Indeed after more than a week of intensive drills, it appeared that the Somali mission would join that same fated category.
The bad news was delivered by General Wayne Downing himself amid much internal frustration during a Friday evening meal for the task force at Delta’s compound. The mission was officially “scrubbed.” “[The] TF was dissolved, the Rangers returned to Fort Bliss for a scheduled deployment, and the rest of us went home for the weekend,” added Smith. When the Rangers arrived at Fort Bliss the next day, Colonel McKnight was informed, however, that circumstances had changed and the mission was now on. An advance party from JSOC would fly out to Somalia immediately to begin preparations for the deployment of the task force.
Those circumstances had been the August 21 ambush of the US Military Police Humvee in Mogadishu. The National Command Authority made a hasty about-turn and Aideed had been elevated to JSOC’s public enemy number one. The elite operators soon received confirmation. It was a normal weekend morning for Kurt Smith:
It was Sunday morning, August 22, 1993, at approximately 0900. I was on my way to church when my pager began to vibrate. I looked at the display; I recognized the coded message that directed the squadron to proceed to work for training.
I immediately turned around. When I arrived at work, the first person I saw was Tom S. He told me a deployment order had been signed. A notice on the chalkboard confirmed what he had said. We would leave Wednesday, but, until then, we would resume our mission rehearsals. I proceeded to my team room to prepare my kit.26
The operators had to conduct one final act that many, with the unit’s relaxed grooming standards allowing beards and longer-than-regulation hair, resented: “Squadron members were giving themselves last minute high-and-tight haircuts in the latrine. The haircuts were required for us to blend in with other TF members.” As Delta was at the time and still is officially a classified unit, the haircuts were intended to help disguise their presence amongst the larger Ranger contingent, all of whom would sport the distinctive Army buzz cuts.
Whilst the task force components had been training and anxiously waiting for the order to deploy, three separate force packages had been proposed by JSOC and presented by General Downing. The decision on exactly what and how many to send to Somalia to hunt Aideed rested with Central Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ultimately Secretary of Defense Les Aspin who would make the final decision. Each of the three options was given a nickname. The largest was the so-called “Cadillac” option which included a full Ranger battalion and attached AC-130H gunships. The medium-size option was named “Oldsmobile” and reduced the number of Rangers to a company. The final package, the smallest and the one eventually chosen, was known as “Volkswagen.”
The political leadership was adamant that they wanted to keep the numbers of deploying special operators as small as possible. They feared increasing the American footprint at a time when they were strategically attempting to disentangle American forces from Somalia. The fact that a diplomatic solution was also being pursued may have also contributed to the requirement to minimize the force posture, as a large force might spook the negotiating parties. Downing also commented that realistically “the numbers were driven by the aircraft load. We were to be deployed with five C-141s and two C-5s. There is some logic to that.”27
The “Volkswagen” package consisted of Delta’s C-Squadron along with personnel from their Operational Support Troop; the majority of B-Company of the 3rd Battalion of the Rangers plus the attached platoon from A-Company; a small contingent of Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescue Jumpers from the 24th Special Tactics Squadron; and a four-man team of snipers from the Navy’s SEAL Team 6. Providing aviation lift and close air support would be elements of the 1st Battalion of the 160th SOAR deploying with a range of MH-60L Black Hawks, MH-6J Little Birds, and AH-6J attack helicopters.
The lack of AC-130 Spectre gunship support in the “Volkswagen” package would become an ongoing controversy for many years after, with most participants believing that their inclusion would have saved lives. It is also important that none of the three options included any organic armored vehicles, another controversy that remains hotly debated to this day. In fact, apart from a number of lightly armored Humvees that Delta managed to borrow from Army Special Forces Groups based at Fort Bragg in advance of the deployment, neither of the principal ground units deploying held any armored vehicles of any type on their table of organization and equipment, nor did either unit routinely train with such vehicles.
The selection of the “Volkswagen” option was unfortunately not the final cut to the task force. A scant 24 hours prior their deployment, the Ranger platoon from A-Company was stripped from the force package as the Pentagon again trimmed the size of the force. Colonel McKnight’s reserve was gone. If anything went wrong in Mogadishu, the Rangers now lacked their own QRF and would have to depend on the 10th Mountain and United Nations units.
General Hoar implied later that the platoon was cut as he believed it would be “employed for local security – a job I definitely would not allow them to do.” Hoar argued that “local security was outside our mission and was in the areas under allied responsibility.”28 Whatever Hoar’s feelings on the matter, as we will see, the task force would feel compelled to conduct local force-protection measures to reduce the threat from Somali mortars, a job that they felt the United Nations garrison forces were simply incapable of doing.
Once the force package and deployment were finally agreed, the task force was formally named Task Force Ranger. The operation itself was called Operation Caustic Brimstone during training but was changed to Operation Gothic Serpent once the actual mission was authorized. In overall command was a cigar-chomping Texan Major General, William F. “Bill” Garrison.
