An SNA militiaman was engaged and killed by a member of Delta’s E-Team as they cleared the area but no trace of the radio station could be found. One civilian was also wounded during the assault. The antenna that had been spotted later turned out to be a “derelict light pole” according to Faust. A significant portent was the rapid arrival of masses of Somali civilians, some armed. Kurt Smith recounted:
After the search was complete, we began our exfiltration. MH-60s were hovering around the objective, providing air support with 7.62mm miniguns. This created a beacon by which to draw crowds on this night. As we began our exfil, many Somalis had begun converging on the objective area. War is a spectator sport to Somalis. Even if the area is dangerous for spectators, they still want to come watch.49
The GRF spotted a number of gunmen during their exfiltration from the objective. “On one of the missions, we did a convoy of vehicles in and on the way out. A couple guys made the mistake of looking [down from] a two- or three-story building with guns. I told the Ranger behind the .50 cal to engage them. The .50 cal ripped through the cinder block making it look like it was exploding,” recounted Paul Leonard, a member of C-Team. Other militia were spotted down an alleyway by Kurt Smith. He engaged them with his SAW which alerted the other Humvee gunners to the Somalis’ presence, and recalled:
Almost immediately, the Ground Force Commander, Captain Ben S, was on the radio. “Looks like we’re taking some fire from the left side.” With that, I looked back and saw every turret in the convoy turn its weapons in that direction. Each Humvee was alternately equipped with a MK19 40mm automatic grenade launcher or a M2 .50-caliber machine gun. Every vehicle’s occupants on the left side fired down the alleyway as they passed. The explosions from the grenades and tracer fire from crew-served weapons made it appear like a 4th of July celebration through my NODs.50
Tommy Faust confirmed that Task Force Ranger later used “helicopter gun cameras”51 to watch SNA personnel erect the actual antenna for Radio Aideed just across the street from the targeted location. The Task Force had been within meters of striking the right location. Garrison was informed and the radio station kept on the target list.
During the post-mission “hot wash” or debrief following this mission, Colonel Boykin, the then commander of Delta, decided to hold an impromptu prayer session for the armed militiaman killed during the operation. This decision was met by much bewilderment from the operators present. Boykin’s evangelical Christian beliefs would later impact on his career after he conducted a presentation in which he displayed aerial photos of Mogadishu taken on October 3 and bizarrely reportedly claimed there was a demonic presence visible in the smoke over the city.52
Another little-known operation was also conducted by Task Force Ranger during September. Civilian employees at the airport had been discovered to be acting as forward observers for Aideed’s mortar strikes. The American SIGINT capability meant that voiceprints could be taken from recordings of radio intercepts guiding in the mortar rounds and compared to those of the ostensibly civilian airport workers. When they matched, the J-2 Cell knew they had identified the culprits. A security operation in late September resulted in the temporary capture of one of these spotters. The mortar attacks continued, unfortunately, but that particular spotter never reappeared on the radio net.
After the death of their main HUMINT source from Russian roulette, the CIA and J-2 Cell now conferred with the 10th Mountain QRF’s J-2 unit, requesting a list of Aideed’s top half dozen key lieutenants. This was phase three of Garrison’s plan. Phase one had been to establish Task Force Ranger and make it ready for immediate operations. This phase had officially concluded on August 28. In phase two, Task Force Ranger had targeted Aideed directly to no avail. Now, with phase three, Garrison was going after the warlord’s henchmen, aiming to isolate Aideed by targeting his immediate supporters, a group termed the “Tier One Leadership.” There was also the distinct possibility that one of his lieutenants would give up Aideed’s location under tactical questioning.
