Somalia had only gained independence a scant nine years earlier. Before 1960, it had been two separate nations under United Nations trusteeship: British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The concept of a central government had always faced struggles in Somalia. Much like Afghanistan, the society was heavily clan-dominated. Six major clans had shared power whilst the country see-sawed through various iterations of colonial rule. Barre manipulated these clans, setting them against each other, outlawing some whilst bringing others into the fold to maintain his power base.
The beginning of the end for Barre was the disastrous conflict with Ethiopia in 1977 known as the Ogaden War, which saw the Somalis defeated largely due to their Soviet benefactors switching their support mid-flow to back the Ethiopians. Many in the Somali military lost faith in Barre in the aftermath and a failed coup ended in bloody reprisals and executions amongst the leaders of the clans responsible for the uprising.
This crackdown led to the eventual formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), an insurgency based in the northwest of the country with the aim of overthrowing Barre’s junta. The Somali leader sought to crush the SNM, establishing what he termed Mobile Military Courts to try suspected insurgents and sympathizers. These trials were perfunctory, typically ending in the execution of the unfortunate defendant. From these kangaroo courts, the Barre regime soon escalated to mass slaughter, attempting to literally wipe out the clans that made up the SNM.
The United States, which had stepped in as Barre’s benefactor after the Soviets withdrew their sponsorship, also withdrew their support in the wake of this attempted genocide. With widespread international condemnation of the regime, clan-based militias emerged rivalling the SNM and attempting to wrestle control of regional centers from Barre’s forces. The largest, the Italian-backed United Somali Congress (USC), was established in 1989 by the Hawiye Clan. This emergence of multiple armed rivals placed pressure on the increasingly fragile dictatorship of Barre.
After the USC conducted a major offensive against the capital Mogadishu in 1991, Barre saw the writing on the wall and fled the country in the time-honored fashion of the dictator. A factional war soon broke out within the USC itself as sub-clans vied for control. Former general Mohamed Farah Aideed, who had been sentenced to six years in jail by Barre, violently contested the USC’s choice of president to replace Barre, Ali Mahdi Mohammed.
Aideed had been educated in Italy and served as Mogadishu’s Chief of Police before attending military staff college in Russia. He progressed rapidly through the ranks in Barre’s regime although, in the Stalinesque atmosphere, Aideed’s popularity brought him under suspicion and he was imprisoned, only to be released to serve during the ill-fated Ogaden War. Following the defeat of Somali forces, Aideed served as Ambassador to India.
Aideed was from the Habr Gidr, a sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye. Mohammed was from another Hawiye sub-clan, the Abgaal. Arguments soon turned to violence and bitter fighting broke out between the factions in Mogadishu. In the power vacuum after the fall of Barre’s regime, other clans who held territory outside of the capital soon joined the fighting that turned at least a fifth of the country’s population into internally displaced refugees.
The civil war coupled with a crippling famine – itself a by-product of the war – and drought resulted in a burgeoning humanitarian crisis with more than two hundred thousand Somalis dying from malnutrition in 1992. Global television coverage spurred an international effort to relieve the suffering. Initially nongovernment agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took on most of the task.
The United Nations Security Council established a number of resolutions which called for an arms embargo on all warring factions and an end to hostilities but lacked any scope for the deployment of international peacekeepers to enforce such measures. A token security force – UNOSOM or United Nations Operations in Somalia – was added in a later resolution to monitor an early UN-brokered ceasefire and ensure aid shipments were delivered to those in need. The UN were working toward an ambitious goal, the so-called “100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance,” aiming to end the famine and subsequent humanitarian disaster in Somalia within months.
Whilst Aideed initially supported humanitarian efforts, or at least allowed them to proceed, the game changed on October 28, 1992. Aideed pronounced that the Pakistani battalion providing security for the UN operations in Mogadishu was no longer welcome. He also railed against what he saw as outside control of the airport. In reality, his position as powerbroker within Mogadishu was threatened by the arrival of the United Nations. Aideed’s militias began firing mortars and artillery at both the airport and at cargo ships delivering the much-needed aid.
UNOSOM faltered in its efforts as most factions roundly ignored the ceasefire and Aideed stepped up his attacks. The United States under President George H. W. Bush offered to provide much-needed additional manpower, an offer readily accepted by the UN. The mission was known to US forces as Operation Restore Hope. Bush had recently heralded the arrival of a “New World Order” following the end of the Cold War and was keen to place the United States at the forefront of forging that new world. One official explained: “The intent is to allow the food deliveries to continue, to allow Somalia as a nation to kind of come together.”1
The United Nations saw the US role as one of providing physical security for the humanitarian mission: “The United States has undertaken to take the lead in creating the secure environment which is an inescapable condition for the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction, objectives which have from the outset been included in the various Security Council resolutions on Somalia.”2
United States military forces first deployed to Somalia in numbers on December 9, 1992. Some readers may recall the images of Navy SEALs (SEa-Air-Land), their faces caked in camouflage cream, making a covert landing onto the beaches of Mogadishu, only to be met by the full glare of the world’s press. Such press attention would continue to dog, and at times undermine, US military efforts in Somalia.