At the time of the Gothic Serpent deployment, Garrison was head of JSOC. Previously, Garrison had led the Operations Squadron of the shadowy Intelligence Support Activity in the mid-1980s and had been the commander of Delta between 1985 and 1989, although his operational experience in special operations extended as far back as the Vietnam War where he served with the infamous Phoenix Program, targeting enemy leadership personnel.
Colonel William G “Jerry” Boykin was second-in-command under Garrison as the then-current commander of Delta. Under Boykin were the three operational commanders responsible for their respective units: Lieutenant Colonel Danny McKnight, battalion commander of 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; Lieutenant Colonel Gary Harrell, squadron commander of Delta’s C - or Charlie Squadron; and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Matthews, battalion commander of 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR.
On the ground, the Delta assault element would be led by a Delta Captain whilst the Rangers reported to the Bravo Company commander, Captain Mike Steele. The Delta Captain was also the official Ground Force Commander. Theoretically equal in rank, the friction of battle would cause significant challenges between these two positions and between Delta and the Ranger company commander.
The objectives of Task Force Ranger were deceptively simple on paper at least: “The special operations forces had the mission to capture General Mohammed Farah Aideed and designated others, and to turn over captives to UNOSOM forces.”29 Major General Garrison succinctly outlined his concept of operations based on those objectives: “When directed, deploy to Mogadishu, Somalia; conduct operations to capture General Aideed and/or designated others. The aviation task force must be prepared to conduct two primary courses of action: moving convoy and strong point assault. Success is defined as the live capture of General Aideed and designated individuals and recovery to the designated transload point; safely and without fratricide.”30
Kurt Smith recalled that there were three distinct stages:
The operation would be conducted in three phases: phase one consisted of a train-up period, deployment, and preparation for combat operations; phase two consisted of the search for Aideed and operations conducted specifically to capture him; and phase three consisted of the dismantliz
ation [sic] of Aideed’s infrastructure through the meticulous and methodical capture of the top personalities in Aideed’s organization.31
The advance party consisting of Garrison and a senior representative from each of the three primary units arrived in Mogadishu on August 22. The main body of Task Force Ranger followed on August 25. Garrison met with General Montgomery to explain their purpose and to emplace liaisons within his headquarters, Colonel John Vines with Montgomery and Major Craig Nixon with the 10th Mountain who comprised the QRF.
Aviators from the 160th SOAR met with their fellow pilots from the 10th Aviation Brigade to begin to understand the environment of Mogadishu. By the end of August, all 441 members of Task Force Ranger were dispatched to Somalia and were soon ready for their first missions to begin.
Ranger Lieutenant Tom DiTomasso later recalled: “This excitement was a new feeling, mixed with both adrenalin and fear. As a platoon leader, I often wondered what it would be like to take my platoon into combat, to do something real. Later, I would learn to be more careful of what I wished for.”32
CHAPTER 2
THE FIRST SIX
“There is no question that we lost strategic surprise when we moved the force in the country, therefore we had to maintain tactical surprise.”
Major General William Garrison, Commander Task Force Ranger
By August 28, the Task Force had settled into their new home and were now, in Garrison’s words, “fully mission capable.” Their home for at least the next three months was a rundown aircraft hangar on the edge of Mogadishu’s equally rundown international airport. A disused concrete building opposite would become their Joint Operations Center (JOC) as well as housing the various intelligence collection entities working for the Task Force.
The hangar was open to both the airfield and to the outskirts of Mogadishu, a scant 50 meters from the JOC Building. First priority went to establishing some form of defenses. Using whatever was handy, the Rangers placed shipping containers to form a defensive wall to shield them from prying eyes and stray bullets from the continual internecine firefights occurring just beyond the wire. Sandbagged fighting positions with overhead cover were built, and an access control point established by the Rangers.
It was evident that Task Force Ranger would have to provide its own security after all, despite General Hoar’s pronouncements to the contrary that such security would be provided by the United Nations. What little security there was appeared to the men of Task Force Ranger to be wholly inadequate. Major General Garrison made an immediate request for reinforcements in the form of the missing platoon from Alpha Company that McKnight had been forced to cut. Predictably, given the prevailing political climate around the deployment, the request was denied.
The poor security environment around the hangar was underlined several nights later when a United Nations sentry position nearby was taken under fire by unknown assailants. The UN soldiers, likely Egyptians, did not return fire as incredibly they had been issued with no live ammunition. Instead, a small element of Rangers posting security at the hangar itself maneuvered against the gunmen and a number were shot and killed before the survivors beat a hasty retreat. Even this incident did nothing to convince Washington to grant Garrison’s request.
The Task Force lived a spartan existence in the hangar. Each man only had a folding bed in his respective unit area and each kept his weapons and equipment next to his bed. There were neither curtains nor internal walls. The aviators, because of safety rules regarding flying, moved into a number of air-conditioned trailers. A TV room was eventually established by one of the operators with a VCR to watch movies, and boardgames provided some relief from boredom.