Back in the United States, White House opinion had turned increasingly toward a negotiated solution to the “Aideed problem.” Diplomatic overtures were now being made to the warlord by representatives of the US government through Habr Gidr intermediaries. At his address at the United Nations General Assembly in September, President Clinton, however, made no mention of any such a change in policy. Incredibly, these diplomatic efforts were never directly communicated to Garrison, Montgomery, or the Task Force Ranger leadership. Les Aspin was later directly quoted as claiming: “The Pentagon’s understanding of the policy was to move to more diplomatic efforts but snatch Aideed on the side, if you can.”53
Interviewed years later, General Thomas Montgomery tellingly explained:
There had been a recommendation to re-think new ways to maybe engage the Somali faction leaders, Aideed specifically. I knew that recommendation had been made, but not even the Ambassador knew that anybody had taken it under consideration or advisement back here … You may recall the President said something about the fact they’d kind of made a decision in Washington to take a different course. And he was appalled at the news – well, I think we were appalled at the news – that somebody had decided to take a different course and yet we were continuing our operations. Here [in Mogadishu] we had no new orders or new guidelines.
But apparently the President’s remarks were about maybe they were deciding to take a different course … But nothing had ever been communicated to the field. I wish if that was the case, that whenever somebody had made that decision back there [in the US], [they] had told the military chain of command to cease and desist in this effort to bring Aideed to justice.54
Garrison, as the head of JSOC, was astute enough, however, to understand this dimension and knew that the longer his units struck “dry holes,” the more the political willpower supporting the mission would ebb away – he needed a success. Public approval of the mission in the US was also flagging badly as the situation in Mogadishu degenerated. All of the political indicators pointed to a phased but speedy US withdrawal and handover to the United Nations. Congress had recently passed a resolution which would require specific Congressional approval after a November 15 deadline to maintain US forces, including Task Force Ranger, in Somalia.
The wider US effort under Montgomery was increasingly concerned about the roadblocks that Aideed’s militias had been using to block and channel American and United Nations forces and that were beginning to be seen during Task Force Ranger operations. Tanks would have been able to easily clear such obstructions. Armored vehicles were possessed by several of their United Nations partners including the Pakistanis and the Italians but Montgomery was uneasy relying upon them.
He was particularly concerned that under the convoluted United Nations command structure there would be delays or even the potential for a contributing nation to flatly refuse to support his forces with their armor, particularly following the June 17 operation which had seen Habr Gidr territory declared off-limits to many of the UN contributing nations. Instead, he wanted American armor under his direct command. Montgomery made his initial request for four M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and 14 M2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles on September 14, a request that was denied by Hoar and Aspin again citing the aim of minimizing, and in fact reducing, the overall US footprint.
The first opportunity to strike at an Aideed leadership target was early on September 18. Osman Atto, Aideed’s financier and a top target on the Tier One list, had been spotted. One of the CIA’s local assets signalled, under the watchful eye of a pair of SEAL snipers stationed atop a water tower at the Pakistani-controlled soccer stadium, that Atto had arrived at one of his numerous places of business, a garage and mechanical workshop which built and repaired technicals and heavy vehicles for the Habr Gidr.
Aerial surveillance confirmed the target’s presence at around 08:15 that morning and the Task Force launched by helicopter on another daylight operation. To avoid establish
ing a pattern, this time the GRF would conduct a ground extraction of the assault force whilst any detainees would be transported directly from the objective by Little Bird back to the hangar. When the assaulters arrived on the objective and breached into the garage a mere 30 minutes later, they apprehended suspects with ties to Atto, but the principal target and his bodyguards had fled. Apparently Atto had quickly changed clothes and fled at the first sign of trouble.
The operators also discovered and released a local national who had been chained to a nearby tree, apparently a member of a rival clan taken hostage. A press photographer who strayed too close to the target was warned back with flashbangs thrown by a sniper on board Super 61. Three gunmen, including one armed with an RPG, were shot and killed by the SEAL snipers providing overwatch during the mission.