Aideed, a Machiavellian strategist of the first order, at first publicly supported the US efforts, hoping to drive a rift between the Americans and the United Nations. His Finance Minister and second-in-command, Osman Atto, produced leaflets extolling the US whilst decrying the UN. “USA is Friend – UN is Invader” read the leaflets.
The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had supported Barre in his former role as Egypt’s Foreign Minister and was particularly hated by Aideed, who believed that Boutros-Ghali had a secret agenda to undermine Aideed. Indeed Boutros-Ghali did nothing to dissuade Aideed of this opinion, arguing that only a complete disarmament of the clans, including the Habr Gidr, would solve the humanitarian crisis facing Somalia.
Aideed instead saw the chaos as a means to an end and positioned himself to become the kingpin of the Somali warlords, refusing to join the UN’s negotiated solution with the other warlords, and continuing his war with the rival Abgaal as he felt the presidency was his right. The USC and Aideed maintained close relations with yet another armed militia, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) that also soon began attacks against UN forces, typically in the form of mortar harassment fires, sniping, and the laying of landmines.
Food distribution centers were still being hijacked by clan militias who stole the aid to re-sell on the black market or simply to deny relief to rival clans. Those who controlled the food, controlled Mogadishu. Security around the centers also became problematic with the distribution of aid resulting in food riots, which led to US Marines being deployed to guard the shipments. The militias, however, would simply wait for the Marines to leave for the night before seizing the shipments. A US State Department spokeswoman noted at the time: “The appalling and intolerable slaughter results from selfish attempts by clan-based factions to gain or maintain an advantage over one another.”3
UNOSOM, and the US Operat
ion Restore Hope, ended in May 1993 and both organizations transformed into UNOSOM II in May 1993 under the new American administration of President Bill Clinton. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 814, signed by the UN Security Council on March 26, 1993, UNOSOM II was given an exceptionally broad mandate to secure humanitarian supplies and bring peace to Somalia, including the deployment of combat troops to actively target the troublesome warlords. In that month, the most brazen and brutal of attacks on United Nations forces occurred, one that would lead directly to the deployment of an American special operations task force to target Aideed.
On June 5, 1993, Pakistani peacekeepers had deployed to inspect one of the Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS), cantonment areas set up by the UN that held surrendered heavy weapons and technicals, the ubiquitous armed pick-up trucks. By chance, the AWSS was located near Aideed’s radio station from which he transmitted self-serving Habr Gidr propaganda against the United Nations’ presence. The Pakistanis found convincing evidence of significant numbers of missing technicals and of crew-served weapons including heavy machine guns and recoilless rifles. As the poorly equipped Pakistani troops returned to their base after the inspection, they were ambushed near an old cigarette factory deep in Habr Gidr territory. Their soft-skinned trucks offered little protection.
A US Army history detailed the ambush:
A Pakistani escort unit ran headlong into an ambush on 21 October Road en-route to the stadium [the Pakistani forces were based at a former soccer stadium to the northeast of the city]. Delayed at hastily erected barricades, UNOSOM vehicles came under intense fire not only from small arms but also machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades … Calls went out for reinforcements, but the relief column, in a scenario that foreshadowed the events of 3 and 4 October, immediately came under attack. In the ensuing chaos, Italian helicopters inadvertently sprayed fire at the very personnel they came to aid. At the same time, scattered roadblocks appeared around the city to hinder relief forces’ movement, and additional ambushes ensued.4
Concurrently, another group of Pakistani soldiers detailed to provide security at a food distribution site on National Street, the main thoroughfare that bisected downtown Mogadishu from east to west and one of the only paved roads in the city, came under attack. American Major General Thomas Montgomery, then commander of all US forces in Somalia and Deputy UN Force Commander, commented:
At one of those sites, Pakistanis … were overwhelmed by women and kids, which was a typical way the Somali militia operated. They put women and children at the front and just sort of let the crowd press in, and they pressed in around them and then disarmed them and then there were shooters in the crowd and they shot a couple of them. A couple of them were literally taken apart by hand.5
A SEAL who was later assigned to Task Force Ranger remembered the event in graphic detail: “Aideed’s people, including women and children, celebrated by dismembering, disemboweling, and skinning the Pakistanis.” In all, some 23 Pakistani soldiers were killed in both incidents and more than 50 wounded. Six were also captured during the ambush, one of whom later died whilst in captivity. Aideed believed that he could force the United Nations to withdraw from Mogadishu and thus eliminate the greatest threat to his power by inflicting casualties on the UN forces. Perhaps recalling the effect of press coverage of casualties during the Vietnam War, he knew that such mounting casualties would naturally play poorly in their home countries and lead to calls for disengagement and withdrawal from Somalia.6
Retired US Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe who served as Boutros-Ghali’s Special Representative for Somalia, for all intents and purposes the face of the United Nations in Somalia, remarked:
I don’t think he liked the US being there. He opposed it until the last minute, and I don’t think he liked the UN or any other international force being there. I don’t think he liked what representative government would mean, because he didn’t have the votes. I think this really meant a loss of power to him.
