International mercantilism is the official doctrine of contemporary economic thought — the official doctrine of the corporations, the banks, and the European Commission. The exchanges and profits it generates take precedence over notions of production, full employment, independence, or supply. Hence, outsourcing and the abolition of tariff barriers. Mercantilism works against the European economy, against its independence and power — to the benefit of the United States and the ‘emerging economies’.

  Mercantilism is the basis of free trade, which negates any idea of economic independence. It rests on the false assumption that humanity is an ensemble of homogeneous economies, each nation responsive to the same relations of production, each specialising in a particular area in which it excels.

  (see economy, organic; society, market)

  * * *

  Meritocracy

  Power to the most capable and meritorious, independent of their social origin or communal membership.

  Meritocracy is inspired by the ‘social Darwinist’ theory of natural selection and is rationally organised by the state. It’s long been one of the principles of the French Republic (competitive exams, free public schooling, scholarships, etc.). It seeks to abolish the privileges of birth by selecting the best from the different social classes of the people. Today, though, with the combination of anti-selection principles in the schools, affirmative action (racial quotas and preferences for aliens), and the destruction of public education, meritocracy has given way to social chaos. There is no longer a circulation of elites, nor are the most capable socially promoted. As usual with egalitarian doctrines, illegitimate castes are created. Only aristocratic principles allow the best elements from the people to develop their innate capacities. Meritocracy is an aristocratic socialism.

  (see aristocracy; democracy; elite; selection)

  * * *

  Metapolitics

  The social diffusion of ideas and cultural values for the sake of provoking a profound, long-term, political transformation.

  Metapolitics is an effort of propaganda — not necessarily that of a specific party — that diffuses an ideological body of ideas representing a global political project. Metapolitics is the indispensable complement to every direct form of political action, though in no case can it or should it replace such action.

  From the ‘societies of thought’ (and ‘clubs’) that prepared the French Revolution to today’s pressure groups and associations, metapolitical practice constitutes a requisite not just to every political or revolutionary action, but to the maintenance of the powers-that-be.

  Situated beyond partisan politics, metapolitics has the advantage of a non-electoral or disinterested ‘neutrality’, which enhances its persuasive powers. Possible in every kind of media, metapolitics diffuses a conception-of-the-world applicable to the long term. It was through a long, exhaustive metapolitical effort that egalitarianism came to dominate not just the political scene, but the mentality of those supposedly opposing it. Metapolitics is the occupation of culture, politics is the occupation of a territory.

  *

  A multifaceted metapolitics addresses the movers and shakers, as well as the general population; it aims at ideologically forming an active elite, as well as influencing the populace. Finally, metapolitics has to avoid excessive culturalism, which risks becoming an empty intellectualism, a boastful erudition, or a philosophy of amateurs — instead, it needs to pursue the political objective of positively affirming the principal lines and central concepts of its particular social/civilisational project.

  (see politics, Grand Politics)

  * * *

  Miscegenation

  The mixing of races or different ethnic groups.

  In the name of anti-racism, the dominant ideology insists that miscegenation (métissage) is the planet’s fate. It’s only Europeans, however, who actually believe it, not the world’s other peoples, who are now organising themselves into ethnic blocs to preserve their identity.

  With the replacement population that comes with Third World colonisation, miscegenation threatens to destroy our germen, i.e., the roots of European civilisation. Ethno-racially mixed populations, similarly, foster instability and rarely carry out great historical creations. Inevitably they succumb to racial supremacism, which weakens national solidarity. The example of Latin America is especially eloquent: the social hierarchy there is organised, whether admitted or not, according to an implied criterion of ‘more or less White blood’. The ideology of miscegenation culminates, as such, in an implicit and generalised racism.

  The constant, repetitive justification of miscegenation as a social imperative is pre-eminently an ethnomasochistic trait of European elites; but it also comes from a utopian optimism that sees a future racially-mixed Europe as necessary to her larger welfare. This dogma rests on certain pseudo-scientific tenets of la pensée unique[179] — the reigning one-track thought (as represented by Jacquard,[180] Coppens,[181] Le Bras,[182] etc.), which holds that ‘pure races’ are degenerate and that ethnic homogeneity is a historical handicap. This dogma just happens to be based on a flagrant contradiction: for the partisans of miscegenation (partisans, similarly, of ‘anti-racism’) claim that it’s biologically necessary to ‘mix the races’ — though at the same time they claim that ‘races don’t exist’ and that biological determinants have no significance . . .

  *

  The dogma of the métis (miscegenated man), this figure of the future, is also part of the universalist dream of l’homme unique — a uniform humanity — the unattached man. The ideology of miscegenation has, as such, a totalitarian component — that of the world state and that of a new man, who is to be the same everywhere — an idea shared by both Trotskyists and ultra-liberals.

  Miscegenation is tolerable only in exceptional cases, not on a mass scale, and especially not when it’s obligatory or systematic.