On this raid, the Task Force had received significantly more small-arms and RPG fire directed at their helicopters. A report authored by US Military Intelligence Major Roger Sangvic would highlight the standard Somali response to these Task Force Ranger incursions, mirroring Kurt Smith’s comments: “Any mission gathered hundreds of curious, bored onlookers who had nothing better to do. Sniping would soon pick up, many times coming from crowds or behind women or children. This would escalate to more bold actions and even an RPG or two.”55
The Task Force did not have to wait long for a second shot at Osman Atto. On September 21, the JOC was alerted to a possible sighting. Team One, one of the locally recruited CIA surveillance cells, had established contact with an associate of Atto’s who was willing to sell him out. A hasty plan was concocted, again using the infamous CIA walking stick with the implanted beacon.
The walking stick was handed to the contact who was scheduled to meet with Atto later that day. Team One trailed the car carrying the contact and the walking stick as it headed to the presumed meeting destination. Instead, one of the Team One spotters spied Atto in the car with their contact when it stopped for petrol. The information was immediately transmitted to the CIA and from there to Garrison’s JOC. It was decided to launch an interdiction using the second of the standard templates, the Vehicle Intercept.
This mission was entirely conducted by Delta, with the Rangers aboard Black Hawks in a holding pattern nearby in case Atto managed to escape the intercept. Operators on Little Birds caught up to Atto’s Fiat and the engine block was engaged by sniper and minigun fire from one of the Black Hawks. The reality differed from the film in which there were several vehicles shown in the convoy and Atto’s is disabled by precision fire from a sniper’s CAR15. Delta Sergeant First Class Jim Smith was the sniper who took the actual shots and noted that it wasn’t just his CAR15 that was fired: “I shot the engine block of his vehicle to stop the vehicle. I initially engaged it with my CAR15 and then the minigun on my side of the bird opened up.” The vehicle was allegedly hit more than 50 times.
One of the Little Birds almost landed on top of the car. Atto’s driver/bodyguard attempted to engage the operators with an AK47 but was intentionally shot in the leg and disabled. Atto ran from the car as the helicopters landed and disappeared into a nearby building, the assaulters in hot pursuit. Paul Leonard, on one of the Little Birds, recalled: “After the car was disabled, several men including Osman Atto ran in to a nearby house to hide. I believe E-Team rounded up all the guys from the car and were sitting on a covered deck and Captain Miller told C-Team to guard the prisoners. Gary Keeney started to ask each one of them their names.”
Leonard’s fellow C-Team member Gary Keeney was indeed the operator who made the positive identification of the Task Force’s first high-value target capture. He recounted:
The vehicle with Osman Atto was shot and immobilized by another team from one of the helos. We then landed and assaulted the building that we thought we saw them go into. The first building was a dry hole and then we’re getting reports that they might’ve squirted to the next building so we ran to the next building.
I distinctly remember C-Team entered that building first and we entered into basically a living room area. We froze down that first big room and E-Team kinda flowed through us and we could see through a small [internal] window – the type of window you would pass food through from a kitchen – bad guys in that kitchen area type room, [with] no weapons.
E-Team’s lined up to enter that room and they threw a flashbang in, and I could see these guys all huddled together, [then] boom, the banger went off and E-Team entered and secured those guys. As they pushed them out of the room, I positively ID’d Osman Atto. We had studied the photos – we had Aideed and all of his lieutenants in photos. They’re [E-Team] moving them out of the room for C-Team to take possession of them and control them as prisoners. When I see Atto, I grabbed him and put his back up against the wall, made sure he’s got no weapons on him and I looked him in the eyes and I asked him “What’s your name?.” He didn’t respond and I said “What’s your fucking name?” and he said “Osman Atto” and I looked over at my team leader Matt Rierson and said “We have jackpot, this is Osman Atto.”
When he [Matt Rierson] called it in, you could sort of feel the excitement, like “we’d finally got one of these guys we were here to get, we were accomplishing the mission.” C-Team were then given the task of bringing him back immediately. So then of course we flex-tied him and then went straight to the roof, an MH-6 landed, we threw him in and we flew back to the airfield and brought Osman Atto in.