My feeling is that [it was] probably the fact that the UN was actually starting to implement the Resolution 814 [nation building and power sharing within Somalia under UNOSOM II] and the Addis Ababa accords [to develop a representative government with all clans participating], even though he’d signed them.
In the long term, representative government wasn’t really in his interests because he was occupying a lot of territory that he’d gotten through guns, and he didn’t have the vote nor did his clan have the votes in a totally representative national assembly. And so I think he saw this as a threat to his power probably, this whole international force. So he would be very happy to have all the international people pack up and leave. And I think he saw that striking a blow to the Pakistanis who had replaced the Americans in South Mogadishu, which was his territory, was a way to get the UN to leave.7
The response from the United Nations, however, was uncharacteristically fast and bold. On the following day, it passed Security Council Resolution 837 calling for Aideed to be held responsible for the attacks on the Pakistanis and allowing for military means to effect his capture:
The UN Secretary of the Security Council went into emergency session. This had happened on a Saturday, and [by] Sunday New York time had passed Resolution 837, which basically said three things: arrest the perpetrators of these crimes against the Pakistanis, disarm this city (obviously you’ve got way more weapons than you possibly anticipated because of all this shooting that went on against the Pakistanis), and put a stop to this vitriolic propaganda that is coming through various media means of the Somalis, obviously aimed at Aidid’s [sic] radio station.8
A $25,000 reward was later placed on Aideed’s head by Howe in the hope of incentivizing rivals to sell out the warlord to the United Nations. With the support of Boutros-Ghali, the Admiral believed that key to stopping the bloodshed and bringing about some kind of peace was the capture and trial of Aideed as a war criminal. Aideed and the Habr Gidr took the bounty as nothing short of a declaration of war on the Habr Gidr and immediately retorted with a tit-for-tat bounty of $1,000,000 for Howe’s head announced via Radio Aideed.
It is important to note that at no time was Aideed targeted for assassination. Although clearly a significant thorn in the side of UNOSOM II and Boutros-Ghali, Security Council Resolution 837 called explicitly for the “arrest” rather than the targeted removal of the warlord. Aideed likely did not appreciate the difference with ground raids and airstrikes conducting missions against his clan infrastructure. Further events would only reinforce his belief that his nemesis, Boutros-Ghali, was carrying out a personal vendetta to eliminate him.
Four US Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships based in Kenya were deployed to target Radio Aideed and an Osman Atto-owned workshop which built and repaired their technicals. The strikes caused some collateral damage to surrounding buildings and a number of civilian casualties that would return to haunt US forces in the months to follow. A Pentagon spokesperson claimed that the AC-130 strikes were “by any measure … a very significant military setback for Aideed.”9
On the following day, June 17, a multinational force of American, French, Italian, Moroccan, and Pakistani peacekeepers surrounded Aideed’s headquarters compound and the homes of two of his chief lieutenants, attempting to capture the warlord and his cronies. Not surprisingly, and likely given advance warning of the impending operation by his network of spies and informers, Aideed managed to escape before the cordon was in place.
Somali militia and civilians flocked to the location. Combat soon escalated from random shots to a protracted firefight with Moroccan forces. The close proximity of Somali militia to the Moroccans meant that circling American Cobra attack helicopters could not provide direct support without running the risk of inflicting friendly fire on their allies. Instead French armored vehicles engaged gunmen firing from the nearby Digfer Hospital with main gun rounds. Five United Nations military personnel were killed and some 46 were wounded. Both Somali militia and civilians were also kil
led in the exchange with some estimates placing the death toll at over a hundred.
Aideed cannily took to CNN to argue his case against the United Nations-sanctioned strikes and was shown visiting hospitals treating those claimed to have been wounded in the operations. An unnamed US official commented at the time: “The United Nations, having deprived Aideed of his voice, is now giving him an international stage to act on. He’s always wanted to be the George Washington of his country, when in fact he is more like the Caligula.”10
The June 17 operation also led to a fracturing of resolve amongst the multinational force with most of the partner nations refusing to again conduct operations in Aideed territory, inadvertently strengthening the warlord’s position by creating “no-go zones” that Aideed could trumpet as a victory over the “imperialists” of the United Nations. Largely because of these “national caveats,” by July the mission to capture Aideed had fallen to the in-country assets of the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division and its 2-14 Infantry under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bill David. The 2-14 manned the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the multinational forces, acting as a rescue force should a UN unit be ambushed or attacked. By this time, however, Aideed knew full well he was being actively hunted and had largely disappeared from radar; US officials called it “doing a Saddam Hussein.”
The QRF maintained a significant standby force should Aideed surface. A US Army history noted its composition:
“Team Attack” was comprised of one UH-60 [Black Hawk] helicopter with sniper[s] and three [Cobra] attack helicopters. “Team Snatch” was made up with the [infantry] scout platoon, two UH-60s, one UH-60 MEDEVAC [medical evacuation], and one EMT [Emergency Medical Technician] with surgeon. A rifle platoon and two UH-60s made up “Team Secure.” Special Operations Forces initially provided the sniper and the “snatch” element, but handed over these taskings to the QRF.11
Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On Page 2