  *

  In the same spirit, ‘cultural miscegenation’ is called for — a miscegenation that leads not to the expected formation of a universalist culture, but to the destruction (the Afro-Americanisation) of European culture — alone subject to the race-mixing imperative. Decked out in the most elaborate phraseology, this imperative dominates virtually every contemporary realm of European discourse.

  *

  In biological and cultural matters, it would be stupid to categorically reject all miscegenation in the name of biological purity. To be fertile, though, such melanges need to occur between closely related peoples. It’s a general law of life. Overly close unions, like overly disparate unions, fail: the first leads to sterility, the second to chaos. In any case, the facts hardly suggest that humanity is evolving toward a general mixing of races; only declining societies succumb to such an illusion.

  (see chaos, ethnic; ethnosphere; identity; race, racism)

  * * *

  Modernity, modernism

  Cult of the present, alleged to be intrinsically superior to that which is past.

  As a notion, modernity is ambiguous; at first positive, it became negative. Originally conceived in terms of the European’s capacity for innovation and transcendence, by the Twentieth century modernity has ended up being confused with a naïve progressivism and anti-traditionalism — in the name of the present, treated as if it’s intrinsically superior to the past. Modernism is now nothing but a fashionable academicism.

  Modernity has never fulfilled its promises, because these promises were impossible, given their roots in utopianism and their denial of the real. Modernity promised to: first, ensure happiness, peace, and prosperity through economic and technological domination; second, replace aesthetics and traditional philosophies with radical new aesthetics and philosophies lacking continuity; and third, do away with peoples, religions, and customs for the sake of a homogeneous huma
nity and an atomised individual. Formulated in the late Seventeenth century, such objectives have since been taken up by globalist mercantilism, Marxism, and the myth of progress.

  *

  Modernity has been a total failure, commensurate with the conceit of its pretensions. After three and a half modern centuries, the Twenty-first century is heading now toward a convergence of catastrophes. Its failure, however, is no reason to embrace a contemplative ‘traditionalism’. Just the opposite.

  *

  Modernity is old-fashioned, the very opposite of futurism. In condemning a despised ancestry, that is, the formative vitalistic traditions, modernity condemns itself to the ephemeral. (On this point, see my Archeofuturism.) In accord with my theses, Rodolphe Badinand and Georges Feltin-Tracol write, ‘Post-modernity (or archeofuturism, or paganism, the term doesn’t matter) senses the imperative of re-establishing that ancient spherical coherence between present, past, and future. Contrary to the traditionalist attitude, vehemently voluntarist, coming ultimately from modernity in its refusal of modernism, it doesn’t take refuge in a long-gone past, impossible to recover — but affirms the possibility of another future, to which it opens the way’.[183] Traditionalism might be seen as a ‘shallow modernism’. Not so much ‘anti-modern’, as ‘non-modern’. The alternative to modernity is not traditionalism and antiquarianism, since they share the same linear vision of time as modernity (except in seeking a regression rather than a progression); traditionalism and modernism are both equally opposed to the spherical, dynamic vision of time.

  *

  Exhausted at the height of its influence, at the very moment when it’s everywhere acclaimed with thunderous praise, modernity is dying. The word ‘modern’ has even lost its meaning. It was already employed in the Seventeenth century (during ‘the quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns’).[184] The deepest sense of the concept implies ‘everything opposed to the past’ — and this for the last three centuries. This makes the term now doubly stupid, since it opposes what was considered modern a hundred years ago (in a period when the term had a far greater resonance than it has today), but above all, it deprives itself of a future by ‘making the past a tabula rasa’. The concept of ‘modernity’ is inherently suicidal, since, from the beginning, it denies a people and civilisation longevity, it denies the unity of past and future.

  Pierre-Émile Blairon writes, ‘Modernity is a totalitarianism of nothingness: globalisation, indifferentiation, homogenisation . . . Modernity isn’t in crisis, modernity is a crisis’.[185]

  *

  In every realm, the present system endlessly reassures itself, legitimising itself, forgetting its failures and imperiousness. In its view, everything is to be modernised — ‘to modernise democracy’ being one of its favourite expressions: human relations, communications, morals, institutions, justice, sexuality, social behaviour, immigrant policy, etc., all are constantly to be ‘modernised’. And we’ve seen the results. The most pitiful of these are evident in the modernisation of art, which has come to mean decadence and primitiveness — the new barbarism.

  *

  Similarly, ‘modern’ (or ‘contemporary’) art has become the worst sort of academic nostalgia; for fifty years it’s gone in circles, a subsidised nonentity. Paradox: seeing itself as permanent innovation, modernity ends up being an insistent repetition, powerless to advance or create. Once an avant-garde, modernity has since become a rearguard, stymied by its own insolence. It is now a cult — sign of an ageing people that has persuaded itself that it’s eternally young.