Paul Leonard added that the intelligence imagery didn’t exactly match the reality: “As C-Team pulled him to the roof up three flights of stairs with my rifle muzzle up his ass, trying to get him to move fast. The picture we had of Osman Atto made him look like a smaller guy. But in actuality he was over 6 foot tall and 200 plus pounds.”
Outside on the streets, the situation was heating up. Ranger Lieutenant James Lechner in Super 64 could see the Somalis starting to encircle the target. He recalled:
The Somalis … were probing the perimeter in small groups of two and three. Farther out, large mobs could be seen forming, summoned by the SNA’s crude but effective alarm system of burning tires in the streets around the target. Although I could see few weapons in the crowds, they were obviously agitated and converging cautiously on the target building.
Both the remaining sniper bird and the gunships were now firing in support of the assaulters as they extracted from the rooftop. I was convinced that if they had remained on the ground much longer they would have required our assistance to extract. As it was, a number of gunmen had been engaged as they probed the perimeter and at least 15 enemy casualties were inflicted by the assaulters and aircraft. 56
Post-operation analysis also confirmed that the Somalis had launched at least 15 RPG rockets at the helicopters during the operation.
Norm Hooten summed up the mission succinctly: “We shot the engine block and shot the driver. We attacked the convoy, engaged it, and they ran into a building. We landed the aircraft and went into the building and captured him.” Despite the increase in the ferocity of the Somali response, the Task Force were buoyed by their first big capture of one of Aideed’s key people. Days later, however, an incident that should have rung all kinds of alarm bells within Task Force Ranger occurred.
On September 25, a QRF Black Hawk, callsign Courage 53, was struck by an RPG whilst flying over the city. The helicopter was engulfed in flames and crash landed. It was only by great skill and bravery that the pilots managed to land the helicopter in one piece. The three crew chiefs in the rear were incinerated in the fire and both pilots were badly burnt. One fended off advancing Somalis with his 9mm Beretta service pistol whilst they awaited rescue. A friendly Somali civilian led them to a nearby United Arab Emirates United Nations patrol before Lieutenant Colonel Bill David’s Quick Reaction Company arrived several minutes later and conducted a near-perfect downed aircraft recovery operation, in an operation that would somewhat foreshadow the events of October 3.
Although the Black Hawk crew chiefs had perished in the fire, the n
ews passed around Task Force Ranger that their burnt bodies had been further mutilated in a similar fashion to the Pakistani peacekeepers back in June, although this seems to have been incorrect as the QRF recovered what little remains existed before withdrawing from the crash site. Super 65 Black Hawk pilot Chief Warrant Officer 3 (P) Gerry Izzo mentioned that in Somalia: “My greatest fear was being captured, being crippled, or being killed – in that order.”
Courage 53 had been flying very low at rooftop level on a moonless night, even though it was moving at an estimated 120 to 130 knots. The QRF had received intelligence that the SNA might be planning to shoot down a helicopter. It was implicitly recognized by Aideed that the helicopters were the Achilles heel of the Americans, as downing one would draw rescue forces who could then be ambushed. Gerry Izzo explained that the downing of the QRF helicopter “really was the silver bullet, a lucky shot. It was nighttime and I think one guy flung a rocket, an RPG, at him. The Somalis took a different attitude I’m sure: ‘Oh look we can really shoot down helicopters with these things.’”
Tommy Faust in the J-2 Cell later felt that the downing of the 10th Mountain Black Hawk was an omen Task Force Ranger failed to recognize and militate against. He asked a 160th SOAR pilot his opinion of their vulnerability. The response was that the Nightstalkers had discussed the downing in some detail and: “In their opinion, the shoot down was lucky, i.e., ‘big sky, little bullet.’” The unnamed pilot also felt that the 160th SOAR’s tactics and techniques would help guard against such an eventuality:
TFR aircraft … flew rapidly random and irregular flight profiles. He also said that 10th Division pilots were good, but they had less flight time and experience than TFR pilots did. The combination of experience and better tactics minimized the RPG threat to TFR aircraft.
Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On Page 8