The living conditions in the hangar were made worse each time it rained. As the airfield was located at the base of the higher ground upon which most of Mogadishu sat, the rain would head downhill, bringing with it all manner of refuse including human sewage which regularly overran portions of the hangar. That was not the only sewage-related issue to blight the Task Force. During the early days of the deployment, the entire 441 members of the Task Force were forced to use just half a dozen Port-A-Loos which consistently overflowed. The rat-infested hangar was also overrun with pigeons which provided some sport for the Delta operators who attempted to shoot them down with BB guns imported from the States.
Task Force personnel would conduct physical training or marksmanship sessions at a makeshift small-arms range they had established at the nearby beach. The Task Force also spent time on a makeshift volleyball court. “We played a lot of volleyball in the afternoons to pass the time. When intelligence would come down that might turn into a mission, these became known as ‘pants alerts’ because it meant we needed to change from our PT uniform to fatigue trousers and boots in case the intelligence resulted in a mission,” noted Kurt Smith.1
Delta Sergeant First Class Gary Keeney, known by his unit nickname of “Greedy,” remembered: “There was a volleyball net outside the hangar and we sometimes played every day. If we weren’t on a mission, if we weren’t planning, if we weren’t PTing or doing maintenance, you could catch me out on the volleyball court!”
Although the sea beyond the volleyball court looked inviting, the Task Force members were warned about unseen perils. A rumor spread that a Russian firm had once run an abattoir near the beach, throwing their off-cuts into the sea. This attracted sharks who had continued to frequent the area ever since, long after the departure of the Russians. Despite this, some members of the multinational forces braved the waters, leading to at least one death by shark attack: “A shark attack happened while we were there. A soldier from another Coalition force got bit by a shark and it happened in the exact same little cove that me and a couple of other guys were swimming at. I never went back in that water after that!” recalled Keeney.
Training was constant, whether shooting, first aid, and radio procedures or room clearance. Exercises were held to rehearse the actions to be taken in the event of a downed aircraft so that every soldier, airman or sailor knew the basic drills to be followed in such an event. Delta operators passed on the finer points of close quarter battle (CQB) shooting to the young Rangers and explained how to breach and clear an enemy-held structure.
Delta also planned for assaults against targets that might prove to be possible locations of Aideed and his lieutenants. Keeney explained:
Each team was tasked to plan contingency operations if something happened that led us to certain sites or venues or locations in the city. C-Team’s mission [for example] was the Digfer Hospital. Matt Rierson was given the mission of how the squadron would assault the Digfer Hospital. We spent a lot of time and effort planning that. Of course we never went there but we planned for it.
Other training sessions were run by the Delta surgeon, Doctor John “Rob” Marsh. These were termed “goat labs” after the Army Special Forces practice of conducting practical first aid on live animals. In Somalia, goats were purchased from locals and flown to a secure location where the unfortunate animals were shot. Delta and SEAL operators had to administer lifesaving first aid on the goats. The goats were then given back to the locals for food, a useful hearts and minds activity along with providing the most realistic first aid training possible to the operators.
Along with the goat labs, Delta and the small SEAL Team 6 contingent would conduct what amounted to hunting safaris from the air. Snipers would perch on the bench seats of a pair of MH-6s and hunt a range of African game which was brought back to the hangar for impromptu barbecues. Along with providing a welcome break from military rations and the limited fresh food available, it allowed the snipers to practise their skills in engaging moving targets from the air, something which would prove critical in later operations.
The Task Force also began what were known as “signature flights.” Their aim was to desensitize the population of Mogadishu, and Aideed himself, to the presence of their helicopters over the city. The Task Force planners knew that launching an armada of special o
perations helicopters would be a sure sign of an impending mission, so the signature flights were an attempt to both normalize their prescence and confuse the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel James “Tommy” Faust, the Operations Officer of the JSOC J-2 [intelligence] Cell noted: “TF Ranger randomly launched missions for training and rehearsal at all times of the day and night. We could not protect our launches but the idea was to put the challenge on the surveillance to determine if it was a real launch or not.”2 It had the added benefit of getting the aircrews of the 160th SOAR and their passengers used to the norms of the city and its inhabitants.
Kurt Smith recalled his first briefing on the rules of engagement for these flights:
Norm [Hooten] briefed the team on the rules of engagement (ROE) for the signature flights. He briefed, “If you see a technical vehicle in the open, you’re cleared hot. If you see anyone with a weapon, you’re cleared hot. If you have any doubt in your mind whatsoever …” I nodded my head, already knowing the rest. We were conditioned never to fire at anything unless we were absolutely sure of the threat. Norm continued, “… you’re cleared hot.” My eyes widened as I digested this clear departure from normal procedures. It was a simple and welcome adjustment, however.3
Knowing they were likely under surveillance by Aideed loyalists, the Task Force began deception operations, as Garrison explained:
Once each day we loaded the entire force and went out and did something. Once each night that we were there, we loaded the entire force up and went out and did something. There was no way that anyone, and we assumed that they were watching us, could tell when we loaded up as to whether or not we were going out to conduct a mission.4
Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On Page 4