  *

  With Vatican II, the Church also sought to modernise itself: the result, a seventy percent loss of parishioners. In triumphing, Islam has never for a second thought of ‘modernising’! Indeed, everything decadent and declining assumes the guise of the ‘modern’. It thus adorns itself with the degradation of mores, the confusion of sexual roles, social permissiveness, the abdication of discipline, cosmopolitanism, unbridled free trade (after having made the proper sacrifice to the Marxist god), etc., portraying these pathological trends as ‘novelties’, in the sense that ‘everything new is positive’, even the nothing, the regressive, anything. It has indeed succumbed to historical fatalism, without the slightest understanding that history is no longer following it.

  *

  Against modernity, we oppose not traditionalism or reactionism, which are also forms of the ‘modern’, but the tradition and spirit of continuity. As for techno-science, there’s nothing ‘modern’ about it, since it comes from Greek Antiquity; it’s a perfectly neutral instrument in service to the will.

  (see archeofuturism; convergence of catastrophes; interregnum; progress)

  * * *

  Museologicalisation

  The transformation of a living tradition into a museum piece, which deprives it of an active meaning or significance.

  We are living a paradox: everywhere it’s claimed that ‘patrimony’ is a matter of utmost concern, but all the while it is being passionately destroyed. In making museum pieces out of traditions, in petrifying them, killing them, freezing them, their character as ‘tradition’ (as something transmitted and evolving) is eliminated, as they are rendered into objects of erudition or curiosity.

  There’s no question that preserving the patrimony is fundamental, but in itself this is insufficient, because a patrimony is constructed every day and can’t, thus, be conserved in a museum.

  *

  Modern society is paradoxically ultra-conservative and museological, on the one hand, and, at the same time, hostile to the living traditions of identity; Western modernity has proven itself similarly incapable (especially in the arts) of producing new works in continuity with tradition. So-called ‘modern’ art or architecture hasn’t been modern for at least fifty years, it simply recycles the official academicism, which is nihilistic.

  (see tradition)

  N

  Nation, nationalism, new nationalism

  Etymologically, a ‘nation’ is a popular and political community made up of those of the same ethnic origins, of the same ‘birth’.

  The nation ought not to be confused with the nation-state. ‘Nation’ and ‘ethnos’ are the same word, designating a community whose members are of the same origin. To oppose the nation to the Empire is, semantically, to misunderstand it. An Empire, in the positive sense, is a federation, an ensemble of similar, closely-related nations — a ‘federal nation’.

  Nationalism ought not to be associated with a defence of the Jacobin and cosmopolitan nation-state. As a concept, nationalism needs to change its meaning: first, it needs to acquire an ethnic association and no longer a strictly abstract political one. It should return to its original etymological sense. Second, henceforth, nationalism ought to be understood in an enlarged European sense — in a visionary, future-oriented way — to include all the Continent’s Indo-European peoples. In this vein, regional patriotism becomes an organic component of an imperial Great-European nationalism — what I call the New Nationalism.

  *

  In respect to France, the situation is especially delicate and complex. In no case should French nationalism identify with the tradition of Jacobin nationalism, since the latter is cosmopolitan, anti-ethnic, and, paradoxically, destroys the ‘France’ it claims to love (this is the ‘French paradox’). The same holds for the present institutions of the European Union, whose principal concern seems to be the destruction of Europe’s peoples and nations. Another path is possible, an imperial one, with three dimensions: first, the ethnically based region; second, citizenship based on the historical nation; and third, a global, ethnic, historical nationality embracing the whole Continent.

  *

  The relationship between these three levels is too complex to be rationally resolved in a single blow. Only history will solve it. Europe’s problem dictates a top-down solution that transcends existing divisions, a solution that doesn’t destroy attachment to the ethnically-based region, that doesn’t destroy loyalty to the h
istorical concepts of Spain, France, Germany, etc. (to their languages, their cultures), that doesn’t close off a futuristic construction of the Great European Nation. We need to privilege the idea of exclusion and not that of inclusion.

  (see empire; Europe; Eurosiberia)

  * * *

  Neo-primitivism

  The present process of observable cultural involution toward primitive mass behaviour, a weakening of the cultural memory, and the advent of social savagery.

  The signs of this new primitivism are multiple: the rise of illiteracy in the schools, the explosion of drug use, the Afro-Americanisation of popular music, the collapse of social codes, the decline of general culture, knowledge, and historical memory among the young, the dissolution of contemporary art into a brutal, vacuous nihilism, the mass coarsening and deculturation fostered by audio/visual media (the ‘cathodic religion’), the increase of criminality and uncivil behaviour, the decline of civic duty, the accelerated crumbling of social norms and collective disciplines, the deterioration of the language, etc.

  The generation of ‘Beur-Black’ youth offers a remarkable example of this neo-primitivism, but they are not the only ones touched by it.

 

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